

O SELF SEMIÓTICO:
DESENVOLVIMENTO INTERPRETATIVO DA IDENTIDADE
COMO UM PROCESSO DRAMÁTICO

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RESUMO

Recorre-se à teoria semiótica de C. S. Peirce e ao psicodrama de J. L. Moreno para demonstrar a distinção conceptual entre *self* (processo reflexivo) e identidades (papéis internos). A tese divide-se em cinco estudos. O primeiro, sobre autoconsciência e mediação símica, conclui que a semiótica triádica permite estudar o desenvolvimento psicológico incluindo aspectos não verbais. O segundo, sobre o problema da unidade/diversidade identitária, conclui que o *self* é um processo semiótico triádico que integra identidades particulares como interpretantes. O terceiro aborda empiricamente a conversação ou drama interno recolhido por técnicas psicodramáticas usando as categorias fenomenológicas e conclui que a auto-contradição promove a reflexividade. O quarto trata da mudança e da permanência identitárias como efeito da causalidade final e explica a autonomia pelo diálogo interno com a alteridade. O quinto propõe o método psicodramático para estudar as identidades particulares experimentadas como personagens internos e o *self* como identidade supra-ordenada desenvolvimental interpretativa.

Palavras chaves: Semiótica, Psicodrama, Desenvolvimento, Self, Identidade

THE SEMIOTIC *SELF*: THE INTERPRETATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTITY
AS A DRAMATIC PROCESS

ABSTRACT

This work relies on C.S. Peirce's semiotic theory and J. L. Moreno's sociometry to demonstrate the conceptual distinction between self (reflexive process) and identities (internal roles). The thesis is divided in five studies. The first, on self-consciousness and sign mediation, concludes that triadic semiotic allows studying psychological development including non-verbal aspects. The second deals with the problem of unity/diversity in identity and concludes that the self is a triadic semiotic process which integrates particular identities as interpretants. The third is an empirical approach to conversation or internal drama observed through psychodramatic techniques. It uses the phenomenological categories and concludes that self-contradiction promotes reflexivity. The fourth deals with identity change and permanence as an effect of final causation; it accounts for autonomy as the internal dialogue with alterity. The fifth posits the psychodramatic method to study particular identities experienced as internal characters and the self as an overarching evolving interpretive identity.

Keywords: Semiotic, Psychodrama, Development, Self, Identity

APRESENTAÇÃO

Nas últimas décadas, o conceito de *self*¹ vem sendo abordado em duas perspectivas diferentes e opostas. Na área da psicologia, os princípios filosóficos que estão na base da distinção entre as correntes clássicas de pensamento – conhecidas como modernismo e pós-modernismo – operam ainda hoje como divisores de águas segundo os quais se agrupam as principais teorias psicológicas. Longe de ser de interesse exclusivo da filosofia, o dualismo mente-matéria, na época contemporânea, passou a ser um problema que atinge os próprios fundamentos das teorias psicológicas. Praetorius (2003) distingue duas grandes linhas teóricas dominantes na psicologia: de um lado o construtivismo e o construcionismo social, e de outro, o naturalismo que está associado a teorias cognitivistas, tais como a neurociência cognitiva. A tese de Praetorius é que a divisão entre correntes teóricas contrapostas dentro do campo da psicologia constitui uma reedição da oposição filosófica clássica entre idealismo e materialismo, respectivamente. Embora o objetivo das teorias filosóficas contemporâneas tenha sido fugir do dualismo tradicional, as tentativas só têm conseguido, conforme a autora, hierarquizar um dos termos da oposição mente/matéria em detrimento do outro. Assim, o dualismo continua vigente em teorias inconciliáveis que terminam por reproduzir, em vez de resolver, o problema que elas abordam. Segundo Praetorius (2003), a brecha entre os domínios da mente e da matéria, herdada pelas teorias psicológicas, origina-se na concepção dos princípios de determinação de que ambos os domínios são independentes um do outro. Uma alternativa ao dualismo só poderia ser proposta uma vez refutada a hipótese de que um domínio prescinde ao outro.

Maze (2001) assinalou, criticamente, a influência do idealismo nas teorias psicológicas que adotam os pressupostos meta-teóricos do construtivismo social. Tais pressupostos baseiam-se nas correntes filosóficas do estruturalismo e do pós-estruturalismo. A manifestação de sentidos ou os atos interpretativos são definidos como produtos de uma convenção que depende da relação arbitrária entre os elementos constitutivos de uma estrutura global – o código da língua. A crítica de Maze centra-se principalmente na influência do pensamento de Derrida (1930-2004) autor que enfatizou a arbitrariedade do significado trazendo conseqüências negativas para a psicologia,

¹ Adota-se neste resumo em língua portuguesa a opção de DeSouza (2005) de seguir nota dos tradutores de *O mistério da consciência* (Damásio, 2000) e *O self semiótico* (Wiley, 1996), e manter a palavra *self* conforme grafia original em inglês, uma vez que se trata de um termo sem correspondente exato em português.

especificamente para a estabilidade da referência e para o conceito de verdade. Essas teorias acabam por definir o *self* como sendo meramente o efeito das formas da linguagem verbal e das convenções sociais e não explicam a estabilidade do *self* ao longo do tempo.

Uma conseqüência da radicalização das posturas construtivistas e naturalistas acima mencionadas é o esvaziamento da noção de *self*, enquanto uma categoria humana universal. A noção de *self* perde o seu significado específico, ora reduzido a convenções sociais e, portanto, reconhecido como reducionismo ascendente; ora reduzido ao funcionamento fisiológico do corpo e identificado como reducionismo descendente. Para Wiley (1996)², tais posições reforçam o velho problema do dualismo corpo-mente. Assim, ele recomenda que se retorne à filosofia para buscar pressupostos não dualistas que sirvam de base para a tarefa de construção teórica na psicologia. Procura, assim, evitar uma transposição da antiga oposição entre materialismo e idealismo para as teorias modernas a fim de viabilizar o estabelecimento de um sustento teórico epistemológico sólido que explique o *self*, um dos conceitos fundamentais da psicologia.

Uma das possíveis vias para forjar um caminho que leve a um conceito genérico de *self*, como categoria humana universal, encontra-se na corrente filosófica conhecida como pragmatismo norte-americano, que foi fundada por Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) (Colapietro, 1990a; Pape, 1997; Ransdell, 1992; Santaella, 2002; Schrag, 1997; Wiley, 1996). O pragmatismo é uma teoria do conhecimento e da significação que pode ser classificada como um tipo de realismo discursivo (Liszka, 1998). Para tanto, o pragmatismo baseia-se em uma postura filosófica que integra o realismo com o idealismo (Ibri, 2000), em vez de colocá-los em oposição de forma antitética. Trata-se de um marco epistemológico capaz de fornecer uma resposta adequada ao problema que o estudo psicológico do *self* herdou do antigo Cogito Cartesiano.

O presente projeto é uma investigação eidética e empírica sobre a natureza, a estrutura e o conteúdo da experiência de autoconsciência, focalizando especificamente, as relações entre *self* e identidade. Neste sentido, o *self* é concebido como uma capacidade reflexiva de natureza semiótica, uma forma de *semiose*. Essa capacidade foi descrita por Wiley (1996):

² Optou-se neste resumo por referir-se à versão traduzida (*O self semiótico*, 1996) do texto original *The semiotic self* (1994), enquanto na seção do projeto em inglês as referências são ao texto original. Em certos casos, alguns termos utilizados na versão portuguesa (1996) tiveram de ser modificados para corrigir erros na tradução de termos técnicos. Essas divergências são assinaladas numa nota de rodapé.

O *self* reflexivo, o *self* semiótico, ou simplesmente o *self* [denota] uma natureza humana universal, caracterizando todos os seres humanos da mesma maneira genérica em qualquer época e lugar. (Wiley, 1996, p. 17).

O termo identidade tem um significado mais específico vinculado ao entorno social e familiar. Neste sentido, as identidades são múltiplas e se referem a traços distintivos sociais, e a traços psicológicos personalizados. Assim, explica o autor:

As identidades particularizam e nos possibilitam reconhecer indivíduos, categorias, grupos e tipos individuais. Podem ser impostas do exterior, por meio de processos sociais, ou do interior, caso do qual são usualmente denominadas de autoconceitos [*self-concepts*]. (Wiley, 1996, p.17)

Portanto, neste estudo, o *self* é concebido como um fluxo de significação crescente e contínuo. A unidade do *self* é o resultado da consistência lógica (CP 7.593) de um processo semiótico ao longo do tempo. Por outro lado, as identidades são múltiplas, particulares e circunstanciais. Por isso, o interesse mais específico em explorar o desenvolvimento do *self*, como um processo semiótico que se desenvolve ao longo de toda a vida, com atenção as relações entre o *self* e as identidades estabelecidas neste processo.

A presente Tese está dividida em três partes. Na primeira dedica-se ao exame dos conceitos teóricos que sustentam a abordagem semiótica do *self*: semiótica triádica de Peirce, *self* semiótico, papéis sociais, psicodrama, teleologia, conversação interna, e a diferença entre *self* e identidade. Na segunda, relata os cinco estudos que compõem a presente pesquisa, sendo dois eidéticos, utilizando para tanto uma nomenclatura husserliana, e três empíricos. Husserl (1913/1962) denominou de eidética “aquilo que concerne às essências das coisas e não à sua presença” (Lalande, 1990/1996, p. 292), em distinção às coisas empíricas ou factuais. Todos os estudos foram escritos em inglês tendo em vista o debate internacional tão incentivado presentemente pelas agências de fomento (CAPES e CNPq). Os estudos eidéticos foram os seguintes: 1. *The psychological approach to the self and the conception of sign mediation* (A abordagem psicológica do *self* e a concepção da mediação do signo), e 2. *A semiotic reflection on self-interpretation and identity* (Reflexão semiótica sobre auto-interpretação e identidade). Os estudos empíricos foram intitulados de: 3. *Internal dialogue and self-contradiction: The relevance of Secondness to the psychological study of the self* (Diálogo interno e auto-contradição: A relevância da Secundidade para o estudo psicológico do *self*), 4. *Change and Permanence in human identity: The self as a*

teleological sign (Mudança e permanência em identidade humana: O self enquanto um signo teleológico); e 5. *The self in expression, perception and action: Psychodramatic method for empirical study of the self* (O self na expressão, percepção e ação: Método psicodramático no estudo empírico do self). Na terceira parte retorna ao vernáculo nacional para uma retrospectiva geral do trabalho e a discussão dos principais resultados.

INTRODUÇÃO

O objetivo teórico da semiótica pragmática é caracterizar o *self* como uma capacidade universal e genérica da condição humana: uma unidade evolutiva capaz de integrar as múltiplas identidades particulares. Desta forma, a noção de *self* é mais abrangente do que a noção de identidade. Por sua vez, a noção de identidade explica os traços sociais e os traços psicológicos personalizados (Wiley, 1994 p. 36). O objetivo deste capítulo é descrever brevemente a teoria semiótica pragmática de Peirce, e as ampliações recentes desta teoria, representadas por autores contemporâneos, oriundos das áreas da sociologia e da comunicação. O capítulo aborda os seguintes temas: processo semiótico ou *semiose* na obra de C. S. Peirce; papel da mente nas relações triádicas; sobre o conceito clássico de *telos*; a teleologia segundo C. S. Peirce; o conceito de verdade e suas conseqüências para o estudo do *self*; o *self* como resultado de um processo inferencial; o *self* como signo em processo de desenvolvimento em V. Colapietro; o *self* semiótico e a conversação interna em N. Wiley; *self* e identidade em A. Giddens e em N. Wiley; *self*, identidade e papéis em G. Mead e em J. L. Moreno; o processo contínuo do *self*: regularidade ou espontaneidade?; a teleologia e o *self* semiótico; e abordagens empíricas para o estudo do *self* semiótico. O capítulo conclui definindo o problema e os objetivos da pesquisa.

Semiótica Pragmática e os Conceitos de Self e Identidade

Processo semiótico ou *semiose* na obra de C. S. Peirce.

A presente pesquisa apóia-se na visão filosófica do pragmatismo norte-americano, em particular, na semiótica pragmática. A semiótica de Peirce não pode ser confundida com a semiologia de Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). Ela é uma teoria geral das representações que leva em conta os signos da natureza sob todas as formas e manifestações que assumem (lingüísticas ou não). Em contraste, a semiologia³ de Saussure é definida como uma ciência geral dos sistemas de signos (incluindo ritos e costumes), caracterizando-se como um estudo lingüístico de todos os sistemas de comunicação vigentes na sociedade.

O pragmatismo semiótico de Peirce trabalha com um modelo triádico – signo, objeto, interpretante – ao contrário da semiologia de Saussure que trabalha com um

³ Para distinguir ambos modelos teóricos os termos semiótica e semiologia serão utilizados para referir à teoria de Peirce e à de Saussure respectivamente.

modelo diádico – significante e significado. O signo (primeiro elemento) faz a mediação entre seu objeto ou referência (segundo elemento) e entre um seu interpretante ou significado (terceiro elemento). Castañares (2000) afirma que o fato de o modelo ser triádico permite abordar o problema da verdade dos conhecimentos. O conceito de verdade depende de uma realidade independente dos seres humanos e, ao mesmo tempo, das representações mentais às quais essa realidade pode dar lugar. Uma das contribuições do modelo triádico para o estudo do *self*, como será mostrado no decorrer deste trabalho, é que o signo, além de servir como elemento de representação, faz a mediação entre o objeto e o interpretante, sendo este o meio pelo qual o significado se manifesta.

A realidade externa é concebida no pragmatismo peirceano como um fenômeno que exerce sua influência, sua força própria, apresentando-se para a representação. A pragmática assume duas posturas tradicionalmente consideradas como antagônicas e irreconciliáveis, o presentacionismo e o representacionismo. Assim, argumenta Peirce,⁴

O presentacionista afirma que a percepção é uma consciência de dupla face na qual o percepto aparece agindo forçosamente sobre nós, de modo que na percepção a consciência de um objeto ativo e de um sujeito reativo é tão indivisível quanto o senso de exercício é correlato e inseparável do senso de resistência, quando se faz um esforço muscular. (CP 5.607)⁵

No representacionismo a realidade não é passível de ser percebida como tal. Para Peirce o representacionismo é contrário e incompatível ao presentacionismo. A semiótica pragmática rejeita essa oposição radical na procura de uma integração de ambas as posições teóricas, como pode ser constatado na continuação da citação:

O representacionista não admitiria a existência de qualquer consciência bilateral, nem sequer no segundo sentido, relacionada à bilateralidade como uma quase-inferência ou como um produto da ação da mente; enquanto o presentacionista insiste em que não tem nada de intelectual ou de inteligível nesta dualidade. Trata-se, diz ele, de um fato duro experimentado, mas nunca entendido. (...) Esses são, contudo, meramente pontos de vista diferentes através dos quais

⁴ Segue-se, neste estudo, a convenção de citar a Peirce através da grafia “CP [x.xxx]”, referente a volume e parágrafo em *The Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce* (1936-58). Todas as traduções me pertencem, M.M.

⁵ “[T]he presentationist holds that perception is a two-sided consciousness in which the percept appears as forcibly acting upon us, so that in perception the consciousness of an active object and of a subject acted on are as indivisible as, in making a muscular effort, the sense of exertion is one with and inseparable from the sense of resistance” (CP 5.607)

nenhum dos dois [o representacionista e o presentacionista] deveria considerar nada como absolutamente contrário a sua própria doutrina. (CP 5. 607)⁶

Peirce (CP 7.276) descreveu três modalidades de consciência: a consciência imediata do sentimento (*feeling*), considerado na sua condição de qualidade pura ou absoluta sem ser atribuído a nenhum sujeito; a consciência da relação dual através da sensação de ação e reação, de esforço e resistência; e a consciência sintética da mediação, que caracteriza pensamento e aprendizagem. Em termos psicológicos, as três modalidades correspondem a sentimento, volição e cognição, respectivamente. Em um dos seus textos epistemológicos da maturidade, no fim do século XIX, dedicado a questionar alguns conceitos dominantes do pensamento científico de seu tempo, Peirce (CP 7.276) criticou o fato de que a psicologia tradicional tinha se dedicado de modo exclusivo ao estudo da cognição – a consciência sintética, mas tinha negligenciado as outras duas modalidades. Uma vez que a cognição pressupõe a volição e o sentimento em sua forma absoluta, o estudo da função cognitiva requer também uma abordagem analítica das outras duas modalidades de consciência.

O modo como a consciência é afetada por um impacto externo, segunda modalidade, não foi, segundo Peirce (CP 8.41),⁷ adequadamente considerado por Hegel. Lembre-se, contudo, que a teoria semiótica triádica foi muito influenciada pelo pensamento hegeliano. A força exercida por um objeto sobre um sujeito que recebe seu impacto entra em [*enters into*] toda cognição, para usar os termos de Peirce (CP 8.41), e serve para que ela consiga significar algo real. Assim, um percepto ao agir sobre a consciência, deve ser experimentado como um fator externo (CP 5.462). Caso contrário, não seria possível distinguir entre um percepto e uma alucinação (CP 2.142). O percepto, por sua resistência, manifesta-se como algo que não é criado pela mente (CP 2.198). Algumas pessoas costumam se beliscar para conferir o caráter existencial do *self* por sua resistência física, para distinguir algo realmente percebido de uma imagem onírica.

Do ponto de vista presentacionista, aquele que percebe é compelido a perceber o

⁶ “The representationist would not allow that there is any bilateral consciousness even in the latter sense, regarding the bilaterality as a quasi-inference, or product of the mind’s action; while the presentationist insists that there is nothing intellectual or intelligible in this duality. It is, he says, a hard fact experienced but never understood. (...) These are, however, merely different points of view in which neither ought to find anything absolutely contrary to his own doctrine”.(CP 5.607)

⁷ “The capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it is that he almost altogether ignores the Outward Clash. Besides the lower consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness of nutrition, this direct consciousness of hitting and of getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean something real.” Peirce (CP 8.41)

que ela ou ele percebe (CP 4.541). O princípio presentacionista diz respeito à força que o percepto exerce sobre a consciência. Porém, essa força não constitui a totalidade da experiência perceptiva, já que ela se completa com a compreensão do percepto como instância de uma regularidade. Desta forma, compreende-se o objeto em tentativas, de modo parcial e progressivo. A distinção entre impacto externo, qualidade absoluta e compreensão é uma consequência direta do esforço analítico de um fenômeno complexo.

O princípio representacionista enfatiza o processo lógico mediante o qual o percepto se torna conhecido (CP 5.607). Na conjugação de ambos os princípios, reside a possibilidade de saber progressivamente sobre o objeto externo à representação. Para entender cabalmente tal integração, é necessário introduzir o conceito de “determinação mediada” (Santaella, 1999, p. 515), que explica que o signo está determinado pelo objeto embora este último seja logicamente acessível somente através da mediação de um signo. Segundo Santaella (2003, p. 46), a mediação do signo triádico não resulta numa crise da representação, porque o interpretante sempre resulta da ação lógica com o objeto mediada pelo signo.

Afirmar que o percepto força sua presença sobre a consciência parece, à primeira vista, falar de uma atitude passiva do sujeito. Existe, com efeito, uma instância de recepção do impacto de algo que não pode não ser percebido. Sob esse ângulo específico o sujeito é impotente perante a força avassaladora do percepto (CP 1.334). Contudo, essa recepção é apenas um aspecto do processo mais complexo de percepção inteligível, que acontece conjuntamente com a compreensão que, embora parcial e falível, é sempre ativa.

A ênfase colocada no aspecto ativo da realidade externa, enquanto ela produz um efeito de determinação na significação, não pretende negar a atividade do sujeito nos processos interpretativos. O propósito é contrabalançar o subjetivismo radical observado em muitas teorias pós-modernistas, reduzindo a interpretação à subjetividade. Tal posição subestima o papel da alteridade na constituição do *self*, dificultando a compreensão da identidade como um processo dialógico externo e interno.

Uma das principais diferenças entre a teoria semiótica pragmática e as teorias estruturalistas originadas na Europa é que os signos não se encontram no lugar da realidade, mas eles são uma forma parcial e imprescindível de acesso a ela. Outra diferença é que o conceito de signo não se reduz aos signos usados na linguagem verbal, seja oral ou escrita. Sem nunca afirmar que tudo o que há no mundo é somente

semiótico ou feito de signos, nem que o universo só deveria ser considerado como signo, a semiótica pragmática propõe que qualquer coisa no mundo pode ser (e de fato é) considerada enquanto signo, se existir algum interesse em analisá-la. Na semiótica triádica o conceito de signo é inseparável do conceito de processo de *semiose*.

O termo *semiose* indica que o assunto estudado pela teoria não é meramente o signo, nem sequer o conjunto deles, mas o processo de sentido, a ação dos signos na produção de interpretantes. A semiótica considera a capacidade de ação dos signos para gerar outros signos e são eles, os signos mais desenvolvidos ou complexos, aqueles que fornecem o significado (do objeto semiótico). O pensamento é concebido como um processo semiótico que evolui e se desenvolve como resultado da relação de representação triádica entre os elementos lógicos que definem a mediação sígnica, a saber, o signo (chamado também *representamen* ou *medium*), o objeto e o interpretante:

Um *representamen* é o sujeito de uma relação triádica *com* um segundo, chamado seu *objeto*, *para* um terceiro, chamado seu *interpretante*, essa relação triádica é tal que o *representamen* determina seu interpretante para manter a mesma relação triádica com o mesmo objeto para algum interpretante (CP 1.541, grifos do autor) ⁸

A semiótica baseia-se em uma faneroscopia, isto é, em uma forma de fenomenologia que foi assim denominada para marcar a diferença com a fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel. Para Peirce, o conhecimento de todo fenômeno, tanto natural quanto cultural, envolve analiticamente três categorias da experiência, chamadas de Primeiridade, Secundidade e Terceiridade. O termo Terceiridade pressupõe os outros dois por referir-se à cognição, o aspecto lógico do conhecimento. Os outros dois termos só podem ser considerados se assumirmos uma postura analítica diante da nossa própria experiência. A Primeiridade e a Secundidade só podem ser pensadas na Terceiridade, o que implica a lógica e a mediação dos signos. Desde modo, a semiótica de Peirce opera com uma estrutura triádica do signo, constituída por um signo, um objeto, e um interpretante.

Os três componentes do signo foram definidos por Peirce, conforme tradução de Santaella (1992), do seguinte modo:

Um signo intenta representar, em parte pelo menos, um objeto que é portanto,

⁸ “A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant”. (CP 1.541)

num certo sentido, a causa ou determinante do signo, mesmo se o signo representar seu objeto falsamente. Mas dizer que ele representa seu objeto implica que ele afete uma mente, de tal modo que, de certa maneira, determine naquela mente algo que é mediadamente devido ao objeto. Essa determinação da qual a causa imediata é o signo, e da qual a causa mediata è o objeto, pode ser chamada o interpretante. (CP 6.347; tradução Santaella, 1992, p. 189)

Dois elementos relevantes são destacados por Santaella (1992) para esclarecer a definição: “Um signo é um signo porque representa algo que não é ele, que é diferente dele” (p. 189). Por sua vez, “O interpretante terá com o signo uma relação similar à que ele, signo, tem com o objeto dinâmico. Isto porque o interpretante só pode se relacionar com o objeto pela mediação do signo. Por isso, pode se dizer que o signo é um modo de manifestação do objeto” (p.190). O termo objeto semiótico refere à distinção de dois tipos de objetos: o dinâmico e o objeto imediato. Conforme Andacht (1992), o objeto dinâmico é aquele que determina o signo de modo físico, pela chamada causa eficiente, dando desse modo início ao processo da *semiose*. Ele é externo ao signo, isto é, independente dele, mas funciona como sua fronteira natural, exercendo no signo uma força que provém do real. Trata-se daquilo que existe além de toda opinião ou de qualquer concepção que as pessoas possam ter no que tange àquele objeto.

O objeto imediato, por sua vez, é o mundo tal como ele aparece representado no signo, ele é interno ao signo, um aspecto do objeto dinâmico que é selecionado para uma representação. Segundo Santaella (1992), o objeto dinâmico é externo ao signo, mas interno ao processo de *semiose*.

O signo apenas representa o objeto de certo modo e numa certa capacidade, para desse modo gerar numa mente um signo mais desenvolvido chamado interpretante. A noção de interpretante se refere ao efeito de sentido produzido pelo próprio signo na mente do intérprete. O termo interpretante tem um sentido específico e não deve ser confundido com o intérprete. Também o termo não significa exatamente interpretação, já que, segundo Santaella, este último termo alude ao processo todo de geração dos interpretantes enquanto que o sentido do termo interpretante pode ser explicado como o conteúdo do ato interpretativo (Ransdell, 1991, Santaella, 1992).

A categoria da Primeiridade corresponde, na estrutura do signo triádico, às qualidades absolutas do sentimento (*feeling*), além de sua concreção material. Uma consideração que é somente analítica, porque as qualidades não podem se manifestar, senão através de alguma forma de existência. A categoria da Secundidade corresponde

ao Objeto, à condição existencial do signo. Por último, a categoria da Terceiridade refere-se ao efeito de sentido, seu significado, o Interpretante do signo triádico.

A distinção entre objeto e interpretante permite entender que o significado encontra-se nos efeitos de sentido gerados pelo signo. Desta forma, pode-se compreender como o *self* se desenvolve ao longo do tempo pela geração de interpretantes, sem perder a referência objetiva do universo existencial, nem a capacidade imaginativa. A justificativa está na correspondência entre os três componentes do signo e as três categorias fenomenológicas que caracterizam toda experiência: Primeiridade, Secundidade e Terceiridade.

Na categoria da Primeiridade está o signo, referindo-se às múltiplas possibilidades das qualidades, enquanto consideradas de forma vaga, sem relação a nada no mundo. Essa categoria manifesta a fugacidade do momento presente em que algo se nos apresenta como um sentimento de pura qualidade, e quando apenas tentamos pensar em uma qualidade, ela já aparece incorporada a algo, seja um objeto materialmente existente, imaginado ou pensado (Santaella, 1983).

Na categoria da Secundidade se encontra o objeto semiótico que corresponde ao aspecto existencial do signo, isto é, enquanto algo que existe no mundo além da vontade de quem tem uma experiência. O objeto semiótico não é necessariamente aquilo que existe materialmente no mundo. Sua existência se manifesta no limite que impõe sua força, por ser algo não criado pela mente, por manifestar uma “auto-vontade” (*self-willedness*, CP 7.488). Trata-se de “relações, isto é, *atos* de Secundidade, tal como a percussão resultante da batida da pedra no chão, quando o esforço da pedra contra a resistência do solo resulta em polaridade bruta” (Santaella, 1999) Portanto, esta categoria implica a interação diádica de um ego frente a um não-ego (CP 1.325) considerada somente em seu aspecto reativo, sem considerar o pensamento.

O objeto semiótico determina, restringe o universo possível em relação ao signo que pode representá-lo e ao tipo de interpretante que é gerado a partir dele. O signo gera um interpretante que mantém com o objeto a mesma relação que o signo mantém com o objeto. O tipo de relação que um signo estabelece com seu objeto semiótico é influenciado pelo efeito de sentido ou interpretante que pode produzir – relaciona-se com uma regularidade a qual os eventos futuros terão uma tendência de se conformar. Por sua vez, o signo refere-se ao objeto de modo parcial, em algum respeito ou aspecto para gerar um interpretante. Desta forma, o signo triádico não é nem um objeto e nem uma palavra que designa um objeto, mas uma relação lógica através da qual

conhecemos a realidade, tanto material quanto imaginativa ou conceitual.

Na categoria da Terceiridade, a compreensão, o pensamento, a cognição supõem regularidades do universo, uma legalidade a qual os fatos tendem a conformar. O entendimento é produto da relação entre as três modalidades da experiência. Trata-se de uma relação lógica entre três elementos fenomenológicos. Uma relação lógica difere de uma relação mecânica, na qual um elemento exerce uma força bruta sobre outro, que por sua vez pode ser transmitida a outro elemento numa série de determinações causais diádicas. As relações no universo lógico são o produto de uma “influência tri-relativa” (CP 5.484)

A descrição das categorias peircianas, apresentadas acima, foi breve e sucinta. Uma descrição exaustiva exigiria a distinção de três perspectivas nas quais as categorias podem ser estudadas: o ponto de vista da qualidade, do objeto e da mente. Para resumir essa breve apresentação das categorias fenomenológicas, podemos dizer, conforme Santaella⁹, que as categorias universais são noções gerais que indicam um perfil lógico dentro do qual algumas classes de idéias se incluem:

Desse modo, a categoria da Primeiridade inclui as idéias de acaso, originalidade, espontaneidade, possibilidade, incerteza, imediaticidade, presentidade, qualidade e sentimento. Na Secundidade, encontramos idéias relacionadas com polaridade, tais como força bruta, ação e reação, esforço e resistência, dependência, conflito, surpresa. Terceiridade está ligada às idéias de generalidade, continuidade, lei, crescimento, evolução, representação e mediação. (Santaella, 1999, p.95)

A mediação genuína do signo se dá por intervenção da Terceiridade, que é o âmbito do entendimento das relações, da regularidade e, em definitiva, da legalidade concebida como fenômeno natural, além de cultural. Na estrutura triádica, o funcionamento da mente corresponde à categoria da Terceiridade. Ransdell (1977, 1992) destaca a autonomia dos processos interpretativos, consequência do fato de a geração de sentido depender da capacidade dos signos de gerar interpretantes de si mesmos. Os sentidos são atualizados em signos mais desenvolvidos, determinando, assim, o processo chamado *semiose* que é um processo auto-governado. A *semiose* revela a realidade de modo parcial, progressivo e falível. Tal processo é uma tendência cuja causa final é a busca da verdade. Para a semiótica, atingir a verdade é algo

⁹ Para uma descrição detalhada das três categorias fenomenológicas de Peirce, ver Santaella; 1992, 1999.

possível, pois os signos não impedem o acesso à realidade, sendo, pelo contrário, a única forma de acesso a ela. Portanto, o acesso da mente humana ao corpo, ao mundo e a si mesma se dá por meio dos signos.

A respeito dos processos semióticos, é importante salientar que todo fenômeno possui a capacidade de gerar uma interpretação, cujo conteúdo depende, basicamente, da ação do próprio signo (Ransdell, 1992), e não de uma atribuição de sentido feita por alguém. Ninguém, nem o indivíduo, nem a sociedade, tem a capacidade de dar uma significação às coisas e aos acontecimentos. A capacidade semiótica é intrínseca aos signos. Por sua vez, a competência semiótica humana está na observação dos signos, e nas inúmeras combinações decorrentes de suas propriedades que o ser humano pode realizar.

Todo signo é capaz de gerar um outro signo mais desenvolvido e mais complexo do que ele mesmo. O componente que define alguma coisa como sendo um signo é o interpretante, mesmo tratando-se de algo existente, possível, ou geral. Além disso, cada signo pode ser concebido como se fosse uma interpretação de outro signo anterior, na cadeia da *semiose*. Os signos têm uma natureza processual e eles evoluem ao longo do tempo, crescendo em complexidade a cada instante. Assim, é mais correto afirmar que a ciência desenvolvida por Peirce dedica-se ao estudo dos processos de significação, da ação dos signos ou *semiose*, do que afirmar que ela se dedica ao estudo dos signos (Short, 1981a).

A *semiose*, portanto, refere à ação do signo ao determinar um interpretante. Conforme Santaella (1992), em cada momento do processo, “apenas uma fase relativamente completa” (p. 50) pode ser atingida. A autora explica que, por um lado, todo signo tem um aspecto de generalidade que deixa para o intérprete a possibilidade de completar a determinação, no sentido de decidir sobre a aplicabilidade do signo. Por outro lado, “todo signo é objetivamente vago na medida em que, deixando sua interpretação mais ou menos indeterminada, ele reserva para algum outro signo ou experiência possível (interpretante) a função de completar a determinação” (p. 50). É nesta lógica que, segundo a autora, é possível basear a inserção da teoria semiótica no “Paradigma Evolucionista Contemporâneo” (Santaella, 1992, p. 51; 2002, p. 104-105).

Na semiótica de Peirce, os signos não se restringem aos signos da linguagem verbal. Eles abrangem qualidades, fatos, e conceitos. Assim, classificam-se em ícone, índice e símbolo, em três dimensões: qualitativa, existencial, e conceptual. Isso faz com que, aplicando o modelo triádico, o *self* possa ser estudado de um modo mais abarcador

do que o restringido à linguagem verbal.

Para dar prosseguimento ao exame da constituição do self em uma abordagem semiótica é preciso distinguir que “o ícone é o tipo de representação de uma qualidade exclusivamente, uma forma de representação por similitude” (CP 2.276). Peirce explica que uma palavra é um signo que tem a natureza de ser um símbolo, contudo as palavras são inseparáveis no momento da compreensão de alguma imagem que venha a produzir numa mente. Essa imagem também é um signo, trata-se de um ícone, definido como uma semelhança que é também um signo da qualidade real de alguma coisa.

O índice é um signo que “designa, aponta, indica um objeto dinâmico que tem a natureza de um concretivo que, de fato, como o próprio nome diz, tem uma existência concreta” (Santaella, 1992, p. 194). Peirce define o índice como “um fato que é um signo de seu objeto em virtude de estar conectado com ele de fato e também por invadir com ele a mente sem levar em conta em absoluto que ele seja interpretado como um signo” (CP 4.447).

O símbolo representa o fenômeno de modo inteligível, isto é, enquanto sujeito a uma lei, à representação de um fenômeno através de um signo geral (CP 8.268). Todos os signos combinam as três modalidades de representação. Sendo assim, o símbolo prevalece na Terceiridade, o índice na Secundidade e o ícone na Primeiridade.

Um dos intuitos fundamentais da teoria semiótica triádica é conseguir explicar os signos como parte de um processo de sentido crescente, sem que isso implique em um distanciamento da realidade e dos fatos.

Se entendermos o *self* como um signo, podemos entender de que modo ele possui intrinsecamente o poder de gerar interpretantes de si mesmo. Com efeito, os signos crescem de modo progressivo no encontro entre o sujeito e a realidade externa. Assim, pode-se estudar o desenvolvimento da identidade como um processo semiótico auto-governado, sem abrir mão dos limites que a objetividade impõe ao sujeito. A semiótica pragmática concebe toda interpretação como um processo. Os signos triádicos não são entidades isoladas e inertes, mas fazem parte de processos interpretativos orientados a atingir o conhecimento do mundo, e também o autoconhecimento de um modo parcial, falível e gradual.

No estudo do *self*, essa concepção pode se aplicar à natureza evolutiva da interpretação da identidade ao longo do desenvolvimento humano. A abordagem semiótica de Peirce concebe a realidade como algo que possui um dinamismo próprio. As regularidades, as mudanças e as relações entre objetos são concebidas como fazendo

parte da realidade, e não como colocadas nela pela concepção dos seres humanos. O universo, além de ser um conjunto de objetos físicos e de processos mecânicos que possuem qualidades de substância e forma, é também um universo que manifesta uma vitalidade própria. Ele se transforma e evolui de um modo autônomo, não sendo determinado extrinsecamente pelo intelecto humano. Essa concepção da realidade leva a pensar que tudo o que aparece no universo não pode ser compreendido senão em seu existir temporal e relacional. Assim, tudo o que percebemos é uma forma de acesso ao universo que, por sua complexidade, não se mostra como um todo em um instante. Nosso modo de acesso ao universo é parcial e imperfeito, uma vez que ele é a um tempo, direto (percepção) e mediado por signos no entendimento, que é lógico (ver Ransdell, 1977).

Por isso, tudo o que há no universo pode ser considerado como um signo (sem nunca ser exclusivamente um signo). Se nossa observação só considerasse como signo aquilo que se manifesta de forma evidente como tal, por exemplo, os signos da linguagem, a análise poderia ficar empobrecida, conforme Santaella, (1992) porque esse olhar restrito poderia impedir que percebêssemos outros tipos de processos de significação ou *semioses* que também fazem parte da natureza. A redução do universo da significação aos puros signos verbais “nos cega para a leitura de *semioses* que pulsam e palpitam na floresta de signos que chamamos de realidade” (Santaella, 1992, p. 200). Não é, portanto, um exagero assinalar que vivemos imersos num universo de signos vivos, que reclamam permanentemente atenção e interpretação, às vezes contrariamente à vontade ou de forma independente da consciência do interprete.

Isso não significa dizer que a semiótica tem a capacidade de fornecer a compreensão da totalidade do que existe no mundo, mas sim que qualquer coisa que há no mundo, mesmo como possibilidade, pode ser estudada do ponto de vista semiótico, assim como também de outros pontos de vista complementares, por exemplo, o físico, o biológico, o estatístico, o psicológico, o social, etc.

Papel da mente nas relações triádicas.

Para abordar a concepção Peirceana de mente é necessário abrir mão da noção de mente localizada no interior do corpo humano, outrossim do pensamento como conjunto de idéias abstratas sem nenhum contato com o âmbito da matéria. O paradigma antidualista rejeita as posturas teóricas associadas ao chamado “dogma do Fantasma dentro da Máquina” (Ryle, 1949, quoted by Pinker, 2002, p. 9).

Num artigo dedicado a explorar os significados pragmáticos da mente, Santaella (2002) explica que para evitar a postura dualista, Peirce rejeitou a hipótese da existência de duas substâncias diferentes no universo, uma apta para caracterizar a matéria, e outra para explicar a mente. No seu lugar, ele adotou uma metafísica monista e desenvolveu a teoria do sinequismo ou continuidade lógica do universo. Segundo essa doutrina, o universo inteiro pode ser explicado recorrendo apenas a uma espécie de substância universal governada pela lei que chamou de “lei da ação mental” (CP 6.21; CP 6.24). Trata-se de um tipo de “idealismo objetivo [para o qual] toda realidade, em uma série infinita de diferenciações, é governada pela lei da mente, quer dizer, a lei para adquirir hábitos” (Santaella, 2002, p.103). Concebe-se, assim, que entre o pensamento e o mundo objetivo não existe uma diferença qualitativa, senão uma diferença de funcionamento.

O universo está regido por leis, que não têm um funcionamento perfeito. Dentro deste universo regido pela legalidade e pelo acaso, a matéria tende a seguir a regularidade das leis, enquanto que a mente exibe um maior grau de comportamento espontâneo (para uma discussão detalhada do tema, ver Santaella, 1999b, p. 511; 2004a, pp. 101-130). O funcionamento imperfeito da lei de ação mental é responsável pelas incertezas na predição de fenômenos. É essa imperfeição que abre o espaço para a flexibilidade nos sistemas orientados por tendências finais, isto é, nos sistemas ou processos télicos (Alexander, 2002). Segundo Peirce (CP 1.390; 1.383), se imaginarmos que na origem das espécies, a tendência a adquirir hábitos tivesse sido substituída por um mecanismo perfeito por meio do qual toda célula funcionasse sempre de um modo exatamente igual, então qualquer possibilidade de evolução teria sido impossível. A lei da mente estabelece probabilidades e deixa aberto o espaço para a espontaneidade sem a qual a vida, a evolução e a criatividade não seriam possíveis. A matéria física não é outra coisa que a mente, na qual os hábitos são quase totalmente regulares, mecanicamente rígidos. Em consequência, matéria é mente “ressecada, congelada” (Santaella, 2002, 102). Cabe lembrar aqui que a concepção de mente está inserida em uma “metafísica antidualista” (ver Santella, 2002, p. 101), o sinequismo:

No contexto metafísico do sinequismo, mente é sinônimo de continuidade, é tendência do universo para a aquisição de hábitos. No contexto lógico da semiótica, mente é sinônimo de *semiose*. Mente, portanto, é continuidade e *semiose* (Santaella, 2002, p. 130).

A constatação de que não há uma diferença essencial entre a inteligibilidade dos

fenômenos naturais e dos mentais, sugere que há uma inteligibilidade no universo inteiro que se traduz na consciência em um “eu penso sintetizador” (CP 1.383). Isso faz com que a semiótica pragmática adote uma concepção da mente que coloca em xeque a centralidade do ser humano quando Peirce propõe que não são os pensamentos os que estão dentro das pessoas, mas os seres humanos os que estão imersos no pensamento (CP 5.289). Embora que os seres humanos não sejam os possuidores e criadores onipotentes do pensamento, a natureza humana possui uma capacidade semiótica distintiva que é a capacidade de compreensão. Tudo o que existe é suscetível a dois tipos de influência: a ação bruta de forças físicas e o poder da razão, o qual explica a ação proposital e o poder semiótico. Nem os seres humanos, nem o resto do universo carecem de significado. Enquanto os objetos materiais são compelidos a receber e transmitir forças mecânicas, os seres vivos são capazes de “receber e transmitir influência ideal” (CP 1.574). A ação mecânica é uma ação dinâmica entre fatos de Secundidade. Essa força é necessária para explicar o movimento dos corpos no espaço, mas insuficiente para explicar as relações gerais e o funcionamento proposital próprio da “causação da mente” (CP 7.591). Em uma relação de determinação eficiente a causa sempre precede a seu efeito. Para a lei da mente não é verdadeiro o princípio de que um estado de coisas não pode determinar seus antecedentes. A influência ideal explica que fatos futuros podem ser preditos por sua disposição a funcionar conforme com uma lei geral, própria da Terceiridade (CP 1.26).¹⁰

Portanto, a genuína mediação sígnica completa-se na Terceiridade. Os três componentes do signo estabelecem entre si uma relação “tri-relativa”. Contrariamente ao que aconteceria numa cadeia de relações diádicas, de ação e reação mecânica, o poder exercido pelos signos é o resultado da relação triádica conhecida como *semiose*:

Por *semiose* eu quero dizer (...) uma ação ou influência, que é, ou que envolve a cooperação de três sujeitos como o signo (*representamen*), seu objeto e seu interpretante, essa influência tri-relativa não é resolvida em ações entre pares (...) e minha definição confere a todo o que atua desse modo o título de ‘signo’. (CP 5.484).

¹⁰ “A rule to which future events have a tendency to conform is *ipso facto* an important thing, an important element in the happening of those events. This mode of being which consists, mind my word if you please, the mode of being which consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a determinate general character, I call a Thirdness.” (CP 1.26)

Sobre o conceito clássico de *telos*.

A noção de teleologia foi introduzida ao pensamento filosófico por Aristóteles para explicar fenômenos que não podem ser reduzidos a uma explicação por causa eficiente ou material, e que se tornam compreensíveis como efeitos da determinação de uma causa final. Trata-se de processos explicáveis, modernamente, pela sua finalidade entendida como uma tendência do processo à realização de um fim ou propósito. A explicação teleológica, apesar de sua aparente relevância, continua à margem das discussões acadêmicas, sobretudo, nas teorias pós-modernas. No estudo das narrativas de identidade, o conceito de causa final tem sido muito pouco explorado pela literatura. Contudo, o conceito aparece de modo implícito em algumas discussões ou trabalhos teóricos. Na visão de Alexander (2002), a explicação teleológica está sempre presente nas reflexões teóricas nas quais ela aparece como necessária e ao mesmo tempo muito controversa. Assim, a autora comenta que, “tendo sido rejeitado por Francis Bacon, por Darwin, e posteriormente por Derrida e Barthes, o *telos* continua retornando como um fantasma incompreendido” (para. 1).

A título de exemplo, podemos mencionar, no campo das narrativas de identidade, um trabalho no qual esta resistência teórica foi explicitada por Mishler (2002). Com o intuito de explorar a noção de tempo narrativo de Ricoeur (1980) o autor argumenta que uma explicação causal baseada numa sucessão linear de acontecimentos não é suficiente para explicar os fenômenos cognitivos, lingüísticos, ou de desenvolvimento da identidade. No estudo das narrativas, procura-se explicar a influência exercida por um argumento global sobre o processo narrativo que precede o fim da história. Uma explicação causal baseada numa concepção linear da temporalidade não é suficiente para que se entenda, numa trama narrativa, a determinação da seqüência cronológica de eventos que antecedem o desenlace. O autor afirma que tanto as narrativas de identidade, como os processos de aprendizagem, e também as metodologias de pesquisa com desenhos de pré- e pós-teste, requerem outro tipo de explicação que vá além da seqüência temporal linear. A argumentação de Mishler parece levar em consideração a noção de causa final. Todavia, quando atinge a conclusão de seu raciocínio, o autor, em vez de reafirmar a noção de causa final, traz as suas dúvidas. Uma explicação que não esteja baseada numa seqüência linear de eventos, segundo o autor, “corre o risco de ser considerada estranha ou perversa e, ainda mais preocupante, como o retorno a uma idéia de teleologia já rejeitada longo tempo atrás” (Mishler, 2002, p.7).

Numa postura radicalmente contrária a este ceticismo, Peirce afirma desafiante que “o não reconhecimento da causação final [...] tem sido e continua sendo geradora de mais erros filosóficos e de *nonsense* que qualquer outra fonte de erro ou de *nonsense*. Se existisse uma deusa do sem-sentido, esta deveria ser sua morada” (Peirce, 1903, MS 478, p.155, citado por Ransdell, 1977, p. 163)

A teleologia segundo C. S. Peirce.

Os trabalhos teóricos dedicados à noção peirceana da teleologia (Alexander, 2002; Hulswit, 2001; Ransdell, 1977; Santaella, 2002; Short, 1981a; 1981b) começam por explicar a rejeição histórica da noção clássica de teleologia, e assinalam o desconhecimento geral que existe das diferenças que o pensamento de Peirce introduziu no que tange à teleologia tradicional, associada à metafísica grega. Embora Peirce tenha partido das reflexões de Aristóteles, sua inclusão dessa concepção dentro da filosofia pragmática e semiótica redundou em uma modificação considerável do conceito tradicional. O desconhecimento da originalidade da teleologia proposta por Peirce fez com que muitas teorias modernas, que consideravam superada a teleologia aristotélica, desconsiderassem a dimensão télica em seus modelos semióticos. Por conseguinte, encontraram sérias limitações para entender a determinação nos processos não mecânicos. Outro preconceito freqüente relativo à teleologia alega uma suposta incompatibilidade teórica da causa final com a causa eficiente. A explicação teleológica é melhor compreendida quando ela é pensada como complementar à causa eficiente (Ponce, 1987, Short, 1981b, p. 371).

Originada na filosofia grega antiga, a noção foi adotada por Peirce que introduziu nela modificações relevantes. No caso de Aristóteles, a causa final estava associada à idéia de Deus. Trata-se da idéia do bem supremo ou da perfeição que geraria o movimento de tudo aquilo que, sendo imperfeito, procuraria atingir a perfeição divina. Aristóteles não concebeu a Deus como um agente externo, afastado do universo humano imperfeito, senão como integrado a ele sob a forma de causa final. Quando algum movimento pode ser explicado pela ação de um agente externo, existe uma ação que provoca um efeito ou reação. O efeito é posterior a sua causa. Essa modalidade de determinação é a causalidade eficiente. Os processos irreversíveis não podem ser explicados como resultantes de uma seqüência de ações mecânicas. Eles requerem outra explicação que evidencie tendências de como atingir um estado final. Esse modo de determinação não exclui a causalidade eficiente, mas opera de como um mecanismo

complementar a ela.

Peirce adotou a causa final concebida como sendo imanente à dinâmica do universo mas, diferentemente de Aristóteles, ele não atribuiu sua eficácia ao fato de ela representar um bem ou uma perfeição. A eficácia da causa final para Peirce radica nela representar um tipo ideal no sentido da lógica (Short, 1981b). Trata-se da tendência a conceber os fatos particulares em concordância como alguma lei geral ou regularidade. Ou melhor, a causa final é concebida por Peirce como um “tipo geral que tende a se realizar determinando processos de causa eficiente” (Hulswit, 2001, p. 343). Segundo Ransdell (1992), a noção de causa final na semiótica peirceana não é diferente da tendência de atingir um estado final (“*end state*”), o qual rege todo o processo de interpretação de signos ou *semiose*. A causa final deve ser concebida como uma forma geral de propósito (*purpose*); contudo, ela não deve sua capacidade de determinação nem ao fato de ser consciente do propósito (= intencionalidade), nem ao fato de ser realizável ou concretizável no futuro. Esta forma de causalidade é inseparável de sua condição de tipo geral e ideal que, como tal, constitui uma possibilidade presente, a qual alguém converte em seu propósito pessoal com ou sem consciência disso (Short, 1981b). Short (1998) classifica os processos télicos do mundo físico em dois tipos: aqueles que tendem em forma irreversível para um estado final e aqueles, como os processos biológicos, que explicam o final com referência a um propósito.

Conforme Santaella (2002), os conceitos de Peirce só podem ser adequadamente compreendidos se considerados em conexão com outros conceitos de sua teoria com os quais estão fortemente interconectados. Assim, a teleologia está relacionada à categoria de Terceiridade, que na doutrina do sinequismo é sinônimo de continuidade lógica. Entretanto, é necessário levar em consideração que as três categorias faneroscópicas ou fenomenológicas não se encontram desligadas entre si. Elas mantêm uma inter-relação, segundo explica Santaella, da qual decorre que:

A continuidade é, isto sim, um estado disposicional que infinitamente tende a se espalhar. Isso é possível porque a continuidade possui, dentro de si, o princípio da descontinuidade, visto que a originalidade do acaso viola a conformidade de um evento ao governo estrito da lei. (Santaella, 2002, p. 101)

Após ter analisado o *telos* narrativo e sua relação com processos do mundo natural, Alexander (2002) conclui que a importância da contribuição do pragmatismo à concepção da teleologia está centrada na sua inclusão da espontaneidade ao integrar o acaso ao funcionamento regular do universo. A autora observa que o funcionamento dos

processos de significação é compatível com alguns descobrimentos científicos recentes sobre o funcionamento télico dos sistemas e processos naturais. As reflexões de Peirce nesse âmbito, portanto, unificam filosofia e ciência. Sua teleologia se sustenta no pressuposto da possibilidade ontológica de emergência espontânea de ordem a partir do caos original, indeterminado. Destarte, a emergência do novo no universo se explica por causas intrínsecas que se relacionam com fenômenos de auto-organização.

Algumas conclusões da investigação da teleologia realizada por Alexander (2002) na sua tese doutoral, no âmbito específico da narrativa literária, são aplicadas aqui ao estudo do desenvolvimento do *self*. A tese de Alexander é que o livre arbítrio, ou conduta intencional, decorre da convergência das tendências repetitivas – o *telos* direcional – e das inovadoras – o *telos* original – do sentido. A contribuição mais importante da teleologia de Peirce, segundo a autora, é que essa teoria propõe uma ontologia na qual se insere o determinismo probabilístico no indeterminismo. Esta ontologia está baseada na idéia de que o caos original é ordenado pela tendência do universo a produzir tendências. Não se trata de uma ordem preestabelecida, mas de uma ordem emergente. A ordem decorre das regularidades e a originalidade decorre da possibilidade ontológica do acaso. A possibilidade de emergência espontânea de elementos não presentes nos antecedentes faz parte dos processos e do funcionamento dos sistemas da natureza. Os elementos que surgem pelo acaso podem ou não se constituir em novas regularidades ou tendências direcionais dependendo deles acharem ou não uma funcionalidade por emergência extrínseca. Conforme Alexander, o estudo da teleologia pode fornecer elementos para entender o *self* como uma entidade capaz de livre arbítrio, como aquilo que surge dos efeitos combinados das tendências conservadoras e das tendências inovadoras nos processos de *semiose*.

A tese central de Alexander é que o funcionamento teleológico dos sistemas naturais (*telos*) envolve dois mecanismos distintos: um está orientado à manutenção da ordem (*telos* direcional), e o outro está dirigido ao descobrimento de uma nova ordem (*telos* original). Os sistemas seguem regras mecanicistas que podem surgir de forma espontânea. Os sistemas que obedecem às leis podem oportunamente começar a atuar de um modo não previsto pela lei. Assim, o efeito combinado dos dois mecanismos faz possível o fenômeno de legalidade emergente, e também abre espaço para a possibilidade de transcender as leis em certas oportunidades. É essa combinação que define os sistemas como télicos. A autora descreve os sistemas télicos como aqueles sistemas que estão progressiva e criativamente organizados para atingir uma meta.

Segundo a autora, a teleologia peirceana permite explicar o funcionamento télico, pois assume que uma ordem pode surgir, de modo espontâneo, da desordem (acaso absoluto, CP 6.47).

Conceito de verdade e suas conseqüências para o estudo do *self*.

Na concepção pragmática, todo pensamento é um processo semiótico orientado pela finalidade de atingir algum conhecimento verdadeiro sobre o mundo ou sobre o próprio *self*. Por verdade entende-se todo aquilo que é, de uma certa maneira, independentemente de qualquer crença ou opinião que, num determinado momento, uma ou várias pessoas possam ter a respeito (ver Haack, 1998, p. 32). Uma verdade é algo que não pode ser criado pela mente, mas que se impõe a ela através da experiência, sendo o efeito de uma realidade independente (CP 5.564). No horizonte de qualquer processo interpretativo existe sempre a possibilidade real de um conhecimento verdadeiro do objeto, o qual independe do modo de representá-lo. Trata-se do conhecimento do objeto dinâmico.

A pergunta sobre a possibilidade ontológica de saber do objeto como ele é em si mesmo remete a um dos problemas mais complexos da semiótica, porque ele requer a resolução de um aparente paradoxo: se a relação com o objeto do conhecimento está sempre mediada por signos, como poderia haver um modo de conhecer aquilo que é independente do modo de representá-lo? Short (1998, pp. 28-30) propõe que uma solução para este problema epistemológico pode ser atingida através de dois conceitos que são chaves para compreender o funcionamento da determinação semiótica: a obstinação do objeto e o propósito interpretativo. Todo signo conjuga duas influências, aquela que se expressa num propósito concebido como uma tendência a atualizar um tipo ideal, e a determinação que provém da obstinação (*obduracy*) do objeto semiótico. De um modo similar a um alvo de tiro, explica Short, o objeto semiótico é criado pelo propósito interpretativo e, simultaneamente, ele resiste a ser representado de um modo arbitrário. Todo propósito requer que seu objeto seja independente dele próprio; senão fosse assim, não teria sentido o próprio conceito de propósito cognitivo. O signo deve ser apropriado a respeito de seu objeto para poder ser um signo desse objeto. Segundo Short (1998, p. 30), qualquer objeto semiótico, seja ele real ou ficcional, é sempre obstinado, já que ele resiste e insiste em sua demanda de representação. Não é o fato de ele ser um existente físico o que está no cerne da definição de objeto dinâmico, senão sua obstinação (Short, 1998, p. 35); sua teimosia se expressa numa pertinaz resistência

perante as interpretações erradas ou enganosas.

Como é possível conhecer o objeto dinâmico se ele é independente do modo como é representado? A resposta para a pergunta está no modo como opera a resistência do objeto na representação sígnica. Os três componentes do signo, quais sejam, signo, objeto e interpretante, designam respectivamente a indeterminação da Primeiridade, a qual caracteriza a multiplicidade de possibilidades icônicas; a determinação indicial do objeto na categoria da Secundidade; e o elemento geral simbólico associado à legalidade da categoria da Terceiridade. A classificação dos signos em três tipos, quais sejam, ícones, índices, e símbolos; a taxonomia está baseada numa prevalência de cada uma das categorias sobre as outras duas. Não há diferença radical, essencial, entre os diferentes tipos de signo, porque os signos na sua ação conjugam as três modalidades de representação: icônica, indicial e simbólica. O nexos entre concepção e objeto só pode ser entendido cabalmente, segundo Short (1998), uma vez que se compreende a função do componente indicial presente em todo signo no modelo triádico. Isto é assim porque, enquanto categorias gerais, os conceitos não são capazes de fornecer nenhuma classe de conhecimento sobre a particularidade da experiência. A partir da proposta de Peirce de que todo signo possui um componente indicial é que pode ser explicada a relação entre particulares, porque o índice é aquele componente do signo que denota o particular enquanto particular (Short, 1998, p. 38).

O conhecimento como instância conceitual pressupõe sempre uma forma de conhecimento através da experiência particular própria da categoria da Secundidade. Embora o termo conhecimento leve necessariamente a pensar em um conceito, existe um aspecto cognitivo que provém de um contato sensorial iniciado na experiência que por definição, acontece no aqui e agora. A ação do índice determina uma forma de conhecimento ligada à particularidade de uma experiência que não é repetível. Essa modalidade comunicacional explica uma forma de conhecimento que possui características diferentes daquela que na qual predomina a comunicação em termos simbólicos e que é chamada por Andacht (2003) de “conhecimento carnal”, porque nele prevalece o vínculo indicial. O elemento preponderante na lógica indicial não é a compreensão intelectual do que acontece, senão o registro sensorial, bruto, de algo que acontece num momento determinado. Nessa lógica, não são os símbolos os que prevalecem, embora eles sejam parte de toda relação semiótica, mas a experiência de contato com o particular que se manifesta na fala do corpo, através de seus gestos e reações involuntárias. Nesse tipo de comunicação, prevalecem os aspectos físicos que

acompanham toda comunicação humana, e que dificilmente podem ser ignorados ou distorcidos já que “o poder indicial arrasta-nos física e irresistivelmente, como num ato de hipnose, em direção a isso que é assinalado” Andacht (2003, p.150). A proposta de um efeito de atração compulsiva exercida pelo índice está baseada na classificação triádica de Peirce:

Achamos agora que, além dos conceitos gerais (símbolos), duas outras classes de signos são totalmente indispensáveis em todo raciocínio. Uma dessas classes é o índice (*index*) que, como um dedo que aponta, exerce uma real força fisiológica sobre a atenção, como o poder de um mesmerizador, e a dirige para um objeto específico do sentido (CP 8.41, tradução, Andacht 2003).

Neste trabalho, considera-se que uma aproximação psicológica ao *self* pode extrair inúmeros benefícios de uma concepção semiótica que, por meio da inclusão da particularidade da experiência no conhecimento simbólico forneça insumos para teorizar sobre os aspectos físicos envolvidos na interpretação. Desse modo, presta-se para compreender o funcionamento integrado do corpo e da mente no desenvolvimento psicológico e na comunicação terapêutica.

Self como resultado de um processo inferencial.

A semiótica pragmática fornece uma base para estudar a autoconsciência, não como uma forma de conhecimento intuitivo, mas como uma cognição reflexiva. Com efeito, não é muito diferente do mecanismo para inferência no silogismo clássico. A reflexividade é em si a própria natureza semiótica do *self* e manifesta-se na consciência como mais um signo através do qual conhecemos o universo e nós mesmos, enquanto fazemos parte, ao mesmo tempo, do processo de conhecer e de pertencer ao universo.

O silogismo aristotélico é um tipo de silogismo demonstrativo “cujas premissas devem ser verdadeiras, primárias, imediatas, mais bem conhecidas e anteriores à conclusão, que depois se relaciona a elas como efeito e causa” (Santaella, 1992, p. 38). De modo similar, a inferência em Peirce (CP 2.442) é descrita como a adoção consciente de uma crença pela união de duas premissas consideradas verdadeiras. Com base na lógica aristotélica, Peirce (CP 1.65) propôs a existência de três tipos de razoamentos: dedução, indução e abdução. Na dedução, uma vez aceitas as premissas como verdadeiras, a conclusão surge de modo necessário, isto é, compulsório para quem faz o raciocínio. Na indução, parte-se da observação de casos particulares: “pode ser definida como uma inferência virtual de uma probabilidade” (CP 2.101). Na abdução,

tem-se uma inferência hipotética por meio da qual uma conclusão surge sob a forma de uma conjectura (CP 5.188). Trata-se de uma inferência lógica que gera uma hipótese explanatória perante um fato surpreendente. Este tipo de silogismo está sujeito a certas restrições que dependem da suposição de que se a condição que é inferida como hipotética fosse verdadeira, um fato observado que é surpreendente, passaria a ser considerado como algo evidente (CP 2.102).

