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dc.contributor.authorFaria, Paulo Francisco Estrellapt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-09T02:28:17Zpt_BR
dc.date.issued2009pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1807-3883pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10183/159426pt_BR
dc.description.abstractJudgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfpt_BR
dc.language.isoengpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofDoispontos : revista dos Departamentos de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Paraná e da Universidade Federal de São Carlos. Curitiba, PR. Vol. 6, n. 2 (out. 2009), p. 185-201pt_BR
dc.rightsOpen Accessen
dc.subjectInferência (Filosofia)pt_BR
dc.subjectInferenceen
dc.subjectPresuppositionen
dc.subjectPressuposição (Lógica)pt_BR
dc.subjectExternalismo (Filosofia da mente)pt_BR
dc.subjectContent externalismen
dc.subjectLogical lucken
dc.subjectExternalismo (Epistemologia)pt_BR
dc.subjectLógicapt_BR
dc.titleUnsafe reasoning : a surveypt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de periódicopt_BR
dc.identifier.nrb000783162pt_BR
dc.type.originNacionalpt_BR


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