Repositório Digital

A- A A+

Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game

.

Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game

Mostrar registro completo

Estatísticas

Título Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
Autor Silva, Roberto da
Kellermann, Gustavo Adolfo
Abstract This paper aims at showing how analytical techniques can be employed to explain the global emerged behavior of a heterogeneous population of ultimatum game players, over different strategies, by calculating their payoff moments. The ultimatum game is a game, in which two players are offered a gift to be shared. One of the players (the proposer) suggests how to divide the offer while the other player (the responder) can either agree or reject the deal. Computer simulations were performed considering the concept of turns (in every turn each participant plays necessarily only once, which is equivalent to performing matching a graph) in the game. We reproduce by simulations the expected analytical results at the limit of high number of turns. From these results, we are capable of establishing diagrams to say where each strategy is the best (optimal strategy).
Contido em Brazilian journal of physics. São Paulo. Vol. 37, no. 4 (Dec.2007), p. 1206-1211
Assunto Agentes inteligentes
Inteligência artificial
Jogos : Estrategia
[en] Evolutionary game theory
[en] Payoff moments
[en] Ultimatum game
Origem Nacional
Tipo Artigo de periódico
URI http://hdl.handle.net/10183/75801
Arquivos Descrição Formato
000657511.pdf (4.559Mb) Texto completo (inglês) Adobe PDF Visualizar/abrir

Este item está licenciado na Creative Commons License

Este item aparece na(s) seguinte(s) coleção(ões)


Mostrar registro completo

Percorrer



  • O autor é titular dos direitos autorais dos documentos disponíveis neste repositório e é vedada, nos termos da lei, a comercialização de qualquer espécie sem sua autorização prévia.
    Projeto gráfico elaborado pelo Caixola - Clube de Criação Fabico/UFRGS Powered by DSpace software, Version 1.8.1.