Em relação às premissas do silogismo dedutivo, Peirce (CP 2.27) acreditava que, qualquer processo lógico, uma vez considerado em sua totalidade de modo regressivo, na procura da origem das premissas em sucessivos passos, chegaria a mostrar ter sido gerado a partir de algum fato percebido [*perceptual fact*], ou de uma proposição resultante de um pensamento sobre algum percepto. A noção de intuição foi questionada por Peirce, com o argumento de que “mesmo que haja intuição originária, não temos meios de saber se elas são, de fato, originárias”. (Santaella, 2004b, p. 41)

O argumento que sustenta a crítica à introspecção como método de conhecimento do mundo interno procede de uma concepção reduzida da capacidade conhecida tradicionalmente como intuição. Peirce (CP 5.244) questionou a possibilidade de conhecer diretamente o mundo interno. A atribuição de um sentimento a um ego requer um raciocínio que inclui a distinção ego/não-ego. Portanto a introspecção não pode ser um conhecimento direto, devendo ser considerada uma classe de inferência que deriva da observação do mundo externo. Nenhuma inferência pode ser realizada no instante preciso do presente imediato, já que sendo um processo lógico a inferência é um raciocínio que acontece ao longo do tempo.

A aproximação semiótica ao conceito de *self* consiste no corolário de duas premissas. Primeiro, assume-se que todo conhecimento do mundo interno emerge em relação ao mundo externo através de um processo lógico. Segundo, assume-se que todo processo lógico é um processo semiótico. Sendo assim, infere-se que o *self* é um processo semiótico e, como tal, se desenvolve ao longo do tempo. No desenvolvimento humano essa inferência é produto do estabelecimento de uma dualidade ego/não-ego que por sua vez é resultado de um impacto externo (CP 5.539). A consciência do ego é inseparável da consciência do não-ego, que se manifesta como uma oposição, algo alheio, às vezes até rebelde, a respeito da vontade e dos esforços do ego. O *self* emerge para a consciência a partir desse encontro diádico, que é conativo e fisiológico (corporal), surge na realidade externa como uma inferência lógica (mente). Peirce (CP 5.233) ilustra o modo como essa inferência do *self* acontece no desenvolvimento

humano através do exemplo de uma criança que ouve os adultos dizerem que um aquecedor está quente, mas que prefere achar que isso não é assim. Quando a criança finalmente toca o aparelho, sente uma dor que confirma o testemunho dos adultos. Ao experimentar essa resistência, a criança descobre algo que é independente de sua vontade, uma externalidade, por um lado, e por outro, compreende que sua crença estava errada. O *self* é inferido como aquele espaço lógico no qual o erro cometido e a ignorância podem localizar-se. Assim, a partir do limite que a realidade externa impõe à onipotência infantil é que o mundo interno pode ser inferido. Uma vez que se aceita que o conhecimento do mundo interno não é direto senão mediado, então se compreende porque o *self* é definido como um signo, na semiótica peirceana.

Self como um signo em processo de desenvolvimento em V. Colapietro.

A proposição do modelo do *Self* Semiótico origina-se em um trabalho de compilação crítica, realizado por Colapietro (1989), de todas as referências à noção do *self*, espalhadas na extensa obra de Peirce. O objetivo era estabelecer as bases para uma teoria semiótica do desenvolvimento da identidade. Na sua condição semiótica, a natureza humana é caracterizada pela capacidade de gerar signos cada vez mais desenvolvidos (interpretantes), e pelo processo autocontrolado de conhecimento de si. A principal tese do trabalho de Colapietro, (1989, p. 61) é que a visão de Peirce a respeito do *self* não tem sido adequadamente apreciada na história, por não ter sido considerada em uma perspectiva desenvolvimental. O intuito fundamental é assim salientar que na perspectiva semiótica o *self* é concebido como “um signo em processo de desenvolvimento” (CP 5.313, citado por Colapietro, 1989, p. 66).

O conceito do *self* estudado de um ponto de vista semiótico interessa à psicologia desde que o estudo empírico da mente, segundo Peirce, depende de modo fundamental de uma teoria geral dos signos (Colapietro, 1989, p. 30). Isso porque a semiótica é uma ciência normativa cujas observações provêm da experiência comum, e a psicologia é uma ciência particular cujas observações provem da observação especial com instrumentos. Assim, Colapietro conclui que o entendimento psicológico dos modos em que a cognição pode ser frustrada ou detida podem se beneficiar do conhecimento das normas de acordo com as quais a cognição se desenvolve (p. 53).

Para entender adequadamente a perspectiva peirceana do *self*, o autor considera necessário esclarecer que ela não é fruto de uma visão negativa, como poderia ser inferido – e de fato foi por alguns comentadores – se o tema não é abordado com cautela

suficiente. Um dos aspectos polêmicos da aproximação peirceana do *self* é a afirmação de que a existência separada dos outros se manifesta através do erro e da ignorância. Ela decorre da descrição da emergência do *self* no desenvolvimento humano como uma inferência feita pela criança para assim dar conta da ignorância quando essa se revela na experiência. Conforme a descrição de Peirce (CP 5. 317) considerada acima, no momento em que uma criança faz uma inferência que é contrária ao testemunho dos outros, se a experiência confirma o testemunho dos outros, o *self* é inferido como espaço lógico no qual o erro pode ser inerente (ver CP 5.233). Segundo Colapietro (1989, p.73), é necessário esclarecer a afirmação de Peirce de que a existência separada do homem individual é manifestada pelo erro e pela ignorância. A postura de Peirce, que na visão do autor possui uma afinidade com a filosofia de Merleau Ponty, sustenta uma visão do *self* como um elemento sendo constituído pelas relações com os outros. Assim, pode-se entender que Peirce propôs uma visão negativa do *self* enquanto uma existência separada, completamente isolada. Conforme Colapietro, se entendermos a palavra separada, no sentido de distinta, distinguível dos outros, então se torna compreensível a expressão de que ela se manifesta a partir do erro, da ignorância.

A negação do isolamento do *self* está vinculada a um questionamento realizado por Peirce a respeito da noção proposta por W. James (1890) de que existe uma “mente pessoal” na qual residem os pensamentos. Segundo Pierce, essa concepção da mente faz com que o *self* apareça para James como sendo invisível aos outros, incomunicável. Segundo Colapietro, o estatuto privado da consciência humana não é negado por Peirce, embora tenha uma dimensão menor do que em James. Isso decorre da postura sinequista, da qual deriva o pressuposto de que o *self* é por natureza própria comunicativo:

Seus vizinhos são, em alguma medida você mesmo, e numa medida muito maior do que, carecendo de estudos profundos em psicologia, você acreditaria.(...) todos os homens semelhantes a você e que estão em circunstâncias análogas, são em alguma medida você mesmo, porém não totalmente do mesmo modo em que seus vizinhos são você mesmo. (CP 7.571 citada por Colapietro, 1989, p. 64).

O autor conclui que a visão negativa do *self* individual, separado dos outros, está vinculada à oposição radical de Peirce a todo excesso de auto-centramento no que tange à identidade pessoal. Essa visão é complementar a sua postura afirmativa do *self* como centro do autocontrole. A autonomia humana é uma consequência de o *self* ser um centro de propósito e de poder semiótico no marco da visão desenvolvimental do *self*. O

processo interpretativo enquanto pensamento autocrítico, autônomo é um processo reflexivo de auto-observação. Para que a auto-interpretação se desenvolva de modo contínuo, é crucial não perder de vista que o *self* é: por um lado, sujeito que interpreta; por outro, objeto interpretado:

Como sujeito que interpreta, o *self* deve distinguir-se do fluxo de signos que, a cada momento de sua existência, usam o *self* como meio de expressão. Como objeto interpretado, o *self* é um com o processo de *semiose* (o *self* é, neste sentido, o signo no curso de seu desenvolvimento) (Colapietro, 1989, p. 66).¹¹

Uma das conclusões da pesquisa de Colapietro é que o *self* como signo em desenvolvimento é essencialmente o *self* no decorrer de um diálogo consigo mesmo. Esse diálogo intrapessoal é muitas vezes privado mas também, potencialmente, ele faz parte de um contexto mais amplo, o contexto dos diálogos interpessoais. O conceito de diálogo implica que o pensamento evolui sempre no confronto com a idéia de um outro, com a idéia de alguma forma de “não” (CP 1.324). Assim, no diálogo interno o *self* aparece como estando dividido. Porém, o *self* tende a uma integração na Terceiridade, devido ao fato de que o pensamento está sempre orientado para ser interpretado por alguém num momento futuro. A força vital do *self* se manifesta como uma teleologia desenvolvimental (*developmental teleology*) (p. 91), uma procura de propósitos, um processo através do qual o sentido está sempre evoluindo.

O bloqueio do processo desenvolvimental do *self* é uma consequência de um excesso de egoísmo, do auto-centramento, da ilusão de um *self* independente dos outros que provém da vaidade (CP 7.571, citado por Colapietro, 1989, p. 96). Essa ilusão está associada em Peirce aos conceitos de personalidade, *self* individual, *self* pessoal. Se o *self* é concebido como auto-suficiente (Petrilli, 2004), o resultado é uma falência no auto-conhecimento, porque ser um *self* implica de modo essencial estar em contínua comunicação com outros.

A conclusão da exegese de Colapietro aparece à primeira vista como um paradoxo: somente abrindo mão do egoísmo de se pensar capaz de existir sem os outros, é que se atinge a posse de si mesmo. Somente na relação com os outros, é que a unicidade do *self* se revela (Colapietro, 1989, p. 73).

O auto-conhecimento é um processo dialógico. O diálogo significa um limite eficaz à onipotência do indivíduo. Somente se o ser humano tem a humildade de aceitar

¹¹ Essa citação foi escolhida porque nela aparece uma distinção similar à proposta por Wiley (1994) entre *self* e identidade.

os limites que sua condição semiótica traz consigo a respeito do controle da sua identidade individual, ele pode realizar plenamente seu poder semiótico. Isso implica uma capitulação, uma entrega do *eu* como centro de sentido. A capacidade semiótica não permite atribuir de modo arbitrário o sentido às coisas ou aos semelhantes. O *self* entretanto, sendo objeto interpretado não é nada além de um outro signo no multiforme e cambiante universo semiótico. Nesse universo, o sentido progride da mesma maneira que uma conversação que precede a cada ser individual, e que continua mesmo depois de sua morte. Concomitantemente, a natureza semiótica habilita os seres humanos a participar dessa contínua *semiose* universal e do processo de crescimento da razoabilidade universal. A outra face do limite é uma grande oportunidade. Uma vez que a condição humana consiste numa existência corpórea em continuidade com a mente, e que para Peirce a mente é uma noção que transcende os indivíduos concretos, os seres humanos são capazes de receber e transmitir influência ideal (CP 5.589). Enquanto signos, mediadores do sentido, eles participam tanto do mundo mecânico de forças físicas, quanto do entendimento das relações entre elas, do universo das leis.

O poder semiótico provém da renúncia ao controle ilusório do sentido da identidade. Esse controle é uma imposição autoritária de uma vontade sobre outra. No caso do *self*, trata-se da auto-imposição, que ignora de modo não realista o caráter dialógico da identidade humana. O fluir do pensamento como processo auto-interpretativo requer das pessoas a capacidade de tolerar a existência constante de uma oposição no seu próprio diálogo interno. Isso é assim porque, tendo uma natureza dialógica o pensamento só pode fluir no confronto com uma idéia contrária. O sentido de si, desenvolve-se e cresce em relação a um fim ao qual se tende de modo parcial e progressivo. Se, por um lado, o *self* carece da certeza de poder atingir uma identidade perfeita, definida de uma vez e para sempre, por outro lado, ele pode se desenvolver na direção de ideais que atuam como uma clareza no final do caminho. Esse é o modo de agir dos tipos ideais no presente, como um foco que norteia os processos semióticos, como um modelo que orienta o exercício do autocontrole. É precisamente nesse sentido que o *self* pode ser definido como um centro de propósito e de autocontrole. Na renúncia ao controle voluntário do sentido da identidade, as pessoas se submetem à influência dos ideais que fazem parte dos processos auto-interpretativos. Como agente interpretativo, o *self* desenvolve-se na procura de metas que orientam o contínuo processo semiótico, nunca realizado completamente, de vir a ser um *self*.

Neste estudo, Colapietro descreve o pensamento como uma forma de

comunicação, como uma conversação do *self* do presente, o Eu que se dirige ou interpela o próprio *self* de um momento futuro, como se ele fosse um outro, isto é Você. Nessa conversação o *self* é, alternativamente, falante e ouvinte: uma fonte da qual o discurso flui, e um ser para a qual o discurso é dirigido. O *self* também pode ser o tópico da conversação, no discurso existem também ressonâncias, ecos de discursos de outros que são veiculados pelo *self*.

Self semiótico e a conversação interna em N. Wiley.

Partindo do trabalho de Colapietro, Wiley (1994) propôs um modelo para o estudo do *self* semiótico. Neste modelo, o *self* é descrito como uma competência interpretativa universal própria da condição humana, a qual evolve de modo dialógico como uma conversação interna. De acordo com Wiley (1996), o modelo triádico de signo aplicado ao estudo do *self* evita as reduções do *self* às condições intelectuais, sócio-culturais ou às condições bioquímicas. Se definirmos o *self* como um processo semiótico, a estrutura triádica consegue dar conta do funcionamento do *self* e do desenvolvimento da identidade ao longo do tempo, conciliando três aspectos da condição humana: imaginativo, existencial e mental. A concepção desenvolvimental do *self* está ligada à concepção desenvolvimental dos processos semióticos.

Para elaborar seu modelo do *self* semiótico Wiley (1994) trabalhou teoricamente para superar a noção de *self* à estrutura triádica do signo. Para isso, o autor recorreu ao modelo de conversação interna de Mead (1863-1931) que ele considerou complementar àquele proposto por Peirce. O modelo de conversação interna de Peirce focava a relação dialógica entre o *self* do presente e o *self* do futuro, enquanto que Mead focou na relação do *self* do presente e o *self* do passado. G. H. Mead (1913) descreveu a gênese do *self* a partir da habilidade que uma criança desenvolve de assumir o papel dos outros significativos e de se referir ao *self* como se fosse um outro (Mead, 1913). Para Mead, referir-se ao *self* como o outro é o início da ação reflexiva. O próximo passo é a conversação interna entre dois pronomes pessoais o Eu (I) e o Mim (Me) que Mead define como o próprio *self* num momento já passado.

A complementaridade dos dois modelos de conversação interna (Peirce-Mead) constitui o fundamento sobre o qual Wiley (1996) elaborou um terceiro modelo de conversação, baseado em três pronomes pessoais: o Eu (presente) que fala do Mim (passado) para o Você (futuro). Os três pronomes se justapõem aos três componentes do

signo descritos por Peirce: o *signo* (ou *representamen*), o *objeto*, e o *interpretante*,¹² respectivamente.

O modelo de conversação interna proposto por Wiley (1996) inclui, além dos três pronomes pessoais Eu, Mim e Você, uma estrutura mais ampla. Trata-se de mais três posições, instâncias ou papéis: os visitantes permanentes, os visitantes temporários e o inconsciente. A instância do Eu refere ao *self* no presente e é um ponto cego cognitivo porque uma vez que ele se pensa já aparece para o eu como objeto através do pronome Mim. É por isso que o Eu corresponde à categoria fenomenológica de Primeiridade. Enquanto o Mim corresponde à Secundidade, o Eu corresponde à Primeiridade, ao âmbito da multiplicidade de possibilidades do momento presente. A instância Você pertence à conjugação do futuro, ele é aquele *self* para o qual o discurso do pensamento está dirigido. Assim, o Você corresponde ao interpretante, à categoria da Terceiridade. No que diz respeito à determinação, o Eu é espontâneo e livre, o mim é determinado e não livre, e o Você é descrito como sendo “nem determinado nem livre, mas simplesmente estranho à questão” (p. 61). Conforme o autor, o Eu manifesta-se na amplitude de possibilidades do momento presente e, portanto ele tem a capacidade de redefinir situações. Esse é o verdadeiro mecanismo pelo qual o Eu pode romper com o Mim (Wiley, 1996, p. 65). Essa capacidade decorre de seu vínculo com o Você. A relação do Eu com o Você influencia as definições cognitivas.

Na estrutura ampla da conversação interna, Wiley descreve os visitantes temporários e permanentes. O termo ‘visitantes’ se refere às pessoas que, no ato do pensamento, são invocadas na mente. Eles podem ser presenças mais ou menos permanentes na conversação interna. Wiley assinala que a noção de outros em Mead inclui a possibilidade de que o Eu fale por seus visitantes, complementados com as entonações, os gestos e, em menor medida, com as expressões faciais. Assim, os visitantes “falam tanto de maneira explícita, como visitantes no foro interno, como de maneira implícita, enquanto sedimentados nos aspectos regulativos do *self*” (Wiley, 1996, p.69).

O inconsciente foi considerado na proposta de Wiley (1996, p.71) de duas

¹² Na versão brasileira do livro *The Semiotic Self* (Wiley, 1994) o termo em inglês usado pelo autor é “*interpretant*”. O termo “intérprete” escolhido pelo tradutor da versão em português (Wiley, 1996) dá lugar a uma confusão do conceito com o “intérprete” no sentido de sujeito que faz o ato de interpretar. A noção de “*interpretant*” em inglês alude à interpretação no sentido de conteúdo do ato interpretativo e não ao sujeito que interpreta, portanto o sentido mais próximo é traduzir o termo inglês “*interpretant*” por “interpretante”. (ver. Santaella, 1992).

maneiras: como membro ou pólo relativamente submerso do consciente e semiconsciente, e como uma conversação distinta da consciente, que opera na sua própria arena interna. A forma em que o inconsciente parece operar na zona consciente segundo Wiley é como uma pessoa única, mas multifacetada e não como uma multiplicidade em interação.

Distinção Semiótica entre *Self* e Identidade.

O presente estudo está abordando o tema do *self* semiótico e suas relações com o conceito de identidade. Até aqui tem se apresentado brevemente a teoria semiótica triádica e a aproximação semiótica ao *self*. Cabe agora justificar a proposição de uma distinção conceitual que concerne aos termos *self* e identidade, e também apontar os recursos metodológicos que permitam apontar tal distinção.

Self e identidade em A. Giddens e em N. Wiley.

Giddens (1991) propõe a noção de auto-identidade (*self-identity*) em seu livro dedicado a refletir, desde uma perspectiva sociológica, as complexas conexões entre a vida dos indivíduos e as instituições modernas. A proposta resulta da observação de dois usos distintos do termo identidade na literatura. Um é o uso simples do termo. No segundo uso, quando associado à palavra *self*, o sentido muda de modo considerável. Assim, o autor oferece uma importante precisão terminológica no que diz respeito ao estudo do *self*.

A identidade está, portanto, associada ao pronome eu. As pessoas têm a capacidade de usar tal pronome em contextos diferentes entre si e esta habilidade é uma condição necessária para a emergência da autoconsciência, não sendo, porém, suficiente para defini-la. Além disso, a pessoa é capaz de compreender que existem aspectos de si mesma que transcendem os contextos particulares. Essa capacidade está associada a uma auto-identidade – a forma reflexiva de identidade. Assim, Giddens (1991, p. 53)¹³ explica que a auto-identidade não é um traço distintivo, nem sequer um conjunto de traços possuídos por um indivíduo. Ela é o *self* como ele é entendido de modo reflexivo pela pessoa em termos de sua biografia. Para Giddens, a identidade sempre requer um senso de continuidade, o que caracteriza a auto-identidade é que se refere a essa

¹³ “Self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits possessed by the individual. It is *the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography*. Identity here still presumes continuity across time and space: but self-identity is such continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent” (p.53).

continuidade da identidade assim como ela é entendida reflexivamente por um agente.

A auto-identidade está associada a outra noção que, segundo o autor, é importante salientar na época contemporânea, a de “segurança ontológica”. O autor explica que existe atualmente uma forma de cultura pós-tradicional caracterizada pelo questionamento e abandono de muitas das tradições que forneciam anteriormente uma segurança básica às pessoas. A dúvida tem se tornado um traço marcante da razão crítica moderna. Essa dúvida não se limita às reflexões filosóficas ou acadêmicas, mas perpassa a vida cotidiana. A dúvida tem se institucionalizado em todos os âmbitos da cultura atual.

A tese principal do autor é que perante essa mudança, no marco de incerteza moderna, surge uma necessidade de manter a confiança, entendendo o termo num sentido amplo e geral. Em todas suas manifestações genéricas, a confiança está, segundo o autor, diretamente relacionada com a necessidade atual de atingir e manter a segurança ontológica (Giddens, 1991). O autor propõe que nessa nova ordem pós-tradicional a auto-identidade padece também do questionamento geral que caracteriza a vida em relação às instituições modernas. Nesse marco a auto-identidade aparece como um empreendimento (*endeavor*) organizado reflexivamente que consiste em manter uma biografia narrativa coerente, embora revisada de modo permanente (Giddens, 1991, p. 5).

Nos casos patológicos em que a pessoa não desenvolve um sentimento consistente de sua continuidade biográfica, ocorre também uma falência na concepção duradoura da própria vitalidade. A conclusão do autor é que um sentido estável da auto-identidade pressupõe dois elementos fundamentais da segurança ontológica: a aceitação da realidade das coisas e da realidade dos outros. A segurança ontológica não deriva diretamente da aceitação da realidade, mas do processo reflexivo do qual resulta a auto-identidade em contínua relação com a confiança na consistência de um fundamento real. Conforme Giddens (1991):

[o problema do outro] concerne às conexões inerentes que existem entre a aprendizagem das características das outras pessoas e os outros maiores eixos da segurança ontológica. (...) Confiança, relações interpessoais e convicção na ‘realidade’ das coisas, vão juntas nos ambientes sociais da vida adulta. (p. 51).¹⁴

¹⁴ “[The ‘problem of the other’] concerns the inherent connections which exist between learning the characteristics of other persons and the other major axis of ontological security. (...) Trust, interpersonal relations and a conviction of the ‘reality’ of things go hand in hand in the social settings of adult life” (p.

Para resumir, desatacam-se aqui duas idéias fundamentais: a primeira é a de que existe uma diferença entre a identidade enquanto traços distintivos individuais e a auto-identidade enquanto processo de entendimento reflexivo da identidade. A segunda é que o processo reflexivo da auto-identidade depende não somente da realidade das coisas e das pessoas que rodeiam o *self*, mas também do entendimento reflexivo do *self* no que tange à certeza da realidade.

Partindo dessa observação, Wiley (1996) propôs a distinção conceitual entre os termos *self* e identidade. O autor considera necessário prevenir conseqüências nocivas que resultam da confusão entre ambos conceitos. Seria melhor, portanto, segundo Wiley, reservar o termo *self* para designar a capacidade reflexiva e interpretativa da identidade, e o termo identidade para o uso particularizado e contextualizado desse conceito. Desse modo, o *self* pode ser claramente distinguido da noção de identidade no seu sentido específico, isto é, quando ela é referida a traços distintivos, a características sociais, a traços psicológicos personalizados, (p. 52), a autoconceitos (p. 17). As identidades são, portanto, qualidades múltiplas do *self* que podem atuar em longo prazo, ou inclusive durante a vida inteira, mas sempre num sentido particularizado. O *self* é, conforme Wiley, o resultado de uma somatória de identidades, senão uma propriedade emergente das identidades. E, portanto, a distinção de conceitos opera para manter uma diferença de níveis de generalidade lógica. As identidades não são qualidades que definem a natureza humana de um modo genérico; são os indivíduos em relação às suas circunstâncias variáveis. Por outro lado o *self* designa uma qualidade que independe das circunstâncias particulares e designa uma condição genérica e universal do ser humano.

Quando essa distinção se apaga, tanto na teoria quanto na vida cotidiana, as qualidades específicas das identidades podem ser atribuídas aos indivíduos sem levar em consideração sua contingência. Essa atribuição desconhece que as identidades dependem de traços históricos específicos que são mais o menos variáveis. Wiley (1996) destacou a necessidade de trabalhar teoricamente para preservar a distinção *self*/identidade no âmbito social das políticas de identidade e no âmbito da saúde psicológica das pessoas.

Os selves são estruturas humanas genéricas, e as identidades cada uma das quais pode ou não estar presente em cada caso, são formas específicas e inerentes às estruturas (p.18).

Para explicar a distinção entre *self* e identidade segue uma síntese da descrição feita por Wiley na seção dedicada a discutir a relação entre estrutura e conteúdo (ver Wiley, 1996, pp. 51-53). A respeito da localização semiótica das identidades o autor as define como conjuntos e sínteses de signos individuais. Elas são aspectos parciais em relação à estrutura do *self*, de uma forma similar ao que acontece aos signos individuais, que são instâncias parciais do processo de *semiose*. O termo ‘subordinadas’ refere-se a um ordenamento lógico. Para Wiley, as boas identidades são adequadas pontes entre o *self* e o mundo. As identidades em si não trazem sofrimento para as pessoas a menos que, nas políticas sociais de identidade, elas correspondam a autoconceitos destrutivos. O efeito prejudicial decorre de considerar que uma identidade, seja positiva ou negativa, possa ser usada para definir a totalidade da pessoa, sua natureza.

Quando uma parte do *self*, isto é, uma identidade, toma a totalidade da estrutura do *self* ela é tomada como a base principal da identidade pessoal. Deve-se aqui fazer uma precisão terminológica. O termo identidades particulares refere-se aos autoconceitos ligados à inserção social da pessoa, que são aspectos parciais da estrutura. O termo identidade pessoal refere ao senso de ipseidade do *self* no decorrer do fluxo da existência. Trata-se de uma propriedade constante do mesmo. Outras propriedades do *self* são o canal reflexivo (que se refere à função reflexiva da estrutura); a fonte de poder semiótico (que se refere à capacidade interpretativa); e a principal realidade do *self* (que designa o papel mais abrangente da estrutura).

Portanto, quando uma identidade semiótica particular torna-se a base principal da identidade pessoal, uma identidade particular torna-se o substituto funcional do *self*, assume seu papel. Assim a capacidade reflexiva do *self* é usurpada pela identidade particular. O autor denomina estas identidades de “identidades invasivas, quase cancerígenas” (Wiley, 1996, p. 54) que se associam a fenômenos tais como o narcisismo de Kohut ou o falso-*self* de Winnicott (1960).

Um dos intuítos deste trabalho é avançar na distinção conceitual entre *self* e identidades, observando na conversação interna do *self* qual lugar ocupam as identidades particulares. Assim, procura-se reconhecer os elementos que favorecem a reflexividade, o fluxo de poder semiótico e o crescimento de sentido do *self*.

Para descrever a diferença de nível lógico entre *self* e identidades, Wiley utilizou a metáfora espacial *self* (continente)/identidade (conteúdo), a despeito de não ser totalmente adequada à natureza do processo semiótico. Por um lado, a metáfora espacial permite visualizar uma subordinação de conceitos. Não obstante, a metáfora espacial

tende a estar associada na mente a uma imagem estática que, inclusive, corre o risco de desnaturalizar o aspecto processual da interpretação da identidade.

As identidades são signos particulares – elas são componentes, descritos aqui como interpretantes dinâmicos (Andacht & Michel, 2005). Desse modo, será possível salientar o caráter temporal e teleológico do *self*. A natureza teleológica do pensamento em relação às fases do processo e aos signos particulares que o compõem implica uma diferença lógica, conforme descreve Peirce:

...o pensar sempre procede em forma de diálogo -- um diálogo entre diferentes fases do ego – de modo que, sendo dialógico, ele está essencialmente composto de signos, como sua matéria, no mesmo sentido em que um jogo de xadrez tem as peças de xadrez como sua matéria. Não que os signos particulares empregados sejam eles mesmos o pensamento! Ah não; nem um pouco mais do que as capas de uma cebola são a cebola. (Quase desse mesmo modo, não obstante) (...) todos esses não são mais do que as capas da cebola, seus acidentes não essenciais. Porém, que o pensamento deve Ter alguma forma de expressão para algum possível intérprete, isso é o próprio ser de seu ser...(CP 4.6).¹⁵

Desta citação, infere-se que o fato de estar teleologicamente orientado para ser interpretado é uma característica central e definidora do pensamento, e conseqüentemente do *self*, que independe das atualizações concretas dele mesmo.

Self, identidades e papéis em G. H. Mead e em J. L. Moreno.

O conceito de papéis foi utilizado por J. L. Moreno (1889-1974) como base para a sociometria, tendo como método o psicodrama. O conceito de papel é comum à teoria do interacionismo simbólico do pragmatista G. H. Mead (1863-1931). O Psicodrama surgiu como um método adequado para a observação dos agrupamentos de papéis que constituem o *self* (Moreno, 1946/1978, p.iv.). Na perspectiva sociológica, a gênese do *self* pela assunção do papel do outro foi estudada por G. H. Mead. Moreno, por sua vez, levou a noção de papel para a área da psicologia e psicopatologia. Moreno, qualificou as

¹⁵ “...thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue -- a dialogue between different phases of the ego -- so that, being dialogical, it is essentially composed of signs, as its matter, in the sense in which a game of chess has the chessmen for its matter. Not that the particular signs employed are themselves the thought! Oh, no; no whit more than the skins of an onion are the onion. (About as much so, however.) One selfsame thought may be carried upon the vehicle of English, German, Greek, or Gaelic; in diagrams, or in equations, or in graphs: all these are but so many skins of the onion, its inessential accidents. Yet that the thought should have some possible expression for some possible interpreter, is the very being of its being. . . .” (CP 4.6).

reflexões de Mead sobre papéis e self como excelentes, mas criticou a carência de um método para sua observação e experimentação. O psicodrama, argumenta Moreno, fornece um instrumento para observar os processos de papéis tanto no âmbito social quanto em condições experimentais. O Psicodrama também é proposto como um método de utilidade para a situação terapêutica, assim como para o treinamento de papéis nos enquadres pedagógicos. (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. i-v)

A importância do conceito de papel para o estudo do *self* decorre de sua utilidade para poder abordar conceptual e empiricamente a multiplicidade de identidades que fazem parte do processo semiótico do *self*. Sendo as identidades pontes de conexão da pessoa com seu entorno social, elas estão associadas aos papéis através dos quais a pessoa se vincula aos outros nas diferentes circunstâncias.

Mead descreveu a gênese do *self* a partir de um processo de assunção de papéis e de uma ação reflexiva. Segundo Mead (1913), quando a criança vai assumindo os papéis dos outros significativos no seu entorno, com seus gestos e atitudes correspondentes, ela não está somente seguindo um impulso imitativo. No momento em que a criança atua, ela também está registrando em sua memória as imagens de sua ação e da reação dos outros a respeito do próprio *self*. Assim, Mead (1913) afirma que “a criança pode pensar sobre sua conduta como sendo boa ou ruim, somente enquanto ela reage a suas próprias ações nas palavras lembradas de seus pais” (p. 377). Desse modo, nos primeiros estágios do desenvolvimento, o self emerge num cenário interno no qual pensamento é um processo literalmente dramático. Essa dramaticidade senta as bases do que, com o decorrer tempo, vai ser o pensamento adulto. A intensidade da gestualidade corporal que acompanha o desdobramento dramático infantil começa a se reduzir na medida em que a criança amadurece. A evolução da dramática dos primeiros estágios até que a forma do pensamento adulto seja atingida consiste apenas numa diferença de ênfase: o aspecto teatral se torna menos evidente, mas permanece na forma dialógica do pensamento. Com o amadurecimento da criança, o aspecto icônico do pensamento perde brilho para ceder a predominância para o aspecto simbólico do discurso interno. Desse modo, Mead explica que “posteriormente, o cenário interno muda num foro e numa oficina de pensamento. As características e as entonações das *dramatis personae* se desvanecem e a ênfase recai sobre o significado do discurso interno, o imagético torna-se meramente o estritamente necessário” (Mead, 1913, p. 377, trad. MM).¹⁶

¹⁶ “Thus the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts to his own acts in the

Essa transformação acontece devido a uma mitigação do “imagético” (*imagery*), no sentido de gestos físicos e acessórios visuais que acompanham o discurso infantil. Contudo, o pensamento adulto preserva o caráter dialógico de ser um foro, no sentido de um espaço em que acontece um debate.

Conforme Mead, o pensamento não consiste meramente numa atividade intelectual puramente abstrata e monológica. Trata-se de um pensamento que se expressa de modo intelectual, corporal e visual, mesmo quando os aspetos corporais e visuais adquirem progressivamente uma modalidade mais leve, como também de um pensamento no qual se expressam várias vozes. Na infância, através do processo dramático, em sua forma explícita, a criança vai desenvolvendo a capacidade de se colocar no papel do “outro generalizado” (Mead, 1925, p. 268). Para ilustrar esse conceito, Mead fornece o exemplo do conjunto de leis ou regras que defendem o direito à vida e à propriedade das pessoas. No processo de desenvolvimento, quando um indivíduo toma a atitude de um outro generalizado, ele aparece como objeto para si mesmo. Na concepção de Mead, na gênese do self essas duas aparições são correlativas.¹⁷ Da mesma forma como as ações de comprar e vender são correlativas (a compra estando em direta vinculação com o estímulo que provém da ação de vender), são correlativas às experiências do outro e do *self*.¹⁸ Isso é o que está implicado no fenômeno da autoconsciência segundo Mead.

A teoria de papéis de Moreno coincide com a concepção de Mead, destacando a pré-existência temporal do desempenho de papéis sobre a gênese do self. Moreno coincide com Mead na importância que ele atribui à evolução social da criança, mas considera que Mead não prestou suficiente atenção ao desenvolvimento pré-semântico (Moreno, 1946/1978).

Parece possível traçar um paralelismo entre a noção de bilateralidade da consciência em Peirce, concebida como origem da distinção ego/não-ego, e a descrição de uma aparição correlativa do *self* e do outro na consciência, em Mead. A noção de

remembered words of his parents. Until this process has been developed into the abstract process of thought, self-consciousness remains dramatic, and the self which is a fusion of the remembered actor and this accompanying chorus is somewhat loosely organized and very clearly social. Later the inner stage changes into the forum and workshop of thought. The features and intonations of the *dramatis personae* fade out and the emphasis falls upon the meaning of the inner speech, the imagery becomes merely the barely necessary” (Mead, 1913, p. 377).

¹⁷ Note-se a vinculação entre o conceito de uma “dupla aparição correlativa” para a consciência na gênese do self, com a proposta de Peirce de uma “double-sided consciousness” através da qual a pessoa se torna ciente do self ao se dar conta do não-self (CP 1.324).

¹⁸ A idéia de duas aparições correlativas (nos papéis de comprador e vendedor) pode ser contrastada com a noção moreniana de papéis complementares (ver descrição abaixo).

Mead é compatível com a descrição de Moreno do *self* como emergente da dinâmica de papel e contra-papel (Moreno, 1959/1975).

Um dos exemplos que Peirce (CP 2.84) forneceu para ilustrar a bilateralidade da consciência que pertence à categoria da Secundidade é justamente a relação de um papel e seu contra-papel, embora o termo “papel” não tenha sido utilizado pelo semioticista. Peirce afirmou que o aspecto diádico do vínculo entre um marido e sua mulher consiste no fato de cada um dos membros do casal pensar-se como esposo ou esposa, o que faz do marido um marido, e vice-versa, e a real (co-)existência do outro.¹⁹

Moreno (1946/1978), por sua vez, enfatiza em toda sua obra que a noção de papel é uma noção essencialmente vincular, já que um papel só pode ser assumido em função de um contra-papel. É uma filha ou filho quem faz de uma mãe uma mãe e vice-versa. O mesmo acontece para todos os papéis sociais.

Todo indivíduo, assim como ele é o foco de numerosas atrações e rejeições, ele aparece também como foco de numerosos papéis que estão relacionados aos papéis dos outros. Todo indivíduo, assim como ele tem em todo momento um conjunto de amigos e um conjunto de inimigos, também ele tem um rol de papéis e faces, e um rol de contra-papéis. (p.8) .

Moreno salientou que o conceito de papel não somente descreve o vínculo entre pessoas, uma vez que ele se refere a uma experiência sintética na qual mais de um indivíduo participa. O conceito de papel é relevante para o estudo do *self* porque fornece insumos teóricos para explicar um fenômeno complexo como o é a vivência da identidade pessoal. Ele integra o autoconceito da pessoa enquanto indivíduo e também, na própria matriz geradora dessa identidade, a relação com seu entorno social. Assim Moreno (1959/1975) definiu o papel como:

Uma unidade de experiência sintética em que se fundiram elementos privados, sociais e culturais. (...) Toda sessão psicodramática demonstra que um papel é uma experiência interpessoal, e que necessita habitualmente de dois ou mais indivíduos para ser operacionalizado”. (p. 253)

Moreno descreve o processo de desenvolvimento da identidade a partir dos papéis em cinco fases que podem ser organizadas em três estágios básicos. Ao nascer, a

¹⁹ “Imagine two objects which are not merely thought as two, but of which something is true such that neither could be removed without destroying the fact supposed true of the other. Take, for example, a husband and wife. Here there is nothing but a real twoness; but it constitutes a reaction, in the sense that the husband makes the wife a wife in fact (not merely in some comparing thought); while the wife makes the husband a husband. A brute force is only a complication of binarities” (CP 2.84).

criança não se distingue do seu entorno social ou placenta social. Nesse primeiro universo infantil, tampouco existe distinção entre objetos e pessoas, entre mundo interno e mundo externo. A criança faz parte de uma matriz de identidade total e indiferenciada. Os primeiros papéis são desempenhados já nessa fase. Eles são experimentados como duas partes de um mesmo ato. O primeiro ato é o ato de mamar. Os primeiros papéis são chamados papéis psicossomáticos, porquanto eles estão ligados a funções fisiológicas. No segundo universo começa uma progressiva diferenciação: primeiro entre objetos e pessoas (no segundo estágio da matriz de identidade total diferenciada), e logo, num terceiro estágio, aparece uma brecha entre fantasia e realidade.

Os três estágios da matriz de identidade fornecem o embasamento teórico que sustenta a implementação de três técnicas básicas do método psicodramático: o duplo, o espelho, e a inversão de papéis. A primeira fase correspondente à técnica chamada duplo: a criança e a mãe (ou substituto) fazem parte da unidade do ato de alimentação. Na segunda fase, a criança se concentra no outro extremo do ato e assume seu papel deixando fora o resto do mundo, inclusive a si mesma. A terceira fase corresponde à inversão de papéis. Após ter distinguido uma brecha entre mundo externo e mundo interno, a criança pode realizar uma completa inversão de papéis com outra pessoa. Ela pode se colocar no papel do outro e interagir com alguém que assume seu papel (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 102).

Na medida em que a criança se desenvolve, os papéis ultrapassam a relação com as funções fisiológicas, diferenciando-se em papéis sociais (mundo externo) e em papéis psicodramáticos (mundo interno). Isso acompanha o processo de estabelecimento da brecha entre fantasia e realidade (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 119).

Bello (1999) assinala que no terceiro estágio, com a inversão de papéis, se manifesta a distinção entre self e outro. É justamente essa distinção a que faz possível para alguém se colocar no lugar do outro. Porém, segundo a autora, Moreno não deixou totalmente claro na sua teoria a forma em que a distinção entre self e outro acontece. A despeito disso, a tese de Bello é que essa explicação está implícita na concepção de Moreno. Quando Moreno explica a técnica psicodramática chamada de interpolação de resistência, através de sua descrição da técnica, ele explica o modo como se estabelece uma brecha entre fantasia e realidade, entre self e outro. Para chegar ao estágio de inversão de papéis é necessário que antes opere uma interpolação de resistência da realidade. Só assim se compreende a distinção entre self e outro necessária para que

possa acontecer essa inversão de papéis. A incidência forçosa da realidade no desenvolvimento que, segundo Bello, não foi explicitamente descrita por Moreno, pode ser inferida considerando o conjunto da teoria no que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento de papéis. A seguinte citação é um exemplo dessa definição da função da realidade no desenvolvimento do self:

A função da realidade opera mediante interpolações de resistências que não são introduzidas pela criança, mas que são impostas a ela por outras pessoas, por suas relações, por coisas e distâncias no espaço, e por atos e distâncias no tempo. (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 115, citado por Bello 1999, p. 42).²⁰

Na análise de Bello (1999), a função da realidade seria equivalente à função do pai como foi descrita pelo psicanalista francês Jacques Lacan: enquanto um outro que estabelece um limite necessário para a passagem do estágio imaginário ao simbólico.

Conforme Moreno, uma vez estabelecida a brecha fantasia/realidade, subsiste na noção de papel a idéia de unidade funcional que envolve dois extremos, papel/contrapapel (Moreno, 1959/1975). Por isso, no desenvolvimento de papéis, o que o *self* da criança vai incorporando não se limita simplesmente a papéis isolados de outros, mas a modalidades de interação. Assim, Moreno desenvolve a noção de “papéis complementares” (Moreno, 1959/1975, p. 8) como a forma na qual o papel do outro é constitutivo da própria identidade.

A complementaridade de papéis observa-se quando existe um conflito no desenvolvimento. O conflito na sociometria começa a partir dos papéis. Bustos (2000) explica que quando existe um conflito nos vínculos primários, um papel pode se fixar em seu *modus operandi* (p. 39) a seu papel complementar. Com o passar do tempo, quando a pessoa se encontrar com outras que desempenham papéis similares àqueles da situação conflitiva, se manifestará uma tendência a se comportar de acordo com o *modus operandi* antigo. Ela não consegue se adaptar aos aspectos diferentes de um vínculo novo. Predomina assim, uma estereotipia no desempenho de papéis. O funcionamento rígido dos papéis complementares dificulta a percepção dos aspectos diferentes desse encontro com uma pessoa diferente.

²⁰ Confrontar essa concepção da realidade de Moreno com a descrição de Peirce da inferência do self como resultado desse confronto no desenvolvimento da criança: “A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness” (CP 5.233).

O fenômeno da transferência é para Moreno um fenômeno relativo aos papéis. Nesse sentido, ele destaca algumas diferenças do termo homônimo da psicanálise. Trata-se aqui de uma distorção da percepção do outro, pela projeção de um “papel complementar interno patológico” (Bustos, 2000, p. 39). A noção de transferência moreniana faz parte de um conceito mais abrangente, a noção “tele” que dá conta da possibilidade de comunicação baseada numa percepção adequada dos outros sem a distorção da transferência (Bustos, 2000; Karp, Holmes & Bradshaw, 1998; Moreno, 1959/1975).

Moreno diferencia a noção psicodramática de transferência da noção psicanalítica homônima em três aspectos: a) está subordinada à noção mais abrangente de “tele”; b) não é exclusiva da relação terapêutica nem do paciente em direção ao terapeuta; c) trata-se de um fenômeno que envolve especificamente papéis:

A transferência não acontece para uma pessoa generalizada, ou uma vaga Gestalt, mas para um “papel” que o terapeuta representa para o paciente, um papel paterno, um papel materno, um papel de sábio, um papel de homem todo sabedor, o papel de um amante, de um cavaleiro, de um indivíduo perfeitamente ajustado, um modelo de homem, etc. (Moreno, 1959/1975, p. 8).²¹

A caracterização da transferência como um fenômeno relativo aos papéis é importante para este trabalho, uma vez que fornece a distinção conceitual entre *self* e papel. A transferência compromete o funcionamento de papéis, porém o *self* não necessariamente se reduz na teoria a esse funcionamento estereotipado da identidade. Distintamente da transferência, o tele sim é concebido como uma característica do *self*. Desse modo, existe sempre como uma possibilidade de retorno a um funcionamento saudável, pois o conceito está associado à natureza humana em si mesma.

A concepção sociométrica do fenômeno da transferência é inseparável do conceito de tele. Ambos estão ligados à percepção, sendo a transferência uma distorção que interfere com o tele. Por isso, ambos os fenômenos podem ser estudados do ponto de vista semiótico para entender quais são as alterações do processo comunicacional que podem resultar numa distorção transferencial. Considerando-se que a percepção na teoria semiótica é concebida como direta e interpretativa a um tempo, há uma continuidade perfeita entre perceber e compreender o mundo e a nós mesmos nele.

²¹ “Transference does not take place towards a generalized person or a vague Gestalt, but towards a ‘role’ which the therapist represents to the patient, a fatherly role, a maternal role, the role of a wise, all knowing man, the role of a lover, of a gentleman, of a perfectly adjusted individual, the model of a man, etc.” (Moreno, 1975, p. 8).

A transferência é para Moreno um problema que compromete mais do que uma pessoa, já que está associada a uma estereotipia de papéis. Tanto a manutenção de um vínculo transferencial, quanto à recuperação da espontaneidade e do tele acontecem na interação. A natureza humana caracteriza-se para Moreno pela espontaneidade. A espontaneidade é a capacidade de responder de modo adequado numa situação nova e de dar uma nova resposta numa situação antiga. Segundo o psicodramatista, não há situação mais inovadora e desafiante para a espontaneidade que o nascimento. A sobrevivência do bebê em condições extra-uterinas, tão diferentes das condições uterinas e, portanto, pouco aptas para a existência autônoma do ser, seria nesta perspectiva, uma prova mais do que suficiente de que a natureza humana possui espontaneidade. Se a natureza humana possui a característica da espontaneidade, as pessoas têm a capacidade de assumir papéis novos nas relações humanas.

Neste ponto, deve-se mencionar que Moreno (1946/1978) foi influenciado por Peirce no que diz respeito ao conceito de espontaneidade. Em Peirce, espontaneidade faz parte da noção teórica mais complexa de teleologia, a qual não foi incorporada por Moreno em sua teoria sociométrica. A compreensão da espontaneidade dentro de uma área de estudo mais global como é a teleologia tem a vantagem analítica de fornecer um marco para integrar a regularidade e a espontaneidade dos processos e tendências da natureza em geral. Ao estudar a espontaneidade separada da teleologia mais abrangente, as reflexões de Moreno arriscam opor regularidade à mudança de uma forma muito radical muito próxima ao dualismo. A discussão sobre espontaneidade e teleologia será retomada no Estudo 2.

A sociometria de Moreno focaliza-se na criatividade e na flexibilidade do *self* em detrimento de uma explicação da continuidade do *self*. Uma forma de resolver esse problema é proposta por Bustos (2000):

Dentro da matriz de identidade começa a aparecer um papel central que eu chamo de gerador de identidade. A partir deste papel se incorporam condutas cuja dinâmica terá características próprias seja qual for o papel com o qual a pessoa funcione. (Bustos, 2000, p. 39).

Esta afirmação aponta na diversidade de papéis um senso de continuidade que independe da contingência dos papéis.

O processo contínuo do *self*: regularidade ou espontaneidade?

Algumas das principais perguntas que a psicologia tenta responder se referem ao

peso determinante do passado sobre nosso presente: Quanto pode a história familiar e social influir sobre a forma de atuar e de ser no presente? Em outras palavras, nossa dúvida enquanto psicólogos é saber em que medida os vínculos significativos familiares da infância determinam a identidade na vida adulta.

A possibilidade de decidir livremente o modo de ser e de atuar no mundo parece ser mais uma meta a atingir do que um privilégio inerente à condição humana. A dificuldade para compreender por que os indivíduos repetem com insistência condutas que não desejam ter e atitudes que até são prejudiciais, tem sido um grande motivador para a reflexão de muitos psicólogos e psiquiatras. Este problema enigmático levou a Freud (1920/1972) a sustentar que as ações involuntárias estão regidas pelo inconsciente, e que nele opera uma compulsão inexplicável (racionalmente) à repetição de atos penosos, a qual estaria determinada por uma lógica que vai além do princípio do prazer. Algumas teorias opuseram-se à psicanálise à causa de sua excessiva ênfase determinista, de sua dificuldade para dar conta da capacidade criativa do ser humano para transformar não só o mundo, mas também para se transformar a si mesmo. Uma delas foi a teoria dos papéis de J. L. Moreno. Moreno (1946/1978) mencionou ter visto Freud só uma vez, oportunidade na qual fez a ele a seguinte colocação:

Bom, doutor Freud, eu começo onde o senhor deixa as coisas. (...) O senhor analisa os sonhos (das pessoas). Eu tento lhes dar a coragem para sonhar de novo. Eu ensino as pessoas como brincar de Deus. (p. 27, tradução M.M).

O conceito de “espontaneidade” foi proposto por Moreno (1946/1978, p. 89) para dar conta da criatividade na vida quotidiana, assim como da possibilidade que os seres humanos têm de responder adequadamente às novas situações que surgem no dia a dia, ou de responder de modo inovador, no caso de situações familiares. A espontaneidade é um fator que explica a capacidade inovadora, a qual é inata e essencial da condição humana. Para compensar a falta de atenção teórica que a emergência do novo tinha nessa época, principalmente na área da psiquiatria, Moreno esforçou-se para que o conceito de espontaneidade explicasse a capacidade das pessoas de ir além dos estereótipos que fazem parte de toda cultura. A identidade humana poderia ser pensada então como mais flexível e mais livre das determinações produzidas pelas vivências da infância.

As duas teorias mencionadas aqui não tentam representar a diversidade de teorias existentes dentro da psicologia, senão somente exemplificar duas visões opostas a respeito do problema da determinação da identidade. A referência a Moreno serve

também para pesquisar sobre uma fonte bibliográfica do pragmatismo americano que sustenta a noção de espontaneidade para explicar a emergência do novo na vida humana. A respeito da semiótica pragmática de Peirce, Moreno (1946/1978, p.ii) afirma considerar que as reflexões sobre a espontaneidade foram sua maior contribuição teórica. Por outra parte, ele discorda da ênfase que Peirce outorgou ao acaso, ao fortuito, para definir a espontaneidade.

Embora na concepção de Peirce a espontaneidade seja explicada como um resultado do funcionamento ontológico do acaso, a espontaneidade não se reduz ao acaso, trata-se de um conceito mais complexo. A seguinte citação bem poderia ser uma resposta cogitada por Peirce, como se ele tivesse antecipado uma provável crítica, similar àquela realizada por Moreno:

Dedicar-se a dar conta de alguma coisa, dizendo simplesmente que ela se deve ao acaso seria, em verdade, fútil. Mas isso eu não faço. Eu me sirvo do acaso principalmente para abrir espaço para um princípio de generalização, ou tendência a formar hábitos, que eu considero que produziu todas as regularidades. (CP 6.63).²²

A concepção teleológica da significação proposta por Peirce para sua semiótica possui a capacidade de fornecer um fundamento teórico para compreender a relação entre repetição e mudança do *self*, porque tal concepção permite transcender a oposição dualista entre criatividade e repetição em geral, nos processos da natureza, e não simplesmente no âmbito humano. Portanto, a resposta à pergunta formulada no título desta secção deveria incluir uma combinação entre regularidade e espontaneidade cujo equilíbrio seja regulado em função à finalidade dos processos envolvidos.

Processo contínuo do *self* e a teleologia.

A preocupação principal da semiótica triádica não são os signos em si mesmos, mas os processos de “*semeiosy*” (Fisch citado em Short, 1981, p. 202, cf. CP 5.473). Portanto, a experiência de “ser um *self* é ser um signo em processo de devir um *self*” (Colapietro, 1989, p.77). Focalizar a *semiose*, ao invés de focalizar no conceito de signo de modo isolado, implica necessariamente considerar um processo e, conseqüentemente, perguntar-se sobre a determinação e a direcionalidade do processo.

²² “To undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not do. I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities” (CP 6.63).

O termo ‘*semiose*’ remete primariamente à ação do signo quando ele produz um interpretante de si mesmo; mas como o interpretante de um signo é em si mesmo um signo com a mesma classe de poder produtivo, pode-se também aqui falar de processos semióticos. (Ransdell, 1992, p. 1).

Todo processo interpretativo rege-se em última instância por tendências, e toda tendência é auto-regulada pelo propósito de atualização de tipos ideais lógicos (Short, 1981b). Contudo, os tipos ideais não são passíveis de atualização em nenhuma de suas instanciações concretas. Por isso, o *self*, enquanto interpretativo, é definido como processo, como movimento, como um signo em desenvolvimento, como um devir (Colapietro, 1989). O *self* é mais do que um estado de coisas estáveis. Ele é autocontrolado, não podendo ser totalmente atualizado, nas suas identidades particulares concretas. Enfim, os processos semióticos não são regulados por normas externas. Eles são autogovernados. Na visão de Alexander (2002), uma conduta pode ser considerada intencional quando envolve uma combinação entre tendências direcionais e originais, o *telos* direcional e o *telos* original. No seu estudo das narrativas contemporâneas, a autora define a atividade intencional em seu livre arbítrio, como uma atividade criativa do *self*. Aplicar-se-á uma noção de atividade criativa caracterizada pela originalidade, a qual, na perspectiva teleológica é concebida como a combinação proposital de regularidade e espontaneidade ou acaso,²³ para compreender o desenvolvimento saudável do *self*, isto é, de um *self* orientado à preservação da continuidade e da possibilidade de mudança.

A conversação interna

Wiley (1996, p. 72) sistematizou o funcionamento (*workings*) da conversação interna em um gráfico como artifício metodológico para uso em pesquisas empíricas (Tabela 1). Seis papéis, também chamados posições, participantes, pólos, ou instâncias de conversação interna são listados no eixo horizontal: Mim, Eu, Você, Visitantes (temporários), Visitantes (permanentes), o inconsciente. No eixo vertical se listam as variáveis ou diversas dimensões que podem ser assinadas a cada um dos seis papéis: Pessoa; Tempo/Conjugação; Caso; Liberdade/Determinismo; Relação com o outro

²³ “Onde quer que o acaso-espontaneidade seja achado, lá, na mesma proporção há o sentimento. De fato, o acaso não é mais que o aspecto externo daquilo que dentro de si mesmo é sentimento. Há já tempo, eu demonstrei que a existência real, ou coisaidade, consiste em regularidades” (‘Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling. I long ago showed that real existence, or thing-ness, consists in regularities.’) (CP 6.265).

generalizado; Disponibilidade cognitiva para o eu. A tabela resultante é uma matriz de seis-por-seis. Quanto ao inconsciente, Wiley considera sua inclusão na Tabela como se tratando de uma tentativa. O objetivo do autor foi dramatizar o problema de situar esse participante na conversação interna.

Tabela 1: Estrutura da conversação interna: participantes por perfis.

Participantes Perfis	Eu	Mim	Você	Visitantes temporários	Visitantes permanentes	O Inconsciente
Pessoa	Primeira	Primeira	Segunda	Segunda	Segunda	Terceira
Tempo/ conjugação	Passado e atemporal	Futuro	Presente	Presente	Presente	Atemporal
Caso	Ojetivo	Sujetivo	Subjetivo e objetivo	Subjetivo e Objetivo	Objetivo	Todos
Liberdade/ Determinismo	Não livre	Livre	Não livre e livre	Não livre	Não livre	Determinado
Relação com o outro generalizado	Aliado	Sem Vínculo	Aliança diminuente	Mais livre que visitante permanente	Aliado e constitutivo	Livre
Disponibilidade cognitiva para o Eu	Como objeto	Ponto cego	Como co- sujeito	Como co- sujeito	Como co- sujeito mas sedimentado no outro generalizado	Velado pela barreira semiporosa da linguagem

Psicodrama.

O método psicodramático é utilizado para a observação de papéis na pesquisa, para o treinamento na educação, assim como para a auto-observação na psicoterapia. O termo alude a um conjunto de técnicas dramáticas aplicadas de modo variado em diversos contextos. Num sentido mais específico a expressão psicodrama clássico ou tradicional (Bello, 1999) é usada para designar uma técnica psicoterápica complexa. Em termos gerais, as técnicas psicodramáticas estão enquadradas na teoria de papéis ou sociometria de Moreno e compartilham uma estrutura geral, um procedimento metodológico em três etapas, uma distribuição de papéis dos participantes e um conjunto de técnicas básicas.

As três etapas são: aquecimento, dramatização e compartilhamento (*sharing*) (ver Karp et al. 1991, Bello,1999). Nos casos de treinamento se agrega um quarto passo

chamado de processamento. O aquecimento é uma preparação para a ação dramática que se divide em aquecimento específico e inespecífico. A dramatização é a encenação e ação dramática propriamente dita. O compartilhamento está dedicado a narrar ao protagonista experiências e lembranças acordadas pela cena no público. Finalmente, o processamento está dedicado a discutir os recursos técnicos utilizados.

Os participantes são o protagonista, os ego-auxiliares, o diretor e o grupo (platéia). O protagonista é quem se oferece apoiado pelo grupo para expor sua experiência pessoal. Os ego-auxiliares são membros do público escolhidos pelo protagonista (ou pessoas treinadas) para representar os papéis necessários para a ação. O diretor é quem propõe os recursos técnicos necessários para atingir os propósitos da dramatização, seja ele terapêutico, pedagógico ou de autoconhecimento. Quando não é possível usar ego-auxiliares para a cena, podem utilizar-se almofadas ou cadeiras. Bello (1999) descreve as seguintes técnicas básicas do método psicodramático: duplo, espelho, inversão de papéis, solilóquio, entrevista, maximização, concretização, interpolação de resistências. Por fim, o espaço dramático, conforme Moreno (1946/1978), pode ser qualquer espaço demarcado para esse fim, como ocorria no teatro de Beacon, Nova York, conduzido pelo próprio Moreno. Os papéis psicodramáticos são concebidos neste trabalho como sendo equivalentes às identidades particulares porque uma vez que eles são internalizações das relações interpessoais, principalmente das primárias, eles passam a fazer parte do self.

Proposta da pesquisa.

Problema de pesquisa

Foi descrita acima a proposta de Wiley (1996) de diferenciar os conceitos de *self* e identidade. A noção de identidade é crucial para estabelecer pontes adequadas entre o *self* e o mundo. Não obstante o *self* não está reduzido a uma identidade específica. O *self* é uma estrutura mais abrangente, uma noção lógica de hierarquia superior, envolvendo os três pronomes: Eu-Mim-Você. Wiley (1996) adverte sobre os obstáculos que surgem para o desenvolvimento saudável das pessoas e das sociedades quando se confundem *self* e identidade. Nesses casos uma identidade particular pode crescer de um modo patológico, usurpando o lugar da totalidade do *self*. O fluxo normal do processo interpretativo pode ser bloqueado. A consequência poderia ser a constituição de um falso-*self* (Winnicott, 1960, referido por Wiley, 1994), que é descrito como uma diminuição da capacidade de geração de signos mais desenvolvidos, uma redução de

espontaneidade e do poder semiótico, uma detenção do fluxo de crescimento de sentido do *self* (CP 2.228), uma reificação de uma identidade particular. A distinção teórica entre *self* e identidade traz repercussões práticas importantes. Por exemplo, pode contribuir para o desenvolvimento de conceitos que podem ser aplicados para implementar medidas profiláticas nas áreas da educação e da psicopedagogia ou para delinear objetivos terapêuticos.

Para avançar na distinção entre *self* (processo semiótico) e identidades (signos particulares resultado desse processo) é necessário abordar o problema de como entender a relação entre o geral e o particular, na evolução da identidade humana. Wiley (1996, p.52) propôs uma metáfora espacial para descrever o *self* como uma estrutura abrangente, e as identidades como elementos parciais contidos dentro dessa estrutura. Porém, ele admitiu que a metáfora espacial não é totalmente adequada, já que dificulta a compreensão do aspecto processual do *self*. Essa solução, portanto, traz um novo problema. Se concebermos o *self* como um processo de desenvolvimento, torna-se fundamental achar conceitos para dar conta da relação *self*/identidades na sua evolução ao longo do eixo temporal. Trata-se do problema de como conciliar um fenômeno temporal com a vivência espacial do *self* como mundo interno. Portanto, torna-se necessário entender qual o papel das identidades na evolução da conversação interna concebida como um processo interpretativo. Outrossim, o estudo do pensamento requer a abordagem de um problema metodológico decorrente da dificuldade dos pesquisadores para observar uma atividade que é levada a cabo em forma privada e usualmente silenciosa.

Objetivos.

O objetivo geral do presente estudo é demonstrar empiricamente: 1) que os pensamentos de tipo verbal e não verbal, incluindo gestos e outras formas de significação não exteriorizadas, estruturam-se como um diálogo durante o qual o *self* assume alternativamente diferentes posições (papéis) em uma conversação interna; 2) que a natureza dialógica do discurso interno implica a existência de múltiplas identidades constituindo uma dramaturgia no mundo interno; 3) que o *self* não pode ser reduzido a nenhuma das identidades particulares que o constituem, constituindo-se em um processo interpretativo através do qual a diversidade é integrada numa continuidade temporal; 4) que cada identidade particular pode ser analisada como um efeito de sentido (ou interpretante) que se atualiza em um novo signo através do qual o Eu se

refere a um Mim e se dirige a um Você situado num momento futuro como uma dimensão potencial que orienta a teleologia do processo; 5) que o processo da conversação interna pode ser observado na forma em que ele acontece naturalmente através do método psicodramático.

Implicações e expectativas.

Os objetivos de pesquisa levam a três importantes perguntas que devem ser consideradas com atenção: 1. É possível observar empiricamente uma noção tão abstrata como a do *self*? 2. É viável integrar teórica e metodologicamente a semiótica de Peirce e a sociometria de Moreno? e 3 Qual a relevância da distinção entre *self* e identidades para a psicologia enquanto ciência aplicada a uma prática profissional?

O pressuposto de que o *self* é passível de observação está baseado na máxima pragmática descrita por Peirce:

Para evidenciar o significado de uma concepção intelectual, deveria se considerar quais conseqüências práticas poderiam resultar conceptíveis necessariamente da verdade dessa concepção; e a somatória dessas conseqüências constituirão o significado total da concepção. (CP 5.9)²⁴

Uma vez que o *self* é definido como um signo, isto é como um conceito, ele pode ser observado através de suas conseqüências experienciáveis. Todo discurso, inclusive o pensamento, desenvolve-se através de signos que são palavras, gestos, imagens, emoções. Enquanto signos, não existem aspectos do *self* que não sejam passíveis de serem comunicados ou de integrar uma comunicação. A conversação interna não é essencialmente diferente da conversação externa.

Nenhuma distinção conceitual deve se reduzir ao âmbito teórico, sua validade define-se pelas suas conseqüências experienciáveis. Considera-se que a distinção *self*/identidades traz conseqüências que ultrapassam o âmbito acadêmico e afetam o desenvolvimento psicológico das pessoas numa comunidade qualquer. Caracterizar o *self* como uma capacidade interpretativa que é universal e genérica supõe conceber uma natureza comum a todos os seres humanos independentemente de sua cultura, raça ou circunstâncias sociais. Caracterizar a identidade como uma multiplicidade de relações implica entender a incidência dos papéis sociais assumidos em diversos grupos de

²⁴ “In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception” (CP 5.9).

pertença, e dos auto-conceitos que emergem dos vínculos sociais e familiares.

Do ponto de vista do marco teórico, é necessário justificar a compatibilidade do método psicodramático com a teoria semiótica. Argumenta-se neste trabalho que existem coincidências importantes entre as concepções fundamentais da teoria de Peirce e da sociometria de Moreno. Ambas teorias assumem uma dramática interna na qual há uma continuidade entre as relações de papéis sociais no mundo externo com o processo dialógico interno. O psicodrama pode complementar o estudo do *self* de acordo com uma perspectiva pragmática, porque oferece um instrumento para a observação da conversação interna. O psicodrama considerado como um “método de ação” (Blatner, 1995) é adequado para abordar uma concepção dinâmica do *self*. Além disso, o psicodrama pode fornecer um suporte metodológico para sustentar a crítica peirceana da introspecção como método de autoconhecimento, porque constitui um instrumento para o estudo do *self* através da observação externa, um método que pode ser classificado como “extrospectivo” (Rychlak, 1973)

A distinção teórica entre *self* e identidade pode contribuir para tomar medidas profiláticas que evitem a estereotipia da identidade, para impedir que uma identidade particular torne-se o substituto funcional do *self*, evitando assim fenômenos patológicos tais como o falso-*self* (Winnicott, 1960). Medidas profiláticas embasadas na teoria semiótica podem ser aplicadas à área clínica, educacional, ou de aconselhamento parental.

A expectativa principal para avançar na distinção *self*/identidade acha-se na tentativa de fornecer insumos teóricos e metodológicos que possam ser de utilidade para psicólogos e educadores voltados à prevenção de transtornos no processo de desenvolvimento da identidade. Em circunstâncias sociais ou familiares ansiogênicas uma identidade particular – que pode ser inclusive uma identidade auto-desvalorizadora ou anti-social – pode ganhar excessiva preponderância e usurpar o lugar da estrutura mais abrangente, do *self*, produzindo assim um bloqueio do processo interpretativo. Nesse caso acontece uma perda de flexibilidade da pessoa para assumir novos papéis e para a geração semiótica de novas identidades. Essa diminuição da espontaneidade do *self* implica uma diminuição da capacidade de autocontrole. Segundo Wiley (1996) “Se alguma identidade usurpa o papel mais abrangente da estrutura, tem a pretensão de ser a principal realidade do *self*” (p.53). A importância da distinção *self*/identidades, tanto nas teorias quanto nas suas aplicações em ações sociais, educativas e terapêuticas, leva a evitar fenômenos psicopatológicos que estão associados a “identidades invasivas, quase

cancerígenas, que tomam conta do *self*' (Wiley, 1996, p.54).

Portanto a investigação dedicada a compreender as formas de pensamento autocontrolado pode ser de utilidade para colaborar com a elaboração de programas de prevenção para o desenvolvimento infantil, conhecidos como CDP (*Child Development Projects*). Esses programas estão orientados para a promoção, para o autocontrole e, conseqüentemente, para a redução de problemas que se exprimem em sintomas de psicopatologia infantil, tais como agressão, depressão e ansiedade (ver Greenberg, Domitrovich e Bumbarger, 2001)

ESTUDOS EIDÉTICOS E EMPÍRICOS

Com dito na apresentação desta Tese, foram realizados cinco estudos correlativos, divididos em eidéticos e em empíricos. O primeiro estudo eidético é uma revisão da literatura psicológica sobre *self* e mediação semiótica, para indagar sobre o lugar que a semiótica de Peirce ocupa na literatura psicológica, e sobre os possíveis benefícios que o uso do modelo triádico de signo poderia trazer para os estudos psicológicos. O segundo estudo eidético responde à pergunta sobre como podemos explicar a coexistência de uma multiplicidade de identidades junto ao senso de unidade e de consistência do *self*, ao longo do tempo.

Os estudos empíricos recorrem à ação psicodramática como instrumentação para obtenção de dados e à fenomenologia semiótica como método de análise, como serão explicados no decorrer dos próprios estudos, preparados em forma de artigos. O primeiro estudo indaga sobre o lugar da semiótica de Peirce na literatura psicológica, e sobre os possíveis benefícios que o uso do modelo triádico de signo poderia trazer para os estudos psicológicos. O segundo estudo é sobre a concepção semiótica e o problema da coexistência de identidades múltiplas e do senso de unidade do *self*, ao longo do tempo. O terceiro estudo explora a relevância da categoria da Secundidade para entender a relação dialógica interna através da observação dos processos de pensamento. O quarto estudo recorre ao filme *Turista Acidental*, como um caso ilustrativo da teleologia dos processos semióticos, para explorar a incidência da causa final na ação combinada de tendências de repetição e de mudança no desenvolvimento do *self*. Por fim, o quinto estudo propõe uma convergência teórica e metodológica entre a semiótica peirceana e o psicodrama moreniano.

Study 1

The Psychological Approach to the Self and the Conception of Sign Mediation

Abstract. The problem of semiotic mediation is deemed relevant for the study of self-consciousness. However, the literature on the self has not reflected enough on the conception of the sign. We argue that constructivism and social constructionism adopted a notion of sign reduced to linguistic symbols which instills an idealistic bias into psychological theories. Pragmatism posits an alternative notion of sign construed as a relation of three logical elements, to account for a process whereby the meaning of a sign is gradually revealed through the generation of interpreting signs. We conclude that psychological theories may benefit from attaching more relevance to triadic semiosis for a developmental approach to the self which includes its non-verbal aspects. Such is the upshot of conceiving the self as a continuous, dialogical semiotic process.

Key words: self, semiotic mediation, constructivism, social constructionism, pragmatism.

Estudo 1

A Abordagem Psicológica do Self e a Concepção da Mediação Sígnica

Resumo. O problema da mediação semiótica é considerado relevante para o estudo da autoconsciência. Contudo, a literatura sobre o *self* não se dedica o suficiente a explorar o conceito de signo. Argumenta-se que a noção de signo restrita a símbolos lingüísticos adotada pelas teorias construtivistas e construcionistas transmite um viés idealista às teorias psicológicas. O pragmatismo propõe uma noção alternativa de signo definido como a relação de três elementos lógicos. Trata-se de um processo através do qual o significado é gradualmente revelado através da geração de signos interpretantes. Conclui-se que as teorias psicológicas podem se beneficiar ao outorgar maior relevância à semiótica triádica no estudo do desenvolvimento do *self* para incluir os aspectos não verbais, por concebê-lo como um processo semiótico contínuo e dialógico.

Palavras chave: self, mediação semiótica, construtivismo, construcionismo social, pragmatismo.

The present paper discusses the conception of sign mediation assumed by some of the psychological theories that serve as foundation for the dialogical and semiotic models of the self: constructivism, social constructionism and pragmatism. It is argued that structuralist and post-structuralist conception of sign as exclusively a linguistic symbol endows an idealist bias to the conception of the self. The tendency towards psychologism which can be observed in constructivism, on the one hand, and the tendency to sociologism, attributed to constructionism, on the other, are consequences of such a reductionist conception. The paper attempts to show that there is a contradiction at the core of psychological theories that aim to propose interactive models of human cognitive development which are associated with a dialogical view of the self on the one hand, and sign models that are based on idealistic principles on the other. Pragmatism proposes an alternative conception of sign mediation that has been insufficiently explored by psychological theories in comparison to the potential benefit that can be derived from the triadic notion of sign. The present paper reflects on how the triadic sign conception can contribute to solve some of the problems that the literature on the self is currently discussing, for instance, how to account for an overarching identity that integrates the multivoiced self, and also how to overcome the limitations of the spatial metaphor of contained selves or identities to include the temporal description suitable to describe the developmental process of the self.

Psychological theories and the study of the self

Regarding the notion of self, psychological literature is extensively dedicated to works framed within the model of the dialogical self proposed by Hermans and Kempen's (1993). Their aim is to account for a polyphonic self constituted by a multiplicity of voices in permanent dynamic dialogue with each other. Barresi (2002) analyses carefully the theoretical sources of this model of the self in James, and Bakhtin and compares it with the account of the self developed by Hermans and Kempen. The author introduces James's distinction between a pronoun 'I' constituted by the thinker's present thought and the pronoun Me which is the self in the past, constituted by a multiplicity of empirical selves or characters. Barresi describes the problem of explaining if the thinker identified with the stream of thought chooses an identity among the multiplicity of empirical selves. Influenced by Bakhtin's notion of polyphonic novel Herman proposed to consider that each of the selves or characters would take

alternatively the I position in order to express itself in its own voice. This would determine a dialogue among many voices that speak within the self. According to Barresi (2002), the self concept changed from being a thinking I, to become a speaking voice. The problem that is discussed in Barresi's article is how once conceived as a polyphonic novel, the self achieves integration without proposing an authoritarian narrative I position. The author expresses a reluctance to accept a narrative voice that stands above the characters, a metaposition, and seems to prefer the notion of a unifying narrative goal that provides the self with a precarious, unstable unity.

Barresi's article tackles a problem that is recurrent in the literature on the dialogical self. The proposal of a non unified, heterogeneous and decentralized self opposed to the classical Cogito paradigm is nowadays been considered an insufficient characterization. Once a multiphonic self is proposed a new problem arises, namely, the need to account for unification and autonomy. To do so, it is necessary to explain how a multivoiced self interacts dialogically in an imaginal landscape to integrate the incompatible positions and thus develops a metaposition (Hermans, 2001b, 2002a,b; 2003). The study of the normal dialogical process has been applied to the understanding of the disorder that comes about when there is a schizophrenic collapse of the capacity to maintain an ongoing dialogue (Lysaker & Lysaker 2004). On the opposite side, there is a position that questions the need to explain the self's integration and unity assuming for the self a normal state of multiplicity (Raggat, 2002). Still, once the issue of change is explained by a state of multiplicity, sheer multiplicity does not seem enough to account for autonomy or for goal oriented innovation.

The study of how the dialogical self is open to innovation is considered crucial for the elaboration of a developmental theory, since it is necessary to account for creativity in psychological growth. The study of innovation is opposed to the rigid conservation of routines (Fogel, de Koeyer, Bellagamba, & Bell, 2002; Hermans, 2003).

Another issue that has been discussed in the literature is the relation between the model of the dialogical self and Vygostky's theory, something which necessarily involves working on the problem of how signs and dialogical relationships can be brought to converge into a single unit of analysis (Shotter, 1999; Leinman, 2002)

Besides the theoretical problems there is also the problem of how to find methods suitable to study Hermans and Kempen's self that allow capturing the interactive aspect of the dialogical model. An attempt to address that problem is carried out by Verhofstadt Deneve, (2003) through the application of Moreno's Social Atom

Method and Sociogram. It is argued in that work that Moreno's method is adequate to provide a spatial situation to turn vivid the experience of dialectical oppositions. However, in spite of the adequacy of the Moreno's methodological device to a dialogical view of the self as a vivid interactive process, there are not many applications of this instrument to research along this line.

In a thesis dedicated to compare the dialogical model (Hermanns and Kempen, 1993) and the semiotic model proposed by Colapietro (1989) and Wiley (1994), DeSouza (2005) focuses on the complementary aspects of both model and also discusses the lack of adequate methods to study the self. The author concludes that the first model is useful to describe the self through a spatial metaphore, while the second emphasizes the experience of the self as a temporal process. The methodological device proposed by Hermanns is applied by DeSouza (2005) to contribute to the mapping of what are denominated different positions of the self. According to DeSouza (2005), the method of the PPR provides access to a synchronic cut of the self and therefore it is appropriate to furnish an encompassing vision of the multiple positions, but does not furnish insights about the dialogical process as it takes place along time. We believe that if the two models of the self are considered complementary in the sense of accounting for two actually experienced dimensions of the self phenomenon, the possibilities of psychodramatic and sociometric techniques need to be more exhaustively explored, because they furnish the means to combine the two dimensions of the self through the spatialization of the interactions and the observation of their evolution along the time axis.

According to the revision of psychological literature, it can be concluded that some of the salient issues that are being currently discussed concerning the self are the problems of self and semiotic mediation, the integration of the self's dialogical multiplicity, innovation and change versus unchanging rigidity in the development of the self. Even though the problem of semiotic mediation in self narratives stands out as a relevant issue, psychological literature is very scarcely dedicated to discuss Peirce's semiotic. The works of Colapietro, (1989) and Wiley (1994), have given pioneering steps in the direction of developing Peirce's approach to the self. The semiotic self model which is based on pragmatism and is known shares with Hermans and Kempen (1993) a dialogical stance. The fact that, both Peirce and James belonged to the pragmatic movement explains that there are some common basic assumptions. Nevertheless, Colapietro (1989) points out that there are also non-minor disagreements

between Peirce's and James' perspectives. Such discrepancies are perhaps the source of the differences between the semiotic and the dialogical models of the self. In his revision of *Peirce's approach to the self*, Colapietro (1989) holds that Peirce conceived of the self as being defined by its communicational nature, while James (1890) argued in favor of some aspects of an inner realm which are non-communicable and therefore defended the notion of isolation regarding the innermost aspects of the self. The main difference lies on Peirce's view of a unification of the self with sign process on the one hand, and the vision of a self which uses signs to communicate such as it is posited in constructionist approaches.

Some students of psychologicals theorization such as Maze, (2001); Praetorius, (2003) have observed that there is a strong tendency to idealism in present constructivist and social constructionist psychological theories which results from the influence of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to the concept of sign mediation. The present paper argues that the structuralist model of sign which is one of basic concepts of constructivist and social constructionist theories is adequate for the study of verbal language but presents some limitations for psychological theories that aim to study human development including the non-verbal aspects of the sign mediated communicational process and thus avoiding the artificial disconnection of the realms of mind, body, social culture and nature.

Triadic semiotic as an alternative to the notions of mental and social construction

The philosophical reflections of the triadic semiotic²⁵ theory developed by C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) search for an alternative to Cartesian dualism. What underlies the pragmatic alternative is the premise that all kinds of dualistic analytical oppositions, be it intellectualism versus physicalism, psychologism versus sociologism, nature versus nurture, idealism versus realism, end up in different kinds of reductionisms. Instead, it is necessary to try to approach each area of study taking an analytical stance that concentrates in specific aspects but respects and acknowledges the universe as a continuum²⁶. An interesting argument for overcoming dualism is to be found in what

²⁵ A common practice among Peircean scholars, which will be followed in this text, is to use the term '**semiotic**' to denote the specific kind of triadic sign theory developed by Peirce. This serves to differentiate this model from other sign theories (eg. semiology also known as European semiotics).

²⁶ See Charles Sanders Peirce entry in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Psychophysical Monism and Antinominalism entry Number 8. Retrieved on June 18, 2004 from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#syn>.

Santaella (2002, p. 103) a perspective which can be defined as “objective idealism”. This philosophical stance is described by Ibri (2000, p.39) as the “idealism-realism” of Peircean pragmatic semiotic. If we construe “Realism and Idealism as doctrines which are absolutely correlative and mutually necessary” (Ibri 2000, p.39), then the supposedly irreconcilable antagonists world (matter) and representation (mind) are joined in an inseparable collaboration out of which meaning and purpose develop.

In an article dedicated to exploring the possible consequences of applying pragmatism to formal education, Turrisi (2002) engages in an interesting comparison of the constructivist and the pragmatic approaches to learning. The author holds that if pragmatism had greater influence on educational programs and curricula the emphasis on “the test of experience” (p. 134) would increase considerably. Coincidentally, other scholars of pragmatic leaning share the opinion that one of the most important contributions of pragmatism to science in general is the emphasis on experience, as the only way for theories to incorporate new knowledge (see Ransdell, 1998). In contrast, constructivism stresses that there is an individual, subjective mental construction of knowledge that prevails over objective, external reality. The explanation of this bias is that, historically, constructivism emerged as an alternative to authoritarian educational systems that viewed students as passive recipients of knowledge. The author mentions the influence of Dewey’s (1918) educational ideas on constructivism. The aim to promote the student’s active participation led to propose an education in which the “individual student’s construction of the meaning of his learning is considered a priority” (Turrisi, 2002, p.125).

This explains why Dewey, notwithstanding his overall pragmatic philosophical tendency, was followed by constructivist thinkers who developed the notion of a “mental construct” proposed by Bruner. Piaget’s influence is related to his emphasis on the importance of the mental structure of the child at each stage of development. In spite of focusing on social interaction, according to Turrisi, the work of Vygostky assumes that knowledge is integrated to the individual’s mental structure in a way that is akin to Bruner’s, that is, by means of “a mental construct that individuals form in order to incorporate new ideas” (Turrisi, 2002, p. 126). The author argues that pragmatic premises lead in the opposite direction. Instead of relying on “constructions of reality”, knowledge is based mainly on “conclusions that come about through a rigorous process involving the engagement of thought with reality” (Turrisi, 2002, p. 131).

In an article dedicated to compare constructivism and social constructionism,

Arendt (2001) arrives to the conclusion that the two currents of thought embody opposite tendencies. While the former leads to psychologism, the latter ends up in sociologism. When he discusses social constructionism, in a syllogistic fashion, Arendt formulates the assumption that new developments in semiotic, literature and philosophy of culture tend to show that theories cannot be deemed truth or false outside of the culture to which they belong. The upshot of this line of thought is that if the subject depends on language and signs to understand the world, and if language is a collective construction, then it is not totally accurate to speak of an individual mind. A socialized vision of the self was proposed by some thinkers of social constructionism such as Gergen (1991), who theorized extensively on the importance of others in the constitution of the self. Consequently, the subject as autonomous agent lost theoretical credibility in this approach.

The assumption that there is no possibility of true or false judgments that are not relative to culture is, by no means, an unquestionable premise in the field of semiotic studies, but an extremely polemical issue.

After discussing constructivism, Arendt (2001) goes on to address the constructivist assumption that all possible knowledge is dependent on the psychological structure of the individual. To furnish an example of this approach in one of its most radical representatives, he refers to Glaserfeld's (1998) conception of the experience of the social as being nothing but a subjective experience. Finally, Arendt (2001) concludes that in order to arrive to a comprehensive view of the self it is necessary to intensify the dialogue between the two approaches, namely, constructivism and social constructionism, instead of bringing out their antagonisms.

The argument that the present work tries to defend is that although such a dialogue will undoubtedly be beneficial for a psychological theory, the controversial semiotic issue regarding the possibility of truthful knowledge will not be really dealt with, unless pragmatic semiotic is incorporated into the discussion. Although constructivism and social constructionism involve opposite positions in relation to the emphasis on the relevance of the individual or of society, both of them hold a very similar thesis concerning the subjective construction of reality. An intellectualist bias has been pointed out in constructivist approaches owing to the influence of structuralist and post-structuralist semiotic conceptions (Maze, 2001; Praetorius, 2003), which proposes a radical separation between reality and the human understanding of it.

Although we agree with Arendt (2001) that a dialogue among constructivist

and constructionist theoreticians is necessary, the conception of sign mediation will not be revised unless that dialogue includes the triadic pragmatic perspective, because the first two approaches share the assumption that signs are a creation of the human mind. Unless some of the semiotic assumptions are revised, there is the risk that the constraining determination of reality on sign mediation not be adequately considered. Consequently, the study of the self will end up preserving the irreconcilable split between the subjective and the objective realms, which is the classical doctrine of dualism.

For that reason, the assumption that meaning about the world and the self can only be constructed will be here contrasted with the pragmatic conception which proposes that meaning is an immanent property to be observed in signs (Ransdell, 1991, 1992), which thus are the logical and also the most natural means of connection with reality. The kind of observation proposed is not of pure, simple or primitive facts or sense data, as in positivism, but of triadic signs, that is why it is an interpretive observation.

Concerning constructivism, Freitas (1997) describes in a detailed way, in her doctoral thesis, how the subject acquires knowledge in relation to the external world. Piaget's theory is centrally oriented to propose an epistemological subject that is essentially active. This author clearly points out that the Piagetian concept of adaptation has a precise meaning within Piaget's theory, and it should not be construed in a naïve way, nor should it be drawn directly from common sense. Intelligence, for Piaget, is a way of adaptation, since it implies a system of operations that is alive and active. The original French term used by Piaget is *agissant*, which perhaps ought to be translated as *in action*. The child actively constructs what Piaget has called *schemas of action* starting from biological reflexes. These are the child's first steps in the process of developing abstraction capacity.

In Piaget, action is organized logically; mental structures have mechanisms for classification, distribution in series and making inferences. Thus, it is the child's mental activity that organizes the world. The cognitive structure evolves looking for equilibration, and that search is the motor for the evolving movement which is not circular, since each cycle implies a modification that makes the structure grow in complexity. Each stage is a structure; development occurs because the structure evolves. The metaphor that best suits this kind of evolution based on a dialectical opposition is that of a spiral. Once a cycle is completed, the evolving person is at a more advanced

stage of his or her cognitive evolution. The relationship between *assimilation* and *accommodation* emerges from the constant search for an equilibration between them. What is totally strange to the structure of each stage cannot be assimilated (notion of *discrepancy*). What is already known is indifferent and does not produce development of the structure.

A point worth remarking here is that in Piaget's model the child constructs knowledge, but this kind of construction does not entail to say that the child ignores the world altogether. The definitions quoted above make this quite clear. Ferrari, Pinard & Runions (2001) argue that Piaget does not defend an idealistic philosophical perspective, they define Piaget's position as a "synthesis between idealism and realism" (p. 198), and they narrate an illustrative anecdote told by Piaget himself, which depicts his conception of the knowing subject as neither passive nor totally independent of the object. The anecdote is the following. A group of Russian scientists were interrogating Piaget in order to decide whether he was to be labeled as an idealist or a realist and he answered in a synthetical way: 'I believe that the world exists before knowledge, but we only cut it in specific objects during the course of our actions and by interactions between the organism and the milieu' (in Ferrari et al, 2001, p. 199). The Kantian influence in Piaget becomes here quite evident.

At this point of the present brief comparison between Piaget's conception of knowledge and pragmatism, a coincidence and a disagreement need to be pointed out. The coincidence lies on the emphasis of knowledge as something emerging from the active interchange between the child and the world. Their disagreement lies on the proposal that human mental activity organizes the world. In contrast, pragmatism conceives of a world that is not only out there, "before knowledge", but that is intrinsically organized and therefore meaningful independently of it being interpreted by the human mind. Although the human mind is necessary for interpretation, meaning is virtually in the world itself, and it is "discovered" rather than "instituted" as we conceive of the world (Colapietro, 1998, p. 130-131). In spite of the description of Piaget's theory as a synthesis of idealism and realism, by Ferrari et al (2001), this integration was not theoretically completed by Piaget, because there is still a breach between an organizing principle, the human mind, and an external unorganized reality.

The Piagetian model construes a subject that is naturally prone to acquiring knowledge, and in that sense it coincides with the pragmatic conception of human nature as semiotic. The cognitive structure in Piaget's model is defined by three

characteristics: self-regulation, transformation, and totality. Far from being an innatist conception of knowledge, it is based on a human disposition to interact with the world. This assumption is wholly akin to Peirce's understanding of human semiotic nature. So is the conception that knowledge emerges through action.

Piaget has explicitly disagreed with Vygostky's theory in one aspect, namely, the vision of the child-adult relationship during the developmental process of learning. Piaget supposed that a developmental process of learning based on a hierarchical (non-horizontal) relationship between child and adult could inhibit the child's explorative behavior. The hierarchical aspect derives from Vygostky's description of interactive learning whereby the adult transmits cultural signs to the child (see Van der Veer, 1996). In his comments to Vygostky's critics, Piaget discusses precisely this issue (in Vygostky, 1973). The Swiss scientist starts by stating that he coincides with the Russian in many points, but Piaget expresses his disagreement, when he makes a terminological opposition between spontaneous and non-spontaneous concepts. According to Piaget, education should rely more on spontaneous mental evolution, and he formulates the statement thus:

Therefore, I do not believe, as Vygostky seems to do, that the new concepts, even at the school level, are always acquired through the didactic intervention of the adult (Piaget, in Vygostky, 1973, p. 211, translation MM.)

This divergence arises from the fact that Vygostky accentuates the role of the adult in it, and, in doing so he inevitably incorporates a hierarchical element in the definition of the relationship. The concept of "zone of proximal development" (see Goldhaber, 2000, p.343) is construed as a function between a child's actual level of development and the level of performance achieved when external signs are provided to the child to be used as *cognitive aids*. It refers to the relation that exists between the *actual* and the *potential* level of development at each stage. The kind of relationship that is necessary for development to take place within this zone requires some degree of transmission of *cognitive aids*, or of *cultural signs* from one participant to the other. The conception of signs as cultural products, as well as the restriction of the notion to linguistic signs, constitutes the very basis of the hierarchical bias introduced to the process of acquisition of knowledge. Because if signs are external to a generic human nature, then they are not innate, and the infant necessarily has to incorporate them from the outside.

For Vygostky, signs are those mental tools that are used within each culture as

mediators for thought in the sense that they can substitute external objects and increase the potential of internal operations. Contrary to Piaget, who gives more weight to the horizontality of the bond, and to the active participation of the child, Vygotsky is seeking to call attention to the importance of culture, such as it is represented in the proximal processes by the adult.

When the child is acquiring knowledge of the world, according to the Vygotskian outline of development, she or he is at the stage of using *external signs* as aids to solve internal cognitive problems. This explains why the presence of a person who is at a more advanced developmental stage is important for the theoretician, the process requires of a person who has already internalized cultural signs, and for that reason can make those signs available for the child. For Vygotsky, the creation of an intersubjective psychological link between the two participants is a necessary precondition for the process of internalization of cultural signs to take place in the child. Only thus the cognitive exchange which goes on at the intermental level can start to operate at an intramental level. Within Vygotsky's theoretical frame, hierarchy is not to be taken as an authoritarian notion, since it refers to the difference between two persons who are at different stages of cognitive evolution.

This difference between Piaget's and Vygotsky's approach to learning does not exclude the existence of many affinities. Many comparisons between their models have been made by their followers, due to some striking parallelisms, especially in their proposal of a mental evolution from a concrete to an abstract level of functioning. The two scientists also agree in their construal of a process which evolves from the psychological dependency on the perception of objects, as a necessary requirement for mental operations, that is, for thought in general, up to a stage of internal processes which does not need it. Vygotsky centered his studies on thought and language and elaborated on the concept of mediation, that is, the use of culturally constructed signs *qua* internal mental tools. He describes human evolution with a lens that focuses on the relationship between thought and language.

The human infant is capable of thought, though does not master language, and it is highly dependent on the perceptual presence of objects within its scope of vision. Mediation through signs increases the potentiality of the human mind, because it liberates the infant from this limitation, and constitutes the road to language as the condition that gives the species its differential status. This condition, then, is not the presence of thought itself, actually it is not even the presence of language; what is

essential to for human existence is the use of language as a regulator of thought and as a mediator to the external world. As it will be argued below this conception of sign as external cultural products and the relation between thought and signs that is implied in it is the main divergence between Vygostky's conception of sign mediation and that of pragmatism.

During the early stages of development, in Vygostky's model of learning, the mother is culture for the infant, and through her interpretation of the gestures and sounds, she passes on to the baby the cultural signs she has already internalized. The function of a teacher, or of any adult who is engaged in a kind of relationship that enables a child to evolve, is similar to that of the mother. The teacher and child should create a relationship of intersubjectivity that fosters communication; the teacher must provide the child with signs that are adequate to his or her stage of development. Thus the two minds can interact in relation to a common objective. Intersubjectivity is what sets the basis for the internalization process. During this interchange, it is the adult who furnishes those cultural signs that are to be internalized.

In relation to the internalization process, Martí (1996), one of Vygostky's followers points out that:

It is certain that Vygostky's intentions when he explained cultural development were far from removed from the idea that individuals merely incorporate the existing social reality. (...) a simple transfer of social and external properties to intrapsychological functioning. It is an inner reconstruction that preserves some of the external properties but changes others. The problem is that Vygostky did not explain how this reconstruction is carried out in terms of internal constraints. (p.26)

This discussion has led some authors to propose that Vygostky's concept of *internalization* would be better understood if substituted by expressions that make this inner process more evident, for example, Wertsch (1997) has suggested the concept of *mastery* (p.16) that to refer to the ability to control external signs or, in other contexts the use of the expression *appropriation* (p.16), in the sense proposed by Bakhtin (cited in Wertsch, 1997). These modifications aim at avoiding the risk of what Wiley (1994) calls "an ascendent reduction of the concept of self to culture" (pp. 157-194), specifically an interactional reduction (p. 168) of the self.

Actually, Vygostky received the influence of Potebnya and, through him, of von Humboldt, which relates him to Baldwin and to Mead, an affinity that Van der Veer

(1996:249) describes in the following statement:

One of Potebnya's main themes was that of the relation between words or concepts, on the one hand, and ideas and thoughts, on the other hand. (...) Potebnya argued in the tradition of Humboldt that ideas are not simply expressed in words (as if ideas lie ready-made in our mind and only need to be stated aloud), but are born together with the word.

It is worthwhile to recall the difference between this conception of language, and the ideas of Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism, more specifically of the triadic model he created to account for semiosis, that is, the process of sign action:

That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the word *homo* and *man* are identical. My language the sum total of myself; because the man is the thought. (CP 5.314)

Beyond the seeming kinship with the intellectual background of Vygotsky, there is an important contrast here: language and ideas are but one thing, for Peirce, indeed, signs are what enable people to express themselves, to think and to act. Words, whether uttered or only thought do not add or shape ideas à la Humboldt; our life is a life of signs, human or animal communication are a product thereof. What is shared by both lines is highlighted by Potebnya's discussion of the public status of language (Van der Veer, 1996 p. 249). Once it is used, language directly used stops being the property of its utterer and becomes autonomous, it only belongs to the community.

The two authors who are discussed here, Piaget and Vygotsky, have written on the semiotic function and on its relevance to human development. Another aspect they share is the influence of Hegelian dialectics, in their theorization and their conception of the sign. Piaget centered his reflections on mental logical operations, while Vygotsky focussed his writings on the idea of mediation through language.

Now, we would like to refer very briefly to the Peircean triadic model, in order to contrast the relation of thought and signs. Andacht (1992) discusses sign mediation in thought thus:

[T]here are here three elements which are correlated, whose tri-relative tie is the crux of sign mediation. Peirce describes thus the triadic composition of a "thought-sign", since for him every thought is exclusively in signs. (p. 145)

Vygotsky's contribution to develop the concept of mediation within the discussion of human evolution is very important. However, his idea of internalization

of external signs bears within the dualistic opposition between internal thought and external social signs. On the other it is possible to state that he has not trusted enough the mediation of signs, as to make it unnecessary to introduce a second mediator to his conceptualization, that is, an adult as a mediator between the child and the sign. This makes the breach between internal and external reality even wider. Although both Piaget and Vygotsky worked theoretically in order to conceive of cognition as a process that integrates thought and external reality, their conception of sign does not allow for a complete integration to be totally achieved.

In the case of Piaget, the influence of Saussure's notion of sign is at the bases of the understanding of semiotic mediation conceived as exclusively symbolic. The upshot of this perspective is that the concept of sign mediation is identified with that of language. Then, it is a natural follow up to consider the period of development that precedes the acquisition of language as a period that precedes the acquisition of signs. According to Pino (2004), Piaget failed to understand that if a wider notion of sign is applied to the understanding of development, then the sensorial perception stage would be considered already as a semiotic stage. In fact there would be no stage of development that would not be semiotic.

In Vygotsky's model, according to Pino (2004), the problem is similar to that of Piaget, because although Vygotsky did propose a triadic diagram as a model for sign mediation, the notion of sign still remained very closely related to linguistic signs exclusively. That is why there is in Vygotsky's theorization a period of development when the infant would not be functioning with signs. If signs are incorporated at a latter stage of development then it must be inferred that thought has a different nature than that of signs. In such a theoretical frame, it is not possible to conceive of human mind as being of a semiotic nature. Consequently, the self has to be conceived of as being the product of either social signs or of biological structures.

In his thorough study of the notion of "social construction", Hacking (1999) revisits briefly the history of modern philosophy. The author traces the idea of the self as a social construct back to Kant's influence and to some existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, Camus, Jaspers and Sartre. One of the origins of that self notion is related to the critique of the empiricist perspective that posits a pre-social individual self and conceives of the social as the product of the relation of individual "atomistic selves". One of the aims of constructionism, especially in its origins, was to emphasize human rights and individual freedom. Constructionist critics of

empiricism point out that the latter induces people to take family upbringing, social, cultural and economical situations, all of which are contingent, for the immutable, essential human condition. To posit the self as a social construct aims at revealing the contingency of human identity. Social constructionism questions the “pre-social” nature of the self, as it upholds that such an idea leads to take contingent aspects for inevitable, often negative situations (Hacking, 1999, p.16). According to Hacking, one of the aims of social constructionism in general is to exert a liberating influence on society that operates by unmasking the non necessary, oppressive aspects of some notions (e.g. womanhood, immigrant status, etc) that have gained excessive legitimacy and are taken for granted as unquestionable. The critics of constructionism hold that its over-emphasis on contingent aspects leads to lay an excessive weight on the effect of race and of cultural upbringing, which ends up by limiting individual freedom and the possibility of human beings to choose.

Some basic concepts of the pragmatic semiotic alternative

This paper believes that a valid alternative is the one proposed by Wiley (1994): to use Peirce’s pragmatic semiotic as a theoretical base to distinguish between social, contingent identities and the self as a shared human nature independent of race and cultural upbringing. A contribution that the semiotic model of Peirce can bring to this discussion is the conception of the self as a kind of semiosis. Semiosis is the signifying process which is active in the human universe, as well as in the animal and natural ones. Therefore, from this perspective, the human being is part of the entire creation, since it belongs to what Peirce called the “principle of continuity” (CP 5.402). In an article dedicated to reflect upon the mind and the universal principle of continuity in Peirce, Santaella (2002), adopting Peirce’s mature theory of “synechism” or the doctrine of logical continuity, develops the argument that there is only a difference of degree between mind and matter (pp. 98-99). Such a doctrine of continuity issues from the assumption that there is an aspect of regularity in nature itself, this means that such regularity is not projected into nature by the human mind, but is an aspect of nature itself. Still, the observation of the world shows that there is also an aspect of chance in it. So both regularity and chance are, according to Peirce, objective aspects of reality. There are laws and there are “facts that do not adjust precisely and uniformly to the law”, as Santaella rightly notes (p. 99).

Based on Colapietro's (1989) introductory reflections and on Wiley's (1994) development of the semiotic approach to the self, we attempt to build on the implications of defining the self as a semiotic process to the study of the life-long development of human identity.

In order to understand with certain accuracy how Wiley (1994) carried out his theoretical work of logical superposition of the triadic sign structure to the notion of self, it is necessary to consider in some detail the definition of the triadic sign. It becomes feasible to study the semiotic self, if one bears in mind the triadic structure of the sign in relation to which the model of the self was built. The revision of the definition of the triadic sign can also help us understand why the co-relation of the three semiotic elements mentioned by Wiley, namely, sign, object and interpretant, is indeed relevant to a theory of an evolving, natural, as well as social, self.

The theoretical tendency to rely on what Wiley (1994) described as various "faulty semiotics" (p. 212) derives from a basic misunderstanding of the triadic functioning of meaning phenomena, one which relies on dyadic models to account for the structure of signs. Santaella (1992, p.188) observes that it is necessary to be extremely careful when we define the triadic sign, because Peirce worked on the notion quite thoroughly throughout many years. There is a risk that, due to an understandable search for clarity, we take one working definition, and then proceed to apply it as if it were the final formula. Even if we choose a definition given by Peirce himself, and even if in it the triad (sign, object, interpretant) is mentioned, some relevant aspects of a triadic functioning of meaning might still escape us. Taken in isolation, any single definition we may choose will inevitably leave out some of the "microscopic subtleties" (Santaella, 1992, p.188) of a theoretical notion that has been developed progressively and carefully during a lifetime of intense intellectual and imaginative labor.

The discussion of the notion of triadic sign as it is carried out by Santaella (1992, pp. 188-201) amounts to a synthetic but at the same time analytical and very subtle description of sign action or semiosis. The author defines the three semiotic elements with the necessary nuances present in the definition of sign, and at the same time, she explains in a concise way how the definition of sign leads necessarily to the notion of semiosis. What follows the chosen Peircean definition is not to be taken as only a paraphrase of Santaella's discussion, nor as an approximate translation, but as an interpretant of the aforementioned text.

The definition chosen by Santaella (1992, p.189) to define the triadic sign is the

following:

A sign endeavors to represent, in part at least, an Object, which is therefore in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign even if the sign represents its object falsely. But to say that it represents its Object implies that it affects a mind, and so affects it as, in some respect, to determine in that mind something that is mediately due to the Object. That determination of which the immediate cause, or determinant, is the Sign, and of which the mediate cause is the Object may be termed the Interpretant. (CP. 6.347)

In order to come to terms with that definition, we must remember that something is conceived as a sign not on account of any pre-established condition or property, but because of its participation in the logical relation of representation. The terms sign, object and interpretant are technical terms used to describe positions in a logical relation (Ransdell, 1991), let us not forget that logic is just another name for semiotic, according to Peirce. Thus, a sign is what it is only and fundamentally owing to its standing in a logical relationship to the two other semiotic components of the triadic sign, its object and its interpretant. Anything can be defined as a sign insofar as it is regarded as something that mediates between an object and an interpretant. The object is that which the sign represents, and the interpretant is the effect which the sign produces. “In the same way as a sign mediates between object and interpretant, an interpretant mediates between one sign and another future sign” (Santaella, 1992, p. 187 – translation M.M.). The interpretant as the meaning effect produced by a sign is (quite often though not always) of the nature of a sign. Therefore, to speak of a sign is to speak of a semiotic process, a self-sufficient one that is generated by sign action or “semiosis” (CP 5.484), which is a “superposition of mediations, a logical web of complexities” (Santaella, 1992, p. 188, translation MM).

The notion of sign is not a static notion, but a developmental one. Each sign can be regarded as the interpretant of a previous sign, and it can also be interpreted by a future sign. If the new sign does not represent the object falsely, it will be a more developed sign, since it preserves the relation to the same object.

To speak of a sign necessarily entails considering the two other components, its object and a probable interpretant. Although the interpretation process needs interpreters for semiosis to actually function, the interpreter as such does not determine meaning, because the interpretant is a meaning effect which is generated by the sign itself, thus it is independent of the interpreter’s will or concrete action.

As the sign represents something “other than the sign itself” (Santaella, 1992, p. 188), it does so imperfectly, incompletely, that is why a sign is always in part unfulfilled, and the partial representation of its (dynamic) object. The meaning which is thus generated is related to the object (just) “in some respect” (CP. 6.347). Ideally, in the long run of scientific inquiry, the final interpretant of something may be achieved; in such a particular case, the dynamic object – reality as it is beyond representation, or as its limit – coincides (theoretically, at least) with the understanding thereof. That is also the reason why the determination of the object produces a semiotic process of inquiry through which meaning develops or increases gradually and, in this manner, it carries out progressively the revelation of the object.

Triadic signs are not restricted to linguistic signs. Apart from symbols, sign classification includes also icons and indexes. The notion of sign involves three dimensions of mediation: the representation of qualities, facts and concepts. Assim, classificam-se em ícone, índice e símbolo, em três dimensões: qualitativa, existencial, e conceptual.

The icon is the representation of a quality, it is a type of representation based mainly on similarity (CP 2.276). The index is a “real thing or fact which is a sign of its object by virtue of its being connected with it as a matter of fact and by also forcibly intruding upon the mind, quite regardless of its being interpreted as a sign.” (CP 4.447). The symbol represents a phenomenon as we perceive it to be intelligible, i.e., the phenomenon in relation to a law, the representation of it through a general sign (CP 8.268),

All signs combine these three modalities of representation, but in each type: icon, index and symbol, quality, fact, and legality are respectively predominant. Peirce explains that although words are signs of the nature of a symbol, as a word is understood it is inseparable from some image that it produces in our mind. That image is also a sign, an icon. The word is also inseparable from a particular experience at a specific moment, which is represented in an indexical sign.

Let us now give a brief account of the distinction that was introduced concerning the two semiotic objects.

The relation between the object as it is represented in the sign and the object as it is, independent of its being represented, is theoretically accounted for by the distinction of two aspects of the semiotic object: the dynamical object and the immediate object:

- a) Dynamical object designates the object as it is apart from its being

represented, but as that which determines the representation mechanism.

b) Immediate object designates the object such as it is represented in the sign.

It is crucial to bear in mind that the dynamical object, although it remains external to the sign, it does not lose its relation with the sign, it is “external to the sign, but it is still within semiosis” (Santaella, 1992, p. 190)

The object determines the sign in the sense of constraining the kind of sign that can represent it, and it is capable of generating an interpretant through the mediation of the sign. It is not a kind of determination in the sense of a chain of efficient causation, because “there is a back and forth movement whereby the sign has logical preeminence over the object, but the object has real preeminence over the sign” (Santaella, 1992, p.190, translation MM).

The conception of reality in semiotic includes elements which can be imaginary, existential or purely formal. It includes not only things, but also relations, change and evolution along time. According to Andacht (2000), the interpretant as a more developed sign is never identical to its progenitor, the semiotic object which is construed as “a fragment of history [...] of the history of ideas” (Ms. 849 in Andacht, 2000 p. 634). “Meaning receives both, the influence of the past, and also the decisive, direct determination of the sign as a medium”. (Andacht, 2000, p. 634). That is why once the semiotic object is made present within a sign, the representation is necessarily incomplete in the case of each particular sign. It is because semiosis is a process which aims at the revelation of the object, that it is a process of meaning growth: each sign generates a more developed sign of the same object. “The new sign-interpretant that is generated in semiosis will have as its object the sign out of which it was generated, and also the original object, both of them come to compose a complex object. The conclusion is that the object is not static or inert, it grows along with semiosis.” (Santaella, 1992, p.190).

Peirce distinguished three aspects of the notion of interpretant: immediate, dynamical and final:

a) Immediate interpretant refers to the “range of interpretability, the range of possible dynamical interpretants” (Ransdell, 1991, ch. 16, Santaella, 1992) limited by the determination of the object.

b) Dynamical interpretant is the term used to designate the signs that are actually generated to interpret the previous one. The dynamical interpretant affects the mind of the interpreter at three levels, namely, emotional, energetic and logical.

c) Final interpretant is used to designate the effect that a sign would produce if the semiotic process of interpretation were to be carried out extensively enough to attain its end in relation to the object.

This distinction is useful to understand that the term interpretant accounts for the meaning effect of a sign in three senses, the meaning as it is virtually present in the sign itself, even before anyone interprets it, the meaning as it is actually manifested in other signs that are in fact generated in order to interpret the previous one, and the meaning as it would be manifested if all the signs generated were systematically considered

Logical identity is the emergent sense of the unity that derives from the consistency of such a process along time. Unity and consistency are preserved even when the complexity of the semiotic process includes a considerable amount of variety.²⁷ In Peirce's semiotic, identity is conceived in terms of continuity in relation to the variety of representations, it is a logical identity. Logical means here that it is of the nature of mind, in a very broad sense of that term. In the process of interpretation "the mind is an emergent process that creates an irreducible identity, i.e., triadic identity" (Pape, 1997, p.158) The preservation of the continuity of semiosis is related to the triadic relation, that is, the interpretant bears the same triadic relation with the sign than that which the sign has with its object.

Application of semiotic thinking to psychological problems

The literature on Peircean triadic semiotic model applied to the psychological study of the self is not very abundant in spite of the emphasis that psychological theories have given to the issue of sign mediation, especially after Vygotsky's work. In a book dedicated to reflect on the future directions of social constructivism, Shotter (1999) points out the importance of following Vygotsky's pioneering steps to introduce the concept of sign mediation to the psychological study of thought and language. The author also stresses the relevance of sign mediation to the study of our inner lives to understand the relation to others. The consequence of a semiotic analysis is that, according to Shotter, our inner lives appear to be less private, less inner, less systematical and less logical than it was traditionally thought to be.

Considering that sign mediation is of interest for psychological theories a comparison between Vygotsky's conception and pragmatic semiotic seems a natural

²⁷ For a detailed elaboration on the relevant concept of teridentity in Pape (1997)

follow up to Shotter's initiative. Nevertheless, there are only few articles that address that issue. Prawat (1999a,b) discusses the problem of the dualistic separation of mind and world and the solutions proposed by three approaches of social constructivism. The conclusion coincides with Gal'perin's (1989) evaluation of the solutions proposed by constructivism. A way to solve the problem is to build on Vytosky's latest production during the period when he was influenced by the pragmatic integrative conception of process and content. This social constructivist approach is described as a brand of post-Vygostky pragmatics (Gal'perin 1989; Prawat; 1999a) that does not need to deny the individual in order to externalize the mind. Other akin integrative perspectives of social constructivism and pragmatism are the result of the application of aspects of both theories to the study of child adult learning interaction and to the development of learning methods (Perinat, 1999; Kankkunen, 2001)

Peirce's pragmatism has influenced two thinkers of the area of psychology at an advanced stage of their work. A convergence between behaviorism and pragmatism was initiated by Skinner's at a late period of his life when his work shifted from mechanism to pragmatism (Moxley, 2001a,b, 2003; Staddon, 2002). Similar to the case of Vygostky the influence of pragmatism is noticeable at a late stage of the researcher's theoretical evolution and has not been emphasized by classical historical descriptions.

The influence of Peirce's thought in psychological theories seems to be progressively increasing, but it requires considerable time for careful theoretical elaboration. In her revision of the history of psychology, Morgade Salgado (2002) states that although Peirce has given the initial steps in Pragmatism, it is surprising that his role in the foundation of American psychology has been very limited in comparison to other philosophers, such as James, Dewey and Baldwin.

Some authors have pointed out a possible cause for the delayed influence of Peirce's semiotic on psychological theories. The work carried out by Rorty's interpretation of Peirce's philosophy is deemed responsible for having the paradoxical effect of obscuring some fundamental ideas related to the study of mind and thought. (Marcio, 2001).

Although the semiotic study of the self is not widely spread within the area of psychology, there are references to growing interest in areas of study of cognitive-processes, of methods of reasoning applied to learning processes, and in psychoanalytic theory.

In the field of cognitive science and artificial intelligence the literature is

centered on the concept of abduction. The notion appears as potentially useful to solve some problematic issues in the area, but is just starting to be discussed in psychology. In his neurocomputational approach to abduction Burton (1999) considers that a difficulty for the fast understanding of the notion can issue from the fact that there is a traditional opposition between unconscious creativity and logical reasoning which the notion integrates in an innovative way. Abduction accounts for a logical process which is both, a source of creative insight and a kind of logical inference, thus it is not beyond conscious control. This method of reasoning which is responsible for the formation of hypothesis has been also studied by Moxley (2001a,b) who focuses on the fact that abduction is not just presented as a third notion proposed to understand reasoning, but it is theoretically elaborated in a way that it fits together with induction and deduction determining a cyclic process of reasoning. For that reason Moxley concludes that the notion is suitable for postmodern research and for practical case study orientation to research. Magnani (2001) highlighted the importance of abduction to scientific theories, for the study of artificial intelligence, and to account for explanatory kind of reasoning of the type of medical diagnosis. Abductive reasoning is seen as potentially useful to connect scientific thinking with medical expert systems. It is also relevant to point out that the understanding of how both visual and temporal representations occur can be adequately attained. Peirce's elementary operations of reasoning are also deemed useful for the development of logical diagrams with focus on propositions which can be represented in an iconic, visual way (Johnson Laird, 2002).

After a brief revision of literature it comes out clearly that one of Peirce's notion that has aroused most interest within the area of psychology is that of abduction. Apart from cognitive science, Peirce's theory of inference has been considered of interest to develop methods for hermeneutic analysis in order to reconcile realism and relativism (Rennie, 2001). Within the area of education and learning theory the triadic method of reasoning was discussed by Prawat, (1999a,b) who works on a convergence between the notion of abduction and Dewey's theory. The notion of abduction is presented as a reliable means to solve what is classically known as the learning paradox. The triadic conception of reasoning is adequate to deal with the problem of explaining how new learning take can place if, in order to be conceived, it needs to be fashioned out of prior knowledge. In a related article the same author furthers the argumentation that some recurring problems in the area of metacognition can be solved if a triadic model of thought is applied in order to reconcile conscious symbolic thought with unconscious

kind of understanding. The author foresees a promising solution to the traditional mind/body problem if considered in terms of the integration of cognition and perception proposed by pragmatism.

Finally the literature shows that there is a growing interest on Peirce's philosophy in the area of psychoanalytic theory. This is expressed in a relatively recent book (Muller and Brent, 2000). It is a collection of articles that deals with the theoretical complementarity between pragmatism and psychoanalysis. The book is presented as the outcome of an increasing tendency in psychoanalysis to recognize the importance of Peirce's contribution to the study of mind and thought in terms of icons, indexes and symbols. Some of the issues addressed in the book are: the treatment of the problem of meaning revelation in Peirce and Derrida (Pettigrew, 2000); pragmatism and mediated communication (Meyer, 2000); the relevance of Peircean notion of interpretant and habit change to a theory of the unconscious (Colapietro, 1995); the concept of ethical disposition in discourse (Moorjani, 2000). Other areas of shared interest are the study of interpretation applied to the psychoanalytic practice based in Klein and Bion (Pavan, 2001); the comparison of the triadic model of thought in Peirce, Freud, Winnicott, Lacan and Bion (Green, 2004).

Based on Colapietro's (1989) compilation of Peirce's thoughts on the self, Wiley (1994) proposed the semiotic model to study empirically the self, which he described as a generic semiotic human nature which organizes the multiplicity of social voices and identities into a coherent whole. The aim of the author is to preserve a theoretical distinction between the self and the multiple identities. The triadic structure of the sign serves as a sort of logical basis for a triadic model of the self which can be thought of as being in an "intermediary position between the over-centered Cartesian ego and the effaced or eliminated post-structural one" (Wiley, 1994, p. 29).

Implications of Peirce's semiotic to the study of the self

One of the main implications of applying the triadic model of sign action to the study of the self is the possibility of bringing new light to the problem of accounting for a spontaneous self-development, which allows for the possibility of adopting more than a single, rigid identity, and also avoids the risk of dissolving the concept of self in a manifold of social identities or personality traits. The study of the self requires the distinction of two different uses of the term "identity": one is related to the interpretive reflexivity of the generic self (Wiley, 1994) that produces a continuous sense of identity

along time; and another, more specific use of the term, designates the distinctive social traits, self-concepts and personalized psychological features, which are multiple and diverse.

Reflexive self-interpretation is a process which happens gradually and in a permanent way. It develops as the internal conversation evolves through time. Wiley combines Peirce's I-You systemic directionality with Mead's dialogic self – 'I-Me' – to obtain a reflexive triologue that involves the three personal pronouns: 'Me-I-you'. The 'I-self' of the present stands for the 'Me-self' of the past and addresses a 'You-self' of the future, if we formulate this model of the self in terms of Peirce's definition of sign (CP 2.228).

Through this conversation, the person in the instantaneous present in the guise of the I pronoun represents the self in the past (the Me), and addresses the self of the future moment (the You). The interpretation process is carried out in the same way as the sign (representamen) stands for an object in order to generate an interpretant. The I embodies the sign, the Me corresponds to the semiotic object, and the You to the interpretant. The other is identified with the semiotic interpretant (see Andacht, 2000). The diagram that follows is a schematic representation of Wiley's logical superposition or "mapping" of the sign structure to the self process. The aim of the diagram is to show how the triadic structure of the sign and consequently that of the self is not so much a spatial metaphor as it is a representation of the temporal evolution of semiosis. This temporal account is adequate to understand the development of the self, which was described by Wiley as a gradual mechanism of self discovery, as a process of meaning growth. All kinds of semiosis, and the self is one of them, are processes of development, whereby the signs grow in complexity (see Santaella, 2002).

The benefit of defining the self as a triadic sign is that it is identified with a continuous interpretive process through which we integrate a multiplicity of different identities. Thus the self can be conceived of as the product of a socializing process whereby multiple identities arise, but this emergent product is not to be necessarily reduced to a composite of diverse identities. Unity of the self can be preserved in spite of identities' being multiple, because every interpretive process tends naturally to attain coherence. Wiley's reflections on the semiotic self were triggered by the need to answer the question of "how the self is a sign, how the definition of a sign could be mapped onto the self, or how the structure of the sign is homologous to the self" (Wiley, personal communication 4/22/03). It was through the work of "mapping" the structure

of the sign onto the self that Wiley was able to explain in what sense the self can be considered as an integral entity of superior logical level than particular identities.

The multiple identities are to be described as partial aspects of the process in order to account for internal diversity. The notion of identities is important to account for the links of the self with the world; it is in that sense that they can be described in terms of internalized interpersonal roles. Through them inner diversity or alterity can be understood as a permanent constituent of the self, because roles are two-termed functional unities. The multiplicities of identities that constitute the self interact as an internal conversation of the self that takes place along time. Nevertheless, such a dialogical internal reality does not mean a fragmentation of the self, on the contrary, it is beneficial to gain self-knowledge and flexibility in the development of personal identity, because the meaning of the self evolves in the permanent confrontation of the ego with the non-ego, because according to Peirce thought comes naturally as a dialogue, and for dialogue to take place an internal opponent in the Socratic sense of the term is necessary (CP 5.497).

If introspection led to the proposal of a monolithic subject; thought conceived of as conversation reveals a many-voiced dialogue occurring in time, and therefore a divided subject to semiotic analysis. The development of personal identity, that is, the unity of the person through time, is the result of the interpretive process of thought through which the integrity of the self is attained. The person as a thinking being “can distinguish in [him or herself] distinct parts that are, in essence, different roles in an ongoing dialogue” (Colapietro, 1989, p.93, emphasis added). That is why De Tienne (2002) construes the person as “a composition made and kneaded by signs” (p.30). A coherent personal identity is not a given, but an accomplishment, the result of an interpretative integration of our “dramatic inner world” (Colapietro, 1989, p.117).

Even though in his/her thought processes, the person may distinguish different voices that oppose to each other, and which can be defined as different identities within the self, such inner diversity coexists with unity when there are no serious psychological pathologies involved. There is a reflexive understanding of the person’s being one and the same person along time. The normal activity of thought implies the understanding of the difference involved in momentary particular circumstances and of the unity implied in the process, both in the perception of others and in the perception of the self. It can be said that, normal thinking not only involves difference but is also nurtured by it. Thought is kept alive not in spite of, but because, we often disagree with our own

selves. It is because “the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief” (CP 5374), that our thought is motivated and it is because our thought is in constant evolution that our sense of continuous unity emerges. The conception of a monolithic predetermined human essence has lost theoretical credibility in contemporary time. Peirce believed that human beings often find it difficult to take a humble position towards their own self, and he refers to a Shakespearean verse to express it: “proud man, most ignorant of what he’s most assured: his glassy essence” (CP 5.317)²⁸

Still, the conception of a glassy essence in Peirce’s philosophy does not imply a reduction of the self, nor of its continuous sense of identity. The term “glassy essence” refers only to the denial of an immutable essence. For pragmatism, the problem of the essence of the self is a logical issue, since a human being is defined as a sign, more specifically, as a symbol. If the essence of the self is tantamount to that of symbols (CP 7.593), we must bear in mind that we are dealing with a formal and not a material essence. Self-consciousness functions logically as all other sign processes, thus the conclusion is that a continuous identity is the result of the kind of logical unity that emerges from thought. Peirce states that the word “consciousness is used to denote the I think, the unity of thought; but the unity of thought is nothing but the unity of symbolization” (CP 7.585).

We can now turn to one of Peirce’s most polemical statements, but this time in a more extensive way:

It is that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words homo and man are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought. (CP 5.314)

Since signs include not only verbal signs, the term “language” is to be taken here in a very broad sense. This statement does not posit an identity between the human being and the verbal signs that he or she uses, but with the realm of signs in general. Neither does Peirce’s conception of thought reduce it to its conscious aspects. According to Colapietro (1989, p. 38), the text quoted above aims at emphasizing the

²⁸ Shakespeare (1601), *Measure to Measure*.

externality of the *self*, its full-fledged communicability. In this polemical point lies a strong disagreement that Peirce had with William James's (1890) pragmatic approach. The latter assumed the complete "insulation" of thought (Ch. IX), while Peirce defended the externality of thought, and consequently, the externality of the *self* because:

Peirce refused to purchase the uniqueness of the *self* at the expense of its communicability. The possibility of communication does not entail the destruction of uniqueness. Nor does authenticity require invisibility (...) The *self* is truly something unique and irreducible in itself, but whatever it is in itself is only revealed or, more accurately, realized through its relation to others. (Colapietro, 1989, p. 74)

It may be useful to quote Peirce once more, in order to understand the arguments that justify his challenging statements:

It is hard for man to understand this [that man is the thought], because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the consistency of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something (CP 5.315).

If the interpretation of identity is confused with the kind of command human have over material things, the semiotic development of the *self* may become blocked. A reification of identity, a phenomenon described by Wiley (1994) as the outgrowth of an "usurping identity" (p. 38) can substitute the evolving *self*. The willful control of identity is not a realistic assumption, if we think of identity in semiotic terms. This kind of omnipotence can only lead to the mistake of identifying the *self* with a willed, imposed identity, or, in opposite circumstances, with an unwilled identity. In both cases, the developing *self* is mistaking for a '*fait accompli*', instead of being taken as the progressive emergence of a fallible and continuous process of self-discovery. Such a reification of identity will surely end up by blocking considerably the dialogical process of thought.

To become autonomous semiotic agents, the illusory control of identity must be relinquished, in order to enjoy fully the capacity of being attentive observers of meaning in all its manifestations, including the observation of the meaning of our own selves in relation to other signs and to other people. To a large extent, our self-understanding relies on the kind of relation we establish with the people around us. Identity depends on

the public interpretation of what actually takes place in that relation rather than on any willful decision of ours or of others. According to Peirce, it is difficult for human beings to accept that they do not have much sway on meaning, not even about the meaning of their own identity, that which supposedly is our most personal belonging. It is in this point that terms such as construction of identity, creation of identity or invention of the *self* diverge from the kind of interpretation that Peircean semiotic proposes. Such terms, and others like them cannot help but conveying some form of arbitrary and absolute command on (our own) identity.

From this semiotic approach, human will is not all that powerful. The *self* is but the logical upshot of continuous interpretation, and such a process is rigorously limited by the steady input of existential reality. According to Colapietro (1989), to conceive of the *self* as a sign requires a renouncement, a firm relinquishing of the fantasy of complete control, one which, furthermore, would come from a sign-independent mind, from an external force. In his discussion on “self-control”, Colapietro (1989, pp. 92-97) gives a convincing account of human autonomy not as a given, but as that state of a process which derives from the understanding of the implausibility of our supposed omnipotence over meaning. The author explains that the semiotic approach to human psychological development implies such an acceptance; paradoxically this limitation empowers us, instead of curtailing our capacity of self-control. In the sense of semiotic consistency, our identity does not issue from the moment to moment exercise of our will, but from a painstaking, sequential trial and error process, which lasts as long as our existence. Difficult as it seems, this perspective is promising for the understanding of human freedom, because in renouncing to decide who someone actually is, the person thereby gains the possibility of letting the *self* be influenced by ideals, whose task is to guide purposefully the process of becoming. Together with this insight comes the possibility of finding orientation and thus discovering the ever changing, Heraclitean meaning of life, because of the possibility of letting the *self* be attracted by developing ideals (Colapietro 1989, p. 96). The acceptance of this kind of normative limits to the sheer brute force of the human will is what allows for the conception of true, pragmatic purposes that orient our lives in a self-corrective way.

Conclusions

Psychological literature is not profiting enough from the potential benefits that can derive from integrating Peircean semiotic to the current discussion of the problems

of notion of self in relation to sign mediation. The following are some actual problems which are now being considered in the literature, and which can all benefit from the introduction of some of the central concepts of the triadic semiotic:

a) The problem of how to account for non-verbal aspects of the self when knowledge and self-knowledge are conceived as sign-mediated processes acquires a new dimension when icons and indexes are included, instead of dealing only with linguistic symbols.

b) The problem of accounting for the multiplicity and for the integration of the self may be addressed in terms of the logical unity that derives from the continuity of every semiotic process, according to synechism.

c) The problem of how to account for semiotic mediation without denying the possibility of objective determination of external reality which allows for stability in human development.

d) The problem of how the developmental process of the self can integrate stability as well as adaptive innovation.

e) The problem of how to develop methodological instruments to observe the self as a temporal process and the multiplicity of identities in dialogical interaction.

As we have seen above, a central tenet of the pragmatic conception, so close to an experience-oriented approach to reality, is that mediation cannot be limited to linguistic signs. The concept of triadic sign is more encompassing than that of verbal symbols, since in order to function as such, a symbol must integrate the indexical and the iconic components of representation. In that sense, the pre-symbolic stages of development can be considered as being also sign-mediated. The acquisition of language is conceived as a natural development of a semiotic process which is an innate characteristic of human nature. Therefore all thought is a kind of semiosis as there is no thought which is not in signs.

A consequence of this philosophical stance is pointed out by Colapietro (1989) in relation to the problem of subjectivity. The concept of internalization proposed by social constructionism is the product of the construal of signs as mere instruments which as such are external to human nature. The conception of sign as being an inseparable part of the natural functioning of the universe implies that we do not use signs in the way we use other tools. Instead, our very existence as meaningful beings depends largely on our being signs among other signs. Human agency issues from the possibility of participating in a general, all-embracing semiotic process which has

started long before each individual birth, and which will continue long after his or her death. Our semiotic nature endows us with the understanding and the capacity of acting rationally within a rational universe. The conception of human nature as part of the universal circulation of meaning has important implications to approach the problem of subjectivity, since it implies that instead of using external signs “the subject in its innermost being is itself a form of semiosis” (Colapietro, 1989, p.37)

On the other hand, the difference in relation to constructivism lies mainly on the pragmatist conception of an external reality which is intrinsically organized. The main consequence for the study of the self is that this view compensates an idealistic inclination present in the notion of mental construction. The tendency to believe that it is the human mind that structures the world is substituted by a dialogical relation between human mind and external world. If reality is intrinsically and autonomously meaningful, the omnipotence of the self is limited by external constraints. There is no external agency whose role is to attribute meaning to a meaningless universe. Neither are human beings subjects that incorporate external cultural signs and apply them to make sense out of the world.

Considering that the self of modernity was described by Descartes as a center of control, and the postmodern self as constituted by a heterogeneous multiplicity of social voices (Gergen, 1991), there is room for an alternative account of human agency, one which is neither an omnipotent will, nor a passive recipient of social determinations. In order to escape the denial of human agency and autonomy brought about by the radical postmodern reaction to the cogito, pragmatic semiotic posits the subject as an interpretive agent. The kind of agency that comes about once the subject is conceived as a form of semiosis is the same type as that which is involved in any semiotic process which evolves in the encounter with otherness and which is oriented by purposes. In the triadic conception of sign, meaning is the upshot of its running into external reality, this collision is not constructed, but imposes limits on the sign that may be adequate to represent it and, consequently, sets limits to the will of interpreter. Without such a constraint, there is no possibility of a notion of dialogue or of otherness. A dialogical view of the self requires the conception of identity in a constitutive relation to alterity. Interpretive agency implies neither subjectively creating an external reality, nor being passively determined by external signs. It is the product of an encounter of a subject who, on account of its semiotic nature, is able to participate in the continuous ongoing dialogue of a meaningful universe, and to orient his self as a sign among signs, i.e., in

the pursuit of an adopted ideal to conform through the capacity of self-control (CP 1.573).

The pragmatic solution to the risk of exposing the self to fragmentation, which jeopardizes the dialogical conception, is to account for the unity of the self in terms of logical consistency. The preservation of a sense of sameness along time is thus related to the continuity within the process of self interpretation. In order to apply Peirce's philosophical insights to psychological studies, it is necessary to revise the works of Colapietro (1989) and of Wiley (1994), which are important links between philosophical and psychological perspectives. The possibility of exploring the semiotic solution to the problem of how multiplicity is integrated as the semiotic process evolves furnishes a path to solve the problem of how the self integrates many identities.

The notion of self as multivoiced dialogue proposed by Hermanns and Kempen (1993) is consistent with the model of the semiotic self that emerges from Peirce's semiotic, and which historically is inscribed within the Socratic tradition (Ransdell, 2000), because it considers thought as dialogue of the self in relation to an inner or outer opponent. The relevance of Wiley's semiotic model for the study of internal conversation as a temporal process along a past/present/future axis is to be seen in its contributions to produce some rich insights concerning the dialogical conception of the self. What is conceived in James' (1890) terms as multiple selves is described as particular identities in this model, while the notion of self serves to designate an overarching identity, as it is the emergent property of an interpretive process. The I and the Me dialogue proposed by James and Mead (1863-1931) as a triadic Me-I-You relation. The You pronoun proposed by Peirce is integrated to the I-Me dialogue, discussed by Mead and James, in order to account for purposive directionality of the self. Finally, change and conservation of identity can be discussed by focusing on Peirce's notions of regularity and chance. The integration of the self can be studied with reference to the classical Aristotelian idea of teleological unity, and it may be elaborated by considering the dialogical relation between the I and the Me proposed by James and Mead as a triadic Me-I-You relation.

A methodological implication can be drawn from the application of the semiotic model to psychological research. The semiotic description of thought as an "inner drama" as the "theatre of our inner world", Colapietro, (1989, p. 117) is compatible with a characterization of the inner realm in terms of role relations and allows us to apply Moreno's psychodrama as a methodological device for empirical observation of the self.

Study 2

A Semiotic Reflection on Self-interpretation and Identity

Abstract. To posit an alternative to Cartesian introspection as a privileged access to self-knowledge, the paper argues for a communicative embodied self which does not jeopardize human agency. Based on Peirce's triadic semiotic, the text posits a non-reductionistic alternative to the dualistic Cartesian cogito. The goal is to advance towards the solution of an age-old paradox: how to understand the multiplicity of identities that constitute the self, as well as our sense of unity and consistency across time. The triadic sign is considered a useful theoretical tool to account for the unity of the self and for the diversity in human identity, without favoring either of the two terms. The self is construed as a sign in continuous growth through a reflexive dialogue that aims to integrate multiple particular identities, the dynamical interpretants, into the unity of a meaning-generating process.

Key Words: interpretive process, particular identities, self, triadic semiotic.

Estudo 2

Uma Reflexão Semiótica sobre a Interpretação do Self e da Identidade

Resumo. Para apresentar uma alternativa à introspecção Cartesiana enquanto forma privilegiada de acesso ao autoconhecimento, argumenta-se em favor de um modelo de *self* comunicativo e encarnado que não menoscabe a agentividade humana. No marco da teoria semiótica triádica de Peirce, o texto apresenta uma alternativa ao Cogito dualista cartesiano. O objetivo é avançar na solução de um antigo paradoxo: como entender a multiplicidade de identidades que constituem o *self*, e ao mesmo tempo seu senso de unidade e consistência ao longo do tempo. O signo triádico é considerado uma ferramenta teórica útil para dar conta da unidade do *self* e também da diversidade da identidade humana, sem favorecer um dos elementos sobre o outro. O *self* é concebido como um signo em contínuo processo de crescimento através de um diálogo reflexivo que visa integrar identidades particulares múltiplas, os interpretantes dinâmicos, na unidade de um processo de geração de sentido.

Palavras chave: processo interpretativo, identidades particulares, *self*, semiótica triádica.

Psychological theories of the self have been influenced by philosophical dualistic assumptions that oppose mind and body as irreconcilable elements, and consequently introduce a breach between the mind and external reality. In a recent article in this journal, Praetorius (2003) argues that contemporary approaches to this age-old problem involve either naturalist, body-centered perspectives, such as physicalism, or an intellectualist exclusive focus on the mind, such as constructivism and social constructionism, which are influenced by structuralism or by post-structuralist deconstruction. These opposite views, she explains, are actually a version of the classical controversy between materialism and idealism. Such attempts to escape dualism tend to reduce mind to matter, or vice versa; therefore, instead of solving the problem they have tackled, they end up by reproducing it. The possibility of advancing the formulation of this complex issue depends fundamentally on finding new ways of integrating complementary perspectives, instead of exacerbating antagonistic positions.

Assuming that Descartes's cogito laid the foundation of modernity, the advent of postmodernity meant a shift from the study of consciousness to the study of language, and that led to the far more general inquiry into sign mediation, which was deemed to be central to self-knowledge. The modern view of the subject as a disembodied, original, unchanging source of meaning, one who is wholly unrelated to the community, was thus seriously challenged. The traditional, rigid structure of the self conceived as an immutable unit was replaced by the notion of a manifold of social identities whose aim was to account for the plasticity of the development of personal identity. Gergen (1991) described the self as the product of a socializing process whereby we become populated by voices of others. A state of non-pathological multiphrenia without coherence or unity characterizes the postmodern self. Gradually the localized, particular identities, which were heavily dependent on cultural practices, primarily narrative ones, took over and displaced the importance of a generic self, and thus the very notion of a unity of consistency became jeopardized. From this viewpoint, we were to be and to behave as a manifold of socially articulate voices and of political or gender interests (Wiley, 1994, p. 2), but little effort was made to inquire into what human capacity would be able to organize and to gather coherently those different discourses. Lest a Babel-like polyphony take over our postmodern lives, serious reflection on this ordering power seems to be necessary. That is one of the goals of the present paper.

Of the many new questions that arose concerning the self in postmodernity, we will be concerned here with the following: if the subject is not the original, stable source

of meaning that he or she was thought to be, then how are unity and continuity of the self to be accounted for? If identity is constituted by a heterogeneous multiplicity, then how are we to explain the subject's agency and autonomy? Without incurring in contradiction, can psychological theories of human subjectivity explain both a many-voiced identity and an integral self (Colapietro, 1990b)?

This paper aims at contributing to the search for an alternative to the Cartesian view of the dualistic subject by revisiting the triadic semiotic²⁹ of C.S. Peirce (1839-1914) in so far as it concerns the self and the development of personal identity. This theory of sign generation will help us develop the argument that the psychological unity of the self finds a more satisfactory explanation if we define the self as a sign, that is, as a continuous, autonomous process of interpretation. To show the advantages of the triadic semiotic as opposed to European dyadic semiology for a theory of the self, we will elaborate on Wiley's (1994) proposal to distinguish the notion of self from that of particular identities. Wiley's conception of the 'semiotic self' builds on Giddens' (1991) account of the 'self as a generic phenomenon' (p. 52), which he differentiates from a more specific concept of 'identity' in the following terms:

Self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography. Identity here still presumes continuity across time and space: but self-identity is such continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent. (p. 53)

Wiley's (1994) work on this conceptual distinction is motivated by the negative consequences, both clinical and social, that arise when the difference between self and identity is overlooked. We share his tenet that much psychological and social suffering comes about as a result of a 'category error, which equates (particular) identities with the (generic) semiotic self' (p. 12). In order to contribute to an elucidation of the aforementioned distinction, this paper presents a discussion of some aspects of sign theory and their relevance for the analysis of human identity. We will try to show that traditional ideas such as teleology, human agency and self-control gain new relevance in the light of the semiotic perspective.

²⁹ We follow a common practice among Peircean scholars, and use the term 'semiotic' to denote the specific kind of triadic sign theory developed by Peirce. This serves to differentiate this model from other sign theories (eg. semiology also known as European semiotics).

The Relevance of the Triadic Semiotic to a theory of the Self

But dualism in its broadest legitimate meaning [is] the philosophy which performs its analyses with an axe, leaving as the ultimate elements, unrelated chunks of being (CP 7.570)2

In Peirce's semiotic, discourse and objective reality are not irreconcilable opposites, but complementary terms. Therein lies the kernel of Peircean pragmatism, his theory of sign generation construed as a process which is inseparable from behaviour (Greek *pragma*), and from experience in general. Litzka (1998) describes Peirce's semiotic as 'discursive realism', because it presupposes the existence of reality as something external to representation, something independent though incomplete until it is represented. Thus reference is embedded in the triadic sign as a trigger and limit. This is one of the original aspects of Peirce's critical rather than neo-Kantian approach to representation. The triadic semiotic has a central concern with, and develops an exhaustive analysis of, the process whereby something perceptible represents something else, its object, 'in some respect or capacity', so as to determine an equivalent or more developed sign of itself to some mind, the sign's meaning, namely its interpretant, to paraphrase a classic sign definition (CP 2.228).

Being itself a sign, the interpretant, whose generation is the aim of the process of sign action called semiosis, is also the starting point of a new interpretive cycle. The relationship between representamen and interpretant is 'correlative' to that which links object and representamen. This interpretative condition (see Litzka, 1996, pp.18-52) is what preserves co-reference, which, in turn, sustains the consistency of the developing self. Co-reference is a corollary of the functioning of the sign, because the '[r]epresentamen ... stands in such a genuine triadic relation to ... its Object, as to be capable of determining its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object' (CP 2.274). Logical transitivity assures the reliable transmission from the object to the interpretant through the representamen, so that reference is not lost in translation, as it were.

Peirce's notion of the productive power of a sign to generate autonomously an interpretant of itself (Ransdell, 1992) is the keystone on which to build a non-dualistic theory of the self. The autonomy of the triadic sign does not jeopardize human agency, because human beings and signs interact dialectically within the evolving process of semiosis. This is the way meaning grows continuously and thereby the self develops. It is a logical account of a psychological process, and not the other way round (Ibri, 2000).

The partial and gradual nature of the revelation of reality ‘in some capacity’ escapes the blind alley of Kant’s (1781/1978) unknowable thing-in-itself, as well as the epistemic relativism which denies the very possibility of the existence of any reliable bridge between representation and external reality. An interesting ground for overcoming dualism is to be found in what Ibri (2000, p. 39) describes as the ‘idealism-realism’ of the Peircean pragmatic semiotic. If we construe ‘Realism and Idealism as doctrines which are absolutely correlative and mutually necessary’ (Ibri, 2000, p. 39), then the supposedly irreconcilable antagonists world (matter) and representation (mind) are joined in an inseparable collaboration out of which meaning and purpose develop. What pragmatism proposes is an imperfect but self-corrective approach to reality and to truth through sign generation; the two are in a complementary relationship.

Having adopted pragmatism as our general framework, we argue that the triadic semiotic can be used as a theoretical corrective of the flaws of some radical postmodern conceptions of the self which put at risk its integrity, and expose it to fragmentation, even to dissolution. The characterization of the self as a sign process is the upshot of Peirce’s (CP 5.265) objections to Cartesianism. Of the four he makes, we will mention two here, namely the lack of introspective power and the lack of intuition, that is, of a cognition which is not determined logically by previous cognitions. Self-consciousness entails a mediated access to the self, therefore for Peirce the self is a cognition; it has the nature of a sign. Since to function as such, every sign must be embodied, then ‘human self-consciousness is the achievement of an incarnate consciousness’ (Colapietro, 1989, p. 69). For Peirce (CP 6.356), being and being knowable or interpretable are synonymous; in fact, it is the same phenomenon considered from two complementary perspectives.

The specific mode of sign action is to be distinguished from the physical, mechanistic collision of action-reaction of one element upon another. The existence of this dynamic force, however, is presupposed by semiosis, which functions as a ‘tri-relative influence’ (CP 5.484), because it is a law-like regularity that involves existents and the qualities which inhere in them. Thus the three components of sign action correspond ontologically to the three universal layers of experience (quality, fact, law) postulated by Peirce (CP 1.304). They constitute the phenomenological basis of the semiotic, and manifest themselves epistemologically as a three-tiered sign. The categories and the triadic sign underlie Peirce’s very broad definition of ‘mind’, so

broad that it is synonymous with the life principle or *psykhé*³⁰ (CP 5.486) in all its possible manifestations (see Ransdell, 1977). An example of it is the ‘little creature’ observed through a microscope, because as it shows a purpose, the scientist must conclude that ‘there is mind there’ (CP 1.269). Therefore no form of life is excluded from the ‘universal mode of action’ of the triadic sign:

By semiosis I mean ... an action or influence, which is, or involves a coöperation of three subjects, such as sign (representamen), its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs ... and my definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a ‘sign’.
(CP 5.484)

Let us now provide an illustration of the above. What we wrote so far about pragmatism and the triadic semiotic, namely the English words we chose and then put down on paper (actually on screen), are a series of signs or representamina (the plural form of ‘representamen’) which refer to Peirce’s sign theory, which thus constitutes the sign’s object. Lastly, the comprehension that these visible marks aim at eliciting in the reader, including, of course, the writers of this text, is the interpretant or meaning of it, what would be understood by anyone who goes through the text with the purpose of gaining some knowledge on the relation between sign theory of the self. Rather than concrete, separate things in the world, the three sign components are logical relations to the world, which produce (fallible) knowledge thereof. The aforementioned words are, by turns, sign, object or interpretant. This depends on the analyst’s concern, when she deals with this text semiotically, and not on some natural, pre-established order.

A corollary of the conception of the self as a triadic sign is that its development is not to be seen as isolated or as radically estranged from nature, but, on the contrary as a living component of it, namely a manifestation of the universal life principle, which is defined in the present context as the autonomous, continuous generation of meaning. We want to highlight an aspect that is briefly discussed by Wiley (1994), and which, in our opinion, upholds the self/identities distinction, namely the self-governed, end-directed functioning of semiosis, since this is the kind of teleological process through which the self evolves, and, a fortiori, the one through which the particular identities come to be. What was known in classical antiquity as final causation is construed by

³⁰ CP 5.486. Peircean semiotic distinguishes psychic truths from psychological truths. The former refer to logical matters, and the latter to a special, applied science. See Ibrí (2002, p.44) for a development of the opposition.

Peirce as functioning in a complementary fashion with mechanical, efficient causation. Still he specifies that ‘the being governed by a purpose or other final cause is the very essence of the psychological phenomenon’ (CP 1.269). According to the logician, ‘the mind works by final causation, and final causation is logical causation’ (CP. 1.250). For Peirce, ‘logic’ is but another name for ‘semiotic’, It is then clear that the characterization of the triadic sign cannot be grasped if separated from the working of final causation.




Figure 2.1. The triadic model of sign generation or semiosis

Our claim is that in order to understand the nature of the relationship between the two components of human subjectivity, namely self/particular identities, we should consider the semiotic self as a tendency or ‘disposition’ (Ransdell, 1977), and the manifold of identities as the historical upshots or concrete meaning effects of the former: ‘A sign should not be construed as an entity governed by rules from the outside, but as a process which itself is of the nature of a rule, of a “disposition,” in the Aristotelean sense of hexis’ (Ransdell, 1977, para. 38). It is in that autonomous, generative, semiotic process which is inseparable from its circumstantial, concrete results that the human being qua human being dwells and develops. The concept of human autonomy is not to be equated with an absolute command over the meaning of ourselves as signs, but with our capacity to understand ourselves as beings who are

guided by the purpose of both our personal desires and the general ideals embodied in the signs of our culture. Becoming a self takes place through the continuous generation of tangible ‘dynamic interpretants’ defined as ‘whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign’ (CP 8.315), which are the logical conjunction of what is most idiosyncratic – dreams and fantasies – and of that which is most impersonal - the voice of the other as it is manifested in the expectations and traditions of our community.

The Problem of Subjectivity and the Semiotic Self

In his useful discussion of the state of the art in the study of subjectivity, Colapietro (1990a) concludes that the pragmatic approach to human agency is an adequate response to the dangers entailed by some postmodern theoretical analyses which ‘displace the cogito from its position of privilege and authority’, and bring about ‘the vanishing of the subject’ (p. 651) as an autonomous agent. In view of this theoretical risk, Colapietro (1990b) states elsewhere, we must prevent the integrity of the self from being jeopardized by the proclivity to overemphasize multiplicity to the detriment of unity, in both the social sciences and the humanities. He holds that we must heed both multiplicity and ‘an overarching identity’ (p. 192), and concludes by positing the need for a more comprehensive theoretical analysis of the self ‘if I am to be more than an ever shifting signifier, if I am to be a steadfast self’ (p. 207).

Another relevant contribution to this alternative approach to the self is Schrag’s (1997). In metaphorical terms, he gives an account of a critical revision of the postmodern deconstructive turn, which makes the self re-emerge like ‘the phoenix arising from its ashes - a praxis-oriented self, defined by its communicative practices, oriented toward an understanding of itself in its discourse, its action, its being with others, and its experience of transcendence’ (p. 9).

To explore the self in action as well as in discourse or in exchange with others, which are all inseparable realms for the pragmatic semiotic, we need to consider in some detail the aforementioned ‘tri-relative influence’ embodied by the sign. Only thus can we get away from the too abstract, disembodied self of post-structural theory, which, in fact, has not gone very far away from its Cartesian ancestor, the split subject of modernity.

In an effort to reconsider critically the psychological self, Esgalhado (2002) posits a sign-based perspective to develop an alternative formulation of subjectivity. She draws most of her arguments from French post-structuralism, which, in turn, derives

from Saussurean, binary semiological theory, with some contributions from contemporary psychoanalytic theory. The overall goal of Esgalhado's (2002) analysis, namely to bring out the importance of signification in the quest for a way out of Cartesian dualism, in order to offer 'a view of the subject as dynamic and multiple' (p. 778), comes close to our own. However, we have some reservations concerning her theoretical framework. Binary sign theory seems adequate to explain each of the multiplicity of identities that the subject successively adopts as a member of different groups separately, but the signifier/signified pair, which is the basis of semiology, does not seem sufficient to account for the subject's agency, nor for his or her sense of enduring personal identity, of unity and sameness through time. We believe that the triadic sign can yield better results if it is used as the epistemological basis of a psychological theory of the self, since it allows us to conceive of the generation of a multiplicity of identities as partial realizations of the continuous interpretive process which is the self. That is why the 'living metaboly' (CP 5.402) of sign action is essential to analyze the self and the development of identity.

Peirce (CP 5.462) claims that we are immediately conscious of feeling qualities but not so of the attribution of feelings to an ego. As we stated above, the semiotician concludes that the self is the result of an inference, of an instinctive logical process. Reason starts with perception: first, we perceive qualities or feelings; second, their reaction against our will; and, third, their generality (CP 8.144). As opposed to the act of reading the units of a binary abstract code, interpretation entails, for Peirce, the progressive revelation of 'brute' reality through signs, which is a fallible, purposive endeavor determined - in the sense of being constrained - by the semiotic object: 'the idea of one thing manifesting a second to a third - providing experiential access to it, revealing it, mediating the one to the other - is among the most helpful intuitive understandings of what semiotic is supposed to be about' (Ransdell, 1991, ch. 2).

Every semiotic process must have a unity of consistency as it evolves in time, but how can the subject be at once multiple and still preserve a unity? Peirce's (CP 6.327) answer, which is based on the Kantian analysis of unity, is that the unity of consciousness can logically imply multiplicity without incurring in paradox. To understand this postulation, a brief introduction to the universal phenomenological categories that account for experience in the triadic semiotic must now be made. Multiplicity in its sheer variety corresponds to the category of Firstness, namely feelings considered absolutely in their purely qualitative aspect, not yet embodied in any fact or

existent. The definition of Firstness is based on the monadic unrelated aspect of things or events, which is the analytical result of regarding them neither as actual facts nor as regularities, but as sheer possibilities: it is ‘the mode of being which consists in the subject’s being what it is regardless of aught else’ (CP 1.21).

Something corresponds to the category of Secondness if it consists in an embodied dualistic relation, one which involves an element in reaction against another. This kind of experience implies the existence of a second subject; it is what makes our perception of objective reality. By ‘objective’ we mean whatever stubbornly resists or opposes us, that which is ‘immediately known as external ... in the sense of being present regardless of the perceiver’s will or wish’ (CP 5.462). The semiotic object belongs to the category of Secondness and as such it has the nature of a determination or limit for sign action. Peirce describes the influence of this on interpretation thus: ‘in the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the mind’s creation’ (CP 1.325). When Peirce writes that ‘the sense of externality in perception consists in a sense of powerlessness before the overwhelming force of perception’ (CP 1.334), he offers a semiotic account of a basic experience of growth in the process of human development, namely the coming to terms with the hard limits of the real, which brings a gradual end to a child’s omnipotence. A developmental account is given by Peirce (CP 5.233) through an example of the historical emergence of the self of the child as a kind of logical site where error can inhere. (For an extensive discussion of the developmental perspective of the self as a sign, see Colapietro, 1989, pp. 69-75.)

The relation of a first element with a second one in semiosis corresponds to that of the ego with the non-ego, an experience which implies ‘a two-sided consciousness’ (CP 8.330). However, genuine mediation is not attained until the category of Thirdness is introduced; with it we transcend the realm of brute force, of mechanical, dynamic reactions. Understanding, thought, reason itself, can only come about through the category of Thirdness, namely, the working out of a purposeful activity:

the rule to which future events have a tendency to conform is ipso facto, an important thing, an important element in the happening of those events. This mode of being which consists, mind my word if you please, which consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a general character, I call a Thirdness. (CP 1.26)

This account of the category which presupposes the other two highlights the

complementary nature of facts in which qualities inhere and of tendencies, namely the phenomenological basis of the tri-relative influence which operates at the heart of the semiotic. Rather than being dependent on intentions, sign activity - and, a fortiori, the self- is teleological: 'there is a real tendency to an end in the sign itself ... the type of teleology involved is tendential rather than intentional in type' (Ransdell, 1992). Semiosis is a process of meaning growth that tends towards an end. The parallelism between the sign's 'living metaboly' (CP 5.402) and the self/identities dialectical relationship is manifest: each concrete, historical identity is an actual or dynamic interpretant, that is, an adaptive effort of the subject through understanding.

To sum up this brief presentation of the phenomenology which underlies the theory of sign action, we must bear in mind that Peirce relates the three universal categories of experience to 'that of which we are aware in feeling, volition and cognition' (CP 1.332), respectively. Possible qualities and general laws are, for the triadic semiotic, as real as existents (facts); the three are the essential living bricks in the development of human subjectivity, which, from the pragmatic view, is part of nature, not its omnipotent, detached constructor. Assuming this rather modest but powerful epistemological stand, we will try to revisit a semiotic theory of the self which does justice to both permanence and change, namely the self as a meaning-generating pattern, and human identities as its protean 'significate effects'.

Peirce's Heraclitean model of signification offers a sturdy though flexible bridge of triadic, multifarious, not only verbal signs which vitally connects us to reality. In no way does sign action conceal from us the inherent semiotic structure through which the real becomes available to all creatures, human beings included. The semiotic tri-relative influence serves as an antidote against any theory which pulls the rug of the real from under our very feet, and which may transform the subject into a creature which floats in a septic vacuum which only holds signifiers and signifieds that are disconnected from anything which is not language. Against the enduring vision of a spiritualized subject cut off from the fierce friction of objective reality stands the process of an evolving and continuous semiosis. The human self cannot bear too much abstraction, because in order to evolve, it needs the precious ties of concrete place, time and others, in short, the working station of her or his own body situated within some community, at some particular period of its history.

Neither a denial of positive facts nor a devaluation of the sign textures on which we rely to find our way through life, the triadic semiotic heeds both elements and

introduces a third one, namely the logical synthesis called the interpretant. This Peircean notion is not tied to an individual - the interpreter - but is a technical term for the content of an act of interpretation, for the sign's meaning effect. Peirce's original conception of realism and idealism as complementary doctrines aimed at 'depolarizing the subject-object relation, by rejecting any form of estrangement which could be congealed in it' (Ibri, 2000, p. 39). The upshot of basing semiotic on synechism, namely the doctrine of universal continuity, is that sign action, whereof the self is an emergent property, incorporates subject and object as aspects of one and the same process. Interpretation is not what a person constructs inwardly from a remote standpoint in order to project it on the world. In category terms, interpretation is the general synthesis of Thirdness, which involves free-wheeling Firstness, namely subjectivity as a manifold of possible forms, when considered analytically apart from any other element, as well as obdurate, existential Secondness, the concrete individual wherein the form inheres. In order to observe and interpret signs, human beings must navigate in that stream called semiosis. Colapietro (1989) points out that we do not use signs in the way we use other artifacts; our very existence as meaningful beings depends largely on our being part of the sign process: 'the subject in its innermost being is itself a form of semiosis' (p. 37).

Some Advantages of the Triadic Semiotic over Dyadic Semiology for a Theory of the Self

A triadic model of the sign is required if we are to avoid positing either the human subject or objective reality as irrelevant to the interpretive process. In this lies one of the key contributions of triadic semiotic, namely a steady flux of perception-action-understanding which can be compared with the Moebius strip, whereby world and interpreter, as manifestations of both external reality and the semiotic web, intermingle creatively. The subject and the real are fully placed within the process of sign-interpretation. This perfectly continuous relationship of the subject and the object of thought contrasts sharply with Saussurean semiology's dualistic sign of signifier and signified, which inevitably weakens and blurs the influence of the world outside, as it were, in favor of mental signs.

Saussure's sign theory or semiology was originally (1916/1961) defined as the study of the life of signs within society (p. 60), and it was said to belong to social psychology. Therefore, signification was deemed to be to be part of society's ways and customs, a kind of taxonomic analysis of some of its practices. Peirce construed

‘semiotic’ as a synonym of ‘logic’, which has a different kind of relation with psychology, as we wrote above.

The Saussurean sign is defined (pp. 130-133) as an arbitrary relation between a signifier (= sound image) and a signified (= mental concept), while co-reference, as an upshot of logical transitivity between object, representamen and interpretant, makes the triadic relation between them a necessary one. The relation between signifier and signified depends on a conventional, social code - the Saussurean *langue* or language system. Thus meaning in semiology is construed as the purely negative upshot of structural differences among signs which belong to a system, for example national military insignia. This becomes even clearer in the work of one of Saussure’s followers, the Danish linguist Hjelmslev (1961), for whom meaning is nothing but the projection of an abstract grid over an amorphous and inert substance, namely brute reality before language cuts it out and shapes it in orderly meaningful units. In structuralism signs are understood not so much on account of the existence of an intrinsic meaning within the sign unit, but owing solely to a system of oppositions within an abstract pattern, the language system construed as a closed, self-sufficient universe. It is no coincidence that Saussure’s (1916/1961) favourite example of a meaningful sign system is the chess board: the value of each place is wholly dependent on the other spaces of the board; nothing external enters into the abstract, oppositional definition of meaning of semiology.

Let us sum up the inconvenience of working with a dyadic theory of signification for an account of the self. First, objective reality tends to lose its relevance regarding meaning, and this jeopardizes the self-understanding of a being who exists in the world, surrounded by things and by others with which he or she must interact and negotiate the meaning of his or her self. Second, since in semiology reference to reality and to mental concepts are fused into just one notion, that of the signified, meaning generation as an evolving process which compounds the determination of the real and that of the sign structure to elicit an interpretant cannot be accounted for. The theoretical loss of the generation of interpretants is a death blow for the understanding of the self as a continuous process whereby subjectivity evolves, and adapts or fails to do so while it interacts with the world. Far from denying the strong ties of self with discourse, we believe that to construe the self as exclusively dependent on verbal conventions cannot but weaken its other essential features. If the three phenomenological categories are part of every experience, then possible qualities and the hard evidence of existents, namely

imagination and concrete circumstances, are as much part of meaning as regularities, which exceed by far those of human linguistic patterns. The determination of the real consists in its being what it is regardless of any personal opinion about it (CP 6.495). If we do not want to withdraw a vital sustenance from the self, its perceptual as well as its imaginative connections with the world, with the lived situation, the triadic semiotic account seems more adequate.

We may conclude this brief contrast of the two sign models by means of an analogy proposed by Wiley (1994): ‘Peirce’s semiotic triad is dynamic and in potential perpetual motion, involving an indefinite amount of interpretation and reinterpretation. To stretch a metaphor, it is more a (triadic) moving picture than a (dyadic) snapshot’ (p. 14).

A Semiotic Approach to the Development of Personal Identity

In a book-long analysis of Peirce’s account of the self, Colapietro (1989) appraises systematically the many references to this notion that are disseminated throughout the semiotician’s vast writings on logic, which, for Peirce, was but another name for semiotic. Colapietro proposes the outline of a budding semiotic theory of personal identity in Peirce’s writings. In a chapter devoted to semiosis and subjectivity, there is a critique of Locke’s (1690/1998) pioneering introduction of the term *semeiotiké*, the doctrine of signs, for his failure to substitute the notion of idea for that of sign as the basic means to attain knowledge (p. 27). For Colapietro, the use of the term ‘sign’ implies a conceptual advance over that of ‘idea’ regarding the problem of subjectivity, and not a mere change of words:

From the perspective of semiotic, we are always already in the midst of others as well as of meaning; indeed otherness and meaning are given together in our experience of ourselves as beings embedded in a network of relations—more specifically, enmeshed in the ‘semiotic web’. (p. 28)

A similar point is made by Ransdell (1991) when he deems ‘representation’ and ‘sign’ to be complementary notions. ‘Representation’ is associated with the subjective realm; it is an internal, private aspect of things, something that happens within the mind, but which is related to some external fact or event. The term ‘sign’ is linked with something that is publicly available. The self as sign possesses a dimension of inwardness, but it is not inaccessible, since meaning is generated in an intersubjective way.

A frequent criticism raised by Peirce (CP 1.368) against Hegel's phenomenology is based on the insufficient importance that the German thinker gives to the category of Secondness, to 'the outward clash' (CP 8.41) of experience. A consequence of the theoretical standpoint of pragmatism is that the self is not to be located inside the head, as it were. Neither a part of the brain nor an intangible sociocultural abstraction, the self is knowable through its externality; it is embodied mind. Colapietro (1989, p. 99) remarks that although the experience of inwardness subsists in Peircean semiotic, thought construed as internal reflection is radically incomplete as a means for self-knowledge. The self only becomes fully though fallibly knowable and meaningful through its outward manifestation: 'What passes within we only know as it is mirrored in external objects' (CP 8.144).

The acquisition of self-knowledge always takes place in relation to others, who function as interpretants of the self (Andacht 2000). Our condition of being knowable externally is not restricted to the others' perspective; self-knowledge crucially involves interpreting oneself as other. Thus the experience of an inner world derives from the active and endless commerce with the outer world. The construal of thought as an inner dialogue of the self across time is the natural outcome of its semiotic functioning. Peirce describes this mechanism as a conversation wherein the self of the present - the 'I' role - addresses the self of the future as if it were a 'You', in a similar fashion as if it were addressing others.

In his study of the theory of the self, Wiley (1994) concludes that the influence of Descartes is the main cause of two kinds of theoretical reductionism relative to the ontology of the self (p. 213). One is a downward reduction, a biologically determined account of the self. The other is an upward reduction which tends to dissolve the self in the community, and thus misses the individual experience of the person. Wiley's central tenet is that the triadic structure of the sign is needed to avoid such reductions: 'Both reductions misunderstand the *sui generis* self, because both, being dyadic, are based on faulty semiotics. In the pragmatic scheme there are three semiotic elements that can be missing: the sign, interpretant, or object' (p. 212).

Based on Peirce's dialogic construal of thought, and on G.H. Mead's (1913) symbolic interactionism, Wiley (1994) devises his own model of the communicative self (see Figure 2), which he depicts as a triad engaged in an internal conversation (pp. 13-16), a self 'not based on cogito but on a slow self discovery' (N. Wiley, personal communication, April 22, 2003). Thus Wiley combines Peirce's 'I-you' systemic

directionality with Mead's dialogic self – 'I-me' – to obtain a reflexive triologue that involves the three personal pronouns: 'Me-I-you'. The 'I-self' of the present stands for the 'Me-self' of the past and addresses a 'You-self' of the future if we formulate this model of the self in terms of Peirce's definition of sign (CP 2.228).




Figure 2. A diagrammatic representation of Wiley's (1994) account of the inner speech of the self

Concerning the development of personal identity, Wiley's (1994) central tenet is that the 'I-you-me' self structure ought to be conceptually distinguished from the manifold of particular semiotic identities (pp. 26-39), which are the concrete contents of that structure. The pathological taking over of the self by a single identity is compared by Wiley with the unrestricted growth of a tumor. The normal self-governed process comes to a halt as a momentary product of it replaces the entire process. We will illustrate this below with a clinical example. To illustrate this dangerous confusion, Wiley describes the 'overall structure of the self' (p. 36) as a 'container', and the specific identities, which are sets of particular signs, as being 'contained' (pp.11-17).

However, this spatial image of the self may unwittingly conspire against our

grasping the processual nature of the semiotic self which Wiley himself assumes, as he himself acknowledges (p. 27). Let us recall that Peirce's original conception of the 'tri-relative influence' involves the generation of interpretants across time. The use that Wiley makes of the three personal pronouns which structure human communication points strongly to the teleological dimension of sign action: the development of the communicative self through time, the tendency to address the 'You' in the future, starting from the 'Me' in the past, and going through the present mediation of the 'I'.

The question now is how to advance in the characterization of concrete identities that Wiley (1994, p. 36) relates to 'social traits', to 'personalized psychological traits' and to 'self-concepts', on the one hand, and the generic self as the center of meaning generation, on the other. The hegemony exerted by a partial component of the self process cannot but reify and falsify the true nature of human beings as temporal creatures, who must find their feet in an ever-changing, Heraclitean reality.

Short's (1981a) assertion that the basic issue of the triadic semiotic 'is not that of sign but that of semiosis, the process of sign interpretation, [which] is essentially teleological' (p. 202) is no overstatement. The corollary of a semiotic theory of personal identity is that 'to be a self is to be a sign in the process of becoming a self' (Colapietro, 1989, p. 77). To develop the consequences of the self/identities distinction we must rely on the teleological functioning of semiosis. The autonomous generation of interpretants is decisive for the generation of the 'significate effects' (CP 5.475) which we call our identity, and which occurs at a certain place and time, in our interaction with others. If this distinction becomes blurred, or worse if it is obliterated by the unwarranted halting of what is in fact a continuous flow of change (self) which includes and integrates its stationary pauses (identities), then we are apt to become the prisoners of a jail of our own devising, namely a fixed identity which we feel and think we have to adopt for all times and circumstances. Against such trouble, psychology must focus its analytical strategies, lest the flow of adaptive creativity not become frozen, and bring about a numbing of psyche, the life principle of all that exhibits a purpose.

The Teleological Integration of Identity

Constructivist theories consider meaning as that which is made up or attributed by people to phenomena which do not possess any intrinsic meaning, and which thus are entirely subordinated to this potent human act of will, whereby to interpret entails to invent or to construct meaning where there was none before (Turrise, 2002, p. 126). It is

not hard to see constructivism as the theoretical counterpart of the radical postmodern, post-structuralist theories discussed in the first part of this paper. Whether the subject be construed as a formal system of signifiers, who then may vanish in an all-powerful community, or as an omnipotent though unsuspecting meaning-maker who is oblivious of being the tireless inventor of what is out there and in him- or herself, in both cases there is a glaring lack of the constraint of reality and of the autonomy of meaning generation, which is indeed social but also natural and universal.

For pragmatism, human agency is but another manifestation of a far more general purposeful activity or mind taken in Peirce's broad sense, which allows for the integration of all living beings, as opposed to a hierarchical and anthropocentric vision. Instead of conceiving the world as a vast blank bereft of sense which must then be filled with meaning by the subject, or as a chess game ordered by abstract, external, rational rules, the triadic semiotic posits interpretation as a way of interaction with the world which is akin to the observation of it.

If thoughts are not in us, but it is us interpreters-observers who are in thought, just as we do not say that motion is in the body, but that the body is in motion (CP 6.301), then a pragmatic account of the self is one which does not separate understanding from acting purposefully in the world, and one for which the most precious skill is to learn how to navigate among signs. There is a continuum between perceiving something and interpreting what that something means, and this is inseparable from conceiving a way of behaving in relation to it, not necessarily then and there, but in a general, prospective manner, as 'the way every mind would act' (CP 8.315), namely what we think would happen if we were to actively engage with the observed element. It is in that sense that Ransdell (1992) writes: 'An interpreter's interpretation is to be regarded as being primarily a perception or observation of the meaning exhibited by the sign itself' (para. 2).

In her article about the structuring function of narratives in relation to self and to identity, Crossley (2000) criticizes the assumption that the self be considered as just any other object in the world. The alternative proposed by social constructionism sees the self as 'inextricably dependent on the language and linguistic practices that we use in our everyday lives to make sense of ourselves and other people' (p. 529). Crossley criticizes the postmodern radicalizing of this proposal. The construal of the self being wholly dependent on local linguistic practices entails the loss of the self as a universal human category.

To further Crossley's argument in favor of the universality of the self, we can add that to consider the self as one more sign in the world, a relational unit, and not as a mere object of the world enables us to integrate theoretically both aspects of human nature, namely our interpretive tendency and our objective embodied existence in the world. Such a conception displaces the discussion away from the 'prison-house of language' (Jameson, 1972) of the self, and relocates it in a much larger environment, that of nature. This is nicely captured by Alexander's (2002) notion of 'relative objectivity', which she uses to describe pragmatism as a philosophical alternative to the radical subjectivity favored by postmodernism. The non-passive nature of human knowledge of the world can be accounted for without giving up objectivity altogether. The apparent paradox of a direct (perceived) and mediated (represented) experience which is entailed by sign action, the kernel of Peircean semiotic, is a way of overcoming the duality of matter and mind. The fact 'that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves ... does not prevent its being a phenomenon without us, just as a rainbow is once a manifestation of both of the sun and of the rain' (CP 5. 283). The observer does not stand outside of semiosis, but actively participates in the generation of meaning by establishing some kind of relation to that which resists her in experience, the semiotic object, and to that which she understands as its meaning, the generated interpretant. These two logical components are mediated by a perceptible element which is not only linguistic or necessarily linguistic, the representamen, and whose systemic aim in the process of semiosis is to reveal an aspect of the object in the interpretant, after receiving the determination of the semiotic object.

...when we think, to what thought does that thought-sign which is our self address itself? It may, through the medium of outward expression ... come to address itself to thought of another person. But whether this happens or not, it is always interpreted by a subsequent thought of our own. (CP 5.284)

Once again the image of the Moebius strip comes in handy: the theory of the self as sign entails no privileged God-eye's view of this logical process; it is an endless circulation without an inside or outside which enables us to understand the world and ourselves as part of it. For such a sign theory we do not construct or invent meaning, but actively participate in its fallible revelation. It is through the self-criticism of our interpretations, which are often framed narratively, that meaning grows.

According to Crossley (2000), a way out of the postmodern reductionism of the self as a universal category can be found in the assumption that human life bears 'within

it a "narrative structure" ' (p. 528) which furnishes a 'sense of order and connection' (p. 542) that orients the development of the self. In our view, her argument finds further theoretical support in the teleological functioning of signs in human life, namely the experience of a sense of directionality or systemic purpose, which is not always or necessarily a conscious one. Pragmatic semiotic accounts for such a narrative sense of order by teleology, which involves a dialectical tension between telic directionality and telic originality (Alexander, 2002). Alexander's thesis is that Peirce contributes to the classical theory of teleology by introducing the notion of ontological 'absolute chance' (CP 6.74), whereby the semiotic 'nests' probabilistic determinism within indeterminism. This proposal accounts for the possibility of order arising spontaneously out of disorder. While the directional telos allows for predictions, since it is based on regularity, the original telos explains the emergence of new patterns, of changes, through the intervention of objective chance. The conception of the self as a dynamically stable emergent form (Alexander, 2002) is the processual background against which personal identities emerge, and with them originality is introduced in the development of human subjectivity. Out of every spontaneous variation a new tendency can consolidate through self-interpretation: from sheer possibility (Firstness), through its manifestation (Secondness), a new regularity is born (Thirdness).

The development of the self is purposive, but we must heed Short's (1981b) timely caveat against a too narrow account of this notion:

Purposes are not particular psychological events. Rather, someone's purpose is the ideal type which he wills to actualize. His willing to actualize it is what makes this type his purpose, but the purpose is the type, and not any particular act or acts of will. (p. 368)

This view of teleology is presupposed by Peirce's conception of the self as a center of purpose and interpretive power (Colapietro, 1989, p. 92), and not as a wholly external agent who goes around in an Adam-like way bestowing meaning to a meaningless environment. To state that semiotic processes are teleological is tantamount to saying they are tendencies. Therefore, what Wiley (1994) describes as the 'generic' dimension of the self results from the tendency of all signs to actualize a general, ideal type. The many identities over which the self rules are the actualized results of this process, but the former should not be confused with the latter.

The solution to the false dilemma of being either the passive puppets of autonomous signs or the sole owners and creators of our signs is found in Peirce's view

of human nature as essentially communicative. The notion of a human creature that can do without the avenues which signs open for it to walk along is implausible. To become human then entails to learn (and to reflect on) how to navigate amidst signs, which is part and parcel of our species. The notion of an isolated creature that is wholly deprived of the communion with signs and with others simply does not fit any reasonable description of humanity. However, in order to argue for an account of the self as a sign, we cannot rely only on our will, that most vaunted and cherished human virtue. The functioning of signs does not allow for the arbitrary endowment of meaning by anyone. This does not mean, however, that we lack the necessary semiotic skill to handle signs:

... such control as we do have over the powers of signs (thus over meaning phenomena in general) lies in our skill at setting them in interaction with one another in the compositional process in ways favorable to some desired result. (Ransdell, 1992, para. 2)




Figure 2.3 Diagrammatic summary of Colapietro's (1989) reflection on self-control (pp. 92-97).

What constitutes the genuine, species-specific semiotic dimension of human beings is the representational or interpretive relation in which we are continuously engaged, and this comes about through the dialogical generation of meaning. Such is the logical basis of the power of self-control. Semiotic power is different from the force of sheer will; the former is 'the creative power of reasonableness' (CP 5.520). Therefore, human autonomy is not to be equated with our absolute command over the meaning of ourselves as signs, but with our capacity to understand ourselves as beings who are guided by the ideal purposes of both our personal desires and the general ideals

embodied in the signs of our culture.

An Illustration of the Self-Identity Distinction: A Child's Self Narrative

A story told by a patient from a children's psychotherapy group serves to illustrate the notions of particular identities as actual dynamic interpretants and of the self as a semiotic process that evolves by the cooperative effort of objective reality, imaginative qualitative form and purposive human agency.

A young girl introduced herself with a story to a psychotherapy group. In a previous family interview with Lucia (an assumed name) and her mother it became known that the reason for her consultation was an abrupt change in her; from being a lively, playful child, she had become cheerless and devitalized. There was an obvious reason for this loss of vitality which seemed to escape her mother. Her father had been recently killed in an accident. During the interview, the mother repeatedly emphasized that Lucia was not *herself* any longer. The girl agreed wholeheartedly that she was indeed a cheerful girl. Her manifest concern was not to be able to be who she wanted to be, someone always willing to play with her friends.

This is the story Lucia told to the group. Once upon a time there was a kitten that did *not* want *not* to play. A rabbit offered to play with him, and the kitten said 'no'. A dog asked him to play, and he also said 'no'. Finally, the kitten felt so sad and lonely that he went home and died.

From the semiotic point of view, the reduction of her self to a single identity had diminished the generative power of the self as an evolving sign. In terms of Wiley's (1994) proposed distinction of generic self and particular identities, we can say that Lucia had mistaken the identity of a cheerful girl, of a single dominating 'self-concept' (Wiley, 1994, p. 36), for her generic self. Therefore, in spite of her peers' considering her story an extremely sad one, she did not see herself as responsible for having told a heart-breaking story. There was no doubt that the intense sadness that was felt all around was of her own doing, but Lucia did not heed the others' request. She said that she was tired and she did not feel like changing the plot at that moment.

As a closure to the session, it was decided that a make-believe picture of the whole group of children was to be taken. Its aim was to help Lucia see herself through the eyes of the others, and thus to integrate what she so insisted was not part of her. As she took her turn behind the imaginary camera, she was taken aback with what she saw in front of her: 'Lucia looks sad!' she exclaimed. Then she stopped to think for a

while, until her face lit up with an idea that had obviously just come to her: 'I know why she is sad! It's because her father died!' There was a long silence in the room. At last, one of the boys said softly: 'My mother also died.' After that, he approached Lucia and held her hand.

It is relevant to recall that the girl had attributed her distress not to an inhibition of grief, but to the difficulty of accepting a manifest change in her identity, which implied a limitation of her self-interpretive power. Expressed in the girl's words, the motive for her consulting was that she did not want to be the kind of person she actually was. If her will had had its way unrestrainedly, that is, if the self could be really constructed, Lucia would have told the group the cheerful, carefree story of a character who was energetic, sociable and lively. That was indeed her will, as it had been clearly asserted on the day of the interview. Still, the story that came out of the girl's mouth seemed to have a life of its own, or a visible lack thereof, in fact. The signs were independent of the manifest force of her will (CP 1.220), as opposed to the teleological power of ideas, which, for Peirce, are the same as signs, whereby we 'receive and transmit ideal influence of which (we are) a vehicle' (CP 1.212).

The playful characters who populated her story embodied a particular identity of Lucia's self, that of a cheerful girl. However, the kitten with the deadly feeling stood for another voice or identity that was also part of the girl's self. The girl's self is an interpretive ongoing unity and not the simple sum of the voices. This explains that her liveliness is not the result of her being always 'a cheerful girl', but of her capacity as an interpretive agent.

If we combine Short's (1981b) proposal of human purpose as the appropriation of some ideal type, and Ransdell's (1992) proposal of our real power consisting in observing and manipulating signs that already have meaning-generating power, then we are able to understand human agency. It is Lucia who picks the narrative signs that are able to express, as a living purpose, what her past, concrete identity does not allow her to express. Thus she becomes the vehicle for the emergence of telic originality, the truth, which, in this case, is the aesthetic ideal of being a self continuously in the process of becoming one, and not the reiteration of a single, predefined interpretant/identity which is willed by others or by even herself. Her taking up that ideal type or purpose, the tragic narrative, is what being a self is all about: the manifestation of a multifarious continuum which is made of both playfulness and grief, and many other possible identities, which are nothing but the possible and actual

interpretants of our self in changing circumstances. Each ‘self concept’ or ‘psychological trait’ (Wiley, 1994, p. 36) corresponds semiotically to the generation of a single interpretation.

Short’s (1981b, p.368) description of somebody’s purpose as the actualization of an ideal type allows us to conclude that the girl’s choice of that story shows the convergence of telic directionality and of telic originality (Alexander, 2002). The narrative begins like a typical children story, since, like so many others, it involves pets, and thus is akin to playing. But her story also contains an unexpected, tragic turn of events that upsets the young audience, and allows the girl’s unwilling identity to emerge, and then to be observed and interpreted by the narrator herself.

Conclusion

Our paper began with the central problem tackled by Wiley (1994) concerning the Cartesian influence on various forms of contemporary reductionism affecting the self as a universal category. Theories such as constructivism and social constructionism tend to identify human generic nature, the self, with the shifting identities that are adaptive to changing social contexts and different life circumstances. We argued that the framework of the pragmatic triadic semiotic and the phenomenological categories which serve as its foundation could contribute to the search for an alternative perspective to the dualistic opposition between idealism and realism and to preserve the distinction between the self as living process of sign action, of meaning generation, and the particular identity or identities which are construed as momentary, concrete realizations of that process.

A reasonable doubt may still arise at this point: what is the alleged benefit of bringing in the Peircean triadic semiotic to bear on the theory of the self? Or, to sum up the main point of our paper, how can we semiotically explain the multiplicity of identities and the unity of the self across time? The answer lies in the fact that the triadic semiotic is based on the cooperation or tri-relative influence of the following logical elements:

- The real as a constraining force, that of our actual life circumstances over which often we have but little power. It involves the pressure of historical facts, whether they be material or not. Our ignoring or denying them cannot suppress their determining effect. This is the point of friction between ego and non-ego, which functions as a stubborn limit for the self-as-sign process. It is the objective boundary of human subjectivity.

- A possible quality conceived of as a pure form which is sought after as an adequate expression by the blind determination of the real, to produce a concept thereof. A narrative which at first appears as a normal, innocent children's story then shows itself as having a tragic, elegiac quality, as in the previous example. This is the space that the semiotic allots to creativity. The spontaneous, random, formal variety introduced by each voice stands in a dialectical relationship with existential circumstances, and with a general, guiding purpose which is aimed at, consciously or not.
- The general meaning effect as the probable upshot of the triadic cooperation. This is the ongoing synthesis which comes about through the influence of the other two elements. It is the systemic end towards which the entire semiotic process tends. The unity of consistency of the self derives not from there being an already existent, predetermined end-state, but from its being of the nature of a 'would be' or *esse in futuro* (CP 2.148), namely an evolving tendency or disposition, which presupposes the two other components (existential and qualitative).

From that theoretical perspective, the triadic sign bears within itself the power to determine an equivalent or a more developed sign that relates to the semiotic object in the same respect as the sign itself does. In such terms, to become a self entails a continuous growth of reasonableness (Santaella, 2000, p. 98). Thus the self of a person is not an accomplished fact, such as being always a cheerful person, because the meaning of our self as that of any other sign emerges as our will actualizes ideal types. However, 'a general (fact) cannot be fully realized. It is a potentiality' (CP 2.148). That is why it is more realistic to consider the self as a process that is based on a spontaneous logic of inquiry in a self-governed, self-corrective and self-critical mode of functioning. Becoming a self is not to remain faithful to one particular content or interpretation - a dynamic interpretant. Neither does it imply the loss of unity as a sense of continuity across time. It implies to be always engaged in a self-controlled semiotic endeavor which is inseparable from the fallible pursuit of some evolving ideal (Colapietro, 1989, pp. 92-97).

The conclusions that we have drawn in our paper point to the need to examine a theoretical issue which could only be briefly discussed here, namely the relation of Peircean teleology with the development of the self/identity process. This appears as the next logical step in order to understand both the conservative (telic directionality) and

the innovative tendencies (telic originality), and thus to delve into the nature of human autonomy and agency.

We have argued that triadic signs have their own, proper meaning, which is our task to observe and gradually understand in our endless road to the truth, which is not invented or constructed but laboriously and fallibly discovered. That center of interpretive power which is the self, a triadic structure which functions tendentially to generate meaning, in no way relinquishes agency, as the post-structuralist theories postulate, nor does it invent reality at will, as social constructionism and constructivism uphold. Our main conclusion, then, is that not even something as real and as close to a human being as his or her own self can be truly constructed, as the result of either a collective or a personal decision. Such is the purport of the example presented above. We are neither the passive recipients of social signs nor the omnipotent creators of meaning, but beings who are actively engaged in the universal process of meaning generation. This semiotic involvement is what makes us truly human, namely part of an evolving, meaningful reality, and not its external and alien constructors or inventors.

Study 3

Internal Dialogue and Self-contradiction:

The relevance of Secondness for the Psychological Study of the Dialogical Self

Abstract: The semiotic self has been defined as a continuous process of meaning generation in which multiple particular identities are integrated through an internal dialogue which evolves along time. We present an exploratory qualitative research aimed at observing an enactment of the internal conversation of ten participants at a psychodrama workshop. The procedure is based on the “empty chair” technique created by J. L. Moreno. Participants were stimulated to think about a situation of strong personal doubt. The analysis focuses on the interaction of different inner voices, and it applies C.S. Peirce’s phenomenological categories. It is argued that the consciousness of a resistance is constitutive of the self, and is logically related to the emergence of distinct multiple identities. We conclude that the capacity to tolerate self-contradiction fosters the semiotic development of the self as an interpretive agency.

Keywords: meaning, internal-dialogue, self-contradiction, self semiotic, self dialogical.

Estudo 3

*Diálogo Interno e Autocontradição:**A relevância da categoria da Secundidade para o estudo psicológico do self dialógico*

Resumo. O *self* semiótico foi definido como um processo contínuo de geração de significado no qual identidades múltiplas são integradas no diálogo interno que transcorre ao longo do tempo. Apresenta-se aqui um estudo qualitativo exploratório orientado a observar a encenação da conversação interna de dez pessoas que participaram numa oficina de psicodrama. O procedimento está baseado na técnica psicodramática “cadeira vazia” criada por J. L. Moreno. Os participantes foram estimulados a pensar numa situação de forte dúvida pessoal. A análise focaliza a interação de diferentes vozes internas e aplica as categorias fenomenológicas de C. S. Peirce. Argumenta-se que a consciência de uma resistência é constitutiva do *self*, e ela está relacionada de modo lógico à emergência de distintas identidades múltiplas. Conclui-se que a capacidade de tolerar a autocontradição favorece o desenvolvimento semiótico do *self* como agente interpretativo.

Palavras chave: significado, diálogo interno, autocontradição, *self* semiótico, *self* dialógico.

The present paper attempts to apply C. S. Peirce's (1839-1914) phenomenological categories of Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness, that underlie Wiley's (1994) semiotic self conception and his I-me-you model of internal conversation, to the study of the experience of dialogical thought. We also intend to follow Peirce's initiative in acknowledging the relevance of the category of Secondness in theoretical discussions of signification. Peircean triadic phenomenology is inscribed within the Socratic tradition of the relentless, dialogical pursuit of the truth (Ransdell, 2000) which conceives thought to evolve through the permanent interaction with an internal opponent. Categorical³¹ Secondness is proposed to account for the effect of alterity (*altersense*) or otherness in human experience, which is described by the semiotician as an idea of "not" which acts as the very pivot of thought (CP 1.324).³² The triadic phenomenological categories are proposed as an epistemological, critical alternative to Cartesian dualism or, to use Hermans's (2001a) expression, to any kind of "exclusive opposition" (p. 802) between the inner and outer realms. It also functions as a *de facto* critique of the postmodern excessive emphasis on the mental in detriment of the determinative capacity of external facts on thought processes. We will focus on the influence of objective reality in the development of the *self* construed as a semiotic process. We believe that the category of Secondness is relevant to contemporary dialogical theory to analyze internal dialogue, insofar as the dialogical is not exclusively or mainly definable in terms of the communication between two or more concrete persons. Psychodrama is proposed as a method for the observation of the internal conversation, because Moreno's (1946/1978) role theory relies on the internalized relationship of roles as a constitutive element of the human self. A psychodramatic exercise was designed for the present research purpose since it enables us to make detailed observations of the interaction of roles within a person as s/he engages in an externalized intra-dialogical situation to solve a dilemmatic doubt. The use of Moreno's method is particularly well suited for empirical work with the manifestations of Secondness, i.e., with the concrete embodiments of otherness in the functioning of internal roles. Our aim is to ground the theoretical discussion on the empirical data of

³¹ The term refers too Peirce's scheme of the three universal categories with which to analyze all modes of experience. For a discussion of causality in relation to Peircean and Aristotelian categorical schemes see Hulswit, M., "Peirce on Causality and Causation", in <http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-cauhul.htm>

³² Peirce's citations are quoted in this article by volume (1.) and paragraph (324).

the observed internal opposition which arises when thought is triggered by situations of doubt. For the analysis of the obtained data the Peircean categories that underlie Wiley's (1994) *I-You-me* model of the internal conversation were applied, since they were devised to study all forms of experience, which, a fortiori, includes the mechanism of dialogical thought.

Pragmatism and the dialogical approach to the self

Peirce's pragmatism³³ is the product of a thorough revision of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy, aimed at bringing out the importance of objective external reality not as an unknowable reality in itself, the Kantian *Ding an sich*, but as a tangible and decisive influence in the actual process of meaning generation. The pragmatic perspective conceives the self as a process of meaning generation, whereof concrete thoughts are the observable phenomena. Therefore, self-consciousness is not longer conceived as the product of classical, Cartesian introspection, but as what the subject achieves "by virtue of its being a sentient, active, communicative and cognitive organism (Colapietro, 1989 p.70). Thus in semiotic theory there is no undivided, self-contained subject; the self emerges in the interpretive relation of a subject with the external world. In this relation the self is the evolving, emergent product of a meaning-generation logical process. Since 'logic' in Peirce is synonymous with 'semiotic', the self is construed as a developing sign, that is, as a living entity which is destined to generate further, more complex signs of itself, as that is the purport of meaning in the semiotic.

The construal of the self as a sign was first organized systemically in a book-length study by Colapietro (1989), who appraised and wove the many references of this notion that are disseminated throughout Peirce's numerous writings on logic. This scholar's thesis is that Peirce's approach to the self has not been adequately appreciated historically, because it has not been considered within a "developmental perspective" (Colapietro, 1989, p. 61). For this view the essential to define the self semiotically is to construe it as "a sign in the process of development" (CP 5.313, in Colapietro, 1989, p.

³³ Despite Peirce's having being the founder of pragmatism (1878), as it is acknowledged by James' (1906/1963) in the first lecture of his book "Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking", he decided to abandon this name due to modifications which in his view violated the Ethics of terminology that some of his followers had introduced to his original conception of the pragmatic maxim. One of them was James himself, his close friend but often a criticized thinker, when it came to the principles of his semiotic. That was Peirce's justification for renouncing to his first creation and proposing "pragmaticism", a term he described as "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers" (CP 5.414).

66). The approach to the self as an inner dialogue through time is an upshot of its semiotic functioning as a process. The self evolves as it carries out a conversation wherein the self of the present – the I role – addresses the self of the future as if it were a you, in a similar fashion as if it were addressing external others.

This dialogical conception may be fruitfully compared with Mead's (1913) "inner *forum*" notion (p. 377). The proximity between Mead and Peirce is probably due to the historical influence of Dewey, who was a student of Peirce at Johns Hopkins in 1882, and a mentor of Mead, whom he hired in 1891. Mead's own conception of a dialogue between two phases of the self is not too different from the kind of relation a person has with others. The difference between the two dialogical models lies on their distinct emphasis regarding the directionality of the thinking process along the time axis. While Peirce focuses on the orientation of the *I* (the present self) to the future, Mead (1913: p. 374) stresses the process whereby a subject turns to "the moment passed", in order to capture the self as an object represented by the *me*. The latter conception is based on James's (1890, Ch X) emphasis on the impossibility of direct self-knowledge in the present moment, due to the continuity of consciousness or 'sciousness'. James stated that things experienced in the present cannot be immediately known and thus his proposal of the pronoun *me* serves to designate the empirical self that can be reflectively known. An important distinction that Mead (1913) introduces in his socially-oriented proposal is that self-awareness is gained by the apprehension of the self through its role-based interaction with others:

The self acts with reference to others and is immediately conscious of the objects about it. In memory it also reintegrates the self acting as well as the others acted upon. But besides these contents, the action with reference to the others calls out responses in the individual himself – there is then another 'me' criticizing, approving, and suggesting, and consciously planning, *i.e.*, the reflective self. (p. 376)

Mead's description of the *I* is akin to Peirce's depiction of the evanescent present moment as a typical instance of the category of Firstness. Human beings are only the site of a fleeting, impossible to verbalize quality of feeling; this component of human experience is something apart from any kind of concrete emotion and, *a fortiori*, of the consciousness thereof. Thus if someone asks her or himself "what is the content of the present instant, his question always comes too late" (CP 1.310). Mead's pronoun *me* describes the self as it appears in consciousness, as an objective component of it. The *I*-

me relation can be compared to Peirce's relation of thought with its object, which involves the interaction of an Ego with an external non-Ego and pertains to the category of Secondness. The difference between the two pragmatists insofar as the internal conversation is concerned lies in the fact that Mead focuses on the turning of consciousness to the past, while Peirce stresses its orientation to the future. What the semiotic highlights is the completion of representation by means of the co-operation of its three constituent elements. The qualitative relation of presentation of the object – its Firstness aspect – is presupposed by the representation of it: the tendency towards meaning of sign action is to associate the qualitative dimension with the actual, perceptual impact or Secondness, so as to bring in the intervention of a third, general element, the mental representation of the other two components. The latter phenomenon pertains to the category of Thirdness, it involves the generation of an interpreting sign of that object, at a future moment. The orientation of a thought to the future is manifested in the thinking process by the *you* pronoun.

Peirce's anti-Cartesian theoretical perspective is the result of the carefully balanced presentationist *cum* representationist approach to meaning that the semiotician argues for (CP 5.607). Short (1981:204) states that Peirce's conception of signification can be compared with Brentano's notion of intentionality. The difference between them lies in Peirce's proposal that signs derive their intentionality not exclusively from their relation to an object, but from the relation of one sign to another, which constitutes a process.

The semiotic approach to the self

In spite of the centrality that Peirce granted to the triadic conception of thought/sign processes, this logical discovery is not evident in the *I-you* dualistic description of thought. In a similar fashion, despite Mead's teleological view of human behavior, which entails an orientation to the future, this was not made explicit in his *I-me* model. Based on the complementarity of Peirce's and Mead's dialogical models, Wiley (1994) proposes a model of the semiotic *self* which combines Peirce's *I-you* systemic directionality together with Mead's *I-me* self model to obtain a reflexive triologue that involves the three personal pronouns: *me-I-you*. The *I-self* of the present is logically determined by the *me-self* of the past, and it addresses the *you-self* of the future, into which it tends to develop. Wiley's aim is to establish a full, structural correspondence between Peirce's components of the triadic sign structure with these

three pronouns, in order to furnish a model to study empirically the internal conversation.

The fundamental assumption that underlies Wiley's semiotic self, which he drew to a large extent from Colapietro's theoretical elaborations, as he acknowledges (1994, p. 15), is that the self is a sign in continuous process of development. Peirce's emphasis on the future derives from the following central tenet of the semiotic: "every thought or cognitive representation is of the nature of a sign" (CP 8.191), and also from the premiss that sign processes are self-controlled, autonomous, teleological or "end-directed". (Ransdell 1977, p. 168). The fact that the evolution of thought is dialogical is, for Peirce, not "merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic" (CP 4.551). To draw out the implications of this logical necessity in the process of evolving thought-signs, one must bear in mind that for Peirce even introspection is a form of inference, which thereby is related to his critique of the notion of intuition. A human being can be immediately conscious of his or her feelings. However, the attribution of such feelings to an Ego requires something else, a reasoning process. Thus, introspection is construed as a form of inference which derives from our observation of the outer world (CP 5.244). There is no inference which could take place instantaneously, in the lived, immediate present, because as any logical process it occurs along the axis of time.

If we accept that all possible thought must be performed by means of signs, then it must of necessity be dialogical, since the purport of every sign is to determine a further sign of itself, namely, the interpretant, which is another sign. Due to the recursive and generative nature of semiosis this new sign will, in turn, generate a further sign/interpretant of itself. It is in this way that meaning grows (CP 2.302). According to Ransdell (1998), semiotic *qua* theory of signification does not deal mainly with separate signs, as if they were fixed units, but with the process of sign action or semiosis. This technical term does not denote a single, existing thing, no matter how powerful and ubiquitous a sign may be, but a kind of logical "productive power", therein consists the process of interpretant-generation. Since "the mere presence of a sign calls forth the presence of another" (Santaella 2004a, p. 132), we can conclude with this scholar that the starting point for understanding Peircean dialogism is his notion of sign action. The quintessential dialogical and, for Peirce, intersubjective situation is one in which every utterance of a speaker has as its main purport to address some future utterance, one which is bound to arise as its response and fulfillment. Such a regular, law-like

performance is what Peirce describes as a ‘would-be’, and it accounts for the working of symbols and it is an alternative way of designating the category of Thirdness, that of the greatest possible logical complexity in triadic theory. The fate of every sign is thus to reproduce in miniature, as it were, the above-described dialogical situation, and it always does so by engendering, via the representamen sign (which is in charge of the presentation of the object), a more developed version of itself, namely, the interpretant sign. The latter functions as the meaning of the determining sign in the triadic model, just as the response one aims at eliciting in a dialogue constitutes the meaning or interpretant of one’s utterance: it is there, in the other who responds, and not here, in my own speech act, that the real purport of my dialogical intervention is to be sought.

To sum up, the notion of a semiotic process as the kernel of the theory of signification developed by Peirce must be distinguished from the hegemonic sign conception, which is a single, fixed material or reified entity. Instead, concrete signs in triadic semiotic serve specifically to furnish the perceptual material which is grasped by interpreters, and which can be indefinitely reproduced in all forms of media. From this theoretical point of view, the historical and always circumstantial interpreter and her/his concrete act of understanding some particular semiotic instance or sign token, loses relevance. This is more evident when we compare the above embodied instance of sign activity with the most important, systemic aspect of the Peircean model, which is the disposition of signs themselves, i.e., their immanent tendency to become more complex by means of their generation of more developed thought-signs of themselves. It is in that natural process where thought is to be found, thought in action that is, and not in any concrete instance thereof, which is only the circumstantial upshot of that activity, relevant as it may be for some analytical or practical purpose in the world of human affairs.

The construal of thought as a semiotic process has as its main corollary that every such process is thoroughly intersubjective, and that all thought is by necessity dialogical. So now the problem is how to understand the precise sense in which an intersubjective process takes place in what was traditionally considered the subjective, solitary, even insulated realm of the self.³⁴ One should read Peirce’s statement that “a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself’,

³⁴ Below we bring in a critique that Peirce makes to William James’ *Principles of Psychology*, on account of James’ counterintuitive construal of a wholly isolated self, which would, in fact, keep us from being able to communicate with each other, and we could add, with ourselves.

that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time” (CP 4.421) precisely as a critique of the traditional, monological and insulated conception of the human self.³⁵

The interpretation process whereof the *self* is the developmental product is akin to the logical circuit whereby a sign or *representamen* comes to stand for an object, if and only if it thereby generates an interpretant of itself, which constitutes a more developed sign of that object which the sign aims at representing. The triadic signification relation is not linear, because it does not consist in the juxtaposition of two dyadic relations, like the one we find in Saussurean semiology and in the post-structural theories that derive from it. Semiosis is tri-relative, which entails that the determination of sign by the object occurs if and only if, the latter determines a further sign, namely, the interpretant, which embodies and conveys the meaning of the sign that engendered it, once it has been determined by its object. In order to give an illustration of this logical mechanism let us follow Freud’s advice and listen to the poets.

A narrative illustration of the functioning of the semiotic triad and the semiotic self

A short story by Jorge Luis Borges may furnish a clear instance of the intersubjective, triadic functioning of our thought-signs, that is, of the dialogical process whereby our past self – the *me* –by means of the present self – the *I* –addresses the future self or *you*, in order to understand who we are and what we are about. It is at a troubled moment of the dialogical scene of her thoughts, that we meet young, innocent, factory worker Emma Zunz, at the opening of a story which bears her name as its title, directly after she has received a brief, blunt letter. It was sent from somewhere in southern Brazil, to inform her that a certain Manuel Maier had committed suicide. The letter’s writer had no way of knowing that Meier had once been Zunz, and continued being Emma’s (dead) father. Reading those tragic words and making up her mind to become the implacable nemesis of the man whom she judges responsible for that violent death seems to happen in the dense, oily slow motion time of nightmares: “Furtively she put away (the letter) in a drawer, as if somehow she knew the impending deeds. Perhaps, she had already begun to glimpse at them; she was already the one who she would be.” (Borges 1996: p.564).

³⁵ For a suggestive comparison between Peircean process like engendering of meaning and self, and Bakhtin’s dialogical theory see Ponzio “Semiotics between Peirce and Bakhtin” *Kodikas /Code. Ars Semeiotica* 8, 1/2, 1985.

In that narrative overture, the author has drawn not only the future itinerary of the maiden's revenge, but he has also included the other two elements which make up Emma's inner dialogue. We also behold the mechanism whereby an object-sign, the past event as it literally hits its target, the now orphan daughter as the sign/representamen, and transitively generates its interpretant, her revengeful disposition. Nevertheless, what could be taken as an ordinary interpretive process, in this narrative, acquires a pathological tinge, an obstruction which makes the normally fluid tri-relative determination congeal in a rigid result, namely, the tumor-like identity of a killer, which ousts all other possible outcomes. Thus the reader witnesses the fierce seizure of Emma's Protean self as a creative possibility, when an invasive identity metastasizes, at that point of the plot. This is a process whereby the *I-me* relation of the past harshly intervenes through a physical sign that brings to consciousness the time when Emma was a happy, carefree middle-class girl living with her father, Emmanuel Zunz. His reputation and livelihood were brutally destroyed by the man who then became the owner of the factory where she was now working, and who was guilty of the theft of which he had blamed her father. Emma kept that crime secret; up to that day, she had been content to nourish discreetly her hatred ("maybe she thought that the secret was a tie between her and the absent one"). We may imagine, if placed in the absolute present of that scene, the play of endless possibilities – Peircean Firstness – that flash before Emma's inner eye as an unrealized 'maybe', i.e., the countless ways to redeem her father's cruel fate and the ruin of his/her name. Third, there is the full-fledged vision of Emma's self-appointed mission as an already accomplished deed, the *I-you*, for example, the uncanny, cold, one-track minded woman who is the opposite of the shy, self-conscious, virginal Emma, whom her female co-workers mocked, as they went through a medical check-up.

The tri-relative cooperation of the elements which make up semiosis and the sign itself accounts for the metamorphosis of Borges' dark heroine: the three temporal/personal dimensions concur in true dialogue-like fashion, to make up the ever evolving self. The moment Emma becomes cognizant of the news that the letter brings, she starts to become aware of a change which her self undergoes, as she feels the fury of finding out about the untimely, violent end of her father. Still, theoretically albeit not narratively, nothing has been decided as to the outcome of the silent epic battle between the different identities that her self has the capacity to generate, insofar as it is a creative disposition that allows her to adapt to a new situation in so many different ways. The

narrative, of course, tells us another story. Borges has already made up the tale's mind and will have Emma be forever and exclusively the villain's dreadful nemesis: "she understood that the death of her father was the only thing that had happened in the world, and which would go on happening endlessly" (564).

Emma's iron-like decision is the dynamical interpretant of the tragic piece of news. Although her resolve is invisible to others, the reader infers that the next steps are already, *in nuce*, taking up shape in her imagination. Her plan will lead Emma almost as if she were in trance through the necessary moves that end up with the murder of the man who brought first the material ruin, and then the physical death to her innocent father. Those virtual gestures are already there, as on the draught board of her mind; as such they are energetic interpretants, since Emma's understanding of the letter's written signs consists mainly of a physical (re)action. Her full interpretation involves taking up an identity which is not at all compatible with her habitual way of being, with her glaring innocence. Like Lady Macbeth before her, all Borges's heroine's possible acts converge into a single, obsessive "particular identity" (Wiley 1994), that of a ruthless murderer.³⁶

The immediate interpretant of the suicide news is the range of all possible and yet unvoiced meanings whose being depends on the characteristics of the sign itself (= the letter). The upshot of the story is that such a range is brutally reduced to just one dynamic interpretant, i.e., the elimination of the person who Emma believes was directly responsible for her family's misery. In this self-process, the semiotic object functions as a factual constraint which limits or defines the possible signs which can represent it. Thus, the particular identity of a human being full of rage is not a meaning that Emma voluntarily attributes to herself in an arbitrary way. As an emergent, concrete interpretation, it is a historical identity in relation to her intense feeling of murderous retribution, and to her forlorn past of blissful innocence. Naturally, it would have been highly unlikely that Emma, the grieving daughter, had not heeded the awful information, that she had been entirely oblivious to it. Still, her predictable grief could have followed a more dialogical pattern. If we consider the dynamical interpretant of an

³⁶ The proposed analogy is further justified by an apparently senseless act of self-debasement carried out by Emma – she prostitutes herself with a sailor whose language she ignores, and whose money she then tears to pieces. Just like her literary mentor, Emma seems in need of the dark forces to smother the creative power of the self, and thus to turn all of her energies, especially the psychic ones, into an obsessive identity, that of the killer who sets him or herself above moral values: "Come, you spirits... unsex me here, And fill me, from the crown to the toe, top-full/Of direst cruelty. Make thick my blood ... Come to my woman's breasts, /And take my milk for gall, you murd'ring ministers" (*Macbeth*, I, v)

aloof killer as one particular identity, there could have been a different outcome, one which engaged in an internal dialogue with the different, contradictory aspects of her identity (the daughter, the worker, the virgin, the maturing woman, the nemesis of her father's foe). To sum up, in this narrative example, the possible debate within Emma, which is part and parcel of our dialogical self, is smothered under the crush of "decreased multivoicedness" or "monologization of the self" (Valsiner 2002, 256): the pervasive sound and the fury of one particular, oppressive identity seems to have cancelled all her possibilities from coming onto the identity inner stage, in order to assert itself ferociously, i.e., it is the absolute triumph of that murderous gesture.

Self and identity in a triadic/dialogical approach

Let us sum up the basic theoretical notions: in the semiotic or logical generation of an interpretant by a sign there lies the crucial distinction between the triadic model and the binary, linguistically-inspired theory of signification. From the vantage point of Wiley's construal of a tri-relative internal conversation, the *I* or sign (also called *representamen*) corresponds to Peirce's (CP 8.330) phenomenological category of Firstness (a possible, absolute, sheer feeling or absolute quality); the *me* or semiotic object relates to Secondness (the clash of experience which involves only two elements), and the *you* or interpretant is accounted for by Thirdness (the growth of reasonableness as a syllogism-like synthesis which brings about law-like generality, ex., the personality).

From this preliminary account, it follows that for Wiley (1994), the *self* construed as a triadic structure which involves the three personal pronouns is not to be reduced to the *I* pronoun, nor to any of the two other instances which constitute the inner conversation. Thus the *self* is conceived as a dispositional property of an interpretive process which has particular identities as its upshot, and which is inseparable from the time axis along which it evolves. The hypothesis which Wiley defends conceives the *self* as a universal human capacity that manifests itself through the concrete products of meaning generation, and which, therefore, must be distinguished from those multiple, circumstantial identities (Wiley 1994, p. 12), which are the contents of the general interpretive process. The evolving self has the same kind of logical unity as the natural development of meaning in language, and thereby of human cognition; the self is the producer of consistency along time, thus it is a kind of "overarching identity" (Colapietro, 1990a, p. 192). The relevance of this notion is that if

we construe the self as an overarching identity, we admit an ongoing logical continuity, and this implies the integration of the particular and the multiple into a synthetic unity, which entails a growth of complexity. Peirce conceives of a person's identity in terms of logical consistency. Personal identity "consists in the consistency" (CP 5.315) of a person's actions and thoughts along time. The relevance of establishing two levels of generality in the conceptual distinction of self and identity proposed by Wiley (1994, p. 36-38) lies in the fact that the latter is subordinate to the former. On the other hand, the self operates as a historical matrix made up of social and family role dynamics. In semiotic terms, particular identities correspond to dynamic interpretants (Andacht & Michel, 2005, p. 57), which are defined as "whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign" (CP 8.315).

If a person mistakes one particular identity, whether it is a social or psychological trait, regardless of how important it may be, for the unique reality of her or his self, then the reflexive *I-you-me* process is severely distorted, as we saw happened in the case of the protagonist of *Emma Zunz*. For Wiley (1994, p. 38) this is a dysfunction analogous to Winnicott's (1960) false-self. We believe the inner dialogue of voices entails their mutual opposition and eventually, the negotiated acceptance; granted there is enough tolerance for the multiple, concrete identities. The reality of such a multiplicity helps us avoid the life-impoverishing taking over by one single identity, which thereby hinders the evolving totality of the self as a living process.

In connection with contemporary dialogical theory, a further relevant element of the notion of an "overarching identity" is to be found in the fact that Wiley's semiotic self shares some crucial aspects with Hermans & Kempen's (1993) dialogical self. The theory of the semiotic self has some debts, as we saw above, with Mead's *I-me* distinction, as well as with analytical features that are shared by Bakhtin's and Peirce's different but convergent dialogisms, and which are related to the "eminently social character of the sign" (Santaella, 2004a, p. 133). The semiotic model of the self also involves the attempt to account for both plurality and unity, or in Hermans' (2001a) words, for the "inclusive opposition of unity and multiplicity" (p. 802) that is required to conceive of dialogical multiplicity as distinct from dysfunctional fragmentation. Another coincidence that is worth mentioning at this point can be found in the conception of self-interpretation as the source of human autonomy and self-control. Valsiner (2002) proposes that semiotic mediation is related to the capacity of synthesis responsible for "the auto-regulatory function of the dialogical self" (p. 262), and this is

highly compatible with Peirce's phenomenological category of Thirdness, which accounts for law-like, predictable behavior.

One relevant difference between semiotic self theory and dialogical self theory derives from the theoretical emphasis on the triadic structure of the sign. Such an emphasis differs from a widespread notion in psychology which is associated to William James, and which assumes that representation hinders the access to external reality. This idea is contrary to an account of the self which involves crucially the interaction with alterity. Thus Peirce (CP 8.81) criticized the dualistic account of the human *self* given in James's *The Principles of Psychology*, one which the semiotician makes a point in citing and criticizing: "No thought even comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law", is the passage the semiotician quotes from James. To this Peirce (CP 8.81) bluntly retorts: "Is not the direct contrary nearer observed facts?" His own explanation is that James mistakes thoughts for "feeling-qualities", which are not intelligible to anyone, not even to the one who has or experiences them; one can say that they are had but not known. To become intelligible, feelings must be embodied and generalized in a symbol; it is only in this guise that they can be interpreted by *self* and others.

The circulation of signs is part and parcel of the life of a community or *psyche* (Ransdell 1977). Our only access to outward reality and to our own *self* is through signs. Our argument is that the function of signs is neither to "peptonize" nor to "fake" reality, as James picturesquely describes in a passage concerning the representation of reality (1963, p. 109). For James, to represent the real entails to alter its true nature, and thereby to cause a frustrating, tantalizing deviation from the real. A similar critique is the one asserted by Hausman (1993, p.77), when he emphasizes that the relational kind of system created by the process of our thought-signs in no way jeopardizes the independent being of reality: "Merely to be in relation does not require (the object) being wholly relative to, much less consumed by thought". Quite on the contrary, the corollary of Peirce's introduction and emphasis on Secondness, on alterity as a full constituent of signification is that reality strives to reveal itself as it is, in a gradual and fallible manner through the intervention of signs. We shall now consider the upshot of this interpretive, non-constructionist semiotic view of reality on the self notion.

We believe that dialogical self theory could profit from the inclusion of some key concepts of triadic semiotic such as the three phenomenological categories of

experience, because of their analytical potential of every kind of experience, be it existential, imaginary or conceptual. As the goal of exploring all three categories in relationship with self theory is too ambitious for the scope of the present paper, we will restrict ourselves to working with the elements that correspond to the category of Secondness, namely, to understand the phenomenon of internal opposition, or to use Hermans' (1999) terms, the "*intrasubjective disagreement*" (p.497).

The phenomenological category of Secondness and the dialogical process of thought

The pragmatist view of consciousness includes crucially the possibility of an interpretive access to outer reality, and thus differs from both idealism and positivism. It is the experience of a two-sided consciousness which brings about a sensation of "collision" or "clash" between two elements, an idea which corresponds with Kant's inner and outer senses (CP 8.41). Let us recall that the Kantian phenomenological categories of experience were reduced by Peirce to only three universal ones, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness (CP 1.525). These analytical notions correspond to "that of which we are aware in feeling, volition and cognition" (CP 1.332), respectively.

The three components of sign action correspond ontologically to the three universal kinds of experience analyzed by Peirce (CP 1.347) by means of the three phenomenological categories. Vague multiplicity in all its sheer variety corresponds to the category of Firstness, that is, feelings when they are considered only in their qualitative aspect, unconnected with anything else, and therefore not embodied in any existent thing. The definition of Firstness is based on the monadic, unrelated aspect of things or events, which is the analytical result of regarding them neither as actualities or facts nor as regularities, but as sheer possibilities: it is "the mode of being which consists in the subject's being what it is regardless of aught else" (CP 1.21). While Firstness is the mode of experience elicited by the "prescission" (CP 2.364) – a term the semiotician uses as a technical variant of the more common "abstraction" – from any realization of the qualities of the sign, the category of Secondness corresponds to the factual, material dimension of the sign process; Thirdness accounts for the intelligibility of experience. The latter involves generality and regularity, in our sign-mediated understanding of the world. In other words, Firstness has to do with ideas of chance, originality, spontaneity, possibility, uncertainty, immediacy, presentness and feeling; Secondness includes ideas of polarity and resistance, such as action and reaction; Thirdness consists in the ideas of generality, continuity, law, growth, evolution,

representation, and mediation (Santaella, 1999a).

If we take due account that the sign is a tri-relation, then it is clear that all logical subjects are equally relevant in the semiotic. However, for the above given reason, this paper will focus on Secondness, to consider in close detail the relevance of otherness in the development of the self.

The relation of one element with another in *semiosis* (CP 5.484) corresponds to the reaction between the ego and the non-ego. From the viewpoint of the self, this results in an experience which involves “a two-sided consciousness” (CP 8.330). However, both in the human and in the non-human universe, genuine mediation is not attained unless the category of Thirdness is involved. It is only through the intervention of Thirdness, as generality or regularity, that we are able to transcend the realm of brute force, of purely mechanical, dynamical reactions. Understanding, thought, and reason itself can only be conceived of by allowing for the category of Thirdness, i.e., the working out of a purposeful activity.

The category of Secondness deals with facts as existents in the world. However, within the process of *semiosis* such facts manifest themselves not only or purely through the exertion of a blind impact, but also by evolving into a constraint which determines the representation of such facts in human consciousness. The dispositional nature of the self is what assures that mere facts of Secondness will bear a virtual purport, already in their brutal emergence. In human beings, Secondness is perceived as an opposition to our subjective will, as the resistance which, willy-nilly, alterity causes on us:

What I call volition is the consciousness of the discharge of nerve-cells, either into the muscles, etc., or into other nerve-cells; it does not involve the sense of time (i.e. not of a continuum) but it does involve the sense of action and reaction, resistance, externality, otherness, pair-edness. (CP 8.41)

In order to correspond to the category of Secondness, something must consist in a dualistic opposition, that is, there must be one element in sheer reaction against another. This implies the existence of a second logical subject, one that appears to the self as an objective reality. Its objectivity or externality derives from its being stubbornly opposed to subjective will. Being external/objective is to be “immediately known as external (...) in the sense of being present regardless of the perceiver’s will or wish” (CP 5.462). The semiotic object which is part of the triadic sign belongs to Secondness, since it is defined by the resistance, by its manifesting “self-willedness” (CP 7.488), and as such it exerts a defining limit to dispositional sign action. Without

such a restraint interpretation would be a free for all, chaotic process: anything could mean just about anything, both in self matters or in world related ones. At its most basic level, the dyadic impact of otherness on the self can be described as the compulsive “hefting (of) its insistency” (CP 6.318), or expressed in more technical, categorial terms: “in the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something **other** than the mind’s creation” (CP 1.325 – emphasis in the original). When Peirce writes that “the sense of externality in perception consists in a sense of powerlessness before the overwhelming force of perception” (CP 1.334), he is giving a semiotic account of a basic experience of alterity, without which psychological growth as the process of human development would not take place or would be very different from what we know it to be. This is the coming to terms with the hard, limits of the real. A developmental, semiotic description is given by Peirce (CP 5.233) through an example of the historical emergence of the *self* of the child as a logical space where error can inhere. It is Secondness that brings a gradual end to a child’s omnipotence.

Such a theory is the consequence of the construal of thought as a semiotic process instead of being only a combination of ideas (instead of signs). The problem if we work analytically with the notion of ideas is that they have a built-in bias towards a private, isolated *self*, while, *a priori*, signs have a public, intersubjective circulation:

From the perspective of semiotic, we are always already in the midst of others as well as of meaning; indeed otherness and meaning are given together in our experience of ourselves as beings embedded in a network of relations – more specifically, enmeshed in the ‘semiotic web’. (Colapietro 1989, p.28)

It pays to take some time to try to understand why Peirce emphasized the relevance of the category of Secondness in the context of the general semiotic, and in the more specific one of self-consciousness. A way to do so is by recalling the three modes of consciousness that the semiotician distinguishes in connection with the three categories: feeling, altersense and medisense. In the mode of consciousness in which the outer world emerges as being external, in contradistinction to us as sentient beings, we find intertwined the notions of alterity and otherness, which are used to account for the self and the world as two elements pitted against each other:

Altersense is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. (...) [It] is consciousness of otherness or Secondness; medisense is the consciousness of means or Thirdness. (...) [It] has two modes,

Sensation and Will. (CP 7.551)

What is objectively external is not perceived by us as external in the same way as an hallucination is, but as something that is present “regardless the perceiver’s will or wish”, that is why according to Peirce, it is a “conative externality” (CP 5.462). Here is the example mentioned above which Peirce presents as an illustration of the developmental account of the human *self* as a public sign, in a constant and constitutive dialogue with alterity:

A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a *self* in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness. (CP 5.233)

For Peirce, the *self* is the emergent disposition of a permanent inner dialogue. The term “externality” is not used above to refer to something which is outside the body, or which is not a part of the *self*, but in the sense of an element that offers resistance to volition. Far from being dualistically opposed to the *self*, “otherness” is inseparable from the internal conversation of the *self*, because thought evolves in confrontation with the idea of another.

There is an interesting affinity between this example of developmental child psychology and similar accounts in the writings of “the great Wundt” (CP 5.505), whom Peirce admired and hailed as the founding father of experimental psychology. This attitude is confirmed by the several allusions to the work of the German scientist that can be found in the *Collected Papers*. However, a noteworthy difference between Wundt’s reflections on the dawning of self-consciousness in the child, in relationship to stimuli of pain and pleasure, is that, for Peirce, the emergence of the self is accounted for by a close interaction between experience (e.g. touching the hot stove) and semiotic or logic: the self is a logical upshot, it emerges inferentially, just as the conclusion of a syllogism, whereby we human beings are able to learn from our errors. In the following passage, there is both an acknowledgment of the virtues of the pioneering works of Wundt, and a veiled critique introduced as an attempt to import his physiological ideas to his own theoretical, semiotic framework:

Endeavoring to sum up the results of this elaborate investigation so far as they concern psychology (...), we may say that Wundt finds that the function of our

thinking-organ lies in its regulation of motor reactions. Now this is neither more nor less than the substance of pragmatism in the dress of physiology. The original definition of pragmatism put it into this form of maxim: ‘Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is THE WHOLE of your conception of the object.’ What is that than to say that the sole function of thought is to regulate motor reactions? (CP 8.201 – capitals in the original)

While introspection is theoretically associated with an insulated, self-contained subject, thought construed as an internal conversation of the self, or as a many-voiced dialogue occurring in time, reveals a “divided subject to semiotic analysis” (Colapietro, 1980, p. 93). The person as a thinking being “can distinguish in [him or herself] distinct parts that are, in essence, different roles in an ongoing dialogue” (p.93). According to this author, the appropriate perspective is that of “a dramatic inner world” (p.117). Wiley (1994) uses the terms “positions, participants, poles, agencies, voices or roles in the conversation” (p.57) to designate distinct dialogical units. Regardless of the term chosen to denote the parts that constitute the self, the common element of dialogical conceptions is that the notion of the self lacks internal homogeneity, it is intrinsically multiple. For Peirce, if dialogical thought is to take place, an internal opponent – in the Socratic sense of the term – is necessary (CP 5.497).

Another way of understanding the relevance of Secondness is to consider the phenomenon that Hermans (1999, p. 497) describes as “intrasubjective disagreement”. This is an internal relation of the self as subject I with the self as an external object (me), since in the position of a dialogical opponent the self manifests resistance, “conative externality” (CP 5.462), or “self-willedness” (CP 7.488). To sum up, the hypothesis that posits dialogical opposition as the main impelling force in the development of the self relies on Peirce’s assumption that self-awareness originates in “effort and resistance” (CP 1.24):

We become aware of ourself in becoming aware of the not-self. The waking state is a consciousness of reaction; and as the consciousness itself is two-sided, so it has also two varieties; namely, action, where our modification of other things is more prominent than their reaction on us, and perception, where their effect on us is overwhelmingly greater than our effect on them. And this notion, of being such as other things make us, is such a prominent part of our life that we conceive other things also to

exist by virtue of their reactions against each other. The idea of other, of not, becomes a very pivot of thought. To this element I give the name of Secondness. (CP 1.324)

From intrasubjective disagreement to troubling aporia as a vehicle for the developing self

Although the self in dialogue with itself is necessarily divided, it is not fragmented; its consistency comes from the tendency to being interpreted (by the self in its 'you' position), at a future moment, as any sign normally is. Thus, the disposition of the self is manifested as a developmental teleology (Colapietro, 1989, p. 91). It is in the pursuit of general purposes that the self in dialogue with otherness evolves. However, it does so without losing its basic, such is the life of the self as an "over-arching identity" (Colapietro, 1990a, p.192).

Since thought is a semiotic process and, as such, it aims at revealing aspects of the world, and the self is one of them, it follows that self-knowledge is not different from other kinds of knowledge. Ransdell (2000) states that every process of scientific inquiry insofar as it is a public, self-critical advancement in the understanding of the world, requires that the persons involved in it necessarily go through the kind of experience that, in the Socratic tradition, is known as *aporia*. Peircean semiotic as a dialectical process owes much to this school of thought:

The Socratic *aporia* is not merely a contradiction but a self-contradiction, which actually precludes refutation where it occurs, since in refutation the refuted element drops out, whereas the *aporia* depends on it not dropping out, but maintaining itself in opposition to what supposedly refutes it. (Ransdell, 2000, para. 13)

A feeling of self-contradiction is normally uncomfortable, because a person finds her/himself in the odd situation of asserting two contradictory elements at once. Although it is never an easy state, it must be tolerated with patience, if one is to explore the world and eventually discover a solution, a way out of the horns of a dilemma. Therefore, the state of *aporia* involves the awareness of an impasse in reflexive thought, but one which is necessary, if we are to commit ourselves to the sustained effort of searching for more information about the familiar though always incompletely known external environment, and thus not to make a premature decision. An authentic dialogue is fostered by allowing ourselves to coexist with these rival voices, that is, with this aporetic state of mind. Tolerance of self-contradiction relies on our previously acquired confidence that this troubled, conflicting state will be solved in the future. Only through

this uneasy *via dolorosa* may we embark in authentic (self)inquiry. If *aporia* is experienced as too frustrating, the person might not remain fully committed to the search of truthful knowledge and, instead, turn to “lying, misdirection, evasion, waffling, fudging, and other forms of deliberate or tolerated misrepresentation” (Ransdell, 2000, para. 24). The hypothesis defended here is based on the assumption that the capacity to tolerate an *aporetic* state is at once beneficial for the development of knowledge of the world, and also for the healthy development of the self. On the one hand, misrepresentation is the consequence of a lack of the adequate psychological balance to be able to live with the “idea of a not” (CP 1.324), which is always a limit to human illusory omnipotence. On the other hand, misrepresentation constitutes a stumbling block in the purposive process of development of the self, since knowledge and self-knowledge are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, it can be inferred that the capacity to tolerate self-contradiction favors the semiotic development of the self.

The questions this paper will focus on are the following: in what does the theoretical introduction of the phenomenological category of *Secondness* contribute to the understanding of internal dialogical opposition? In relation to the triadic structure of the sign, how can the notion of “internal conversation” help us conceive of the internal multiplicity of identity; how can the considerable risk of fragmenting the self be avoided?

In order to help us find answers to these queries, we propose to combine the semiotic perspective with J. L. Moreno’s psychodramatic method. Psychodramatic techniques were used for the observation and collection of data, and the semiotic categories are employed for the analysis of that data. The inclusion of psychodrama is justified by the difficulties that the observation of a silent, lonely activity entails for this empirical inquiry. Psychodrama furnishes techniques for the externalization of the inner world and for the display of the dialogical internal role-dynamics (psychodramatic roles). An obvious limitation of the chosen method consists in the difficulty for the observed thinkers to accept naturally a non-natural setting. To compensate for this, psychodrama furnishes effective warming-up techniques which are usually accepted by participants, since they are associated with theatrical activity or with playful everyday life as-if situations and, somehow paradoxically, the artificiality can be thus overcome.

The compatibility between these different analytical perspectives was already perceived by Moreno (1946/1978, pp. i-v), when he proposed his method as a possible complement for Mead’s sociological theorization on internalized role relations. We

must recall that Mead's own pragmatic approach is part of the semiotic self model. Psychodrama is an action method involving role play and sociometry (the study of group dynamics). It was created by Jacob Levy Moreno (1889-1974) and it is theoretically framed by his role theory. The Viennese psychiatrist, in a way that is akin to Mead, assumes that the self emerges from roles. Moreno's theory and method are the consequences of his application of dramatic techniques to his clinical work. Moreno (1946/1978, p. 31) also acknowledged Peirce's decisive influence on a central concept of his role theory, namely, his notion of spontaneity, which accounts for the possibility of a person's being capable of responding adequately to new situations and of giving new responses to old situations.

Our expectations were that the activity of thinking about a personal doubt of the participants would trigger verbal and non-verbal manifestations of their internal dialogue concerning a problematic issue which caused a state of self-contradiction or aporia. We believe that such a state was not created by the experimental situation, by our observation of it, because the dramatization unfolded from already existing doubts, in the lives of those participants.

The analysis followed Wiley's model of the internal conversation and focused on the use of the pronouns *I-me-you*, which correspond to the three phases of the self, namely, *present-past-future* and to the three phenomenological categories of *Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness*, respectively. A state of logical self-contradiction ensues, when a person finds him or herself holding, at the same time, two contradictory propositions. The question is how this kind of internal dialogical opposition is compatible with the developmental unity of the self conceived as an overarching identity.

Method

The design chosen was a qualitative study which resorted to two different methodological approaches, namely, psychodrama applied to data collection, and phenomenological semiotic applied to the analytical part of our research.

Participants

Nineteen undergraduate students of both sexes from the Institute of Psychology of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul - Brazil were invited to participate in three workshops of psychodrama. Two groups were integrated by five members, one by six and one by three participants. The distribution was done according to schedule

conveniences. The workshops were deliberately made with the sole purpose of exploring and analyzing the points mentioned above in relation to the internal conversation.

Instruments

The data were obtained by using an instrument that combines two dramatic exercises drawn from the psychodramatic methodology: a) the classical empty chair technique (Moreno, 1949/1978, p. xiii), and b) a technique proposed by Blatner (1995) called the multiple-aspects-of-the-self approach. We furnish first a brief description of the techniques and then, a description of the actual procedures to show how the techniques were combined and adapted to the present research.

a) Empty chair technique³⁷: Chairs are used to represent significant others or internal characters. This technique is generally used in a one-to-one therapeutic context. The protagonist enacts a dialogue by role-reversing with the psychodramatic character, which is performed by sitting alternatively on the chairs set on stage.

b) Multiple-aspects-of-the self: it involves working with different aspects of the person's inner realm and having those components engage in a dialogue with each other.

Procedures

The two above-mentioned dramatic exercises were combined to adapt them for research purposes. We followed the following dramatic steps in order to observe the process of the internal conversation (For the Portuguese instructions see Anexo A, p. 245).

Warming up – The researcher asked the participants to think about three actual personal situations of doubt, which involved a really difficult decision-taking.. Then the participants chose one and wrote on a piece of paper some advantages and disadvantages involved in the considered alternatives. The researcher explained at that point that the objective of the exercise was to explore how we think about some issue, and thus she made clear that any issue whatsoever was equally interesting and valid for that exercise. The main aim of this clarification was that the participants understood the difference between the research setting and what this procedure was not, namely, a therapeutic procedure. This was crucial in order to avoid the unnecessary exposure of disturbing personal issues. The participants were also told that the observation would

³⁷ For a detailed description of techniques see <http://www.therapeuticspiral.org/references/pdterms.html>.

focus on whether our thought process is monological or dialogical. Since the researcher's expectations are that thought is dialogical, this notion was mentioned in the second place, to avoid biasing the participants. In addition, the researcher/director invited the participants who were not acting on stage to take the role of co-researchers and to observe whether they could detect or not turning points in the logical directionality of the thought processes of the protagonist, which in turn could be interpreted as distinct inner voices. The aim was to reduce the influence of the researcher's subjective bias on the results. Before dramatic action starts there is a specific warming up process involves a detailed description of the place where the protagonist is thinking about his or her doubt.

Dramatic Action –This exercise works by combining the following basic dramatic techniques: a) Soliloquy – the dramatic action starts with an externalization of the thinking activity involved in evaluating the alternatives among which the decision will be taken; b) Concretization – the different options involved in the decision-taking process are materialized by representing them on the stage by means of chairs. Although the participants generally use only two chairs, there must be at least five in the room, because the actual number of chairs is decided by the protagonist during the dramatization. Each time the protagonist sets up a chair, s/he sits on it to speak from that specific perspective; c) Role-reversal – if the protagonist assumes that a chair represents an oppositional voice, which still is a part of him or her self, then the soliloquy is expected to acquire the shape of a dialogue or inner debate. The dialogue is carried out by the movement of the protagonist from one chair to the other, as s/he follows the direction of his/her flow of thought; d) Mirror technique- Two auxiliary egos are chosen; the protagonist is asked to describe the characters represented by each chair in such a way that it allows the other participants to “visualize” them (Seminotti, 1997, p. 172). Such a technical procedure aims at helping the emergence of the “imagery” (Mead, 1913) that accompanies thought, or, in semiotic terms, the “iconic” aspects of the verbal descriptions. e) Closure – the protagonist is asked to give a name for the typifying element of each chair that s/he has set up on the stage. d) Closure – the protagonist is asked to give a name for the typifying element of each chair that s/he has set up on the stage. The participants are not required to come to any kind of decision. They are only required to make the process of thought as explicit as possible, so that its natural flow can be best explored.

Sharing – After the dramatization, the participants share some personal situations evoked by the scenes staged by other group members.

Analysis

The corpus for the analysis was everything the participants said, as they engaged into thinking aloud, and everything they did on the psychodramatic stage (e.g. movements, gestures), as they attempted to focus on a situation of their lives, in which they faced two or more alternatives with the aim of taking a decision on some personal issue.³⁸

The transcriptions were divided into units of meaning corresponding to the participants' movements that indicate a change of place from the standing position (soliloquy), to their sitting on a chair and also their motion from one chair to the other (dialogical development). Each unit of meaning was analyzed according to the three phenomenological categories of experience devised by Peirce described above.

The three categories were used in order to describe how self-consciousness evolves as a self-interpretive process, when the participants were thinking about external alternatives, in relation to the orientation of their lives. The analytical goal was to understand specifically how the self-interpretive process generates particular identities, which, from a semiotic perspective, may be construed as dynamic interpretants of the semiotic process. The main focus is the observation of how such identities interact dialogically and how internal diversity is compatible with the evolving unity of the self. Given that all dramatizations presented a similar structure, the transcription analyzed below was only chosen for the present paper on account of its length and concision, which we thought could add clarity to our exposition in the context of an academic paper. Thus we will now illustrate the analysis by means of a full transcription of one brief dramatization which, nevertheless, allows for alternative interpretations of our data. The transcription was divided into five fragments.

*Transcription of the dramatization of the first participant: Peter*³⁹

³⁸ The methodology used here is described in the Introduction of the thesis. The Portuguese transcriptions of the dramatizations are in Anexo B, p. 247.

³⁹ An arbitrarily given name.

Transcription

	Moving of the chair	Analytical unities
<i>Now that I'm finishing my internship... I was in doubt whether I was going to do... if I was going to keep on getting up early in the morning... because I didn't want to lose the rhythm of my activity... and... uhhhm, well... it turned out that they're making an agreement because someone is giving up a scholarship uhhhm... ya know? And this person's going to propose my name to take up his place... Then it's like this... I was thinking well... that uhhhm...while on the one hand, I was thinking that... [the participant sets up one chair on the stage, and then sits on it]</i> ⁴⁰	Standing up Position	Soliloquy
- <i>On the one hand I think that... on the one hand ... I ... that this would mean ... to take some deserved vacations; I'd be able to sleep a bit...in the morning... I would sleep a little bit longer... to rest... (at that point he sets up a second chair, and sits on it).</i>	Chair 1	First Unit
- <i>But on the other hand... I mean...well... if I were to stop... (laughter) you know?, I wouldn't be able to start all over again. I believe that I need to keep up a rhythm, that's important to me... I was kind of liking to keep the rhythm, getting up earlier in the morning, I was starting to enjoy my feeling pretty useful, ya know?... uhhhm...well</i>	Chair 2	Second unit
- <i>But it might also happen that... if I start now with the scholarship I'd have to keep on at it, until August, next semester, and I'd risk to go with it until that period that has two internship requirements which would overlap and this would be a risk, I could lose my scholarship, and this wouldn't be very ethical of me, you know? I don't know how you call it...it wouldn't be right... my doing that to that person who's giving me that scholarship.</i>	Chair 1	Third unit

⁴⁰ The introduction of a dash before one speaks is an indication of chair change, and therefore of place of who speaks.

- *But on the other hand, I believe that the person that grants the scholarships is very accessible...it's possible to talk to her, to present the problem to her... to be able to tell her that later on I won't be able to keep on being so committed with the scholarship... so I can discuss with her if there's a way to organize things so that I can work a little bit more at the beginning... and then a little bit less... the coming semester. There's also the problem that I did not present my paper yet... it's due at the end of the semester...you must hand in some article, paper, you know?... for a congress... and I didn't do that yet... and that would be a good opportunity for me... not to mention the fact that I'm also... well uhhhm, I want to have some more money to do other things that are important for me... to travel, it's possible to do that. So, here's what I ought to do: I think I should take the scholarship... 'cause I need it. I need it to stop worrying about what I'm worrying about now... so as not to lose my rhythm, for me too feel useful, which is a feeling I like.* Chair 2 Fourth Unit
- *Still... on the other hand, I think that perhaps, from next year on, I won't be able to keep it up, to keep up the rhythm and that would mean my not being very fair, do you understand?...I mean... I mean towards that person who gave me the scholarship... Well, that's about it...* Chair 1 Fifth unit
- [The researcher asks whether he could give a name for each one of those voices represented by the two chairs] Standing up position Closing
- This one is **Easygoing Peter**. You know what I mean? Easygoing in the sense of **relaxed**... maybe too relaxed.
- And here this one would be...uhhhm... let's see...**Useful, Worrisome Peter**.

During the soliloquy, the protagonist was not yet totally warmed up, so as to feel at ease in the psychodramatic situation of thinking aloud, and doing so in the here and now of the present moment. Instead, he remembered a moment in the past, when the

problem he was interested in solving came to his mind for the first time. Our analytical work only started in the First Unit, when participant started setting up the chairs and sat on one of them, for the first time, so as to distinguish and concretize his alternatives. This allowed the researcher to use the model of the internal conversation following the proper temporal sequence.

Analysis of the First and Second Units

Our analytical decision to tackle the first two units – each one involving a specific chair motion/occupation – was motivated by our considering them as one logical couplet in which the dialogical element came out quite distinctly. The itinerary followed by the participant was to move from the first chair – which corresponds to the First Unit –to the second chair/unit, as the dilemmatic situation came to the surface in the guise of the adversative conjunction “but on the other hand”:

- *On the one hand I think that... on the one hand ... I... that this would mean ... to take some deserved vacations; I'd be able to sleep a bit...in the morning... I would sleep a little bit longer... rest... (at that point he sets up a second chair, and sits on it). [FIRST UNIT]*
- *But on the other hand... I mean...well... if I were to stop... (laughter) you know?, I wouldn't be able to start all over again. I believe that I need to keep up a rhythm, that's important to me... I was kind of liking to keep the rhythm, getting up earlier in the morning, I was starting to like my feeling pretty useful, ya know?... uhhm...well [SECOND UNIT]*

The first unit is organized around the idea of rest. If we apply the three analytical categories to the sign *rest* we can distinguish three aspects. Firstness is related to the immediacy of the present moment. In this unit, the feeling quality of rest is conveyed by the way of speaking, the pauses, the cadence, a certain pace that conveys an unhurried mood or a sluggish stream of thought associated to rest: *sleep a bit...in the morning... I would sleep a little bit longer... rest*. Secondness is associated in Wiley's model to Mead's relation of the I pronoun with the Me or self as object. In this case it is found in the reflexive directionality of the I self and with the past Me evaluated as a self who deserves to rest. Thirdness can be observed in the purpose of orienting the self-interpretive process to the conception of an identity that is rest-worthy..

I (present)= paused cadence slow cadence of speech conveys the quality of resting FIRSTNESS	
Me (past) = the relation of the I with self that deserves to rest. SECONDNESS	You (future) = the directionality of the self. Future acts that would tend to take up the general character of resting (vacations, sleep longer) THIRDNESS

Figure 3.1: Triadic semiotic analysis of the sign *to rest*

There is at the beginning of both units a noticeable use of the *I* pronoun. The flow of speech of the first sentence in these units is tentative, even halting. We interpret the hesitant mode of speech as a piece of evidence of an experience that is characteristic of the phenomenological category of Firstness. This is consistent with Wiley's model of internal conversation, because the *I* pronoun signals the present instant, the qualitative aspect of signs in their mode of sheer possibility, of vagueness, all of which corresponds to Firstness. Hesitation could be construed as the vagueness of the *I* experience, as the person faces the infinite manifold of possibilities, the unplanned spontaneity of a fleeting moment. Still the quality of the speech in the second unit conveys a more energetic rhythm than the first unit, there are also some iconic signs of vitality such as laughter, dynamic gestures and eye movements. This qualitative feeling is expressed in the phrase "*liking to keep the rhythm*" or "*liking the usefulness*" once we detach it or prescind it from its (emotional) possessor and from its conceptual formulation.

It is interesting to mention that the second use of the *I* pronoun in juxtaposition with the *me* pronoun. The sentence that was here translated as '*my feeling pretty useful*' was expressed by the participant in Portuguese by means of a reflexive form of the pronoun '*me*' (*me sentindo bastante útil*), which conveys a sense that is quite close to saying: *the feeling of my being pretty useful*. Typically this use of the pronoun *me* (in the original Portuguese) involves the consciousness of the past self, verbalized in the

past tense, which leads us to another phenomenological category.

The two distinct units analyzed here show the way in which the protagonist faces the two opposite alternatives, and how this engenders a visible tension within him. As the upshot of this tension, he begins to manifest a kind of self-contradiction, that is, an irreconcilable split within his self, which comes about as he feels the simultaneous and contrary attraction for both possible behaviors. At this point, he seems to be giving equal support to the two opposite alternatives. The lived contradiction is handled by making the first move from one chair to another, on the psychodramatic stage: *On the one hand I think ... But on the other hand... I mean... if*. Thus a reasonable ordering is found for these contradictory elements by separating them into two logical units.

The category of Secondness corresponds to the already lived experience which is expressed in the following statement: *Eu estava gostando ...me sentindo bastante útil*, which denotes a dyadic relationship between the *I was starting to like*, on the one hand, and the *me (my) feeling pretty useful*, on the other. Thus the past tense in the expression *I was starting* could point to the vagueness that is beginning to become more definite, that is, its determination has grown, as the self turns to a moment which is already past, one in which the self/me becomes more distinct, as it is being observed by the *I*. The present experience is elusive, and it can only be grasped when it is already past: *I was starting to like.... my feeling pretty useful*.

The use of the verb in the past tense, a past continuous tense, is expressive of the transition of consciousness from present to past, as it narrates the experience of trying to go back, to revisit a certain point in the line of time. In that case, the *I* stretches to the past, as consciousness is embodied in the *me* grammatical form.

The experience of two-sided resistance that is analyzed by categorial Secondness gradually emerged to visibility, in this participant's case. Thus the use of the verb *to like* reveals an element of self-willedness in that sensation of usefulness that the participant associated to the pronoun *me*. Even if there is no clear, tangible opposition between the *I* and the *me* at this point, an experience of Secondness is manifested in the use of the verb *to like*. The fact that the self in the *I* position evaluates (*like*) the *me* indicates the reaction to an objective attribute, a kind of obstinacy inherent in the *me* position of the self. In this particular case, it is an attitude of usefulness that is observed as being something external to the self, insofar as it is not the direct, controlled consequence of the exercise of the will. The *me* thus functions as a symptom of "something that forces its way to recognition as being something other than the mind's

creation” (CP 1.325). If the sensation of usefulness had been experienced as the sole creation of the subjective mind, that is, as an attribute of the self caused by the pure will of the subject or ego, the comment of liking that would have been redundant or obvious. We received the impression that the usefulness of the participant was experienced in a similar way as one can enjoy the fresh air of an evening, or a piece of music, that is, as externalities.

An alternative hypothesis concerning the use of the past tense in “*eu estava gostando*” (*I was starting to like*) is to conceive of it as a consequence of the protagonist not being totally warmed-up for the observational situation of thought yet. If that were the case, he would be still evoking the (recent) previous moment of thought.

The usefulness as pure quality of consciousness, something that is had by a person but not thought about, let alone evaluated, is an instance of Firstness in the self/sign process. Once these feeling becomes embodied in the pronoun *me*, then it is perceived or sensed physically as an instance of Secondness. At that point, it has become something independent of the will of the ego, something which can be observed by the thinker, at the present moment.

The pronoun *you* is not explicit here, so it can only be inferred, if we observe the critical evaluation of the *me* carried out by the *I*, which necessarily supposes some ideal notion in relation to which the *me* is conceived as useful (in opposition to the alternative of taking it easy, of letting go of things, in order to enjoy a deserved rest). Let us recall the definition of the category of Thirdness as “the mode of being which consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a determinate general character” (CP 1.26). In this respect, it is interesting that the participant overtly mentions his own need of sustaining a constant work rhythm, so as the tendency to becoming useful may develop:

- *But on the other hand... I mean...well... if I were to stop... (laughter) you know?, I wouldn't be able to start all over again. I believe that I need to keep up a rhythm, that's important to me... I was kind of liking to keep the rhythm, getting up earlier in the morning, I was starting to enjoy my feeling pretty useful, ya know?... uh-hm...well*

The tendency to being useful construed as a regular drive is a general element which can be shared with others as any other common, public concept, in the culture of the participant. This rule-like pattern is observed in the participant's act of evaluating and appreciating his own effort to keep up a sustained rhythm of work. Through the use

of past continuous verbal forms – *I was kind of liking, getting-up earlier, (my) feeling pretty useful* – his speech conveys the upshot of the unfolding regularities in his quest for the hard-working identity. Such regularities are embodied in the directionality that his identity takes up. When the participant is sitting on Chair 2, his thought is oriented by the purpose of usefulness. When he sits on Chair 1 his thought is oriented by the purpose of rest. According to the pronouns use, the orientation of thought in relation to the time axis, it is possible to find a correspondence between the sign useful, an identity interpretant that emerges during the reflexive process. The self as a process of development is the generation of interpretants which tend to derive in particular identities. (see Figure 2).

I (present)= laughter and dynamical gestures that convey a likable feeling quality of usefulness FIRSTNESS	
Me (past) = the experience of the factual embodied self that keeps up a rhythm which is perceived in direct opposition to an aspect of the self that prefers to rest, to sleep a bit longer SECONDNESS	You (future) = the directionality of the self. Future acts that would tend to take up the general character of usefulness in many different circumstances. Orientation to the identity interpretant useful THIRDNESS

Figure 3.2: Triadic semiotic analysis of the sign *useful*.

Let us sum up this first part of the analysis. The psychodramatic scene was set up with two chairs, which represented the two conflicting, opposite alternatives: either to accept or to turn down a scholarship, in order to carry out an internship during the coming university semester. The burdensome juggling of the two alternatives resulted in the participant's most noteworthy attitude, that of heartily and successively supporting, at very short intervals, each one of the two options.

Analysis of the Third unit

While sitting again on Chair 1, the participant seriously envisaged the possibility of turning down the scholarship he continue with the line of thought of the first unit. His thought process in Chair 1 is accompanied by a quality of fear that is different from the first time he sat on Chair 1 because he envisages a risk involved, were he to choose the option defended in Chair 2. Although the word ‘fear’ was not actually used, the protagonist did use twice the word ‘risk’, therefore a feeling of fear can be inferred or abstracted from his actual utterances. His abrupt change of attitude was signaled by the adversative conjunction ‘but’, which introduced the opposite possibility, namely, to give up the hard work and to finally start enjoying his much longed for holidays, and thus slow down the rhythm in pro of the security of a safe slow rythm:

- *But it might also happen that... if I start now with the scholarship I'd have to keep on at it, until August, next semester, and I'd risk to go on with it until that period that has two internship requirements, which would overlap and ... this'd be a risk, I could lose my scholarship, and this wouldn't be very ethical of me, you know? I don't know how you call it...it wouldn't be right... my doing that to that person who's giving me that scholarship.*

The semiotic analysis of this unit is presented in Figure 3. This argumentative line continues the first unit which is that of keeping a calm rhythm, it deals with the option of turning down the scholarship. This can be diagrammatically formulated as a semiotic triad in the following way:

I (present) = vague feeling of a safer rythm	
Me (past) = sensation of risk which arose from the wish to accept the scholarship opposed to the wish to take time to relax and work in a safe way.	You (future) = purpose of rest associated to an ethical attitude as a sought after general ideal type, an interpretant of the self as an ethical person.

Figure 3.3: The semiotic analysis of the sign *ethical*

This third unity shows that the opposition between the tendency to rest and the tendency to become useful is also influenced by the search to find a compromise between the two identity tendencies since there is the general ideal of an ethical self. This motivates a self-critical attitude which fosters self-control in the search for an

integral self. This explains that the coming back to Chair 1 is not characterized by a repetitive speech, there is a development of thought resulting from the dialogical interaction. The interpretation of the self as a person who likes to rest takes a directionality that is now closer to the purpose of being useful, since the slow rhythm preserves the possibility of being able to cope with the activities.

Analysis of the Fourth Unit

The opposition between the arguments developed during the thought process in Chair 1 and in Chair 2 became progressively more visible, as the two antithetical tendencies within the self (to rest and to be useful) manifested themselves. Still there was a constant search for an integration of the contradiction. This happened through observable, repetitive acts of the protagonist, who went back and forth between the two chairs on the stage, in order to occupy them alternatively. Once again, the precise moment of the change of chair was signaled by the adversative conjunction 'but'. This points out to the development of distinct identity patterns:

- *But on the other hand, I believe that the person that grants the scholarships is very accessible...it's possible to talk to her, to present the problem to her... to be able to tell her that later on I won't be able to keep on being so committed with the scholarship... so I can discuss with her if there's a way to organize things so that I can work a little bit more at the beginning... and then a little bit less... the coming semester.(...) So, here's what I ought to do: I think I should take the scholarship... 'cause I need it. I need it to stop worrying about what I'm worrying about now... so as not to lose my rhythm, for me too feel useful, which is a feeling I like.*

This specific position represents the aspect of the participant's self which is willing to keep up the intense rhythm of his work, and it was verbally expressed by the verb *to do*, which was used several times in the fragment. In relation with this tendency, we believe we are in the presence of what Wiley (1994, p.55) describes as a "transitory visitor" in the internal conversation. The participant mentions this visitor thus: *I believe that the person that grants the scholarships is very accessible*. The function of the visitor is to contribute with a further argument for the plausibility of this 'hard working' identity that was being developed. The third element worth mentioning in this concern is the specification of a purpose by the participant: *so as not to lose my rhythm, for me to feel useful, which is a feeling that I like*.

This unit is a follow-up of the type of thought which began in the first unit, that is, the semiotic process evolves along the direction of the general character expressed by the notion of “usefulness”. The implicit reference to the *you/self* in the future (*so as not to lose my rhythm*) characterizes the self as a purposive agent. Thus, something which was not totally explicit in the first unit was now formulated through the use of the Portuguese preposition “*para*” (*so as to*).

To understand the idea of a purpose as it is virtually embodied in an interpretant, it is useful to recall the following description of the triadic relation: “a sign that stands for something to the idea it produces or modifies” (CP 1.339). The sign is taken in that definition not in its broadest sense, which is that of a triadic unit, but in the more restricted one of the representamen, namely, the logical subject of the triad whose function is described as that of “the vehicle conveying into the mind something from without” (id.). Then Peirce adds a further specification to that account of the semiotic triad: “That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant” (CP 1.339)

In the present case, the sign/representamen is the *I* aspect of the self; the object corresponds to the *me/self*, which was evoked by the participant as someone who was able to maintain a rhythm, to organize his work one thing first, then another; finally, the interpretant is the *You/self*, which the *I/self* addresses at a future moment, with the concrete aim of not being worried any longer. The overall purpose evinced in this part of the exercise was to keep on enjoying that feeling of being useful. The interpretant is then the desire or personal project of becoming a useful self. Peirce accounts for desire as an element which can never be conceived as a single moment, and does not correspond to a once only, specific situation, but denotes a general kind of behavior: “Now, observe that we seldom, probably never, desire a single individual thing. What we want is something which shall produce a certain pleasure of a certain kind. To speak of a single individual pleasure is to use words without meaning” (CP 1.341).

In relation to the temporary visitor, *the person who grants the scholarships*, it is interesting to observe that she was described as a person who shows an attitude which is consistent with this positively evaluated identity of the self: someone who is *very accessible* in the sense of being both available and understanding. This visitor was described by the participant as someone who is akin to the ideal identity that he was aiming at: lenient, understanding, in a word, one who would not offer much resistance to the option of taking it easy and at the same time to be useful.

The observed role/counter role (Moreno, 1959/1975, p. 8) relation of the self with this temporary visitor can be described as follows: the relation with someone who is able to cope with activities, who does not become overwhelmed or too worried. It is a complementary role in the positive sense, since it is that of someone who accepts a gradual development of the participant's own kind of organization arrangement and rhythm, in brief, it is someone who is not over-demanding. This role relation could be characterized as one of supportive complementarity. We observe here that the evoking of the person who grants the scholarship depicts her as a role model, as an ideal that orients the self's interpretive process. The identity embodied by that role seems to represent for the participant a compromise between the cherished usefulness, and a tolerable, not over stressing, and safer rhythm of action.

Analysis of the Fifth Unit

The manifestation of an internal opposition became at this point exceedingly clear. It is worth remarking that the protagonist was then sitting on Chair 1, that is, in the position where he had begun to talk about a feeling of risk, and of a *me/self* which was unable to cope with the activities, and to keep up a sustained, productive rhythm. The following fragment is evidently a continuation of the discourse which started in the First Unit.

- Still... on the other hand, I think that perhaps, from next year on, I won't be able to keep it up, to keep up the rhythm and that would mean my not being very fair, do you understand?... I mean... I mean towards that person who gave me the scholarship... Well, that's about it.

The question *do you understand?* was not, in fact, addressed to the *you/self* at a future moment, but to the external *you* of the researcher who was directing that psychodramatic exercise, as a simple and concrete way of checking whether she was following the general line of thought or not. According to our analysis, that does not mean either an interruption or a disruption of the participant's internal dialogue, because our semiotic theoretical framework conceives of the internal dialogue as not being different in kind from the typical dialogue which the self holds with another person.⁴¹

⁴¹ In order to rightly differentiate the two dialogical instances, talk to one's self and talk to an external individual, we apply Peirce's "pragmatic maxim" (CP 5. 394), namely, we draw the general consequences of one process and the other, and thus we conclude that we are facing two separate manifestations of a more general phenomenon. What really matters in things semiotic, is that the observed upshots of these concepts – inner dialogue and external dialogue be different, otherwise they would be just two ways for talking about the same thing, which is not the case here.

The term 'internal' does not denote a conception of thought as a phenomenon that is entirely locked up within the person, as if it were a completely private affair, but as a generally (not always) silent communicative process. Since all logical processes are dialogical in nature, there is no substantial or theoretical difference involved in the communicative relation of the self with internal or external others.

Analysis of the closing unit

The arrangement of having the participant sit in two alternative chairs did not only mean that he was holding two different, opposite options of future action, but it also represented two different aspects of his self. The latter were experienced as contradictory, because one was capable of coping with a strong, sustained rhythm of work, while the other was unable to do so. As the exercise advanced, that situation became clearer, particularly in the participant's closing remarks, when he gave two different names to the two chairs, insofar as they were two distinct self-concepts. These can be legitimately described as two 'identities', since they serve to define and characterize two different, antagonistic, interpretive tendencies which coexist *aporetically* within his *self*, as it can be seen in the following, last fragment:

[The researcher asks whether he could give a name for each one of those voices represented by the two chairs]

- *This one is **Easygoing Peter**. You know what I mean? Easygoing in the sense of **relaxed**... maybe too relaxed.*
- *And here this one would be...uhhhm... let's see...**Useful, Worrisome Peter**.*

The triadic interpretive process that had been developing during the entire exercise generated as its (for the time being) final product two logical dynamical interpretants, the inner characters 'Easygoing Peter' (maybe too relaxed) and 'Useful Peter' (worrisome). Following Wiley (1994), we construe these two concrete, historical and partial logical products of the on-going interpretive process as two particular identities, because it helps us preserve as a distinct theoretical concept, that generality of the self. That closing statement was uttered as the participant took up a third spatial place, namely, a standing position. By then, it had become quite clear that the participant interpreted his own self in the same way as he interpreted other signs, or in the same way as others do. Thus, he expected the researcher to understand that sign of

When we wrote above that the unity of the self has logical consistency along time, this implies the functioning of an 'overarching identity' (Colapietro 1990) that maintains both kinds of dialogue, internal and external.

his in a similar way as he himself did (do you know what I mean?). Another consequence of this can be seen in the fact that he was able to even evaluate critically that particular identity of his (maybe too relaxed). This indicates the existence of two levels of hermeneutic generality, in the analytical sense proposed by Colapietro (1989, p. 66): one level is that of “the self as interpreting subject”. This can be distinguished from “the self as interpreted object”, namely, the self conceived of as an autonomous sign in the course of its natural development. What this implies, according Colapietro, is that the self is a complex type of semiotic process, “one in which there is a ramification and also one in which the various branches of the process act on one another” (Peirce, MS 290 paraphrased, in Colapietro, 1989, p. 66). Therefore, we have observed in that psychodramatic exercise two ramifications of the semiotic process, which in this case generated two conflicting self-identities, the two dynamic interpretants that those particular circumstances generated.

Conclusions

The outcome of dialogical thinking is the person’s experiencing more than one distinct identity or inner character. The design of the psychodramatic exercise enabled a close observation of that thinking experience. If we take into account all the collected data of the psychodramatic exercises carried out in the research, which included twenty participants, and of which only one example was presented, we observed a remarkable tendency to interpret those identities as inner characters (in the example discussed above, *easygoing Peter*, and *worrisome Peter*). All the participants of the psychodramatic workshops who evaluated different alternatives, in different decision-taking processes, began their thinking aloud process in the first person singular. Their voices emerged in permanent confrontation with an oppositional voice, which was experienced as a non-ego or *me*. That voice was concretized by a chair that was set up in an opposite position to the first chair. Insofar as it represented the self at a past moment (within the internal conversation), the *me* was experienced as something independent of the will of the *I* speaking in the present, that is, as being a self-willed voice, a typical instance of the phenomenological category of Secondness. The *me* stands in a *conative*, external opposition to the *I*, as the latter speaks. The *me* as object/self embodies an internal dialogical opponent whose blind insistence is experienced as the joint manifestation of effort and resistance. This “two-sided consciousness” (CP 1.24) is the hard nub from which the orientation towards the future self or *you* develops. It is only

with the introduction of this third component that we find an element of reasonableness which contributes to stabilize the self in relation to an ideal, which is of the nature of a concept. The obstinacy of an internal opponent functions as the dialogical fuel which keeps thought going. This kind of semiotic functioning derives from one of the premises of our work, namely, the dialogical existence of a “not” acts as “the very pivot of thought” (CP 1.324). In the proposed exercise, the adversative pivot of thought was physically manifested through the movement of the participants from one chair to the other. Every time this motion took place, it surfaced in the participants’ discourse as the oppositional conjunction ‘but’.

This opposition did not come from the other persons in the room, but from the inner realm of the self, and it emerged as a resistance which both blocks and empowers the smooth flow of the I by eliciting further arguments to override the obdurate ‘but’. The dialectical upshot described as Socratic aporia in this paper is the dawning of an awareness determined by the emergence of different directionalities of thought which introduce new, opposite ideas that were not conceived at first by the participant, until s/he occupied the other chair, which embodied a different take on the issue that was being reflected upon.

Thus these contradictory ideas were permanently confronted, as, alternatively, the first person I took up opposite points of view. In the cases studied, the first stages of thought were characterized by the I speaking at turns from conflicting viewpoints. It was observed that, after some time, each perspective started to constitute a distinct voice that followed a sequential regularity (Thirdness), which culminated by the use of a name-giving symbol. Therefore, this continuity allowed the participant to name (Thirdness) the unique qualitative elements (Firstness) of each voice, which served to tell apart distinct identities (Secondness). The co-participation of the three categorial semiotic components furnishes a theoretical understanding of the dialogical process whereby each voice was interpreted as an identity by the participant.

Although, in some cases, we observed that more than two chairs (voices) were used on the stage, the additional chairs ended up being interpreted as supporting roles of the two main voices/chairs that overtly featured characteristics of mutual incompatibility. So, finally, they were interpreted as two opposed identities.

We can conclude then that the initial situation of doubt which was aroused through the psychodramatic warming-up process was experienced as a self-contradiction, that is, as an aporia, by the participant. Our choice of the notion of

'identity/ies' to designate each of the dialogically opposed voices, positions or roles of the participant who sat on each chair, received additional confirmation from the participants when they were able to name and describe those roles without any trouble. Once they were named, these identities were recognized by all of the participants as more or less permanent constituents of the self, which had emerged in those peculiar, experimental circumstances, but which were fully consistent with the previous life experience of the participants.

The experience of self-contradiction or *aporia* was especially clear in the case of one participant who brought a large number of chairs to the stage, but as she alternatively sat on them, she started to separate two groups or classes, so her arrangement consisted finally of two chairs behind which the rest were set up. She ended up her dramatization by taking extra care to make sure that the two central chairs stood exactly facing each other, so as to show to the other members of the workshop that those two voices possessed the same amount of persuasive strength within her.

In all of the cases, the exercise finished by showing how the time-bound development of thought inevitably led to the setting up of distinct spatial positions, on account of the regularity of a dialectical mechanism which involves the return to a previously established argumentative point. Thus the creation of such logical, communicational patterns tends to be interpreted as the existence of more or less permanent constituents of the self, namely, the particular identities. What originated and evolved along the temporal dimension was, nevertheless, experienced by the participants as a space-bound, entity contained within them. In spite of the temporal dimension inherent in any interpretive process, as the Peircean triadic semiotic demonstrates, the time-bound activity which is the self-interpretive process is lived as a spatial phenomenon, namely, one in which the self functions as a container, and the person's identities as characters within it. Consequently, each of those identities can be accounted for theoretically as different interpretive tendencies of the self as a living process.

The disposition to tolerate self-contradiction was readily accepted and expressed as a dialogue by the participants, in spite of their acknowledging that the situation was uncomfortable and even difficult to live with. Nevertheless, they were not in a hurry to come to a pacifying resolution, on the dramatic stage, when they were offered that possibility. The reason they gave for such an attitude was that, for the time being, they still lacked the needed and relevant knowledge concerning that complex issue to do so.

The participants' most common explanation was that they were not ready to solve the conflict, at that particular moment, not because of a personal limitation, but because to take a decision there and then would have been premature. With the exception of two of the participants who enacted a doubt that had already been solved outside of the experimental context, all the others said that the two opposed aspects of the self, that is, the two identities, had the same weight within themselves. They said that was the way things should remain, until the moment of resolution arrived together with the missing pieces of information. These comments tend to support Ransdell's (2000) description of the aporetic state as an important element for promoting inquiry, which in his case is philosophical or scientific, but which could be extended to the everyday life realm. None of the participants manifested the need to indulge into evasive behavior; of course, we should not disregard the possibility of a certain bias produced by the experimental setting on their attitude.

Paradoxically as it may sound, self-contradiction seems to enhance the person's experiencing the self as a unit along time, since the dialogical coexistence of two identities favors the tacit distinction between self and identities, just as it was described by Wiley (1994), from a theoretical viewpoint. In the above discussed case of Peter, the *aporia* consisted in two opposed self-concepts, *relaxed* vs. *worrisome*, which made the participant ask himself how to reach a decision that would involve a compromise solution and, as such, a more adequate response to the situation he was facing. That kind of search for a synthetic unity of the self, instead of a simplistic solution that chose one of the two alternatives, was at the basis of the participant's effort at trying to negotiate the terms for his acceptance of the scholarship. Far more important than accepting it or not, was to come to a decision that would allow him to feel both useful and not too self-demanding.

As psychodrama is an action method, it was found to be very well suited to study thought in action, the process whereby one thought (object) through another (sign) determines a further, more developed sign of itself (interpretant). What is a role if not a summarized way of describing a relationship? Under the abbreviated form friend, student, son, or the inner characters which emerged in our study, what we are, in fact, dealing with is a complex network, wherein each element engages the others in order to be meaningful for life.

In all the dramatizations that were made, there were some moments that required the participants to stand aside and take the role of an observer of themselves. From that

specific vantage point, they were to comment on the ongoing situation, in his or her own name. Although the protagonist had been totally engrossed in the dialogical situation, there was evidence that there remained an aspect of his or her self that was still capable of carrying out the task of self-observation, and which could evaluate and comment on the identities involved in the discussion. Once the particular identities were named, the participants felt the need to find a third position – usually represented by their standing up – in order to speak in behalf of the person’s real name, for example ‘Peter’. From that position, the participants manifested having consciousness that s/he was trying to come to terms with two partial aspects of his or her self, so as to orient the directionality of his/her life. On those occasions, it became clear for the researcher that although the participants had assumed different roles, they had never lost the capacity of self-observation. In other words, the interpretive agency of the self was maintained, even when the person spoke in each role, from each chair on the stage. The self as an “over-arching identity” (Colapietro, 1990a) seemed to be always operative during the dramatization, even though it only became evident, when the participants took some distance in order to comment on the situation.

In the specific case we discussed, had Peter not tolerated the self-contradiction or *aporia* he would have adopted one of the identities, for instance, that of *easygoing* or *relaxed*, and this would have led him to take that self-concept for the sole reality of his self. This would have produced an identity situation similar to the one Wiley (1994) described as a kind of false-self, one which produces stereotyped behavior and thus limits the possibilities of an adequate psychological development. That was one of the points illustrated through the literary example of J. L. Borges’s story *Emma Zunz*. The protagonist of that narrative became one with the murderous revenger identity, that is, she construed her self as identical to that single, dynamical interpretant, one which came up as a concrete reaction to the sad news she received, at the beginning of the story. To do so, she had to leave aside, as a discarded, empty husk, her previous, naïve identity, as well as an indefinite number of other potential identities, which could have replaced or co-existed with the one which, in fact, emerged triumphantly and dominantly in her life.

If a person is ruled by only one identity, even if it is a positive one, as it was the case with so called ‘useful Peter’ example analyzed above, there is a kind of reductionist violence which is committed against the self as a complex, evolving interpretive process. In contrast with that behavior, when Peter took up the third, standing up position in the psychodramatic exercise, he was capable of exercising a

form of self-critical agency (*'too relaxed'*), which manifested both self-control and the search for better solutions, in the external realm.

Consequently, the present study tends to confirm that the tolerance of a state of dialogical *aporia* is a key ingredient so as to engage into an inquiry that serves both as an exploratory conduct in the real world, and as a form of self-inquiry. In the case of self-inquiry or self-interpretation, the tolerance of self-contradiction favors a distinction of levels between the self process and the multiple identities.

The relevance of the integration of the phenomenological category of Secondness to a dialogical study of the self lies in a better understanding of any kind of dyadic relation, and of the way in which the logical determination – in the sense of constraint – of external otherness acts obdurately upon the intra-psychological realm. When we use the term “external” as an attribute of otherness, we include in this phenomenon the influence of an inner voice or identity in conflict, for instance, with the others. Thus the externality of an element arises from the fact that there is nothing the subject can do, no opinion s/he may hold or defend, that can change its determining influence, such is the bottom line of Peirce’s assertion concerning whatever is “immediately known as external (...) in the sense of being present regardless of the perceiver’s will or wish” (CP 5.462).

The analysis of semiotic mediation in triadic terms as opposed to the Saussurean dyadic model involves the theoretical consideration of the impact of externality as an obdurate, factual constraint to interpretation, which manifests itself through effort/resistance. The present study tried to bring in some evidence in support of the hypothesis that favors the objective determination in interpretation, as a basic component of the process of dialogical thought. Our account of the intra-psychological dialogue implies the conceiving of any dyadic human interaction in such a way that it does not rely essentially in the physical separation between (at least) two individuals. Peirce’s phenomenological category of Secondness explains the action of external constraints in a logical process, whose effects on thought are real, whether they take place within one person or between two (or more). Furthermore, they are real not on account of their being merely thought, invented or imagined as external objects, but because they possess an effective capacity to determine our conception of the world and our self conception. The theoretical distinctions introduced by the phenomenological, triadic semiotic of Peirce are crucial to us in order to formulate a definition of internal dialogue which entitles one participant of the dialogue to distinguish him or herself

from a second one, as a consequence of the ensuing resistance entailed by the (thought of the) existence of this other.

Even if we take into account that this specific study relied on a demand of the researchers on the participants to focus on a psychological state of ambivalence of theirs, it still seems of general validity to understand how internal opposition takes place in our normal thought processes, and also in what sense it is a defining aspect of our dialogical inner realm. We observed that the constraint of external reality is part of the thought process as an internalized dialogical opponent. If we base the study of the self on a sign model that posits that external reality is wholly independent of the sign, and therefore that meaning is ultimately arbitrary, as the semiological model of Saussure (1916/1961) does, then it becomes very hard for a psychological theory to differentiate delusional thought, such as hallucinations, or the phenomena psychoanalysis describes as negation, from normal, routine-like thinking. In contrast, the triadic sign model of Peirce enables us to bring to the conception of thought and, thereby, to that of the self, the theorization on the kind of limits that objective external reality imposes on our internal subjective realm. While the participants of the workshops of psychodrama expressed their thoughts and endeavored to follow their dreams, as they indulged in the kind of “distant castle-building (whether in Spain or within one’s own moral training” (CP 6.458), their thinking kept stumbling against real obstacles. This was verbally manifested by the recurrent use of the adversative conjunction *but* in their speech. The conjunction brought a momentary interruption to the flow of thought in a mode called “musement” by Peirce, namely, the imaginative, free play with all kinds of possibilities, no matter how implausible they may be. However, this stop sign of the circulation of thoughts was also crucial for the emergence of new arguments, which aimed at overcoming that obstacle. The opposition between subjective will and external constraints triggers a dialogical movement of thought, a kind of internal negotiation with “that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something **other** than the mind’s creation” (CP 1.325 – emphasis in the original). The clash with alterity is not only a relation with physically external otherness, but also with its internalized effects in the process of thinking. In this relation with otherness, the self emerges as a developing sign, and the regularities of the self-interpretive process lead to the emergence of particular identities.

Study 4

Change and Permanence in Human Identity: The Self as a Teleological Sign

Abstract: This paper focuses on the problem of coexisting repetitive and innovative tendencies in the development of identity. Peirce's theory of meaning generation powered by teleology is applied to the study of the self. It derives from Aristotle's classical account of final causality. The self evolves naturally according to regular tendencies and to spontaneous change. The three-stage process whereby telic originality emerges in life and in narrative is applied to the analysis of human identity as it is illustrated by the film *The Accidental Tourist* (US, Kasdan 1988). The development of the self is the logical upshot of the constant tension between regularity and change, law and spontaneity. The continuity/ consistency of the self is the product of the teleological mechanism which actualizes ideal types. Human autonomy is possible because regularity tendencies coexist with the dialogical encounter with otherness.

Keywords: Development of the self, conservative tendencies, spontaneity

Estudo 4

*Mudança E Permanência No Desenvolvimento Da Identidade:
O self como um signo teleológico*

Resumo: Este trabalho focaliza o problema da coexistência de tendências repetitivas e inovadoras no desenvolvimento da identidade. Aplica-se a teoria Peirceana da geração de sentido orientado teleologicamente. A noção de teleologia provém do conceito clássico aristotélico de causa final. O *self* é um processo evolutivo regido pela combinação de tendências regulares e mudanças espontâneas. O processo em três estágios através do qual o telos original emerge na vida e nas narrativas é aplicado à análise do processo identitário humano ilustrado no filme *The Accidental Tourist* (EUA, Kasdan 1988). O desenvolvimento do *self* é o resultado lógico da tensão constitutiva entre regularidade e mudança, lei e espontaneidade. A continuidade/consistência do *self* é o resultado do mecanismo télico para atualizar tipos ideais. A autonomia humana é possível porque as tendências regulares coexistem com o encontro dialógico com a alteridade.

Palavras chave: Desenvolvimento do *self*, tendências conservadoras, espontaneidade.

The present paper assumes that pragmatic semiotic theory founded by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) can offer a fruitful path to elaborate on human identity developmental process based on Wiley's proposed notion of a reflexive, processual semiotic self as distinct from a particularized conception of identity constituted by the plural, social distinctive traits which undergird the self-concepts associated to them. In Wiley's (1994) main work on this issue, the term 'self' refers to the universal human nature which manifests itself as an interpretive capacity which does not depend on contingent historical circumstances, while particular "identities individuate and allow us to recognize individuals, categories, groups and types of individuals" (p. 1). According to Colapietro's (1989) thesis on the self, Peirce's conception of the self can be best understood if approached from a developmental perspective. Self-consciousness evolves as the living upshot of an ongoing interpretive process which brings about growing complexity of meaning. Semiotic is but another name for logic, in the Peircean architectonic system, wherein the fundamental notion is that of the tri-relative relation between "a sign, its object and its interpretant sign" (CP 3.608). The logician arrives at this description of the process through which meaning evolves, namely, semiosis, on the basis of a phenomenological analysis of reality that distinguishes three different kinds of appearances, regardless of their ontological status, and these are the monadic, dyadic and triadic "seemings" (CP 2.197), another name for the kinds of phenomena which the mind can entertain. Upon such phenomena, Peirce builds his classifications of signs according to their qualitative, factual and general functioning. Notwithstanding his pansemiotic conception of the universe, for the semiotician it is the symbolic sign which embodies the most genuine kind of mediation, because "it owes its virtue to a significant character which can only be realized by the aid of its Interpretant" (CP 2.92). The processual functioning of semiosis depends, therefore, on the evolutive nature of the symbol:

Symbols grow. They come into being by developing out of other signs (...) We think only in signs. These mental signs are of a mixed nature; the symbol-part of them are called concepts, so it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. (CP 2.302)

The present work focuses on the self as a "dynamically stable emergent form" (Alexander, 2002) of a life-long, end-directed, self-controlled process of interpretation.

Contemporary scholars who place themselves in the pragmaticist tradition of Peirce (Colapietro, 1990a; Schrag, 1997; Wiley, 1994) find in this theoretical framework a promising approach to the self. What for them is most relevant in the wide-ranging writings of the logician of Milford is that his non-psychologistic model of the mind provides the basis for a construal of the self which is an alternative to some modern and post-modern theories of identity (e.g. Gergen 1992). What these neo-pragmaticists criticize in the latter is their radical reduction of the self to either social conditioning or biological mechanisms. Adopting Peirce's mature theory of synechism, namely, the doctrine of logical continuity which derives from infinitesimal calculus, Santaella (2002) posits the argument that there is only a difference of degree between mind and matter (pp. 98-99). Synechism assumes that there is an aspect of regularity in nature, one which is not introduced or projected by the human mind, but which belongs to nature itself.⁴² Thus, if there is no breach between the functioning of nature and the understanding of it, albeit with the limitation of our fallible judgment, we are entitled to believe that there is also continuity between the functioning of the social and the natural universe.

The self as a semiotic process is not independent from the laws that regulate natural systems in the universe. Although the observation of the world indicates that it is ruled by regularity, it also reveals the presence of an element of chance in it. For Peirce, both regularity and randomness are objective aspects of reality: "So if observed facts point to real growth, they point to another agency, to spontaneity (...). How can the regularity of the world increase, if it has been absolutely perfect all the time?" (CP 1.174). There are laws, there is also variety introduced by "renewed fortuitous spontaneity" (CP 6.264), and finally there are "facts that do not adjust precisely and uniformly to the law" (Santaella 2002, p. 99). Semiosis or the action of signs is what enables people to grasp the working of the non-human realm in a fallible though increasingly reliable manner. Human beings are perfectly integrated to the entire creation, since they are part of the "continuity of experience". In his study of the self, Colapietro (1989) states that:

From the perspective of semiotic, we are always already in the midst of others as well as of meaning; indeed otherness and meaning are given together in our experience of ourselves as beings embedded in a network of relations – more

⁴² For a detailed and useful discussion of constructionism see Hacking (1999).

specifically, enmeshed in the ‘semiotic web’. (p.28)

Semiotically, the self evolves as a living dialogical process. This conception does not reduce the self by reifying it into a limited set of socially conditioned identities, since the crux of the semiotic self lies in its generative dimension. As the emergent property of a teleological interpretive process, the self accounts for a global overarching identity which through its normal functioning maintains unity and consistency (CP 7.585).⁴³ Such a conception of the self includes the social identities and concrete interpretations such as contextual-sensitive self-concepts, as well. What does it imply to state that semiosis functions teleologically? According to Ransdell (1992), this means that each actualized interpretant or historical act of interpretation autonomously generates other signs which are more complex sub-units (interpretants) within an ongoing process of interpretation. Such a process only pauses and in a partial way with our absent-mindedness, fatigue or even with death of the subject, since the community takes up this endless semiotic labor. In triadic semiotic, it is not the objectual which is decisive – this interpretant here and now – but the generative power of signs which are capable of producing series of interpretants along time. We describe this as a process, insofar as there is a co-ordination of all sub-interpretants which issue from the tendency toward the creation of a global “unitary and unifying interpretant” (Ransdell 1992, para. 10)

Teleology construed as the semiotic tendency toward a unitary end is inseparable from the notion of self-consciousness, which in turn is associated with the “coordination of ideas” (CP 6.155) known in psychology as personality: “This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fullness” (CP 6.155) General ideas have the power to determine acts in a different manner from the working of efficient causation. The latter is involved whenever an action is purely determined by mechanical force. Final causation, instead, is active if it is ideas that determine acts in the future. That is why the study of teleology is relevant to a developmental approach to the self and to the understanding of personality:

(Coordination) implies a teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end; it is a developmental teleology. This is personal character. A

⁴³ We follow the convention of quoting Peirce with the notation “CP [x.xxx]”, referred to volume and paragraph in *The Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce* (1936-58).

general idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious. (CP 6.156)

The lifelong development of the self: repetitive and innovative tendencies

In everyday experience, the semiotic growth involved in the process of human identity is haunted by two threats: automatic repetitive tendencies which we associate with the experience of not being able to change, with the frustration of not being capable of veering away from a rigid identity, on the one hand, and the distress of being in any situation in which the self is no longer capable of guaranteeing the experience of recognition along time which upholds our conviction of being one and the same individual, on the other.

Theories closely related to the problem of therapeutic change, such as psychoanalysis, have extensively focused on the need to understand those kinds of behavior which seemed illogical to normal reasoning. Many theoretical reflections were devoted to solve the problem caused by human obstinate tendencies to repeat unwilled patterns of behavior that are psychologically or even physically harmful. This enigmatic problem took Freud (1856-1939) to propose that our involuntary acts are governed by the unconscious aspects of our psyche. He described an unconscious realm ruled by a mysterious “repetitive compulsion” of painful events which operates with a logic that goes “beyond the pleasure principle” (Freud, 1920/1972). Outside the consulting rooms, it is also frequent to experience the sensation that our lives are governed by some external force or pre-established destiny which we cannot control according to will. People often wonder whether there is any kind of possibility of freewill in the construction of their own lives. There seems to be still no clear answer to the question the amount of free will we actually have regarding the decision of the kind of person we want to be. We are many times haunted by the idea that once our lives were determined in childhood and that the concept of change simply does not exist.

On the other hand, notions such as “construction” or “invention” of identity do not seem realistic if taken in their most radical sense because the more we live the more we realize that to change is much more difficult than what such notions convey. Insofar as it concerns human identity processes, the discussion of causality involves many psychological theories, as well as philosophical studies. Psychoanalytical explanations follow Freud’s (1920/1972) initial attempt to understand the causal determination of

behavior by past events, specifically in repetitive, compulsive acts cannot receive as an explanation the pursuit of pleasure. The critique against such a perspective is that it assumes an excess of determinism of the past upon the present, and this leaves almost no theoretical leeway to account for innovative behavior and for change in general. There are other theories that question such a deterministic bias, and which include spontaneity as a basic element of human nature. An example is J. L. Moreno's sociometric role theory.

In the introduction to his book *Psychodrama* (1978), Moreno proudly tells an anecdote about an encounter with Freud, at a conference in Vienna. On that occasion, the psychodramatist challenged the psychoanalyst with the following intervention: "Well, Doctor Freud, I start where you leave things (...) You analyze people's dreams. I try to give them the courage to dream again. I teach people how to play God. (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 27). Taking this anecdote literally it seems that Moreno is falling in a dualistic opposition of repetition and change. Nevertheless, according to the words of those who have known Moreno closely, this kind of polemical posture was a characteristic of his lively and outspoken personality, but this did not undermine the complexity of his theoretical or methodological perspective⁴⁴. Moreno's emphatic words are related to his lifetime vivid effort to bring optimism to the work in psychiatric hospitals at a time when patient stereotyping was a consequence of rigid diagnostic labeling.⁴⁵ Moreno's method does not underestimate the importance of repetitive tendencies. On the contrary, psychodrama starts very frequently with the enactment of repetitive scenes with the aim of transforming "transference" (repetition of old patterns of role relations) into "tele" (adequate perception of otherness) (see Bello, 1999, p. 69; Karp et al., 1998, p.36).

In his book on *Psychodrama*, (1946/1978, p. 31-32) mentions Peirce's reflections on spontaneity, which the psychodramatist considers a very important contribution. As a matter of fact, Moreno's (1946/1978, p. 89) construal of human spontaneity draws inspiration directly from Peircean teleology. The main coincidence between Moreno and Peirce lies in the conception of spontaneity as a principle of life. Peirce's (CP 6.59) view of evolution posits a principle of original indeterminacy; the

⁴⁴ This and similar comments are frequent in people who were very close to Moreno such as his widow Zerka T. Moreno and his disciple Dalmiro Bustos.

⁴⁵ for a brief summary of Moreno's life see website of Febrap, Brazilian federation of psychodramatists <http://febrap.org.br/psicodrama/jmoreno.asp>. The historical description on that site ends by stating that Moreno expressed his wish to be remembered after his death as a person who brought joy to psychiatrics.

spontaneity as a characteristic of life:

By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really *sui generis* and new can be said to be accounted for. By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law.

In this sense spontaneous change is a basic characteristic of the universal functioning of both human and natural processes, which however does not escape from the restriction of laws. Still, Moreno (1946/1978, p.32) was not completely satisfied with the notion of spontaneity being associated to chance, because the psychodramatist believed that spontaneous behavior in human life did not emerge in an arbitrary way but as a capacity to give new responses to old situations or to respond adequately to new situations. If we revise Peircean theory, we see that Moreno is right in one point. Spontaneity in semiotic theory is, in fact, a notion that explains novelty as a consequence of chance which accounts for the emergence of things in the universe which cannot be explained as issuing from antecedents through mechanical law (see CP 1.174). Nevertheless, Peirce did not reduce spontaneity to chance only. Peirce's (CP 6.62) notion of spontaneity corresponds to the influence of chance in life, but it is a part of a teleological model of meaning generation which assumes the emergence of patterns in nature and in mankind on account of intrinsic causes. This means that the semiotic triadic model requires the ontological possibility of chance as integrated to the general working of the universe. What perhaps was missing from Moreno's take on this issue (1978, p.31-32) is that the Peircean notion of spontaneity combines chance with ordering tendencies instead of dyadically opposing them. Besides there is the fact that interpretation is always related to an end, which accounts for the purposive adaptive behavior in human as well as in non-human life.

The following quotation seems a good counter argument to Moreno's critique of Peirce (CP 6.63) since it makes explicit that the teleological construal of the self is able to develop a continuous, non-contradictory view of spontaneity and regularity:

To undertake to account for anything by saying baldly that it is due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not do. I make use of chance chiefly to

make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities.

The complex and controversial concept of telos

Teleology derives from Aristotle's classical account of several types of causes. It was introduced to explain phenomena in nature that became comprehensible only when considered as the result of the influence of final causation. It includes such processes as the ones which, in contemporary times, are explained by the tendency to the actualization of an end or ideal type. Although this includes purpose, final causation does not necessarily involving conscious intentions.

Although Peirce's use of teleology is based on Aristotle's conception of final cause, and on the assumption that no final cause is actual (Short, 1981), it introduced major modifications to the original notion. The distinctiveness of semiotic teleology (Ransdell, 1977, Short 1981, Hulswit, 2001, Alexander, 2002) has been frequently underrated by modern theoreticians. Consequently, the import of the telic dimension of every semiotic process has been scarcely taken into consideration in the contemporary study of meaning phenomena. One of the differences introduced by pragmatism with respect to Aristotelian thought is that instead of the working of final causation being due to its goodness, it refers to any tendency which a natural process exhibits to actualize a general type (see Short, 1981a, p. 371). This is a kind of logical determination for which Peirce proposes the term *finious*, "if teleological is too strong a word", in order to describe those processes which "express their tendency toward a final state" (CP 7.471). Another relevant aspect of the pragmaticist approach to teleology is that it is not dualistically opposed to efficient causation, but complementary with it (see Ponce, 1987). In this sense, final causes can be defined as "general types that tend to realize themselves by determining processes of efficient causation (Hulswit, 2001, p. 343).

According to Ransdell (1977, p.168), the notion of final causation in Peirce is the tendency towards an end state which rules every processes of sign action or semiosis. Although it may be construed as a purpose, it does not owe its capacity of determination either to its being conscious, or to the fact that it will be actually realized or concretized in a future moment, the systemic goal of sign action is to produce an interpretant, but for the latter "a being *in futuro* will suffice" (CP 2.92). The power which belongs to ideas is the one that produces regularity, which in turn brings about material effects in the world, albeit the latter may remain only a potentiality, for very

long time. Deprived of such an influence we would only be left with, writes Peirce emphatically, a complete void: “matter would thus not only not actually exist, but it would not have even a potential existence, since potentiality is an affair of ideas. It would be just downright Nothing” (CP 1.218).

Still, one further distinction must be introduced at this point. What characterizes this kind of causality is its being an ideal type: “someone’s purpose is the ideal type which he wills to actualize. His willing to actualize it is what makes this type his purpose, but the purpose is the type, and not any particular act or acts of will” (Short, 1981, p. 369). Once we realize the relevance of teleology to account for the autonomous generation of meaning, it becomes even more difficult to accept the marginality of this theoretical aspect of signification in most academic discussions. Fortunately, as (Alexander, 2002) points, its absence is not a silent one: “dismissed by Francis Bacon, then by Charles Darwin, and then by Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes, *telos* keeps returning like a misunderstood ghost”.

In the study of identity narratives, the resistance to accept teleological accounts is becomes explicit in Mishler (2002), when he argues about the insufficiency of efficient causes to explain psychological phenomena. Mishler refers to Ricoeur’s (1980) notion of “narrative time”, with which the latter tries to account for the influence of the plot as an end-directed sequence of events, in contradistinction to a purely chronological sequence of narrated events. This telic influence is exerted before the end of the story actually occurs. Such an organizing element cannot be explained only by efficient causation, that is, one thing coming after the other in sheer successiveness. Mishler (2002) deems explanations that use a linear temporal framework to be insufficient for theory and research in areas such as learning, personality change and identity. He mentions the need to review the assumptions of causal relations on which cognitive, linguistic and identity development theories are grounded. Paradoxically, as the argument seems to reach the point where a teleological explanation would enter logically into the picture, Mishler states that “questioning [the assumption that an earlier event is not influenced by later stages] risks being viewed as odd or perverse, or even more worrisome, as a return to a long-rejected idea of teleology” (p. 7). Almost exactly a century before this strongly dismissive view, Peirce stated that

[The sign’s] causality is of an altogether different kind; and the non-recognition of this other kind of causation -- now going the length of a downright denial, now simple ignoring, now admitting with an emotional ‘merely’ attached to it – has

been and still is productive of more philosophical error and nonsense than any or than every other source of error and nonsense. If there is any goddess of nonsense, this must be her haunt. (Peirce, 1903, MS 478, p.155, quoted in Ransdell, 1977, p. 163)

After a thorough revision of complexity science, Alexander (1999, 2002, 2004) concludes that Peirce's semiotic teleology is compatible with recent research in non-linear dynamics theories about natural processes and end-directed systems in the universe. While following Aristotle's notion of an intrinsic guiding principle or telos, Peircean teleology shares the assumptions of Complexity Science, since it "integrates nonlinear dynamics with the principle of adaptive evolution, illustrating how transcendent order is not a mere fiction but an effectual natural product of chance" (Alexander, 1999, p. 33).

Alexander's (2002) doctoral dissertation discusses at great length Peirce's assumption of the ontological possibility of spontaneous organization based on the emergence of order out of an initial state of indeterminacy. She describes a "three-part process" whereby telic originality results from external emergence, that is, forces external to a system can and do affect its functioning and determine the issuing forth and stabilization of new meaning patterns:

First, a new pattern must either emerge with telic directionality (through a process of *self*-organization or intrinsic emergence), or exist already but serve another function. Then the pattern must be evaluated and found to be *useful* (or more useful as the case may be) to whom –or whatever has evaluated it (illustrating *end* determinedness or extrinsic emergence). Lastly, in order to make it seem patently teleological, the pattern must also serve the purpose of contributing to its own survival (becoming another example of intrinsic emergence).

At stage one, the newly formed pattern can function systemically as being only noise, since it is not productive insofar as the original function is concerned. To proceed to stage two, there is a need of an agent or a second system which is external to the first one. Thus either of them can interpret noise as meaningful with respect to a different purpose. The third phase involves the recognition of a new pattern, namely, the stabilization of a new order as the combined result of chance and of the principle of generalization.

The theoretical integration of repetition and innovation

The objective of this paper is a revision of Peircean teleological account of the development of semiotic processes as the cooperation of regularity and originality tendencies in life to explore the possibility of human innovation, autonomy and free will. The paper argues for a non-reductionistic position which does not deny the importance of neither conservative nor innovative tendencies in the normal development of the self.

This work tries to contribute to the discussion on therapeutic change by holding as reasonable both tendencies of human identity: conservative preservation of routines and spontaneous change. The stereotyping of identity, described by Wiley (1994, p. 38) as a disturbance that occurs when an “identity becomes a “functional replacement for the structure and takes over its [the self’s] role”, can be conceived as a disturbance of the balanced interplay of regularity and originality tendencies that characterizes normal self-interpretive processes. This phenomenon that was described by Wiley (1994, p. 38) with the help of a spatial “container/contained” metaphor, will be here tried to be translated from spatial into temporal terms by applying Peircean teleology. Once the self is approach through a developmental perspective, the reification of identity can be conceived as the repetitive self-imposition of a particular identity. This phenomenon can be associated to defensive psychological affective withdrawal. When a particular identity usurps the whole self structure the inner diversity is reduced and the dialogical aspect of thought is minimized. Change is impossible without the “outward clash” (CP 8.43) with other semiotic processes, namely, the signs issuing from the interaction with fellow human beings and with the world. If this is reduced, the possibility of semiotic kind of “habit-change” will be minimized. The word “habit” is used in the semiotic sense, as a kind of the “final interpretant” of semiotic processes:

It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a habit-change; meaning by a habit-change a modification of a person's tendencies toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause (CP 5.476)

Once semiosis is conceived as an autonomous teleological (telic) generative process, and the self as a kind of semiosis, it is necessary to explore how autonomy can be accounted for in such terms. As we mentioned above, teleology is the result of both material causality and of end-directed logical functioning. We believe that this

contemporary, all-encompassing view of teleology applied to human studies can in fact contribute to account for human intentionality and autonomy. We will try to describe the meaning tendencies which constitute human identity in the light of pragmaticist teleology based on Alexander's (2002) thesis that change is the product of telic originality which emerges as a result of a three-part process. The working of telic originality applied to the understanding of the development of identity will be illustrated by some scenes of the film *The Accidental Tourist* (EEUU, L. Kasdan 1988) based on a novel of the same title by Anne Tyler.⁴⁶ Although this is a fictional narrative, a close analysis of the film's plot and of some of its episodes will allow us to treat it as an esthetic reflection on the problem of how to integrate conservative and innovative tendencies in our evolving self-identity. Our take on the film aims at rendering in concrete terms some abstract notions such as teleology, creativity and autonomy insofar as they relate to self and identity. This complex telic mechanism is applied here to the analysis of identity narratives in the film *The Accidental Tourist* to argue for the possibility of intentional change, which is part and parcel of human autonomy. Without such an element of self-determination there can be no explanation for the emergence of new patterns of behavior and new meaning tendencies of the human self.

Self narratives in *The Accidental Tourist* as manifestations of telic originality

For our discussion we will avail ourselves of a film whose plot deals with the change and the permanence of identity, in order to find an illustration. We hope thus to exemplify the otherwise rather abstract conceptualization of teleology. This fictional narrative is relevant insofar as it depicts the strong influence of extremely conservative tendencies on the film's protagonist, and then proceeds to show in detail the process of emergence of original telos.

When at the beginning, the hero of the film is introduced, albeit that status does not fit too well Macon Leary, he is presented as a talented though uncannily self-effacing writer of travel guide books for businessmen who abhor traveling, namely, *The Accidental Tourist* series. The camera shows Macon at a critical moment of his existence; his wife has just announced her decision to break up their formerly pleasant and uneventful marriage. Husband and wife are well-off, educated middle class people,

⁴⁶ The convergence of Psychodrama and Semiotic theory in the present analysis of the plot of the film *The Accidental Tourist* is the product of a homelike, and also academic, discussion that started a long time ago with my husband semiotician F. Andacht.

if one is to tell by their demeanor; their elegant clothing matches their fine vocabulary and extreme care for conventions. Besides their refined aspect, the setting emphasizes this effect by means of a meticulously well-organized household, one in which daily chores and other routines have acquired the dignified status of fastidious rituals. Soon enough, the film viewer finds out that their marital crisis has been triggered by an awfully traumatic event. Their peaceful, controlled existence was suddenly “devastated” – Macon’s term – by a tragically fortuitous disruption. During a burglary at a fast-food restaurant, their only son was hit by a stray bullet and died before reaching the hospital. The blind collision of deadly randomness against the adolescent’s body made them wholly impotent, as death’s brutal intromission normally does. The couple must face the sudden and complete loss of meaning of a family life which they had so painstakingly built over the years. From that point onwards, the entire plot becomes a reflection on the self and its ordeals; it can even be construed as a modern allegory of the laborious semiotic quest for the hero’s identity, or rather for the adequate interpretation of this evolving process of signification.

Macon’s dilemma is how to steer his life between Scylla and Charybdis, between the snug lure of staying in the dull “Leary groove”, his own description of the airtight, deadening repetitive patterns of his family ways, and the apprehension of embarking in a vertiginous quest for a yet to be discovered alternative meanings of the self as an ongoing interpretive process. Were we to apply Wiley’s (1994, p. 36) notion of “particular semiotic identity” as opposed to the more general, “overarching role” (p. 38) of the self, it can be said that Macon’s terrible loss has harmed the former but not the latter, his capacity to reinterpret his life. Our socially situated identities function as bridges between the self and the community. The key distinction to bear in mind here is that between the self as a sign generative process, on the one hand, and the particular signs which constitute our successive or simultaneous identities, on the other. Albeit, for the protagonists at the beginning of the film, their whole self was taken over, during their very painful mourning period, by one identity associated to their brutally attacked parental role. In Peircean technical vocabulary, a singular particular identity is termed a dynamical interpretant (Andacht & Michel, 2005), which denotes the content of historical acts of interpretation.⁴⁷ The influence of the particular though incomplete

⁴⁷ In Peircean semiotic, the interpreter is not theoretically relevant, it is simply the place where this process of signification occurs. This in no way jeopardizes human autonomy, however, it allows inquiry to consider the act of interpretation objectively, according to its upshots.

identity lies in its capacity to produce a persuasive presentation of who somebody actually is for an extended period of time (e.g. father, teacher, cautious planner), however, we must bear mind that is only part of the story, namely, a slice of a complex, dialogical ongoing process, the self.

On the lure of becoming and staying an accidental tourist

The first scene shows Macon Leary fastidiously preparing his suitcase, a faultless enactment of his own guide's model reader, the accidental tourist in action. With a quiet, subdued attitude, he puts together a kit for a safe trip, in fact, for a more ambitious goal, for a life which is ideally free from all kinds of interactional accidents. This shielding effort not only heeds clumsy stains in clothes, but also makes the traveler ready for "unexpected funerals". A voice-over reads aloud the guide's Decalogue for the change-immunized modern pilgrim, as a scene of banal self-help and personal revelation unravels. Surprisingly, this obsessive traveler breaks one of the golden rules solemnly enunciated: "never take with you anything whose loss could devastate you". Against the backdrop of the calm, polished voice, the bereaved father looks intently at the small portrait of a young boy which he then proceeds to tuck away inside the suitcase, among the neatly folded clothes and individual packs of detergent soap. The latter are recommended to professional travelers so as "not to fall into the hands of unfamiliar laundries".

The soundtrack evokes Eric Satie's *Gimnopédies* and provides a soothing ambiance for the well honed travel routine designed to avoid all possible contact with otherness, be it alien foods or strangers. For the guide's reader, it seems hard not to yield to a pleasant lull of obedience, and to follow literally these smooth instructions, which promise an almost event-free, mild odyssey. If s/he does as advised and carries only the bare minimum, each packed object will not only provide material comfort, but will also serve as a powerful talisman intended to conjure away unpleasant surprises. Wherever the trip's destination may be, this anti-adventurer will be able to harbor the illusion of having stayed safely at home, and even imagine her or himself sitting on a cozy sofa like the one which invariably illustrates the cover of each volume of Macon's series of travel guides. Thus the accidental tourist is a metaphor of a forever still, unchanging, particular identity, one which the film's protagonist does his best to mistake for the complex, evolving semiotic self process. According to Wiley (1994, p.36-37), this kind of mystification occurs whenever:

a person thinks a particular semiotic identity is the major basis of his or her personal identity (then) that person is incorrectly assigning a property of the structure to one of his parts. (...) The *fundamental reflexive channel* of the self is in its structure. (...) All semiotic processes are part of this larger I-you-me reflexive process. If some part of the structure, some identity, begins to masquerade as the whole structure, it is possible for this identity to usurp the structure's reflexive function.⁴⁸

Alexander's (2002) account of the teleological/telic process conceives the self as a dynamically stable emergent form which evolves according to two complementary mechanisms: directional and original telos. We shall first consider the directional tendency of the self process, which accounts for "the maintenance of order", while the latter is responsible for "the mechanisms for change". Behavior as a general pattern of action is shaped, consciously or not, by the pursuit of an ideal type. How a certain end is attained is not predetermined, there being many possible ways of actualizing an ideal type. Let us draw an example from the film, one which illustrates two different, indeed opposite ways of finding an embodiment of what is general in its functioning, in this case it is the same telic directionality, the same structuring concept of an ideal accidental tourist.

After the packing scene, we observe Macon settling himself in his seat on the plane. Directly he is gently though firmly addressed by his neighbor, who unabashedly insists on sharing the joy of having spotted who he thinks to be a fellow reader and devotee of the manual for frequent and unwilling travelers. There is irony in this encounter, since Macon is so visibly engrossed and shielded behind the recommended serious-looking book, which is to serve as a compact, solid barrier against precisely that kind of unwanted intromission. Lucas Loomis, the fat, merry businessman breaks out into exultant admiration, when he learns from his overtly uncooperative seatmate, that destiny has placed him right next to his "hero", the author of the guide which he imperfectly tries to emulate. This episode shows two alternative manners of accomplishing the same purpose; although both men act by following one and the same final cause, each aims at fulfilling it in his own way, according to his imagination.

The final cause is to become the perfectly aloof, problem-free plane traveler; this is described in the guide that one of them wrote and which the other confesses to read

⁴⁸ For a detailed discussion of the I-you-me model proposed by Wiley see Andacht & Michel 2005.

and to follow blissfully. Notwithstanding its brevity, this unexpected encounter is uncomfortable enough for a genuine accidental tourist, someone who follows closely the advice for *not* getting in touch with strangers. It is hard not to miss the paradoxical nature of such a goal, when, by definition, the destination of a traveler is a place where almost everyone is a stranger. There is an amused comment from Macon's neighbor about how on that occasion the book-shield against otherness did not work. The remark brings the barest hint of a smile to the author's bland face, while the rest of his body appears to endure bravely and quietly the invasion of his privacy on board. Despite the overt difference between the gestures and attitudes of both men in the same situation, both pursue a common, general self-protective goal, as the businessman gleefully tells the author, as he enumerates the items of his own accidental tourist kit. Thus we witness the non-linear emergence of signification of a single concept. Let us now consider the opposite though complementary tendency, which is also a vital part of the self process, namely, telic originality.

The first step for the emergence of new meaning tendencies comes about as a side effect of directional teleology: it appears as a "noise, an error or an accident" (Alexander 2002). During Macon's organizing of his suitcase, we saw him smuggling the kind of object which that ritual and its talismans were supposed to preserve. There occurred a mild but still perceptible discrepancy between the gentle sounding voice-over which warns about the risks of doing precisely what the protagonist was about to do, namely, taking along something precious, irrecoverable. Be that minor transgression or the comic incident on the plane, these are slight departures from pure telic directionality. They are the seeds of new beginnings, which may or may not be then fully actualized, and thus become new meaning tendencies of the self.

Identity crisis: a motive for divorce

The principal motive for Sarah's decision to leave her husband has to do with an identity crisis. She believes that she is not being herself any longer and that she has unwillingly taken up her husband's family identity. She alleges that she has become a Leary, on account of her shunning any new social contact. Undoubtedly, the most salient identity Leary feature is to remain unconcerned, detached, affectively uninvolved with others, no matter what the circumstances may be. This trait is most evident in Macon's family of origin; it determines a pattern of behavior which the protagonist describes later on as the "Leary groove". Sarah tries to overcome that fear by separating from her husband.

Her attitude is a clear illustration of identity's semiotic nature. It is how someone understands his or her self that constitutes the limits between self and otherness. Sarah's discourse expresses her anguish at an uncanny threat of semiotic fusion. She finds it difficult to distinguish her self from that of her husband, and thus tries to find a way out by putting a physical distance between them. This example shows how otherness is not a matter involving only or essentially the co-presence of two distinct bodies, but an interpretive issue. It is possible to live a dyadic relation as part of the inner world. Peirce's semiotic theory defines alterity as the experience of resistance (see Study 3). This sense of otherness seems to have been mitigated in this fictional but verisimilar couple due to too many years of ritualized shared behaviors.

Kasdan's film serves to illustrate the argument that new meaning tendencies in the process of self-interpretation can only emerge as a product of the encounter with otherness, through the experience of resistance. This construal of encounter is akin to Moreno's, insofar as it concerns a union of two that involves openness to novelty.

Dualism vs. synechism in life's teleology

If we are to consider the entire film, there is the portrayal of a man who faces the dilemma of two divergent identity tendencies. At this life crossroad, he is progressively led to the mixed blessing of being capable of choosing: one path or tendency appears as a very conservative orientation, while the other seems to be innovative. Notwithstanding the centrality of Macon in the film's plot, his narrative function is to be but one embodiment of the endless conflict between repetition and novelty, which is shared by all the other characters with different degrees of intensity. His is a paradigmatic case of the clash between the innovation and conservation of identity tendencies. Our aim is to analyze the film as the iconic representation of the clash between both tendencies in the self's life-long development. The initial dualistic opposition is overcome as the working through brought about by mourning determines the integration of both tendencies, the sheer predictability of one, and the disturbing, accidental emergence of the new. Half a century before this filmed story, in an essay called 'The History of Eternity' (I: 363), Borges wrote that "the preservation of this world is a perpetual creation and [...] the verbs to preserve and to create, so inimical here, are synonyms in Heaven". In a less hallowed realm such as Peirce's semiotic theory this seems also to be the case.

The film depicts repetition as the pure, absolutely directional tendency materialized in the image of an accidental tourist who must half-heartedly trespass the

familiar and go into alien territories, while trying to sustain the illusion that s/he remains snugly in the warm hug of his living-room armchair, at home. In a similar way, Macon tries hard and almost succeeds, to foster the delusion of his ever unchanging self, a kind of perfect snapshot which changes ever so little, barely enough to enable its onlooker to sustain the belief in normal changes that change nothing in normal life.

On the other hand, there is a character that is a metaphor of the unexpected irruption of all that uncontrollably irrupts in the course of life, surprising even chaotic events amidst our normal, predictable on-goings. The accident, the occurrence of what was not or could not be anticipated, is represented by a restless, temperamental pet called Edward, who runs across Macon's way and makes him to stumble, fall and break a leg.

During its initial scenes, the film enacts this dualistic view of identity development. Regularity and chance are opposed as two irreconcilable concepts. According to Peirce's anti-Cartesian method (Santaella, 2004b), such a view is wholly opposed to his synechistic doctrine of logical continuity. Dualism conceives the two tendencies as unrelated to each other.

With such a dualistic frame of mind, after his child's death, his wife's departure, and his accidental fall, Macon decides to take further measures in order to protect himself from the unexpected, from other eventual accidents, in a futile effort to return and stay in the well known territory of the entirely predictable, and what a better haven than his parental home, the Leary groove itself. There, with the relentless energy of a one-track minded caretaker of the past, a talent honed year after year, his spinster, elder sister has taken up a bizarre maternal role, so as to continue taking care of her two already grown up, bachelor brothers, as if they were forever helpless youngsters.

To be conservative does not seem too difficult for somebody who has received as his heirloom a lesson of maximum self security. This condition is to be achieved by means of an obsessively meticulous handling of objects, timetables, itineraries and people. These props to preserve oneself against the encroachment of otherness are so unyielding as the absurd, stranger-proof rules of the card games which are enjoyed regularly by his elder siblings in the old family home. If a parlor game is anything it is conventional, namely, a rule-like interpretation that can be understood by others, which is a public property; their barren attempt to bar strangers, is just one more evidence of the futility of the attempt to keep change off the premises. In teleological terms, the relevant distinction to account for the self-identity of the protagonist is that between the

blind determination of efficient causation that accidental events and the working of final causation, namely, the self as an end-directed interpretation of those events. Based on those hard facts, it is still final causation which enables human beings to participate in the weaving of a thread made up of an evolving balance between meaning change and of meaning stability, the two inseparable strands of the self of the fallible, interpretative creatures which are human beings.

Final causation is what drives human purpose towards the accomplishment of some ideal type, for example, the accidental tourist which is depicted in the guide series that bears that title. In this case, the directional telos is pure regularity that aims at the preservation of an invariable ideal type. For Macon, it is his desire to maintain a perfectly stable identity, that of a detached, extremely well organized person, one who, ideally, should remain unaffected by any outward clash, like the horrible loss he and his wife have recently endured. This is the main aim of any accidental tourist who relentlessly tries to become immune to any surprise, because that is the good life for a paradoxical traveler who spurns the unknown, and who abhors the irruption of novelty in any of its manifestations. It is this uncanny bias towards absolute regularity which the film presents in its first half.

A zoom of one of the walls of the Leary's house shows some of the family photographs of childhood. Then we see the rhythmic reassuring gesture of a feminine hand buttering a warm baked potato. The voice-over that goes on reading passages from the guide book is heard once again accompanied by the already familiar musical cadence: "there is something elementary comforting about the moment when a plane touches again its own airport; even the most impersonal terminal seems as welcoming as an ancestral family home."

Telic originality

As described above, the uncontrollable, the unforeseeable, is represented at the beginning of the film by the disorderly behavior of the dog named Edward. Apart from illustrating the communicational noise in relation to his purpose of maintaining order, the animal's disruptive presence also stands for the continuity of the affective bond with the lost child. We interpret the dog as a metaphor of the young boy's impulsive liveliness, and an image of the resistance to Macon's will of accomplishing the deadly stillness of a totally conservative goal.

Alexander (2002) states that "terms such as accidental, fortuitous, secondary

effect (in terms of teleology) do not refer to that which is not caused, but to what is unplanned, unintentional". It seems that for Macon, to give up the bond with his late son by getting rid of the uncomfortable pet is a threshold he cannot infringe. That unruly creature is an illustration of the powerful, indomitable life of signs, whose purpose is to transmit the determination of an object and thereby some sort of unyielding resistance to our arbitrary will. In this particular case, what is involved is the obstinate negative against the mirage of an ever unchanging, perfect life. The self as a sign can never renounce completely to the semiotic oxygen of otherness. Macon's attempt to isolate and thus protect himself in the traditional family home is violently disrupted by the dog's perplexing new aggressive behavior; he starts to bite people. Even though Macon tries to avoid all possible communication with the external world by even refusing to answer the phone, the unexpected still manages to slip inside this fortress and take him by surprise. The disorderly, emotional pet at last succeeds in making itself noticeable, and in a non-rational way, Edward guides its owner in his quest for a dog trainer into an accidental encounter, where the former gets far more than he had bargained for.

The term 'noise' is used by Alexander (2002) in her analysis to describe secondary effects in relation to the principal function of teleological systems. Universal laws guide the systems according to the functional relation of a whole and its parts. This kind of organization accounts for the phenomena of self-organized systems known as teleological directionality. In relation to Macon's vital directionality, his act of keeping the inherited pet is a form of transgression, namely, the smuggling of a communicational noise which is disregarded by Macon himself as an interpreter. To attain the perfect order of life's luggage, this awkward being does not fit; it fulfills no function, such as it is the case with the stain-remover, the grey suit, or the single, heavy-looking book which shields its owner from encroaching others. This gesture evokes the first flaw we watched in the opening scene of film. There was a dissonance between the inexorable law that prescribed the faultless act of preparing an admirably organized suitcase and the illegitimate introduction of the cherished picture of his dead son among the clothes.

The young woman who greets them at the pet nursery tries tenaciously and unsuccessfully to grab the attention of the customer who has entered with a bewildered dog; but the man looks absolutely concentrated, vacantly absorbed in his own thoughts and problems. In relation to Macon's self-contained aloofness, the woman is the perfect iconic representation of maximum otherness. Her loud, harsh colorfulness contrasts ever

so sharply with his grey, unobtrusive refined elegance. Their different outlooks is expressed by their divergent clothing styles. This clash of perspectives will unfold as their most unlikely interaction evolves into an apparently impossible encounter. If we were to search for a technical term from semiotic theory with which to associate Muriel's comic irruption in Macon's calm life, it would be the dynamic object: the real which demands to be somehow expressed by a sign, in order to generate an interpretation, is precisely the role of that determined woman. The real being what it is beyond anyone's opinion is a concise way of describing Muriel's tireless attacks against the growingly weak barrier that Macon has put up during his entire life, against others, resistance is all, and from it grows change and more life-giving complexity.

After having ignored many times Macon's stubborn reticence to establish any form of dialogue with her beyond the arrangements for the dog's accommodation, Muriel refers confidently to their next encounter. With an easygoing attitude, as if she were responding to a shyly unexpressed request from the man, she boldly states as a matter of fact that when he returns to pick up the dog, they would surely be able to enjoy a longer exchange. Immediately, while looking firmly into his eyes, she adds reassuringly that those words imply a promise. During the entire conversation, Muriel has remained firm and not once has she let herself be intimidated by Macon's heroic, steady attempts to ignore her. She also remained attentive enough as to spot a crucial word in his demand for training to which she answered affirmatively and added: "if you are desperate". The indefatigable insistence of Muriel, some encounters later, would end up by Macon's involuntarily letting his unpolluted image be contaminated with some spots of otherness: as he bends over to sign the formal contract for dog training, the camera shows his solemn unaware gesture holding a pen ornamented with a colorful hairy dog puppet's head. Still, this stain is only accidental for the time being. What characterizes Macon's identity at this moment is his stereotyped conservative role, and he holds firmly to that image, one which portrays an orderly, self-restrained person. At the beginning of the film the role distribution is clear and complementary, he leaves Muriel completely in charge of assuming his dead son's role, that of the affectionate lively person who can take care of the disorderly and vital aspects of his existence. With professional self-confidence the newly met lady takes total care of the energetic presence of the dog Edward.

In that way, a dynamic of role complementarity (Moreno, 1959/1975, p. 8) is staged between these two film protagonists. One of the characters, Macon, assumes the

representation of order, of lawfulness in behavior at a maximum degree, the absence of spontaneity, everything is planned and predictable in his life. The other two (dog and trainer), assume the incarnation of a somehow chaotic liveliness. The opposition of law and chaos is just a schematic illustration of because in Peirce's view of teleology, law and spontaneity are not pure characteristic of life: "The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, (...) the nothingness of which consists is the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and the absence of all spontaneity. Between this, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit" (CP 8. 317).

Combined functioning of chance and law: spontaneous emergence of a new order

As stated above, Peircean teleology assumes the combined action of law and spontaneity. In order to apply this teleology to the understanding of meaning tendencies in human developmental process of identity we are here proposing as example of the working of (quase) pure legality the image of the "Leary's groove" and, as icons of (quase) pure spontaneity, the caotic dog Edward and the caotic woman recently met by Macon, Muriel Pritchett. But spontaneous change, depends on the cooperation between fortuitous events and universal tendencies to generate tendencies what produces the emergence of a new order. Universal legality includes chance as part of its ontology. This opens up the possibility of spontaneous production of phenomena which is not provided by the law. The possibility of creativity does not depend only on chance occurrences, but on spontaneity which is based on the natural generation of new purposive tendencies. That is why spontaneity is the "germ" (CP 8.317) of a new order. The generation of a new order is a case of extrinsic emergence according to Alexander (2002), that is, a phenomom is identified as emergent by an observer outside the system (see Ali, Zimmer & Elstob, 1998). The spontaneous emergence of new laws or regularities, requires the interaction of two systems. What emerges in an unpredictable way is interpreted as just being noise in relation to the directional telos of the conservative legality. In order for a chance occurrence to develop into a new regularity it requires to be interpreted as useful for a different purpose. In other words it must be interpreted as useful in relation to a different final cause. That is why it is necessary a second perspective to interpret as functional what emerged as noise or "secondary

effect” (Alexander, 2002)

Andacht (2000) proposes that in the semiosis of identity, the other is an interpretant of the self. This conception is useful to understand Macon’s self-interpretation process in relational terms, taking the two feminine characters, that of his wife Sarah, and that of his new acquaintance Muriel as two interpretants of Macon’s self. It is also compatible with the sociometric notion of role complementarity.

After some time, Macon’s wife realizes she has second feelings about her divorce wish, and decides to return to her husband. As she re-settles in their old shared home, she goes back to her old routine of making critical comments about Macon’s meticulous behavior. Nevertheless, she is unable to perceive some modifications in Macon’s ways after he had met Muriel, who, on account of her insistence, has obtained some signs of recognition from the otherwise closed up character. But Sarah interpretative habits remain loyal to the old legality, and she acts accordingly. In a repetitive, almost mechanical way, she observes, and amplifies, those minimal gestures that can be interpreted according to the old pattern: “Macon, the problem with you is...”. On the other hand, she considers as noise every act that diverges from Macon’s old identity regularity which is starting to loosen up: “what’s the matter? Are you all right? You used to be so finicky!”

It is interesting that Macon notices his own change as he realizes that he does not recognize his self in Sarah’s comments. The gestures of his body express his resistance to accept those interpretations as well as the qualification of her comments as the summary of all that’s wrong about marriage. The meaning of something so personal as our self, is not to be discovered by gazing into a physically internal place within the body, it is precisely in interaction with others, who are also signs, that we discover our selves as part of a wide “semiotic web” (Colapietro, 1989, p.28). In that universe, meaning is perceived, observed, and it is impossible for us to attribute it or perceive out of will. The range of each sign – its *purport* (CP 5.429), – becomes manifest through its capacity to generate an interpretant of itself, independent of the will of the interpreter, and this evolution follows an autonomous tendency. Even though Macon does not intentionally want to become a different person, at least at the first part of the film, he observes some signs of change. He discovers that meaning as he encounters others who allow for him to interpret his own identity reflexively. The human relations depicted in the film show that our interpretive capacity is related to our disposition to understand and, eventually, to accept something that is independent of our intentional.

The question that needs to be answer now is the following: Are we passive receptors of external meaning? Is autonomy an ontological aspect of human condition?

Union and diversity: the other as a surprise

Since the self is a sign that evolves in an intersubjective way, the second question will be answered in a positive way once we conceive repetition and change as interpersonal issues. Directional meaning tendencies are necessary for meaning, but no autonomy can emerge from pure regularity. Autonomy depends on spontaneous emergence of behavior that is not expected according to a specific directional telos. Let us remember that spontaneous emergence is considered fortuitous not in the sense that it was not caused but because it is unintentional since it does not contribute to the final cause at work. Telic originality requires of an observer external in relation to the previous systemic purpose. In semiotic terms, externality is defined by the notion of resistance. What characterized a dyadic interaction is the experience of an effort and a resistance which are explained by the phenomenological category of Secondness. Thus, in human relations the encounter of two is manifested through such a sensation.

In the film, it is Julian, a secondary character young editor of Macon's books the one who furnishes the most detailed definition of the encounter with otherness. When he after some serious efforts succeeds to marry Macon's sister who accepts to leave her childhood house, the character as he describes his own encounter in the following way: "I like the surprise in her, I am even surprised of myself when I am with her, I am not exactly the person I thought I was. It is surprising how two separate lives can be united, two differences".

It seems worthwhile to revise the phaneroscopic category of Secondness in relation to the emergence of self-consciousness during human development. The first thing that an infant perceives when it comes to the world is not his own self, but everything around him, a universe which is confused, not distinguished from his own self. The self is not perceived until the experience of error reveals it. Peirce (CP 5.233), writes about a child who hears people around him affirm that a stove is hot. Still, the child chooses to think that it is not. The moment the child gets into physical contact with the stove and feels the heat in it, not only his mistake becomes evident. At the same time error manifests the existence of his own self. The self emerges as a logical inference, as a logical space where error can inhere. The child's mind could think that the stove is cold, until the stove manifests its alterity by "forcing its way to recognition as something other than the mind's creation" (CP 1325). At that moment not only the

otherness of the stove becomes evident, but also the self.

It is not very different the way Macon comes to perceive the change in his own self. Like the resistant undeniable existence of an ardent stove, the persistent manifestation of Muriel's peppery presence offers the accidental tourist no truce. The young lady insists in making herself be noted, just by manifesting her perseverant existence as she continues to talk to him about trivial matters. Like the child, Macon experiences, the simultaneous encounter with total otherness, represented by Muriel's fresh, unconventional ways, so different to his own, and with his own surprising reaction to it. In fact, Macon is starting to show some involuntary signs of amusement, timid smiles with eyebrow rising gestures, which denounce the pleasure that some of her minor eccentric transgressions cause on him. The experience of a dyadic relation is characterized by a simultaneous manifestation of the two related elements, since "we become aware of our self in becoming aware of the not-self. It is a double sided consciousness" (CP 1.324). .

When we see Macon getting ready to accept a dinner invitation at Muriel's house, we are inclined to think that he is willing to go along with the budding aspect of his self. Nevertheless, as we see him drive towards the meeting place with the old type of somber expression something seems to foreshadow another scene of self-restrained aloofness. The prediction is confirmed when the man stands at the doorway in front of a closed door and bends over to slide underneath it a short note expressing his decision to turn down the invitation. Regularity is the characteristic of conservative tendencies, of directional telos. The emergent different pattern of behavior is still seen as noise in relation to hegemonic patterns which he has followed during his whole life and which he has interpreted as one of his most cherished distinctive psychological traces. To a film viewer who arrived late and missed the understanding of the strength of the life-long conservative tendencies of Macon's identity, this behavior would be incomprehensible because a few moments before the screen showed two persons walking along visibly engrossed enjoying each other's company. The identity of an unemotional, firm and stable kind of person has been solidly established since childhood when Macon had learnt the reassuring feeling of following the comfort of the Leary's groove. The loss of the son and his wife's reaction to it, lead Macon to hold strongly to such a final cause by preserving the rigidity of his behavior and the strong predominance of only one particular identity, one which is described in the film as that of an accidental tourist.

Nevertheless, there are also signs that are contrary to that pattern, signs of his enjoying the relationship and especially her interpreting some of his acts as signs of his predisposition to affective concern. This kind of identity is divergent to the understanding of his routines as the sign of a detached, dull kind of person. Thus, in the two relations depicted in the film, the two tendencies are illustrated: directional telos is hegemonic in the relation with Sarah, and original telos in the relation with Muriel.

In terms of a discussion of teleology, what the next scene will exemplify is the crossroad of two identity tendencies. First, one identity, that of an unconcerned kind of person was taken as the unique reality of the self. Due to the father's contained personality all feelings of affection had been very tightly associated with his lively teenager son. So, after his death, all tenderness was interpreted as being gone with the beloved kid. In terms of Moreno's role theory, traumatic events can generate a stereotyped role distribution. In this case, it is possible to project the contained sensitive aspects in another person who plays a complementary role. The boy's mother, for instance, assumed the role of the grieving person and favored the repetition of the fixed role dynamic by projecting, in turn, on Macon her own aspects of detachment as she discovers a tendency to social isolation, expressed by her fear of becoming, herself, a Leary.

During the first scenes, Macon seemed willing to follow the law-like order of the Leary's identity pattern. Fortunately, according to Peirce's teleology, the functioning of legality is not totally uniform; there is law and also facts that do not adjust completely to that law (Santaella, 2002, p. 99). Thus, the audience witnesses now and then some incomprehensible acts that do not abide by Macon's dominant rule of behavior, as the one that follows. First, our protagonist decides to stop seeing Muriel and writes a note rejecting a dinner invitation; a behavior totally understandable in relation to the Leary's identity pattern. But immediately he becomes the messenger of his own note, a behavior that is clearly a transgression. Why didn't he keep the safe customary physical distance this time? The scene of the delivery of the message becomes a decisive moment in the emergence of a new order in Macon's self process.

Spontaneity and the establishment of a new principle of generalization

The first stage of telic originality is the spontaneous occurrence of facts that diverge from social or natural legality. The fact that Macon's body directs itself to Muriel's doorway in order to refuse her invitation can be seen as a transgression to the

law of self-restrain. In relation to that law it is an instance of communicational noise illustrated by the literal noise of a piece of paper sliding under a closed door at an inappropriate time for a dinner meeting. Muriel wakes up alarmed to stop a supposed burglar from breaking in, something probable at that time of the night in her working class neighborhood. Macon feels compelled to reveal his identity and explain his presence there.

The second stage involves the re-signification of those acts that are deviant from the norm. For that to take place it is necessary an external observer that interprets that noise as functional in relation to a new objective or final cause. To exemplify this second stage of external emergence we have chosen a scene in which Macon, the involuntary visitor, tries to explain why he does not feel able to accept the dinner invitation. Again, the reasons given follow the legality of an aloof identity. Standing rigidly at the doorway, with his eyes slightly oblique so as to avoid Muriel's frontal gaze, the man awkwardly does his best to convey his social inhibition strengthened after his son's untimely death. The nature of the discourse is, paradoxically, a kind of self-disclosure which, although unnoticed by Macon, leads him to establish the contact he is trying to avoid. The speech prepared as an excuse for turning down the invitation ends up by deviating its directionality partly on account of Muriel's timely reaction. Macon's words have a conservative aim, but there is an unexpected spontaneous alteration of it, as he starts to reveal the truth of a severely affected self-image, one which was hurt by the painful loss and depressed by the impotence to overcome it. This scene is an illustration of spontaneity both in Peirce's and Moreno's sense. Spontaneity, as a life principle constrained by a law that, this time, allowed for a crucial slight deviation which is bound to become a new regularity. Spontaneity as the adequate response to that new emergence is illustrated by Muriel's timely reaction. In semiotic terms, Muriel's gesture that we will describe next, is basically an indexical interpretant, it is the bodily reaction instead of a brainy answer to Macon's argumentative effort. To use the words of Gena Davis, the actress that played the role of Muriel,⁴⁹ this scene is one of the most intense of the whole film to a large extent because at that moment: "Muriel stops talking and does exactly the right thing".

Macon continues to furnish explanations in predominantly symbolic terms. Still, she faces him so attentive that she does not miss a sign, not even those which are

⁴⁹ Transcript from the DVD version of the film (The accidental Tourist, Warner Brothers 2004)

deviant from the hegemonic objective; she perceives the iconic quality of his breaking voice and the indexical evidence of a body that does not leave the meeting place. The interpretant is the gesture of a feminine hand that gently grabs a motionless arm and slowly drives the person next to it across the doorway and into the house. Her hand is a sign of a resistance to Macon's will to dissimulate with symbols the factual evidence of his physical presence in that place. Finally, it becomes impossible for Macon not to perceive the outburst of signs of change within his self.

This kind of self discovery becomes explicit in the film's following scene through another interpretant, this time Macon's own behavior, at a fashionable store where he is waiting for Muriel's teenager son to try on some jeans. Obviously, Macon is starting to like the refreshing atmosphere of it all. Thus, his presently enhanced self-awareness leads him with content to a mirror where he timidly explores the external look of his emerging identity as he tries on a picturesque cowboy hat. We witness the need for an external reflection of the self in search for a further evidence of change. There is a sort of handicraft artisan-like work on his self-image which manifests that the self is as an embodied concept. In a symmetrical position to the child in the dressing room, the man is engrossed in the trial of his new identity when he is noticed by an old acquaintance, the mother of his late son's classmate. With haste, this well-behaved man, tries to pretend awkwardly the hat has never been on his head and clumsily attempts to recover his customary ways and carry out a normal salutation ceremony with the lady who was used to conceive of him as a formal conventional person.

In this accidental way, with the protagonist facing two identity ideal types to orient his self-image, we arrive to the third stage of telic originality: the establishment of a new legality. The importance of this final step relates to the role played by free will or intentionality as defined by Alexander (2002) which is required to account for human autonomy:

The same kinds of self-organizing processes that constrain and direct forms in nature give a person an identity or a tendency. As nature discovers new functions by chance (re)interpretations of structures, which previously existed for other or no purposes, people can also usefully interpret their environments in a subjective, or we might say, an indeterminate, manner. This means that the future is undecided, and humans have freewill.

As the narrative illustrates the representation of two divergent identity tendencies, the real possibility of choice starts to open up for the protagonist to choose

the kind of person he wants to become. Each of them is represented by a feminine character. After the scene of the encounter with Muriel it seems that Macon has finally decided to open up. Nevertheless, there is a fast drawback. Again, the regular functioning of directional telos shows its strong persuasive power and guides Macon back to routines and to the marital home to which Sarah has already returned to reestablish the normal legitimate relationship. The Leary's groove represents the security of traditions. This conservative drive is illustrated in the film by the ordering tendencies expressed in the perfect ritual organization of the business suitcase trying to avoid every encounter with surprising others who could demand a change of clothing or eating mores.

As usual, Macon sets off to Paris for what is going to be his last trip as an accidental tourist. At the same time, Muriel, following her own identity telos, that of a lively impulsive film character, takes the same plane to the same hotel determined to resist Macon's tentative to convince her that he is unable to cope with the relation he is so obviously enjoying. But, when she knocks at his hotel noiseless room door we see Macon silently listening to her patient question expressed to the vacuum: "Macon when will you change?" Some minutes later, we will see Sarah, the legitimate wife trying to reestablish her menaced marital routine express a similar desire: "Macon, you never take steps!"

The next scene is the illustration of the spontaneous emergence of original telos and also an example of "taking steps", the expression of autonomy. The main consequence of Peirce's teleology supported by an ontology that includes accidental facts not predictable by law, is that it is feasible to account for free choice. But, in order to take steps an individual must act intentionally. Autonomy cannot be explained only by directionality. This kind of conceptualization does not suppose a telos that follows a pre-determined end but an evolutive teleology (see Colapietro 1989: 77).

In the final scene, there is a close-up on the same suitcase with which the film started, but this time it is ready to deviate from its established route. Macon provides a clear definition of spontaneity which closes the film in an optimistic way. It expresses his decision to, for the first time in his life, take steps. While Sarah argues to defend the values of tradition, of things that just feel right only because they have been maintained along time, Macon starts to take steps in another direction and consolidate what is to become a new tradition. It is only at the end of the plot that the protagonist embraces the purpose of definitely leaving the Leary's groove. As he explains to Sarah,

to take a step does not only include to act differently, it involves establishing new patterns by adopting new final causes, new ideas to regulate behavior. In his case he stresses his decision not only to leave the Leary's groove, but to stay out of it. He seems to totally agree with the definition of spontaneity behavior which requires that fortuitous events develop into new regularities, "to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits" (CP 6.63). Otherness manifests itself sometimes as a delightful surprise, sometimes as an insistent opposition, at times as an relentless presence, since it is a manifestation of alterity. Without it there is no hope for evolution⁵⁰ or novelty, of "human intentionality [conceived as] behaving in a directed but free manner" (Alexander, 2002). In an almost hyperbolic fashion, one which is perfectly consonant with Peirce's valuation of self-control, Colapietro (1989, p. 110) argues in favor of positing autonomy as the essence of human deliberate behavior. But such an attribute covers a much broader realm, that of the psychic or generalized mind, which is synonymous of the operation of final causality in the universe:

So central is self-control or autonomy to human consciousness as such, i.e., as a rational mind, that Peirce wrote: 'if we could endow a system of signs with self-control, there is a very strong reason to believe that we should thereby have conferred upon it a consciousness even more like that of a man than is, for example, that of a fish' (MS 283, p. 99 in Colapietro 1989, p. 110)

Moreno took pains to point out spontaneity is neither erratic behavior, nor mere transgressions. Autonomy depends on the adoption of ideals of identity to be actualized in every interpretation of our own behavior in relation to others and change is part of that process. According to Peirce evolution is only possible unless we consider chance the seed of new regularities. The conscious adoption of ideals is not something immaterial, separate from experience but totally on the contrary very deeply enmeshed within it. That is why Peirce's teleology is not distant from Moreno's conception of spontaneity as an "adequate response to a new situation" (Moreno 1959/1975, p. 137). The term adequate implies a purposive behavior since something is adequate or inadequate in relation to some goal or final cause.

In a similar way as our protagonist did:

(...) a man will from time to time review his ideals. This process is not a job that a man sits down to do and has done with. The experience of life is continually

⁵⁰ "The idea of other, of *not*, becomes a very pivot of thought. To this element I give the name of Secondness." (CP 1.325, emphasis in the original)

contributing instances more or less illuminative. These are digested first, not in the man's consciousness, but in the depths of his reasonable being. The results come to consciousness later. But meditation seems to agitate a mass of tendencies and allow them more quickly to settle down so as to be really more conformed to what is fit for the man. (CP 1.599)

Conclusions

As Macon approaches the final scene and the outset of his autonomous decision he comes to a very wise conclusion that can help us to close this paper. His words highlight the fact that our life is a life of signs and our way of being is that of an incarnate consciousness. It is in that sense that we are signs and as such we can only grow in meaning as we develop “enmeshed in the semiotic web” (Colapietro). The human self is an autonomous agent who has free choice, but this choice cannot be a free one unless we conceive of identity in continuous dialogue with otherness. When he discovered the therapeutic powers of drama, (1946/1978) realized that the self emerges from our role relations and evolves when we encounter others, because it is then that we are able to see each other also in those aspects that include a difference.⁵¹ In this sense the “other as an interpretant” (Andacht 2000) becomes an essential aspect of personal identity development.

The possibility of meaning growth depends on the encounter of two perspectives. The co-presence of two members of a dyad implies necessarily the manifestation of alterity through a certain amount of resistance. A dialogical relation includes this kind of physical or material (indexical) type of encounter. In order for new meanings to emerge it is not enough that two persons carry out a discourse which takes place in the realm of generality. The particularity which characterizes the embodied experience is necessary for some external element to impose itself on what functions in a regular way. Peirce's dialogism is inherent to the action of the sign, because the sign process is relevant to understand communicative interactivity (Santaella, 2004a, p. 131-132), which, in turn, can be applied to psychology to escape the circularity of a kind of discourse condemned to self-delusion. On the one hand, the directionality of interpretive tendencies requires understanding particular events according to a principle of generalization. This involves disregarding the accidental imperfections. Without the attentive observation of Muriel from a position which is external to the customary

⁵¹ see Moreno's poem Definition of The Encounter in *Einladung zu einer Begegnung*, Vienna, 1914

directionality of Macon self-conception, he would have been unable to perceive his own signs, which were the evidence of his demand for help. The signs of a change in his habitual way of acting and of being were not perceived by introspection. Macon was only able to see the change when he understood Muriel's gesture of physical approximation as an interpretant of his own self. The physical condition of resistance is materialized in the fact of Muriel becoming an interpretant on account of her remaining in her position.

For Colapietro (1989, p. 111) the decisive issue is whether we can speak of the existence of "autonomous interpreters, agents *who* (rather than *which*) can engage in acts of self-interpretation, self-criticism, and self-control. There is, in principle, no limit to these acts." Our argument is that human life embraces the possibility of acting and thinking in an autonomous way, and that this possibility relies on the conception of the self as part of the teleological functioning of the universe, which allows for the emergence of original telos. Still, we can only become autonomous interpreters if we can perceive our own signs through the interaction with real others.

The possibility of innovation in self-identity does not require to give up conservative tendencies (regularity) described here as telic directionality. Regularity of interpretive habits is necessary for meaningfulness. Telic originality is the upshot of an adequate balance between regularity and spontaneity. The notion of spontaneity does not refer to sudden, chance occurrences, but to the constitution of new regularities. The emergence of new regularities is purposive, and therefore not arbitrary.

The maintenance of the teleological balance depends on our dialogical encounter with otherness, both in the relation to external others and in our internal conversation. In other words, creativity and change in the development of identity are relational issues conceived in terms of semiotic processes as cases of external emergence.

If external emergence is reduced, the interpretative flow loses flexibility, and rigid interpretative habits prevail over original telos. As a consequence, a dynamical interpretant or particular identity tends to be repeated along time. With time, the prevalence of telic directionality would favor the phenomenon of one particular identity being interpreted as the unique reality of the self, blurring thus the teleological nature of the self process.

The result would be a reduction of the capacity of self-control. The re-establishment of autonomous agency, or, in other words of intentional activity, is related to the renewal of the dialogical development of the *self*. Human beings in isolation

would lose the possibility of free will or autonomy, because the directional telos would be totally predominant. What would become dominant is the automatic repetition of routines. The dialogue with others who can surprise us preserves the intersubjective evolution of our semiotic habits. In that process, others who function as interpretants of the self establish a potential limit to interpretive omnipotence. Through the dialogue with alterity, human beings incorporate diversity to the development of the self as a sign. Originality and consequentially human autonomy are only possible in truly dialogical communication with others and with our own self.

As it dawns in Paris, in the hotel room that they will no longer share, Macon tells the woman with whom he has shared so much that he is going to leave her. His explanation comes along with signs of care and affection. It is not on account of a lack of love that he is going to separate from her, he says, but because of a lack of otherness. Their marital crisis is due to an identity crises. That is why, gently, this dialogically/self-made protagonist explains that he has decided to continue his life with that “odd woman”, as he calls Muriel at that point: “I am beginning to think that is not so much how much we love someone, what really matters is the kind of person you can be when we are with that person”.

Our survival through spontaneity may only take place through the encounter with the unexpected, with those unrelenting differences which force us out of the road of our routines, and into the rough liveliness of newly discovered aspects of own selves. The coming upon others brings about an amount of strain, as the accidental tourist knows very well, because it always demands an openness to perspectives that are likely to be “odd”, if measured against our usual values and conceptions. Still, it is only through this openness that our own life can become innovative and creative, as Peirce (CP 6.301) states:

Everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic, while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the ideas.

Study 5

The Self in Expression, Perception and Action: Psychodramatic Method for Empirical Study of the Self

Abstract. Theoretical alternatives to the monological Cogito require the search for methods that may substitute introspection as a form of privileged access to self-knowledge. This paper explores the possibilities of J. L. Moreno's psychodramatic method as an instrument for the empirical study of the internal dialogue. The convergence of pragmatic semiotic and role theory is posited as a suitable, general theoretical frame. Nineteen undergraduate students of both sexes (20-23 years) participated in three psychodrama workshops. The instrument combines two techniques: Empty Chair and Multiple Aspects of the Self. The data was analyzed by applying Peirce's phenomenological categories. The results suggest that the convergence between semiotic and role theory is useful to study the self as semiotic agency, as an overarching evolving interpretive process that emerges from particular identities experienced as internal characters in dialogical interaction.

Key words: Semiotic self, internal dialogue, psychodramatic method.

Estudo 5

*O Self através da Expressão, da Percepção e da Ação:
O Método Psicodramático para o Estudo Empírico do Self*

Resumo: As alternativas teóricas ao Cogito monológico requerem da busca de métodos para substituir a introspecção como modo de acesso privilegiado ao autoconhecimento. Este trabalho explora as possibilidades do método psicodramático de J. L. Moreno para o estudo empírico do diálogo interno. Propõe-se a convergência entre a semiótica pragmática e a teoria de papéis como marco teórico geral. Participaram da pesquisa, dezenove estudantes universitários de ambos sexos, entre 20 e 25 anos. O instrumento combina duas técnicas psicodramáticas: a Cadeira Vazia e os Aspectos Diferentes do *Self*. Os dados foram analisados pela aplicação das categorias fenomenológicas de Peirce. Os resultados sugerem que a convergência entre a semiótica triádica e a teoria de papéis pode ser útil para estudar o self como uma capacidade semiótica, como um processo evolutivo interpretativo supraordenado que emerge das identidades particulares experimentadas como personagens internos em interação.

Palavras chave: *Self* semiótico, método psicodramático, identidades, personagens internos.

Introduction

Recently, psychological theories have shown growing interest in the study of the self. In the last years, communicational models, such as the dialogical self (Hermans and Kempen, 1993) and the semiotic self (Colapietro, 1989; Wiley, 1994) have gained prominence. The semiotic and dialogical perspectives are mutually compatible. An example of the integration of this convergence is the approach known as “semiotic dialogism” (see Leiman, 2002) based on Bahktin’s polyphonic self and Vygostky’s concept of semiotic mediation as well as on some concepts of Peirce’s semiotic. In a doctoral thesis dedicated to compare the semiotic and dialogical models of the self, DeSouza (2005) points out some relevant complementary aspects of both perspectives. On the one hand, Herman and Kempen’s model studies the multiplicity of voices that constitute the self in terms of dialogical positions. Their perspective captures the spatial dimension of the experience of a multivoiced self. On the other hand, the semiotic self model gives special attention to the communicative process in terms of its evolution as a time-bound phenomenon.

The main common assumption of semiotic and dialogical conceptions is that the self is the product of a process of communication. In spite of the centrality of this notion for contemporary theories, most research methods seem inadequate to capture the dynamic interactive dimension which is essential to understand all dialogical processes. Instead they focus on the spatial dimension of the self, and provide a static picture of the self at sequential static moments. For instance, the Personal Position Repertoire of Hermans (2001b) furnishes a useful instrument to observe the multiplicity of positions constitutive of the dialogue of selfhood, but does not include the study of their communicational interaction. Verhofstadt Deneve (2003) proposed the use of J. L. Moreno’s (1889-1974) social atom method. This method recurs to Moreno’s sociometric diagram of the roles that constitute a person’s identity matrix, but it is not designed to observe the dialogical interaction of internalized roles. It is difficult to find methods that give researchers an instrument to observe the self as it develops interactionally (see Salgado, 2004).

The present study proposes the use of Moreno’s psychodramatic method to facilitate the empirical observation of internal dialogue. Since psychodrama is an “action method” (Blatner 1995), it is suitable to study the communicative process. The kind of action fostered by this method is a dialogical interaction that is set in the as-if domain of the theatrical stage. This domain is transitional, in the sense proposed by

Winnicott (1951), an intermediate space that mediates between the external and internal realms and which allows the person to become completely engrossed in a dialogical activity and still be able to preserve the necessary cognitive distance. The latter is required in order to maintain the perspective needed for observation. In order to posit psychodrama for the study of the self as a dialogical (= interpretive) process, it is necessary to explore the compatibility of Peirce's developmental semiotic and the dialogical perspective on the one hand, and its compatibility with Moreno's sociometric role theory on the other.

One of the theoretical links between Peirce's pragmatic semiotic, dialogical theories of the self and Moreno's role theory can be found in G. H. Mead's symbolic interactionism. Mead work is based on the principles of pragmatism, the field founded by Peirce and is a source of influence for the dialogical self model. On the other hand, Mead and Moreno share the conception of the self as being the emergent of role interactions. In the introduction to his book *Psychodrama*, Moreno (1946/1978) states that he holds Mead to be an excellent theoretician on the concept of role. Their discrepancy, he clarifies, is due to Mead's excessive concentration on abstract conceptualization. Moreno considers that one advantage of his own sociometric perspective lies precisely on the fact that it "adds to the theory a methodological instrument for the observation of role processes, both in real life and in experimental situations" (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. ii). Moreno's psychodramatic method for observing role processes can be seen as the corollary of Mead's self theory. Moreno (1946/1978, p.i) also considers that the creation of the psychodramatic method has contributed to bring the sociological concept of role interaction to the field of psychological studies and psychopathology and thus to establish a bridge between psychiatry and sociology.

Through the creation of Psychodrama, Moreno proposes a method for the observation of the inner world that does not imply the withdrawal to an internal, isolated and artificial form of existence. This philosophical posture is akin to Peirce's theory which is inseparable from an anti-Cartesian method of knowledge (Santaella, 2004b). Such a critical stance is at the basis of most postmodern conceptions of the self that assume that it cannot be theoretically located in an internal space disconnected from the person's social environment. Once we leave behind the dualism of Cartesian *cogito*, the understanding of the self requires substituting introspection for methods we can describe as "extraspective" (Rychlak, 1973, p. 21). Just as psychodrama is a method for self-knowledge, which does not require the withdrawal to an insulated, artificial

observational abode, semiotic theory is an account of human meaning that does not assume a mental black box, cut off from human intersubjectivity. Peirce's study of semiosis involves external signs not only as the manifestation of mind, but also as the very building blocks of the whole universe. A further commonality of both theories is the assumption that the experience of an inner realm does not entail incommunicability.

According to Colapietro (1989), Peirce conceived of the inner world as a theatre, as a stage where "imaginary dramas with potential real consequences take place" (p.117). In turn, Wiley (1994) refers to the internal conversation as a process that takes place in an "internal forum" (p. 55), a phrase that is in consonance with Mead's own expression. The genesis of the self was described by Mead (1925) as the effect of the child's adopting the attitudes of others and thereby becoming an "object for himself" (p. 268). The self exists for the individual only insofar as s/he assumes the roles of others who interact with the self:

The presence in the conduct of the individual of the tendencies to act as others act may be, then, responsible for the appearance in the experience of the individual of a social object, i.e., an object answering to complex reactions of a number of individuals and also for the appearance of the *self*. Indeed, these two appearances are correlative. (Mead, 1925, p. 268)

Mead (1913) describes the process whereby the dramatic universe that characterizes childhood develops into an internal forum of the *self* in the following terms:

Later the inner stage changes into the forum and workshop of thought. The features and intonations of the *dramatis personae* fade out and the emphasis falls upon the meaning of the inner speech, the imagery becomes merely the barely necessary (p. 377)

A similar developmental account of the simultaneous consciousness of a social object and the self is developed by the founder of psychodrama. Moreno (1946/1978) emphasizes the fact that role is essentially an interpersonal notion, because each role together with the counter-role that is played by others serves as a functional unit defined as:

A unity of synthetic experience in which private, social and cultural elements are conjoined (...). Every psychodramatic session demonstrates that a role is an interpersonal experience, one which requires two or more individuals to be operationalized. (p. 253)

During the child's development, role functional units pre-exist the consciousness of self and other as separate entities. Both, self-consciousness as well as the notion of other, are the result of role interaction. At an early stage of development, the baby does not distinguish his self from others, since it acts in roles in relation to the roles of others who are not yet perceived as others. An example is that of the baby during the act of ingestion of the milk that it receives from the mother or some substitute. In Moreno (1959/1975, p.8), the developmental stages of identity focus on the child-parent relationship in terms of the connection of a role with its counterpart or "counter-role".

In those terms, Moreno (1946/1978) describes a developmental process whereby through role interaction the internal and external dimensions gradually emerge as distinct from the background of an undifferentiated "first universe" (pp. 117-119). The first stage of the process of distinction is the child's fixating his attention on the furthest part of what is a single act (ex. ingestion), and which is composed of two units. The child leaves unfocused the rest of the world, even his own *self*. Gradually, the child is able to take the role of the other, of the mother, that is, to "role-reverse". The final step of the developmental role process (see Bello, 1999, pp. 37-45) is reached when the child can role-reverse completely, that is, is able to role-reverse and interact with another person who has, in turn, role-reversed with the child. When the "breach" (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 119) between the inner world of fantasy and the outer world of external reality is established, "second universe", the child can start to play psychodramatic roles in the area of the as-if domain, which is akin to the play realm that has been described by Winnicott (1951) as a transitional space. The transitional space is relevant to establish the distinction of inner and outer reality, which, in turn, is an indicative of psychological sanity.

In Moreno's terminology, the dramatic nature of our inner world is accounted for by a psychodramatic theatre. It differs from the artistic theatre because it is a stage where psychodramatic roles are enacted. There is no script, no professional author who gives a detailed description of the roles of the characters. Instead, psychodramatic roles are "personifications of imaginary things" (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 120). The dramatic scenes are proposed by any person who, by means of such actions, becomes the protagonist of a psychodrama. The expression "psychodramatic roles" refers thus to what is traditionally known as the area of the mind that involves the body realm and that of external reality as well. The roles have three aspects, namely, psychosomatic, social and psychodramatic. The first refers to the feelings which are proper of the body, the

second to social interactions, and the third to the internalization of social roles. A child must have already reached the most developed phase, one which involves the clear differentiation between fantasy and reality, for him or her to be capable of enacting psychodramatic roles in the as-if domain.

One of the main assumptions of role theory, shared by Mead and Moreno is that the self does not precede but emerges as a product of human action in roles, through role-taking in relation to others. In a similar way, Peirce defines the self as a sign which is the logical, evolving upshot of the dyadic encounter of ego and non-ego. According to all three thinkers, the self is not a given but an emergent component of human interaction, one that is internal and external. The semiotic conception of the internal conversation includes the notion of roles to describe the participants of such a dialogue. Role theory also construes the inner world as an inner forum which Moreno calls psychodramatic theatre, and he proposes the expression psychodramatic roles to refer to the inner roles.

The dramatic conception is related to the assumption that thought is a sign process. In triadic semiotic, the meaning of a sign is to be found in other signs, thus all semiotic processes are dialogical. According to Santaella (2004a),

Peirce's dialogism implies that the sign be understood as a process, a continuous flow. This is the reason why language is not in us. We are in the movement of language, in its past, present and becoming. As we are in language, our individual ego is necessarily vague, with no definite contour. What gives unity to the individual is the sign that, in its turn, is social by nature. (p. 132).

In order to integrate a psychodramatic methodology with a semiotic analysis, we propose to apply Peirce's universal phenomenological categories of experience which are at the core of the notion of triadic sign, in order to understand the development of the self/sign in relationship with role theory as described above. Synthetically, the phenomenological categories were described by Santaella (1999a), thus:

quality or Firstness, that is, the being of positive qualitative possibility, for example, the mere possibility of quality in itself, let us say, redness, with no relation to anything else, before anything in the world is red. (1.2) Reaction or Secondness, that is, the action of actual fact, any event in its *hic et nunc*, its pure eventness, the fact in itself with no consideration of any causality or any law that might determine it, for example, a stone that falls from a mountain. (1.3). Mediation or Thirdness, the being of a law that will govern facts in the future

(CP 1.23), any general regulating principle that governs the occurrence of a real event, for instance, law of gravity governing the falling of the stone from the mountain. (p.81)

The self is, in semiotic terms, an evolving sign. The self as a sign is the product of the distinction between inner and outer world. This distinction is learned during the child's development and the organism plays an important role since "human self-consciousness is the achievement of an incarnate consciousness" (Colapietro 1989, p. 69), the product of the interaction of the child with otherness. Peirce states that "every sane person lives in a double world, the outer and the inner world, the world of percepts and the world of fancies" (CP 5487).

We propose to make a parallelism between the three phenomenological categories and Moreno's three dimensions of roles (psychosomatic, social and psychodramatic), which relate to the stages of the child's developmental process. The first stage of the development, the undifferentiated first universe, is an experience in which Firstness is predominant. Such a phase is characterized by pure qualities which are "unrelated to anything else" (Peirce), since Moreno's first universe lacks any kind of discrimination. The qualitative dimension prevails in what Mead described as the imagery of the dramatic characters that are staged in early childhood. This imagery is minimized as symbolic signs gain predominance in the adult's inner forum of thought. Still, there is a continuity in the process of development, so this imagery persists all life-long, in the iconic dimension of signs which corresponds to the category of Firstness.

The establishment of a breach between fantasy and reality can be analyzed as an experience in which Secondness is predominant. It is an experience characterized by particularity, one which occurs here and now. Human will leads to action over the world, and this involves necessarily a reaction: "we become aware of the self in becoming aware of the not-self, the waking state is a consciousness of reaction; as the consciousness itself is two-sided" (CP 1.324). The experience of binarity is explained by Peirce with an example of a role/counter-role unit in the following quotation:

Imagine two objects which are not merely thought as two, but of which something is true such that neither could be removed without destroying the fact supposed true of the other. Take, for example, a husband and wife. Here there is nothing but a real twoness; but it constitutes a reaction, in the sense that the husband makes the wife a wife in fact (not merely in some comparing thought); while the wife makes the husband a husband. (CP 2.84)

In role theory, the distinction between outer and inner realms is achieved by a child who is totally involved in action and interacts with persons who act in counter-roles. The notion of role is that of a functional two-termed unit. Mead posits the notion of “two correlative appearances” for the human development that of the other and that of the self. The establishment of a breach between fantasy and external reality leads to the constitution of a psychodramatic dimension which is a transitional space in terms of Winnicott (1951) and corresponds to the as-if domain of Moreno’s psychodramatic roles. While psychosomatic and social roles pertain to the area of the body and to the social domain, respectively, psychodramatic roles pertain to the area of the mind. The psychodramatic realm may be compared to that of the *self* in Wiley (1994), since Peirce’s conception of mind is that of law, of generalization. It is characterized by the prevalence of symbolic signs, which pertain to the category of Thirdness. Psychodramatic roles are conceived as the individual’s internalization of society. Interpersonal social roles become part of each person’s inner world on account of regularities. Wiley (1994, p.134-140) argues that in order to avoid any kind of reductionistic argument regarding the self, it is useful to use a metaphor that recognizes different symbolic levels. The level of the self is ignored in cases of downward reduction to biological or physico-chemical levels, as well as in cases of upwardly reducing the notion to the levels of interaction, social organization and culture. The conception of the self as a semiotic process avoids materialistic or abstract reductions.

Moreno’s disciple, the Argentinean psychiatrist and psychodramatist Bustos (2002) studied the development of the self and described three-basic role clusters, namely, maternal, paternal, and fraternal. During development in the family and early social environment, the role dynamic develops patterns of relations that favor the tendency of roles to function in a complementary way. Thus the notion of “complementary roles” (Moreno, 1959/1975, p. 8) helps us understand how different particular identities can emerge from adopting mutually interrelated perspectives. Regarding the development of identity, we must bear in mind that Moreno’s role-theory assumes that roles *precede* the self, that it is the self which emerges from role interaction, instead of it being the other way round (Moreno, 1946/1978,p.ii).⁵² We believe that the notions of role and counter-role brings out the element of Secondness because it denotes the encounter of two interacting persons, in the particularity of an

⁵² An interesting coincidence in this respect can be found in the work of biologist and maverick scientist Gregory Bateson (1972), when he introduces the notion that the relationship comes first, it precedes.

experience that occurs here and now. On the other hand, the notion of “complementary roles” involves an element of regularity which accounts for the constitution of an interpretive tendency, of a law which governs acts in the future.

The problems that disturb development are studied within this approach as role disturbances, related to the interpersonal aspect of ourselves. Bustos (2000) states that:

Whenever there is a situation of conflict during development this also starts from a role (...). This situation of conflict makes a role become fixed in its *modus operandi* to the complementary primary role, which I denominate the inner pathological complementary role. The stronger the conflict the greater the resulting handicap, and the larger the number of roles it would affect (p.39).

The example Bustos uses to illustrate this situation is the relationship of a very critical father with his son, who adopts the complementary role of a hypersensitive child (p.39). As time goes by, the child tends to behave in similar situations according to that complementary role dynamic. What causes the child to behave thus in front of others is not an intrinsic feature of this child, but the fact that during his development he had been enmeshed in a troubling complementary relationship. The conflicts in the role dynamics involve disturbances in the interpretive process, as stereotyped role functioning is associated to the misinterpretation of the behavior of others. For instance, in the situation presented above, whenever the son faces people who are in a similar authority relationship to him, he will tend to interpret rigidly that, for example, the teacher’s advice or a comment coming from the boss is that of an overcritical person, and he will tend to react as a hypersensitive person. The lasting effect of the interaction of stereotyped roles can be a confusion of such a role, and the identity related to it - in this case that of a hypersensitive person- with the self. This outcome can block the “spontaneity”, the capacity to give adequate responses (Moreno, 1946/1978, p. 137). That explains partly why the distinction of self and identities that are associated to role interactions can have therapeutic effects. Such a disturbance can be theoretically localized in particular identities related to some roles and the self needs not to be conceived as totally affected by the conflict.

In psychotherapy, stereotyped roles produce the phenomenon called “transference”, although Moreno’s (1959/1975) conception of transference is not exclusive of the therapeutic relationship. Moreno takes pains to distinguish this notion from its psychoanalytical counterpart:

Transference does not take place towards a generalized person or a vague

Gestalt, but towards a 'role' which the therapist represents to the patient, a fatherly role, a maternal role, the role of a wise, all knowing man, the role of a lover, of a gentleman, of a perfectly adjusted individual, the model of a man, etc. (p. 8)

What characterizes human nature for Moreno is the spontaneous taking up of different roles when the encounter with new surprising others requires from us the developing within ourselves of new roles in an unexpected way. In fact, that is precisely the objective of a psychodramatic therapy. In semiotic terms, the normal flow of the self-interpretive process evolves simultaneously with the interpretation of otherness. A healthy development is a life experience that evolves as a balance of the three categories of experience, the regularity of Thirdness necessary for reassuring anticipation, the unexpected intrusion of otherness through Secondness, and the multiplicity of imaginary possibilities of Firstness with potential real effects.

For Moreno, human communication apart from the distortions that can be caused by transference, includes the possibility of an adequate perception of the other. This implies the capacity of perceiving new elements in the world that were not included in what we already knew before about other human beings. It is the capacity of perceiving another person as other. It is the possibility of perceiving something new which comes about with the encounter of each new person through *tele*, which he defines as "a feeling into one another ... '*Zweiführung*' in difference from '*Einführung*'⁵³. Like a telephone it has two ends and facilitates two-way communication." (Moreno, 1959/1975, p.6)ⁱ We could understand Moreno's terminological precision as an emphasis on the experience of Secondness which is not conveyed by the term '*Einführung*' that describes empathy as a unification of two persons in one feeling. Moreno's *tele* is a kind of communication that emphasizes the dyadic component since it preserves the perception of the other's distinctive aspects.

In psychological development, the fixation of a person on a too limited role range troubles the adoption of adequate roles when new situations demand flexibility, because there is a difficulty to perceive others as distinct from our own historical set of complementary role relations. In transference, communication ceases to be so because it does not have two ends, since the other is not adequately perceived. The successful adaptation to changing settings is the outcome of spontaneity (Moreno, 1959/1975,

⁵³ *Einführung* is the German term used to describe the feeling of empathy. The difference is that *tele* is, according to Moreno, a feeling of two persons.

p.137).The rigid kind of behavior mentioned above may outlast childhood and become a relatively permanent feature of somebody's identity. From Peirce's logical perspective, this tendency to act in a certain way in similar situations is akin to the semiotic "habit" which refers to "the establishment in our nature of a rule of action" Peirce (1878). Still, the term semiotic habit, does not convey rigidity in the sense of Moreno's stereotyping because it refers to a semiotic disposition (see Ransdell, 1977) which as a result of a semiotic process is bound to end in a habit-change.

We find here a coincidence between Moreno's account of stereotyped roles, which limit the person's spontaneity, and Wiley's (1994, p.14) analysis of the trouble that ensues the confusion between the self as developing sign and particular semiotic identities. Wiley distinguished among the participants of the internal conversation a variety of "visitors" which he described as a "range of roles" (p. 55) and on the other hand there is an overarching developing identity which is the self. In a similar vein, Bustos describes a process of development whereby during the stage of non differentiated infantile matrix of identity a central role starts to emerge and is distinguished from others for being "a generator of identity", responsible for the recognition of sameness among the multiplicity (Bustos, 2000, p. 39). The pathological fixation of one role to its complementary counterpart in conflictive interpersonal relations causes a limitation in the multiplicity of inner roles misleading the person to identify his or her self with some stereotyped role. The consequence is the reduction of the possibility to perceive the self as an overarching developing process and to underestimate our own possibility of change.

Psychodramatic complementary roles construed as interpretants, can be accounted for as the semiotic "disposition" (Ransdell, 1977) to behave in certain ways whenever someone is faced with some familiar object. Someone who is strongly identified with a stereotyped role, for instance that of a hypersensitive person, will tend to generate the meaning of an all powerful, dominating, critical other in his or her relationship to people in positions of authority, and will behave accordingly (and inadequately, not spontaneously). The reduction of the self to one role interpreted as a particular identity (eg. hypersensitive person), is bound to a complementary role (eg. critical other). This in pathological cases diminishes the adequate perception of otherness. If the person establish a relation with a person who does not act critically, those signs which do not represent a "critical person" will probably be misinterpreted. In those cases, telic perception in Moreno's (1959/1975, p. 8) words, 'Zweifühlung',

can be blurred, since the interpreter will try to ignore the elements of Secondness in those signs.

The complementary-role dynamic can be explained, in semiotic theory, by this dispositional nature of signs. If we consider what someone represents to another as being the meaning that s/he bears to him, and which causes some ensuing expectation, we are dealing with the interpretant dimension of sign action.

An adequate development is associated with the preservation of both, of the internal multiplicity and of the overarching self. Moreno's notion of spontaneity can be compared to Peirce's own notion. The latter belongs to the study of teleology (CP 1.174, Santaella, 2002, Alexander, 2002) and is useful to understand the determination of processes such as that of meaning generation. Ransdell (1992) emphasizes that semiosis "refers primarily to the action of a sign in producing an interpretant of itself" (para. 1), that is, to the generation of sign meaning. The corollary of this account of semiotic is that the self should not be construed as an entity governed by rules from the outside, but as a process which itself is of the nature of a rule, of a "disposition", in the Aristotelean sense of *hexis* (Ransdell, 1977, para. 38). Every sign is an embodied disposition that produces more developed signs of itself which, in turn, transmit the logical influence of the semiotic object or reference to another sign, and thus assure the consistency of human communication, both internally and externally.

We now have the outline of a dramatic-semiotic conception of personal identity: to be a human being is to be a sign in the process of becoming a self, through continuous self-interpretation within a reflexive internal dialogue. The self is an emergent property of the internal conversation, as such it has a higher logical level, it is something that transcends the sum of its constitutive parts, the preservation of the unity of the self is a formal issue. Identities are concrete particular instances of the process, semiotic dynamical interpretants of the roles assumed in functional unity with the roles of others.

The concept of psychodramatic roles describes roles as they are experienced in inner life, thus the interpretants associated to them constitute particular identities in semiotic terms. The self can be construed as the developing emergent upshot of the interpretive process. The problem that emerges is how to understand the identities which experienced as roles spatially contained an inner realm as temporal instances of the self as a semiotic process. The conception of a processual self allows to account for an overarching identity. As such, self is not a conjunction of roles or identities but an

emergent interpretive agency which evolves through the relation of the three categories of experience. The expectations are that psychodrama provides an instrument that allows to a spatially stage the roles of the inner drama and at the same time observe the temporal developmental process of self-interpretation. The method used is Moreno's psychodrama.

Analysis

The participants were observed in the process of thinking in a loud voice, as they tried to focus on a situation of their lives, in which they were facing two or more alternatives with the aim of taking a decision on some personal issue. Then they used chairs in order to represent the different alternatives spatially. Their speeches were recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were analyzed applying the three phenomenological categories. The aim is to observe the fragments under the light of the triadic semiotic model and search for the elements which seem to be recurrent in the discourses in order to study the different roles that are assumed during the internal conversation in relation to the semiotic process of the self.

- i. Three stages of Moreno's identity matrix: First universe, Breach between inner and outer reality, psychodramatic/as if domain.
- ii. Three kinds of roles: psychosomatic, social and psychodramatic
- iii. The three phenomenological categories Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.

Results

The instructions of the psychodramatic exercise guided the participants to concentrate on a real life situation of doubt, and to let their thoughts on that issue flow freely. As expected, the nineteen dramatization exercises staged presented a similar structure, which allowed for the qualitative verification of the three phenomenological categories that serve to analyze the experience of thought. In all of them, two or more chairs were set by each protagonist on the stage. Each chair represented a role which the protagonist took up alternatively in order to carry out a dialogue. Thus, the psychodramatic method allowed for the external display of the inner dialogue. As the conversation progressed the participants started to describe the characteristics of each role in terms of psychological traces that were interpreted as particular identities. In the studied cases, identities were organized in terms of pairs of complementary roles (useful/easy-going). To illustrate the analysis, we present a triadic diagram that shows

how the phenomenological categories were applied to the processes of thought to distinguish logical tendencies of self-interpretation in the discourse of the participants, as it is shown in Figure 5.1 below. The three categories are shown in juxtaposition to Moreno's triadic classification of roles.

<p>Firstness (present)= quality of feeling An idea or dream without any particular thisness or thatness (CP 1. 341) ex:qualities of usefulness, day-dreamer, restfulness, enjoyment, accomplishment, tallness Undifferentiated first universe/Psychosomatic roles</p>	
<p>Secondness (past)= binarity, opposition of external and internal will (CP 1.383) Among the inner shapes that binarity assumes are those of the doubts that are forced upon our mind. (CP 2.84) ex. will to fulfill desire versus practical constraints Breach between fantasy and reality/Social roles</p>	<p>Thirdness (future) = interpretive directionality through the mediation of general concepts. General tendency, rule to be fulfilled in future events. (CP 1.26) ex. tendency to behave as a romantic person or as a practical person, etc Transitional (as-if) domain/Psychodramatic roles</p>

Figure 5.1. The phenomenological categories applied to the triadic analysis of the data obtained in the psychodramatic exercises

This diagram was applied to the dramatization exercises of the nineteen participants (The Portuguese diagram for all participants are shown in Annex C, p. 265). The participants provided substantial evidence to support the dialogical functioning of thought and also its teleological unification. The multiple inner voices were distinguished through their association to some qualitative aspect (tallness, comfort, joy, autonomy, accomplishment). The qualitative dimension of the discourses of the nineteen participants is described appears in the first column of Figure 5.1. The analysis sought to abstract the feeling qualities from the discourses of the participants, and to do

so not only from the words but also from the gestures, the tones of voice and the movements, so as to account for the category of Firstness. The second column shows the binary opposition between two opposed voices. The third column shows that opposition as it was interpreted by the participants in terms of role patterns (psychodramatic roles) or identity tendencies (particular identities). It was observed that the development of the internal conversation was favored by the dramatic/dialogical interaction between distinct aspects of the self or roles, which were interpreted as particular identities. The interaction of the different roles was a way to deal with the logical self-contradiction that was experienced by the participants. The psychodramatic roles embodied particular identities that were associated to distinct, even contradictory logical tendencies, during the process of thought. This self-contradiction emerged through the voice of an internal opponent, based on the dyadic experience of resistance, which corresponds to Secondness. Each time the participant switched from one chair to another, the role of an internal opponent (represented by a chair or enacted by an auxiliary-ego) motivated him/her to furnish additional evidence to back up each argument that he or she was defending in an ever more persuasive way. There were also repetitive elements in their speech which served to describe role patterns according to the logical tendencies followed once a position was taken up, as an inner debate developed. The logical pattern that each discursive line showed was associated to an internal role adopted with certain regularity by the person, that is, a role that was not only played on that specific moment of the psychodramatic exercise but which prevailed at other times in his/her life. These roles were described as internal, because the participants acknowledged that there was a continuity of each pattern of behavior in relation to past circumstances, and it was expected that it would keep up being such in the future. As an effect of the regularity of the patterns, internal roles were bound to generate particular identities or concrete semiotic interpretants, the latter correspond to the actualization of the category of Thirdness.

The triadic analysis applied to the discourses of the nineteen participants can explain the generation of two identity patterns that interact as complementary roles. The first column corresponds to the phenomenological category of Firstness. Under that column, the qualitative dimension of signs, the prevalent feeling quality of the discourse, was conveyed. The fact that thought is expressed in signs implies that qualities can only be known through their embodiment in the particularity of experience. At different times, the tones of voice and gestures that went along with the

words transmitted feelings such as pleasure, joy, a sense of personal realization. For analytical purposes, these feeling qualities are considered in that first column as being unobjectified, they are considered regardless of their embodiment, in the present particular experience. Thus the first column tries to distinguish the feeling quality from the sensation of volition which leads to concrete action, and which is dealt with in the second column.

The second column corresponds to the phenomenological category of Secondness and it groups expressions of volition in relation to concrete action in the world. The expression of a will was immediately associated with external constraints such as economical limitations or family concessions. The experience of binarity was confirmed during the exercise in the following way: the participants who were sitting on a chair reacted to the opposition of an internal representation of otherness that was made concrete (psychodramatic technique) through an opposite chair. The opposition was not that of the self in relation to some external object or person, but that which exists between two identities within his or her own self. It was observed that once the protagonists' soliloquy took up the defense of a side in the logical argumentative process, and did so with growing conviction, there occurred an abrupt interruption of the flow. This happened because of the emergence of thoughts that refuted that argumentative line ("but, I don't want to do that because...", "I do not believe that because").

The dynamic of an inner dialogue was set when the participant started to defend alternatively each of the two contradictory logical tendencies. As the process showed regularity, each of the positions defended alternatively were associated to distinct roles. Their discourse resulted in the emergence of at least two semiotic particular identities that were not independent of each other, on the contrary the emergent identities were related to each other as two parts of a relation of opposition and complementarity, which constituted distinct particular identities (eg. audacious Catarina, lazy Catarina). In some cases, they were described as characters or *dramatis personae* (eg. Lilith, John, a short and fatty person who likes beer). (For an integral Portuguese documentation of all diagrams see Annex D, p. 269)

Figure 5.2 is a diagram of the sociometric representation of the roles that were assumed by the participants during the psychodramatic exercise. It distinguishes two levels of generality: the dialogical role interaction of complementary roles constitutes one level, and the development of the self as an overarching evolving identity,

evidences a higher generality level. The internal dialogue was maintained as the person assumed alternatively two roles that showed opposed and complementary characteristics, which were usually expressed in terms of an idealistic or dream-oriented purpose versus a realistic or practical one. The participants observed that not only were the external alternatives conflicting, but also that the conflict existed among the different aspects of their own selves. One of them (Participant #13, Annex B, 247) explained this conflict in the following terms: “There is always an inner debate, because the different characteristics are opposed like this... am I going to put up with the suffering? (= the participant stays on the chair that represents what she describes as a strong, confrontational aspect of the self) ...or do I want to remain on the side (moves to another chair) of the well-being, on the calm side?” In this sense, the pronoun ‘*I*’ stood for two mutually antagonistic aspects of her self. The overarching level is represented by a third position. The roles assumed by other Participant (Participant # 11, see Annex B, p. 247) generated an overarching comment interpreted as the self who understands each of the conflicting positions assumed by him when taking each of the complementary roles.

One contrast was the participant # 8 (Annex B. p. 247), who moved from one chair that represented different concrete steps for attaining the goal she was aiming at. However, she did not engage in an inner dialogue until some time had elapsed, after the exercise started. At the beginning, she used two chairs, one was to represent the object of her desire, and the other the external limitations she found in order to accomplish it. She did not, initially, experience a division within her self because she had a clear desire and the limitations were experienced as being wholly external. When the director explicitly pointed out that she did not experience an internal division, she did not agree. She said that indeed she had an inner voice which opposed her previous argument, but it was very weak, and it spoke from far away. In that distant place she set up another chair. The inner dialogue which was then staged was quite short, and the oppositional voice was rapidly overwhelmed by the arguments given by her planning, determinate, obstacle-solving role. This example serves to show that neither the use of chairs, nor the psychodramatic representation of a variety of contradictory alternatives implied necessarily that the participants experienced an internal division caused by self-contradiction. Still, in all cases, self-contradiction was observed as a gradual effect of the process of alternative evaluation.

It was also interesting that even though some participants set, at the beginning of

the dramatization, more than two chairs on the stage, there was a tendency to reach the end of the exercise with only two chairs facing one another. The chairs were set up with a slight diagonal inclination converging towards a frontal third space where the protagonists took a standing position.

At the end of the dramatization, the chairs set by the participants as contradictory logical tendencies represented distinct internal psychodramatic roles, which in some cases were described as theatrical characters. In spite of the inner diversity that ensued, the self maintained its unified nature during the entire process of thought. The exercise confirms that the self can be distinguished from the particular identities that emerge during the inner dialogue, since the participants kept up their role of being an interpretive agency that manifested itself, as they periodically returned to the standing position from which they could observe the dialogue. The notion of an overarching role should not be construed as one endowed with especial or mighty powers. This was confirmed at the end of the exercise with the help of the psychodramatic mirror technique. From the overarching role, the participant did not have the power to convince any of the characters who were sitting on the chairs. The attitude of participants as they observed their own inner dialogue was to infer some encompassing conclusions from a vantage point that allowed for self-understanding. This also helped them to exercise self-control and not to take premature decisions. On the other hand, the observation of the inner dialogue from the perspective of an overarching position from which the person was not able to identify completely with any one of the particular identities enabled the participant to gain insight on her or his own self as not being rigidly limited to the psychological self concepts that characterized each identity.

The multiplicity of psychodramatic roles or identities displayed on the stage helped the participants realize that those roles, although they represented patterns of behavior, were only partial aspects of their selves (lazy, useful, comfort seeker, etc). The internal multiplicity seems to motivate the person to search for an overarching position, and this is beneficial for attaining a psychological balance, since it allows the person to synthesize conflicting (idealistic/ realistic) tendencies (see Annex D, p. 269).. This process of self-interpretation would act as a warrant that the person be spontaneous, that is, that s/he remains open to any new information which may come from the external world, and which could help him or her take a decision. It was from that identity position that it became easier for the participants to make a pause in the

internal debate, and to talk to the other participants who were observing the psychodramatic situation. From that vantage point, they were more willing to accept other external points of view, since the person did not feel compelled to defend each conflictive idea and overthrow the other, as it happened when the participant was occupying alternatively each one of the chairs on the psychodramatic stage. That was precisely the most significant change regarding the moment when the participants were deeply engaged in the internal conversation, and were subject to the pull of each conflicting point of view.

The transitional space generated by the as-if domain of the dramatic stage made it possible for the self as interpretive agent to distance itself, and thus to differentiate from “the stream of signs that at any moment of its existence uses the self as a medium” (Colapietro, 1989, p. 66). This possibility of self-observation was confirmed by the participants who, after they carried out a dialogue while sitting at turns on a different chair, were capable of, literally, distancing themselves, occupy a different, standing position, and observe the entire scene. It was at that crucial point that they were able to comment on that peculiar situation. This natural inclination of the participants became more apparent at the end of the dramatization, through the the director’s use of the mirror technique. This psychodramatic instrument proved to be especially adequate for taking up a spatial distance which is adequate for self-observation. This technique leads the participants not towards an impossible God’s eye view of the inner and outer world, but to a realistic observation of the internal world through their dialogue. This may be compared with the search for narratives and dramatic plots in other transitional spaces, such as plays and films, since both kinds of fictional representations enhance the critical contemplation of dialogues, as the latter insightfully reproduce our internal dilemmas.

Conclusion

In spite of the different subjects dealt with by the participants, their process of thought evinced a tendency to evolve in a similar fashion, to display an analogous structure. Their speech was constituted by distinct voices. Each voice was characterized by a regular role pattern which was experienced as a distinct identity. When two roles stood in dialogical opposition, it resulted in the organization of complementary pairs. If the totality of the participants of this research is considered, each of the interacting roles followed patterns that can be construed as complementary: one role manifested a tendency to pursue an ideal aim or desire, and the other represented the dialogical

intervention of internalized external constraints. The emergence of complementary roles as antagonistic identities seems necessary for the self not to develop in a wholly (uni)directional way, which would be a considerable obstacle for the development of a purposeful (which means adequate and not arbitrary) identity change.

In our research we found evidence that the tolerance of the internal antagonism is related to the willingness to accept the influence of otherness. This favors the correct perception of others, namely Moreno's concept of *tele*.

Paradoxically, internal antagonism between particular identities opens the possibility for the person to take a material distance – which is also a logical or semiotic one – from each particular identity. In that way, the person is able to improve his/her competence to carry out life-enhancing self-observation and, consequently, the semiotic power that helps to strengthen self-control. On the one hand, the person experiences that he or she has no capacity of determination over particular identities, because s/he perceives that his/her opinions are forced on him/her by compelling life circumstances. On the other hand, as the person observes the inner dialogue that takes place among autonomous voices within, s/he experiences the consequences of an overarching self, which exercises the function of self-understanding, and of evaluating dissonant identities. It is through this complex act of self-government that we can hope to deal more adequately with the ever changing demands that life imposes on us, by means of the capacity to act in an increasingly rational way.

DISCUSSÃO E CONCLUSÕES

A conceptualização do *self* no campo da psicologia, depende em alto grau da teoria semiótica que é pressuposta, e nos princípios filosóficos e epistemológicos associados a ela. Apesar da importância da semiótica para a psicologia, a literatura neste campo tem concedido pouco espaço à revisão minuciosa da concepção de signo que embasa os estudos do *self*.

Atualmente, dois são os modelos de *self* que se destacam: o modelo dialógico (Hermanns and Kempen, 1993) e o modelo semiótico (Colapietro, 1989; Wiley, 1994). O primeiro concebe o *self* multifônico cujas diversas vozes estão em interação e constituem um diálogo entre diversas posições. O segundo descreve o *self* como um processo semiótico, e como tal encontra-se em contínuo desenvolvimento. O modelo

semiótico está baseado numa concepção triádica da significação e, conseqüentemente, oferece uma perspectiva que coloca sua ênfase na dimensão processual.

Os modelos de *self* dialógico baseados em pressupostos construtivistas ou construcionistas adotam uma noção de signo restrita aos signos lingüísticos, cujo significado é atribuído convencionalmente. Essa noção apresenta limitações na hora de definir o conceito de dialogismo. O *self* dialógico é concebido como sendo constituído por partes dinâmicas de um sistema que pode se reagrupar dentro de um todo de modo rápido e adaptativo, segundo as demandas dos intercâmbios pessoa/entorno (Hermanns, 2001a; Valsiner, 2002). Assim sendo, parece indispensável que as teorias psicológicas possam se valer de um conceito de mediação semiótica que não subestime a veracidade dos insumos significacionais que provêm do mundo externo.

Embora o construtivismo e o construcionismo procurem oferecer modelos cognitivos interativos, seu conceito de mediação sígnica é herdado do estruturalismo francês e restringe-se a descrever os signos de tipo convencional como são os símbolos lingüísticos. Essa definição de signo está na base dos conceitos de construto mental e de construção social da realidade, os quais transmitem aos modelos de *self* pressupostos idealistas e provocam uma inclinação do conceito ao psicologismo ou ao sociologismo, respectivamente. O modelo de signo diádico está na base da concepção de mediação semiótica como uma atribuição de sentido (convencional), isto é, uma concepção unidirecional que dificulta o estudo do processo interativo e dialógico entre as pessoas e seu entorno.

Por outra parte, a concepção de mediação restrita aos símbolos lingüísticos leva a reduzir o *self* às convenções das culturas nas quais as pessoas se desenvolvem e desse modo o conceito não permite conceber uma natureza humana universal comum aos seres humanos que seja independente de sua sociedade, raça ou entorno. Por isso, torna-se necessário explorar com maior profundidade a noção triádica de signo da teoria semiótica pragmática.

Dos estudos eidéticos

As conclusões do presente trabalho corroboram a adoção da semiótica triádica como insumo para qualquer teoria que tenha o objetivo de fornecer um modelo dialógico de *self*. A semiótica triádica enquanto epistemologia contemporânea procura atingir um conhecimento verdadeiro, embora falível, gradual, progressivo, da realidade externa. Sem essa possibilidade não parece possível falar de diálogo em nenhuma de

suas formas. O modo em que o signo triádico consegue incluir a realidade no processo de significação é através da descrição de três tipos de signo interligados entre si: o ícone, o índice, e o símbolo. O símbolo, enquanto forma genuína de signo pressupõe os outros dois. Desse modo, a generalidade representada como dimensão simbólica, a qual é imprescindível para poder compreender os fenômenos, opera em forma combinada com a sensação que provém da particularidade e das qualidades materializadas na experiência.

Não obstante o pensamento simbólico esteja pouco desenvolvido no início da vida, os signos icônicos e indiciais também podem ser estudados como parte do desenvolvimento semiótico da criança. Inclusive nos estágios pré-verbais (infância), o modo de existência humana é uma manifestação semiótica. Essa visão traz conseqüências importantes para a concepção da natureza humana porque a atividade semiótica não depende unicamente da internalização de signos culturais. A concepção da condição humana como semiose pode contribuir para resolver um dos problemas salientados na literatura sobre o self dialógico, i.e, a dificuldade para integrar teoricamente a multiplicidade interna. O modelo triádico de signo é adequado para preservar a distinção entre o *self*: como processo vivo de ação sígnica, como semiose contínua e desenvolvimental, e como atualizações concretas do processo semiótico de identidades particulares. O *self/signo* pode ser definido pela inter-relação de três posições lógicas, objeto, signo, interpretante, que correspondem às três categorias fenomenológicas da experiência Secundidade, Primeiridade e Terceiridade, respectivamente. As três categorias fenomenológicas da experiência servem para analisar a multiplicidade de identidades, sem reduzir a unidade lógica do processo auto-interpretativo:

Secundidade refere-se às circunstâncias concretas da vida sobre as quais os seres humanos têm pouco poder, isto é, o real como força que constrange. Trata-se dos fatos históricos que, embora possam ser ignorados às vezes pela mente, não podem ser suprimidos em sua capacidade de determinação. Encontra-se lá o ponto de polaridade entre ego e não ego que funciona como limite objetivo para a subjetividade humana, e como uma entrada do novo a partir da experiência.

Primeiridade é a possibilidade qualitativa concebida enquanto forma pura que é buscada pela determinação do real para produzir um conceito. Eis o lugar que a semiótica propõe para a criatividade e a imaginação. O que é espontâneo, fortuito e variado entra em oposição dialética com as circunstâncias existenciais por um lado, e,

por outro, com a generalidade como propósito norteador, como meta consciente ou inconsciente do processo.

Terceiridade é o efeito de sentido geral como o resultado provável da cooperação triádica. Trata-se da síntese contínua que emerge da influência dos outros dois elementos e do fim sistêmico para o qual o processo semiótico inteiro tende. A unidade e consistência do *self* não surgem da existência de um estado final pré-determinado, senão de sua natureza ser uma potencialidade, uma tendência evolutiva ou disposição a se realizar no futuro ou disposição que pressupõe os outros dois componentes (existencial e qualitativo).

Um dos benefícios de aplicar a teoria triádica ao estudo do *self* é a possibilidade de conceber a multiplicidade de identidades como interpretantes dinâmicos. Enquanto signos interpretantes, as identidades não são elementos fixos senão que possuem as características de parcialidade e de falibilidade que todo signo tem como parte de um processo evolutivo contínuo de crescimento progressivo do sentido. A unidade é a consistência lógica do processo auto-interpretativo, o qual é produto da orientação do processo teleológico para a atualização de algum tipo de ideal. Desse modo, consegue-se explicar semioticamente as várias identidades e a unidade do *self* ao longo do tempo.

O desenvolvimento teleológico da identidade persegue o propósito de atualizar conceitos, desse modo segue um telos direcional. A possibilidade de inovação e mudança não requer a demonização das tendências conservadoras regulares regidas pela direcionalidade. A regularidade é sempre necessária para a compreensão. O que produz a originalidade télica é o equilíbrio adequado entre regularidade e espontaneidade. A espontaneidade emerge de eventos fortuitos, mas não se reduz a acontecimentos pontuais, senão ao estabelecimento de novas regularidades.

A manutenção do equilíbrio teleológico depende dos encontros dialógicos com a alteridade. A manifestação de alteridade em relação à identidade, é necessária para definir um diálogo. O estudo da categoria da Secundidade aplicada ao desenvolvimento do *self* pode contribuir para definir esse conceito (diálogo) e, conseqüentemente, pode ser aplicado ao estudo da emergência do *self* no confronto com o que é alheio, diferente.

Os estudos eidéticos sugerem que a oposição dialógica estimula os processos de autoconhecimento e auto-interpretação. Tal hipótese foi uma das guias principais para os estudos empíricos. Uma hipótese confirmada pela pesquisa é que o papel de oponente interno enquanto expressão de um limite, um “não”, como parte do próprio funcionamento dinâmico de pensamento, contribui para evitar a confusão entre *self* e

identidade, favorecendo a observação crítica do mundo interno. O *self* inclui a alteridade como fazendo parte de sua própria definição. Mas, por outra parte, as fronteiras entre o *self* e o outro externo não estão desvanecidas no desenvolvimento saudável da pessoa. Quando as fronteiras entre o *self* e os outros se apagam, trata-se de um problema psicológico, uma patologia do desenvolvimento da identidade. Para nossa definição teórica do limite entre *self* e alteridade, as três categorias fenomenológicas foram relevantes. Foi salientada a importância da categoria da Secundidade para a concepção do *self* como um processo auto-interpretativo contínuo que inclui uma relação dialógica interna com a alteridade. Esta categoria demonstrou ser útil para entender como a alteridade faz parte do diálogo interno, sem que isto implique uma falha na preservação da distinção psicológica entre *self* e alteridade no diálogo externo. Isto é assim porque a categoria da Secundidade dá conta da relação diádica do Ego/Não-Ego, a qual se completa com a concepção do si próprio, que pertence à categoria da Terceiridade, explicando o reconhecimento da consistência lógica do *self* ao longo do tempo.

Além de ser um problema semiótico, a clarificação da noção de diálogo constitui um problema psicológico, já que para definir a interação entre as pessoas deve-se distinguir ao menos dois sujeitos lógicos. A co-presença de dois corpos no espaço não implica necessariamente que existam dois sujeitos no sentido da lógica (semiótica). Essa concepção da relação diádica possui relevância para a psicologia porque ela permite entender, no desenvolvimento identitário infantil, o estágio em que começa a distinção Ego/não-ego. Por outra parte, pode ser relevante para a psicoterapia incorporar elementos de uma teoria da comunicação para melhorar o entendimento e diagnóstico do fenômeno conhecido como transferência.

A possibilidade de estabelecer uma comparação, entre as três categorias peirceanas e os três registros lacanianos, (Santaella,1999a) permite aplicar a semiótica para entender a equivalência entre os registros imaginário, real e simbólico com as categorias da Primeiridade, Secundidade e Terceiridade, respectivamente. Essa correlação está embasada em dois fatores, segundo a citada autora. Por um lado, na natureza universal das categorias fenomenológicas de Peirce, e por outro, numa referência de Lacan à influência de Peirce em sua própria análise. De uma perspectiva semiótica, Santaella (1999a) descreve o processo através do qual, no estágio do espelho, começa a se constituir a identidade humana, num movimento oscilatório de reconhecimento entre o *eu* e o outro. O registro do imaginário, da Primeiridade é um estágio monádico que enquanto tal corresponde a uma experiência de totalidade, sem

fronteiras de distinção entre ego e outro. A Secundidade aparece relacionada com o estágio de distinção no qual aparece o impacto do real. É na Secundidade que Peirce descreve a emergência de um senso de alteridade (*altersense*), (CP 7.276). No terceiro lugar, a autora descreve o registro simbólico, que enquanto triádico, aparece como o sentido que é a resultante da relação dos três registros lacanianos.

O estudo da categoria da Secundidade foi destacada neste trabalho por sua relevância em pesquisas sobre os primeiros estágios do desenvolvimento da identidade, especialmente para compreender do ponto de vista comunicacional o chamado “estágio do espelho” (Lacan, 1966). Da perspectiva pragmática, Wiley (2004) propõe que existe uma mudança na conversação interna que corresponde ao estágio do espelho, estabelecendo, contudo, uma diferença no que tange à proposta de Lacan. Segundo Wiley (2004), o estudo da conversação interna da criança revela que no início do estágio do espelho, a criança se refere a si mesma pelo pronome *mim*. Conforme o autor, no momento em que ela descobre sua imagem no espelho, também descobre o outro pólo da conversação interna que é o *eu*. Trata-se de um autodescobrimento que envolve três elementos simultaneamente: o corpo, a mente e o pronome pessoal *eu*. Esse autodescobrimento é através da relação com o outro representado internamente no pronome *mim*. Assim, o *self* é um emergente dos papéis assumidos em relação aos papéis dos outros.

Uma implicação metodológica pode ser associada à utilização do modelo de signo triádico para o estudo do *self*. Observou-se uma possível compatibilidade teórica entre o modelo de *self* semiótico enquanto concepção dramática do mundo interno e a teoria de papéis desenvolvidas por Mead, e por Moreno. Existe uma afinidade entre uma teoria psicológica e uma semiótica que enfatizam a inclusão da linguagem corporal ao estudo da comunicação humana. A semiótica e a sociometria, como concepções dramáticas da identidade, permitem estabelecer uma convergência teórica que justifica a utilização do método psicodramático para o estudo do *self* semiótico.

As identidades particulares como interpretantes do processo auto-interpretativo pode ser compreendida numa dialética vincular como relações entre papéis. Consideradas como interpretantes do *self*, as identidades são emergentes da relação no âmbito social. A internalização dessas relações é o próprio processo auto-interpretativo. Nesse processo interpretativo, os papéis sociais fazem parte da conversação interna do *self* e podem ser equiparáveis aos papéis psicodramáticos que estruturam a dramática interna em relações de complementariedade.

Em estudos futuros, a categoria da Secundidade pode ser aplicada para entender todas as formas que adota a relação diádica, como a interação dialógica e a noção de encontro na sociometria de Moreno. Um encontro pressupõe o chamado “tele” moreniano que se define como a possibilidade de perceber adequadamente a realidade do outro, a Secundidade no relacionamento humano. Isso acontece quando os conflitos afetivos não bloqueiam a capacidade das pessoas de reconhecer os signos do outro que não fazem parte do próprio universo interpretativo conhecido. Em termos lógicos, essa capacidade pressupõe uma integração do diferenciado (Andacht, 2000). Moreno, destacou que à diferença da empatia (*Einfühlung*), o tele é um *Zweifühlung*, isto é, um sentimento de dois. É justamente na manutenção da diferença que esse sentimento diádico distingui-se da distorção perceptual que acontece na transferência. A transferência na teoria sociométrica é uma alteração ou distorção na relação de papéis que bloqueia a percepção adequada dos aspectos diferentes do outro.

A diversidade interna do *self* mantém uma relação de continuidade com a diversidade na conversação interpessoal. Com efeito, há uma disposição para a integração da diversidade interna e conversação interpessoal. Desta relação dependem o crescimento de sentido do *self* e sua capacidade de inovação. A diversidade interna indica uma multiplicidade de identidades que convivem num estado de polêmica harmônica— o *forum* de Mead. Em termos dialógicos, fala-se de um estado de *aporia* socrática (Ransdell, 2000). O grau de disposição das pessoas para levar uma conversação com os outros (alteridade), está relacionado à capacidade de tolerância a um estado de *aporia*, no sentido de aceitar a autocontradição na relação intrapessoal.

A dificuldade de estabelecer um diálogo com a alteridade estaria na base do crescimento desmesurado de uma identidade particular (Wiley, 1996), já que uma perda de dialogicidade resultaria em um incremento da repetição no processo interpretativo da identidade. A estereotipia da identidade e a perda de espontaneidade do *self* fazem com que uma identidade transforme-se num falso-*self* (Winnicott, 1960). Em termos semióticos, o fluxo dialógico seria substituído pela repetição de padrões conhecidos, e a conversação perderia seu caráter dialógico. Estabelecer-se-ia uma maior rigidez nos hábitos interpretativos, o que suporia uma predominância do *telos* direcional sobre o *telos* original (Alexander, 2002).

Criatividade e mudança no processo evolutivo da identidade pessoal aparecem como conceitos relacionais, porque o *telos* original depende de um processo em três etapas que caracteriza a emergência extrínseca. Trata-se de um fenômeno que só pode

ser integrado ao processo interpretativo quando é observado por um agente que se encontra fora desse sistema (“observador exofísico”, Ali et al., 1998, p.2). Se o encontro com a alteridade é minimizado reduz-se o *telos* original, e as possibilidades de mudança. O predomínio do *telos* direcional resulta ao longo do tempo na repetição de uma pauta identitária que é interpretada como a única realidade do *self*. Por causa da redução de alternativas no desenvolvimento da identidade, o comportamento das pessoas torna-se compulsivo, diminuindo-se assim o nível de auto-controle. O re-estabelecimento da autonomia e da capacidade de atuar de modo intencional estão associadas ao mantimento (ou ao re-estabelecimento) do vínculo comunicativo do *self* com a alteridade. Isso acontece na relação entre pessoas no entorno social, quando existe a possibilidade de tolerar os aspectos internos inconciliáveis que fazem parte do desenvolvimento da identidade humana como um processo dramático que dura a vida inteira.

Dos estudos empíricos

O uso do método psicodramático permitiu observar o pensamento dialógico em ação e, também, o surgimento de identidades distintas. No Anexo B, p.247 encontra-se a transcrição das falas dos participantes. Todos descreveram tais identidades com adjetivos ou traços psicológicos (relaxada, útil, com medo do futuro), com características de desempenho de tarefas (sucesso, satisfação, autenticidade, postura ética), ou como em detalhes físicos (alta, cheinha, com visual horroroso, etc). Os passos que levaram à manifestação dessas identidades (ver lista completa em Anexo D, p. 269) nos exercícios psicodramáticos realizados se caracterizaram pela manifestação de um padrão estrutural (ver Anexo C, p. 266). Foram avaliadas alternativas de conduta perante uma situação de dúvida pessoal, segundo as instruções do exercício (Anexo A, p. 245), e eles o fizeram em primeira pessoa (*eu*). Ao emergir no próprio pensamento uma voz defensora de uma opinião diferente, surgiu uma nítida oposição entre o *self* presente e o *self* do momento anterior, que era experimentado como um não-ego. Considera-se que o *self* do passado foi experimentado pelos participantes como não-ego, porque ele estabeleceu uma relação de resistência com respeito ao *ego* (*eu*), isto é, uma interação diádica. O participante no momento presente reagia perante a oposição de seu próprio discurso anterior como se ele proviesse de uma vontade alheia, objetiva, não passível de ser modificada diretamente por ele ou ela enquanto sujeito. Contrariamente, para modificar essa vontade era necessário fazê-lo de modo persuasivo, através de

argumentos lógicos. O surgir contínuo de oposição demonstrou ser um verdadeiro motor do pensamento, uma fonte energética que manteve a conversação interna em desenvolvimento, e que fazia a pessoa mudar de cadeira alternativamente, até esgotar os argumentos. Desse modo, através da oposição interna, o funcionamento dinâmico do pensamento recebeu os elementos necessários para que a reflexão continuasse se desdobrando por motivação própria. (ver Figura 6.1)

Primeiridade (presente)= qualidade de sentimento Uma ideia ou sonho sem nenhum particular isto ou aquilo. (CP 1. 341) ex: qualidades de utilidade, de descanso, de gostoso etc.	
Secundidade (passado)= binariedade vontade externa em oposição à vontade interna (CP 1.383) Entre as formas que a binaridade assume estão as dúvidas que são forçadas sobre nossa mente. (CP 2.84) ex. a experiência do self encarnado que sente a vontade de descansar, de dormir mais um poquinho percebida através da oposição à exigência de manter um ritmo	Terceiridade (future) = direcionalidade interpretativa através da mediação de conceito gerais. Tendencia geral, regra a ser realizada em eventos futuros. (CP 1.26) ex. atos futuros que tomariam um caráter geral do tipo útil ou do tipo folgado.

Figura 6.1 As categorias fenomenológicas aplicadas à análise triádica dos dados obtidos

O pensamento exteriorizado pelos participantes durante os exercícios psicodramáticos evidenciou que o ato de pensar não está livre de constrangimentos, já que a realidade manifestou-se nesse processo como uma viva resistência. Uma vez que o exercício psicodramático começou a evoluir, todos os participantes chegaram a experimentar uma sensação de divisão interna, a qual era determinada pela coexistência de uma disposição de sustentar idéias antagônicas. Cada uma das idéias foi identificada com uma cadeira colocada num lugar específico do cenário psicodramático. Ao longo da dramatização, as cadeiras foram concebidas como concretizações de papéis internos que expressavam traços psicológicos reconhecidos como aspectos do modo de ser habitual dos participantes. Cada uma delas foi associada à execução de uma causa final que era incompatível com as outras (ex. a realização profissional vs. a satisfação total; o

enfrentamento vs. a tranquilidade). .

Quando, nos casos estudados, o fluir do pensamento encontrou-se com uma representação relacionada com os limites da realidade externa, (compromissos familiares, necessidades econômicas, etc), manifestou-se no *self* uma ‘polaridade’ (Santaella, 1999a). As ilustrações dessa polaridade com elementos dos discursos dos participantes encontra-se no Anexo C, p. 266, na segunda coluna que corresponde à Secundidade. O encontro de forças opostas marca o limite entre ego e não ego, uma experiência de resistência, por meio da qual a alteridade se manifesta para o *self*. No caso dos exercícios, trata-se da polaridade entre a tendência a batalhar pelos sonhos e as ilusões por um lado, e às coerções auto-impostas porém associadas às coerções externas, por outro. Os papéis representados no exercício foram considerados identidades da pessoa, porque eram papéis internos que os participantes descreveram como possuindo relativa constância ao longo de sua vida. Portanto, os papéis desempenhados durante o exercício foram descritos como aspectos constitutivos do *self*. Eles eram percebidos como manifestações de uma vivência de debate interno mais duradoura do que a situação pontual do exercício psicodramático.

Apesar da diversidade de palavras, nomes e imagens escolhidas pelos diversos participantes para descrever suas identidades (ver a primeira coluna no Anexo C, p. 266, correspondente à Primeiridade), observou-se que a distribuição sociométrica do grupo interno convergiu sendo possível observar, na terceira coluna correspondente a Terceiridade, tendências comuns a todos os participantes. As tendências interpretativas resultantes podem ser associadas a identidades que emergem dos papéis desenvolvidos no cenário (Ver Figura 6.2).




Figura 6.2 Self como emergente do processo interpretativo das identidades organizadas como papéis complementários⁵⁴

Como consequência da incompatibilidade das duas alternativas, as identidades emergentes funcionaram como papéis antagônicos e complementares. Alguns participantes representaram vozes internas que mantiveram perspectivas similares e funcionavam como papéis mutuamente compatíveis e outros que funcionavam como mutuamente antagônicos. (Ver Figura 6.3)

⁵⁴ Em este diagrama 4 unificam-se os elementos comuns considerando os papéis psicodramáticos como identidades particulares e o processo interpretativo como uma identidade supra-ordenada emergente.




Figura 6.3. Self como emergente do antagonismo interno

Em geral, os papéis organizaram-se em torno a uma dualidade identitária central definida pelo antagonismo (ver D, p. 269). Assim, os participantes descreviam principalmente dois aspectos (*lados*) do *self* com características comuns: a) uma identidade idealista ou romântica descrita através de traços psicológicos que destacam um modo de ser otimista, descansado, voltado a considerar muitas possibilidades e orientado à realização de desejos e sonhos. Em geral a identidade que emergiu em primeiro lugar foi mais radical, ela mostrou-se com pouca disposição para renunciar a seus desejos para fazer compromissos. b) A essa identidade, os participantes tendiam a opor outra de tipo realista ou prática, com maior predisposição à renúncia. Ela era descrita como possuidora de traços psicológicos de vulnerabilidade ou de sofrimento perante as restrições externas. Esta outra identidade caracterizava-se pelo temor das conseqüências que a realização irrestrita dos sonhos poderia trazer para o *self*.

Durante o exercício, a oposição entre identidades antagônicas não impediu a experiência de unidade na continuidade do *self*. A sensação da diversidade interna foi descrita como uma verdadeira excisão ou como uma forte angústia. Os comentários que evidenciaram capacidade autocrítica e capacidade de auto-controle que expressava a vivência de uma identidade supra-ordenada. (Ver Figura 6.4)




Figura 6.4 Self como centro de auto-controle

Teoricamente, ela pode ser descrita como o *self* que interpreta as identidades confrontadas no debate interno como se aquelas fossem seus aspectos parciais. Os participantes não conseguiram se identificar totalmente com nenhuma das identidades contrapostas. Nesse lugar do cenário psicodramático, o participante não conseguia controlar totalmente seu próprio modo de pensar, já que as razões expressadas no momento do debate interno impunham-se ao *self*, por elas funcionarem como processos lógicos autônomos. O fato de que as identidades são processos semióticos autônomos se observa nas situações nas quais os participantes não conseguiram deixar de pensar como pensavam no momento em que eles ocupavam cada cadeira. Não obstante, no funcionamento do pensamento como processo dialógico ou dramático, a diversidade interna, longe de promover a excisão do *self*, motivou a busca de um propósito supra-ordenado de integrar a diversidade num *self* coesivo e com a capacidade de sintetizar os aspectos antagônicos.

Embora os participantes pareçam estar totalmente envolvidos em cada um dos papéis antagônicos, o poder de auto-observação não diminuiu durante o exercício. Nos momentos em que isso foi necessário ou requerido por algum observador externo (perguntas de outros participantes ou da pesquisadora), o participante/protagonista sempre conseguiu realizar comentários autocríticos, se distanciar da cena que estava montando, e realizar auto-avaliações. (Ver Figura 6.5)




Figura 6.5 Self como capacidade de auto-observação

Isso mostrou que o desempenho de papéis antagônicos e complementares favorece o processo interpretativo, porque a relação diádica requer um terceiro lugar discursivo para poder ser resolvida. Esse lugar foi sempre o lugar do público psicodramático; porém ele foi ocupado pelo protagonista, quem devia deter a cena dialógica para adotar uma perspectiva que pudesse contrastar os aspectos incompatíveis envolvidos. A técnica psicodramática como espaço transicional facilitou a espacialização da autocontradição e a interação dos papéis internos. Ela também permitiu que o self como capacidade interpretativa pudesse se distinguir e se distanciar dos processos sógnicos que usam o self como meio expressivo, tendo como principal decorrência o aumento da capacidade de autocontrole. Isso parece ser necessário para um bom desenvolvimento psicológico da pessoa. Fora do cenário psicodramático, a vida oferece outros espaços de natureza transicional (ex. ficções teatrais, fílmicas, jogos dramáticos infantis e adultos) nos quais é possível deter a dinâmica da ação diádica que às vezes a vida requer, para tomar o papel de público de nós mesmos, e poder assim observar o foro polifônico das identidades, que não é outra coisa senão o próprio pensamento em evolução individual e intersubjetiva.

Conclusões

- A encenação da dramática interna permite observar padrões regulares de interação ou papéis no âmbito interno (*self*).
- A regularidade da interação entre papéis internos é interpretada como uma coexistência de identidades distintas mutuamente compatíveis ou antagônicas.
- O processo temporal do pensamento passado/presente/futuro resulta em uma vivência espacial do *self* (continente) e das identidades (conteúdo), como conseqüência do efeito da regularidade das tendências auto-interpretativas.
- As identidades combinam qualidade, alteridade e legalidade, e sustentam assim a experiência de uma dramática interna em interação.
- Quando existe uma contradição ou aporia interna, observa-se uma tendência ao estabelecimento de uma relação de complementaridade entre dois papéis mutuamente antagônicos. Surgem duas identidades contrapostas: uma associada aos ideais e outra às limitações externas.
- A categoria da Secundidade que se manifesta na dramática interna através da resistência é relevante para explicar a representação da alteridade como uma parte constitutiva do desenvolvimento do *self*.
- O antagonismo interno é necessário para que o desenvolvimento do *self* não evolucione de modo (uni)direcional, mas que adote uma única tendência identitária.
- As tendências direcionais levam à interpretação repetitiva de uma identidade particular.
- A tolerância do antagonismo interno está relacionada à disposição para aceitar a influencia da alteridade, favorece a percepção adequada dos outros e a interpretação do mundo interno.
- A disposição ao encontro com a alteridade desafia as regularidades das tendências interpretativas direcionais emergentes e introduz a novidade que provém da experiência.
- O balanço entre tendências identitárias direcionais (repetitivas) e originais (espontaneidade) impede a confusão entre identidade particular e *self*. Ela explica a autonomia humana e a capacidade de autocontrole.
- O espaço transicional (o *como si* dramático) favorece a distinção entre o sujeito como agente interpretativo (*self* = capacidade interpretativa), e as identidades (papéis internos em interação).

- A observação da dramática interna favorece um distanciamento espacial e também semiótico, em relação às identidades particulares. Aumenta assim a capacidade e poder semiótico do *self*.

Considerações finais

Um desenvolvimento autocontrolado, que seja uma decorrência do livre arbítrio, depende não somente da vontade subjetiva, mas da interação dialógica com o limite estabelecido por outra vontade (alteridade), independente do desejo subjetivo. Desse modo, a autonomia ou livre arbítrio do *self* distingue-se da onipotência. Uma das causas da confusão *self*/identidades estaria relacionada à incapacidade de aceitar o efeito de sentido produzido pela presença obstinada da alteridade na constituição do si próprio e, conseqüentemente, a dificuldade para tolerar a autocontradição no mundo interno.

A definição de alteridade como resistência (Secundidade, no sentido peirciano), assim como a consideração dos efeitos positivos do antagonismo dialógico é uma das principais conclusões do presente trabalho. Para repensar a prática profissional psicológica, propõe-se considerar teoricamente um conceito de interpretação que permita analisar como as pessoas conseguem integrar de modo positivo os limites externos e internos.

Dessa observação, surge a necessidade de considerar o vínculo profilático e a relação terapêutica como duas formas de comunicação entre pessoas que necessita ser estudado através de noções teóricas não redutíveis à comunicação simbólica. A compreensão da comunicação indicial e da icônica, que não são consideradas tradicionalmente nos trabalhos psicológicos embasados na semiologia estruturalista, poderia contribuir para um melhor conhecimento da comunicação humana em todas suas complexidades. A dimensão icônica e a indicial são especialmente relevantes para entender os primeiros estágios do desenvolvimento humano, assim como as alterações psicológicas que afetam a comunicação verbal. Especificamente, o estudo da comunicação indicial pode fornecer elementos para o trabalho terapêutico que procura favorecer os vínculos caracterizados pela percepção adequada do outro – a noção moreniana de *tele*, que se baseia num sentimento de dois (= *Zweifühlung*). A revalorização da comunicação indicial, que se expressa principalmente pela fala do corpo, aporta elementos para diminuir a transferência no trabalho terapêutico, se entendermos por ‘transferência’ o modo de relação que tende a minimizar as diferenças introduzidas pelo outro no universo interpretativo do *self*. Além das diferenças entre

correntes e linhas teóricas, todos os processos terapêuticos devem outorgar importância ao estudo dos processos comunicativos e semióticos. O objetivo de favorecer a atividade dialógica interna requer um estudo mais aprofundado dos signos que envolvem o senso de ação e reação, de resistência, de externalidade, de alteridade, numa palavra, que supõem uma irreduzível dualidade.

Neste trabalho de pesquisa, uma dimensão abordada com especial interesse foi a comunicação indicial, manifestada através da cenografia das cadeiras no palco psicodramático. A semiose ou ação dos signos indiciais encontra-se associada a um vínculo diádico, de contigüidade que se manifesta como resistência, a manifestação essencial da alteridade. Acreditamos que a aplicação do conceito de Secundidade enquanto resistência pode fornecer elementos para estudar o estabelecimento e mantimento do “marco” na comunicação terapêutica, tal como aquele conceito é definido por Bleger (1979). O psicanalista argentino propôs estudar os aspectos constantes – o que ele chama “não-processo” – que enquadram o processo terapêutico. Esses aspectos estão associados aos estágios primitivos do desenvolvimento e à comunicação corporal, conforme as idéias de Winnicott (1958) citadas por Bleger (1979). Winnicott definiu o “setting” como o cuidado dos detalhes da técnica para ministrar ao paciente uma sensação de segurança e de sustento semelhante à recebida nos primeiros estágios do desenvolvimento, através da comunicação corporal. Uma renovada atenção àqueles componentes inseparáveis do corpo – aos gestos, às atitudes – e aos fatores permanentes que enquadram e fornecem sustentação não verbal à comunicação própria do vínculo terapêutico nos permitirá compreender a importância das ações que acompanham o conteúdo da fala de terapeuta e paciente. Esta visão ampliada poderia restabelecer a relevância da significação polifônica, mais próxima da rica pluralidade sensorial de uma orquestra que da uma solitária voz, para assim conseguir nos adaptar e desenvolver com sucesso no mundo circundante, que jamais cessa de mudar, desde o nascimento até a morte, e que por isso tem que ser enfrentado por um calidoscópio de signos em contínua mudança, cuja complexidade não deixa de crescer.

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ANEXO A

Instruções para condução do exercício psicodramático

Exploração da conversação interna

Técnica psicodramática

1ª. etapa: Introdução à pesquisa

Alguns conceitos básicos sobre a pesquisa:

‘Em primeiro lugar muito obrigado por ter vindo hoje e por participar. O tema é o *self* (traduzido como ‘si próprio’ o sentido de si mesmo) e identidade. A teoria em que se baseia é a teoria semiótica que considera o *self* como um signo que está sempre em um processo de desenvolvimento, um processo que está guiado por um propósito e influído por ideais. Nesta teoria da significação o pensamento é concebido em forma diferente a como ele era concebido na época de Descartes, do chamado dualismo cartesiano (mente-alma e corpo). Há uma oposição entre esse conceito do *self* dialógico e o denominado “cogito”, isto é, a apreensão completa do eu, de modo direto ou imediato.

Na medida em que eu sou somente um ser que pensa, eu não consigo distinguir em mim mesmo nenhuma parte, mas eu me percebo a mim mesmo como claramente um e inteiro. (Descartes, apud Colapietro 1989: 93)

Segundo Peirce, o pensamento como conversação interna revelaria que a pessoa não é absolutamente individual, isto é, indivisível. A segunda hipótese é que:

Na medida em que nós somos seres pensantes, nós podemos claramente distinguir em nós mesmos partes diferentes que são, em essência, papéis diferentes em um diálogo que está acontecendo. Na sua forma mais simples (Colapietro, 1989: 93)

2ª. Etapa: aquecimento inespecífico.

Agora tudo o que vamos a fazer de aqui em diante, com a valiosa ajuda de vocês, é uma exploração do pensamento. Vamos a trabalhar assim, primeiro faremos um aquecimento geral como forma de entrar ao tema. Vou repartir uma folha a cada um de vocês, e vou lhes pedir que escrevam o seguinte, com a maior simplicidade possível. Só queria lembrar vocês que qualquer uma situação de decisão envolve necessariamente uma dúvida, quer dizer, duas ou mais opções ou rumos não compatíveis, isto é, se eu pegar uma opção fatalmente isso vai significar abrir mão ou deixar fora a outra opção. Normalmente, pegar aquela opção supõe um mínimo de angustia ou ansiedade, no sentido que, por exemplo, o fato de escolher um par de sapatos significa não ter mais esse dinheiro, e pior ainda, ter que renunciar a esse monte de outras maravilhosas escolhas que a gente poderia ter feito como sua compra desse dia. E assim por diante. Este comportamento normal pode manifestar uma multiplicidade do *self* num caso complicado, justamente como o que eu vou pedir para vocês pensar agora, a situação pode virar tão complexa, que a decisão não acontece, fica como se estivesse, detida.

Nesta folha, vocês vão escrever três situações de difícil escolha, depois, sem pensar nada, pegam uma delas. Depois vão organizar com a ajuda de duas figuras geométricas, triângulos e círculos, as vantagens e as desvantagens, respectivamente, de decidir a favor disso aí. Este é um modo de esquematizar os elementos contraditórios envolvidos em qualquer escolha normal e muito mais numa escolha difícil.

3ª. Etapa: o exercício psicodramático ‘partes múltiplas do self’

Descrição dos passos do processo dramático:

Aquecimento específico: Agora, vou pedir a cada um de vocês, que represente dramaticamente a situação em que o pensamento surge a respeito de uma das dúvidas escritas na folha. Primeiro vamos a escolher um lugar adequado para o pensamento afluir e se desenvolver, um momento do dia, um entorno ambiental, as vestimentas e a posição em que estamos nesse momento. Apenas o pensamento sobre a dúvida começar proponho-lhes fazer um solilóquio.

Dramatização: Vocês vão começar fazendo um monólogo em voz alta (técnica chamada *solilóquio*), como se estiveram pensando com som, como nos filmes. Imaginem que ninguém está ouvindo o que vocês pensam em voz alta. O cenário dramático vai se transformar num espaço para desenrolar o pensamento e dar forma concreta (técnica chamada *concretização*) às diferentes alternativas que se apresentarem se valendo das cadeiras que estão na sala. Depois do solilóquio, então, começaram a trabalhar com as cadeiras, lembrando-se que cada uma delas é usada para que seja ocupada por cada uma das alternativas, das posições ou para cada uma das opiniões o vozes que puderam aparecer e participar nessa conversação ou pensamento exteriorizados, externos. Pode ser que a situação seja pensada desde uma posição unívoca da pessoa que considera diversas alternativas, ou que no momento de pensar, vocês distingam diversos aspectos, diferentes partes de vocês mesmos que não concordam é que dialogam entre si. No caso de que no pensamento haja vozes diferentes, com características diferentes, podem usar cada cadeira para desdobrar a lógica de cada uma delas. Assim poderia ou não se revelar uma divisão interna do *self* no momento de pensar. Convido aos participantes que não estão ocupando o papel de protagonista a serem pesquisadores junto comigo para ajudar ao protagonista a captar o momento em que começa a surgir uma lógica divergente que muda a direção da corrente do pensamento que está sendo exposta por ela/ele. Eu vou estar gravando o que acontece, porque é muito difícil me lembrar depois de tudo isso que é tão interessante para mim, e que vai começar a acontecer agora.

Uma idéia para lhes explicar um pouquinho sobre a técnica a ser utilizada agora: o benefício de colocar no espaço e concretizar algo tão abstrato é imaterial como uma difícil decisão, que produz ambivalência, é que isso que normalmente fica tão comprimido ou comprimido dentro de nós, consegue sair fora, isto é, se colocar no espaço perante a gente, e fica assim muito mais claro e esclarecedor. No espaço cada uma das vozes irá a ocupar seu lugar próprio, suficientemente diferenciado como para desenvolver cada uma das razões ou argumentos que puxam em cada direção. Uma vez que os diferentes papéis são identificados pode se solicitar ajuda a um colega de grupo (*ego-auxiliar*) para se colocar no lugar de cada uma das cadeiras e desdobrar cada papel. O protagonista descreverá antes as características de cada um dos papéis para que o ego-auxiliar e todos os presentes possam vê-lo (*visualização*)⁵⁵ e o protagonista possa depois olhar a cena de fora (*técnica do espelho*). Não é importante ou necessário que resolvam a questão, isto é, que tomem uma decisão. Ao contrário, o mais relevante ou pertinente neste caso é deixar emergir os diferentes posições envolvidas nessa situação. O tempo para cada cena é de 10 minutos, mas eu vou controlar isso, não se preocupem em absoluto.

4a Etapa: Compartilhamento.

Para encerrar os participantes verbalizam brevemente suas experiências se centrando nos aspectos comuns entre elas.

⁵⁵ Ver técnica de visualização para aquecimento específico em Seminotti, 1997, p. 172

ANEXO B

Transcrições das falas dos participantes

Utilizarão-se as seguintes abreviaturas: A inicial do nome escolhido arbitrariamente para designar o protagonista;⁵⁶ **Di**: para designar a pesquisadora em papel de directora de cada cena; **Pe**: para designar o papel de pesquisador/a quando desempenhado por um dos participantes; a): uma letra minúscula com parêntese será usada para designar cada cadeira seguindo a ordem alfabética a ordem em que o protagonista foi a trazendo à cena cada cadeira respectivamente. As mudanças de parágrafo implicam uma mudança de posição espacial de uma cadeira a outra ou à posição de pé da qual o protagonista comenta sobre as falas que ele mesmo fez em cada uma das cadeiras com a abreviatura do seu nome (não verdadeiro).

Dados coletados no ano 2005

Dados Grupo 1

Participante 1 Felipe

F: Terminado o estágio agora que eu estava em dúvida sobre o que eu ia fazer, acordando de manhã cedo assim... porque eu não queria perder um ritmo assim ... e surgiu um acordo lá em baixo que alguém está largando uma bolsa eei? não e? e vai me indicar para tomar o lugar dele... Então é o seguinte, ta. Então eu estava pensando assim... em quanto por um lado eu pensava [ele começa a montar a cena com as cadeiras, começa com solilóquio em uma das cadeiras] Por um lado eu penso o seguinte:

a) por um lado eu penso queee eu... seriam umas férias merecidas, poderia dormir um pouco... de manhã... poderia dormir mais um pouquinho... descansar...Mas por outro lado...

b) é que se eu parasse, (riso) eu não poderia começar de novo, acho que eu preciso manter um ritmo assim, que eu estava gostando de manter o ritmo... acordando mais cedo...me sentindo bastante útil...né?... eee... bom...

a) Mas também tal vez... começando agora com a bolsa teria que ir até agosto do semestre do ano que vem, e com o risco de pegar aquela época que tem dois estágios de trabalho escolar se sobrepondo, e faltaria um turno para me arriscar também essa bolsa, e então não seria muito ético, sei lá não sei como se chama isso, de minha parte para aquela pessoa que está me dando aquela bolsa...

b) ...mas por outro lado, acho que a pessoa que dá a bolsa é super acessível... para conversar com ela, apresentar o problema... que depois não vou poder ficar... tão comprometido com a bolsa e ver se teria como organizar de trabalhar um pouquinho mais antes... depois um pouquinho menos...o semestre que vem. Também tem a questão de que eu não apresentei ainda o artigo... a apresentação para uma cadeira do terceiro semestre, que a gente apresente algum artigo, paper né? para um Congresso, e eu não apresentei ainda, e essa seria uma boa oportunidade... fora que eu vou fazer também... ter um pouco de dinheiro para fazer outras coisas que eu quero fazer... viajar... dá para

fazer.... Aqui está o que eu deveria fazer. Eu penso que deveria pegar a bolsa porque eu preciso..... para não estar preocupado com o que eu estou preocupado, para não perder o ritmo me sentindo útil que eu gosto.

a) só que por outro lado, eu penso que de repente a partir do ano que vem eu já não vou conseguir seguir, manter esse ritmo e não seria jogar tão limpo assim com a pessoa, entende? ta...

Di: Poderias dar um nome a cada uma destas cadeiras?

F: Aqui a) Felipe Folgado... entende?... [ele pergunta para a coordenadora, que é estrangeira, se ela compreendeu o significado de “folgado”, e depois esclarece o sentido] folgado no sentido de relaxado...até demais.

F: Aqui b) seria Felipe Útil, Felipe Preocupado.

Participante 2 Catarina

C: É bem mais simples a minha. A situação... o dilema e ir ou não à festa... sábado agora. [ela pega uma cadeira]

a) Ta, do lado de cá... eu acho que eu tenho que ir para a festa porque...eu gosto de ir a festas... de ir todo o ano.

b) Eu acho que eu não deveria ir para a festa porque é muito longe, é em Gramado, e aí eu vou dirigindo...e.vou estar muito tempo dirigindo...voltar de noite...de manhã de madrugada... e aí vou ter bebido...(riso)

a) Mais nem mesmo assim ... eu não poder ir a uma festa que é só de vez em quando... e não poder também voltar e contar depois...

b) mas... ah mas também ta muito encima da hora para poder combinar com os colegas que já agora é sábado.

C: Esta aqui a) é a Catarina exposta. E esta b) é a preguiçosa.

Participante 3: Camila

C: O dilema é trancar ou não a faculdade, adiar ou não a formatura. Aí por um lado...

a) é bom adiar isso aí para ter um pouco de tempo para mim... porque eu tenho vontade de fazer outras coisas que eu quero fazer agora e que eu não posso só por causa da faculdade...eu já pensei e faz grande diferença porque seria fazer coisas afora que eu não posso porque eu estou trancada aqui com o curso.

b) por outro lado eu acho que se eu trancar a faculdade eu fico... sem saber muito que fazer... tenho que pensar alguma coisa...tenho que sair...para fazer alguma coisa tem que pedir para isso... e se eu adiar a faculdade eu vou ter que me formar com outra turma, e eu não gosto de outras turmas, eu gosto da minha turma, eu gosto de meus colegas, e eu não gosto dos que vêm depois. Eu tenho um sentimento de turma assim. Também é mais cômodo aqui, meus pais estão me sustentando aqui na faculdade está tudo certinho.

C: Aí eu tenho que decidir então se eu quero ficar acomodada, eu tenho que saber então se eu valorizo...esta é a dúvida mais forte se eu valorizo mais o que esperam de mim é também o que eu quero de mim ou se eu tranco e faço outra coisa que eu quero, eu tento fazer diferente da cômoda, o que esperam de mim...o que eu quero de mim...

Di: Aí existem varias vozes ou não? O exercício é só uma exploração, poderia haver várias ou uma somente. Se achares que há várias, tu podes usar varias cadeiras.

C: Não sei...aqui eu tenho a voz que diz para eu trancar o curso. Basicamente todas a vozes que eu tenho deste lado a) me dizem para eu trancar o curso e fazer outra coisa. Aqui tem uma voz...que diz [senta na cadeira a)]

a) que eu estou muito cômoda, que eu não estou aproveitando muita coisa da faculdade, tem uma voz que diz que eu estou simplesmente cursando e eu não estou... não estou aproveitando... e aí que mais... tem outras situações nesse momento que me forçam nessa posição... [interrupção da fala pela visível emoção]... sair de Porto Alegre...são coisas do momento assim... são coisas de agora, não é? São coisas bem pontuais que estão reforçando essa posição aqui, são coisas do momento de agora, esta posição neste momento não é tão cômoda assim.E aqui eu tenho uma certa segurança... eu estou mais segura aqui, num canto, na faculdade... queira ou não... também eu tenho os estágios aqui.

C: Aqui a) a comodidade é uma segurança.

Di: Podes tu falar para Camila ou que é melhor para ela?

C: Essa Camila aqui?... Aqui a) é uma comodidade, uma segurança.

a) Camila aqui tu tens possibilidades, tu tens coisas, tu tens teus colegas tu podes te formar com eles e tu gosta muito, tu valoriza muito a amizade, tu vai continuar com tua bolsa...e se tu trancar tu vai ter que buscar um emprego... aqui...aqui tu estás segura, (riso) aqui tu estás mais cômoda, estão te sustentando, tu pode te concentrar em outras coisas ir, tu podes ir cursando... quando tu puder, ir te abrindo oportunidades... fazer estágios... ta

b) mas essa segurança que tu quer... essa aqui... fazendo estágios, fazendo os cursos de psicologia que tu querias fazer... mas tu podes tentar, tu podes arriscar... sem... tu pode eee... tu pode fazer tua faculdade, tu podes fazer formação... pode... pode fazer depois... não é tão dramático assim! As pessoas fazem isso, trancam a faculdade. É o momento. Acho que é importante isso. Fazer o que tu queres fazer e não ficar esperando para depois, fazer o que tu queres fazer hoje, tu tens a vontade...

C: Esta b) é a Lilith⁵⁷

[Trata-se de uma personagem bíblica que fez parte de um exercício psicodramático durante uma sessão que teve lugar anteriormente]

a) Mas também tem coisas que eu não posso resolver agora... preciso tempo, preciso tempo...

b) se eu ficar aguardando por essa aqui... eu posso ficar muito tempo aguardando... porque eu estou nessa aqui, eu estou fazendo a faculdade, se eu ficar aguardando, eu não vou trancar a faculdade como essa aqui quer...

C: a questão é se essa aqui, como ela falou b) que eu tenho que decidir agora...

a) Mas eu tenho que esperar algumas coisas, não posso ir tão rápido, não posso, tenho que me preparar para fazer algumas coisas

C: Esta voz a) é a Segurança

Participante 3 Andréa

A: Minha duvida é se eu vou viajar um fim de semana sem meu namorado, ou ficar com ele toda a semana. Mas essa duvida já foi resolvida. Foi assim:

a) Por um lado eu estava com muita vontade de viajar, então eu queria ir.

b) Mas por outro lado meu namorado vai ficar sozinho, chateado se eu vou viajar e eu fico culpada.

a) Mas faz tempo que eu não viajo e ele vai entender é só um fim de semana.

A: Isso foi o que aconteceu. Eu fui à viagem. As vozes que intervieram eram: a que vai viajar é a desculpada, e a que está aqui e a culpada.

Di: Essas vozes estão presentes em outras discussões, ou só foi naquela vez?

⁵⁷ Jornada psicodramático dirigida por D. Bustos “Mitos e conocimientos sobre lo masculino y lo femenino”, ver resenha de Michel, 2002.

A: *Elas estão sempre.*

Participante 4 Santiago

S: *Bom. Eu além de estudar aqui, eu trabalho... então... eu trabalho... eu tenho uma carga horária semanal, e agora faz uns dois ou três anos eu entrei em outro lado a realizar uma prática, e na verdade eu estou de plantão, e às vezes eu trabalho três turnos e nas brechas disso aí é que eu consigo estudar. Então isso é uma coisa que vai e vem, né? Porque eu fico sabendo que eu estou atrasado então sempre penso de repente em largar essa parte prática, para me dedicar mais ao curso porque eu estou aqui de turista às vezes então...a) ... aqui é para ficar principalmente por causa do dinheiro, é uma grana boa e então o dinheiro é bom, isso dá um suporte para a família, é interessante e tudo...*

b) *E a parte para largar é porque eu...eeeh... sinto que não tou conseguindo ter uma formação profissional ee? No sentido de formar uma identidade de psicólogo... uma coisa assim.. por causa também do estágio que ocupa um tempo razoável... e que eu não tou, ainda não... consegui de uma maneira jogar com todas as variáveis...*

Di: *Essas duas vozes têm alguma característica que as diferencia, ou são os argumentos o que as distinguem?*

Pr: *Eu acho que a característica daquele ali [senta na cadeira]*

a) *...eu acho que a minha característica é um pouco mais de responsabilidade... tal vez...maduro... no sentido de tu planejar as coisas com cuidado por causa de que existem outras pessoas que estão na minha volta e que dependem de mim, eh?*

b) *E esse aqui...eu acho que ...ta...eu acho que é a questão da da... do desejo que diz um pouco mais quanto profissional, porque eu transitei por varias faculdades e na área de psicopatologia... e surgiu uma coisa que eu gosto e é interessante, então minha característica seria esse desejo de seguir essa profissão.*

Participante 6 Vanessa

V: *A situação é si eu tranco a faculdade ou não. Bom, tem vários pros e contras né?*

a) *Posso viajar, conhecer novas pessoas... expandir horizontes, outros pontos de vista, tudo diferente, mundos diferentes... seria conhecer lugares, e bom... seria um amadurecimento....*

b) *Tem um aspecto negativo que eu iria demorar mais em me formar, iria mudar de turma para outra turma que eu não conheço e eu poderia me arrepende feio disso porque eu sou... ligada às pessoas...*

a) *Pois é....aquela voz seria a livre, o positivo.*

Di: *e aquela seria o negativo?*

V: *Não... essa é mais... assim... são coisas de medo, são dois pólos assim.*

a) *Eu acho que é bom adiar a faculdade e viajar, realizar teu sonho, expandir horizontes, não ficar parada assim, ta... ir longe.*

b) *Eu acho que tu não deve viajar porque... tu podes fazer outras coisas, tu podes terminar tua faculdade de uma vez, terminar tuas coisas, bom.....tu podes fazer mestrado!*

Di: *Tu já tomaste a decisão?*

V: *Não.*

Participante 7 Gustavo

G: *Minha duvida é si atrasar mais um ano o curso...e em lugar de sete anos eu me formar em oito... eu não sei. Está é a voz do futuro (a) e a do presente (b) no planejamento.*

b) *Bom eu adiar mais um ano esse curso, poderia fazer mais um estágio de trabalho,*

poderia... sofreria menos no sentido de ter mais tempo para mim, para fazer coisas que me dão prazer em vez de estar com dois estágios... Eu acho que é mais um tema de não estar com o tema de ter que me formar logo e ter que levar o curso como tendo que concluir só e não aprofundar mais o conhecimento...daí o presente...

a) Bom se formar mais rápido implica abrir mão de uma serie de coisas para deixar um ter tempo para mim, sei lá... poder ler um livro, não só algo teórico, ter tempo para ler romances... domingo vou deixar mais tempo para minha família...e... daí ter mais tempo livre, e não vou estar estressado...

Pe: Mas só tem coisas positivas...não tens dúvida?

G: É poder estar mais com minha família depois de me formar essa aí (a) é o futuro. A razão está mais aí. Acho que a decisão já está tomada, já está na razão.

Participante 8 Fernanda

F: Minha duvida é si eu atraso a faculdade. Acho que vou precisar de mais cadeiras...aqui vai ser a parte do planejamento (a).

a) Eu acho que deveria atrasar.... porque eu queria fazer os estágios um em cada vez, para aproveitar de cada estágio e também alem das possibilidades de fazer um estágio de trabalho que pode ser xis, e poder fazer um trabalho de pesquisa que tu possas fazer ipsílon, para ter experiências diversas, um pouco mais variadas.... e... também por causa do estágio clínico que eu queria muito assim fazer.. mas eu acho que eu tenho que pensar muito bem para conhecer outras perspectivas...

b) Aqui está o problema do dinheiro. Hoje eu tenho uma bolsa que eu uso toda e incluso uso dinheiro de meus pais. Se eu ficasse mais um ano precisaria que meus pais me ajudassem por mais tempo e daí que recorro a isto aqui, não gostaria...a pesar de...a pesar de que eles aceitam mais do que eu mas...ta... mas... então estou pensando em possibilidades para conseguir o dinheiro sem precisar que meus pais me assistam.

a + b) Aqui está a possibilidade que eu queria mais mais mais, também pode ser uma outra fase do dinheiro, aqui o, [Ela coloca as pernas sobre a cadeira usada anteriormente] minha possibilidade idealizada do dinheiro seria se eu conseguisse um estágio de trabalho agora que fosse remunerado... eu até já tive propostas de fazer estágio social de trabalho não remunerado que eu estou adiando assim para aceitar, porque eu ainda estou buscando um estágio remunerado. Se eu conseguisse um estágio remunerado aí eu conseguiria atrasar.... mas...

b) Se eu não conseguisse um estágio remunerado aí que vai ficar mais difícil, aí é que eu penso que tal vez... tenha que abandonar a bolsa e pensar em outras coisas assim para conseguir o dinheiro, se o estágio fosse mais de mão de obra mesmo assim, entende? numa creche sabe? particular...

Di: Se eu entendi bem estas todas são possibilidades, é assim?

F: Sim

Di: Se tu conseguisses alguma destas possibilidades que aconteceria?

F: Se eu conseguisse isto aqui (b) eu conseguiria aquele meu desejo (a) [ela assinala a primeira cadeira].

[Pergunta: Então o desejo está claro, o problema são as possibilidades, tu não tens outra voz dentro do desejo]

F: Tenho... mais e bem, bem fraquinha. Está aqui oh!.... bem bem longe. (ela colhe uma cadeira e a leva para um canto da sala e senta-se nela). É uma voz que diz assim ô:

c) Ah... são cinco anos, depois tu tens possibilidades, tu tens que pensar no mestrado. Mais aí quando falo e quando eu digo assim, ah... em um ano tu vai estar no mestrado, tu pode fazer depois aí... eu já vou para lá (ela muda para a cadeira do desejo)

b) E aí eu digo para ela: mais aí em sexto ano quando tu estiver trabalhando com

outras coisas também além do estágio, tu não vai poder estar fazendo teu projeto de mestrado e iniciar o sétimo ano já com o projeto mais estruturado... tu não vai poder.

Participante 9 Juliana

J: Eu vou mexer nas cadeiras antes de começar. Minha dúvida veio logo... é si eu vou atrasar ou não... e isso veio agora porque...eee... principalmente na última aula escolar que a gente tem, eu estava pensando é si atrasar um ano o curso... e isso veio agora depois da última aula de escolar que a gente tem... Estava pensando em fazer o estágio de social, um estagio só né? Em vez do estagio escolar de trabalho mas aí conversando com o Felipe, que é nosso colega, e vendo assim... fazendo a gradezinha eu vi que não ia ficar tanto mais folgado quanto eu imaginava, que na verdade era uma... meio ilusão minha de que ia ficar mais folgada. Depois eu fui pensando no estágio de clínica que eu estou começando a gostar e acho que vou dedicar um tempo só para isso... então é assim. Essas são as duas vozes, (ela coloca duas cadeiras uma frente à outra) estão bem de frente assim... e nenhuma é mais forte do que a outra. Essa aqui (a) pode se chamar “um futuro incerto”, e essa aqui (b) pode se chamar “oportunidade”. Eu vou começar por um futuro incerto (Riso, se senta numa das cadeiras) Agora eu vou falar por essa aqui, porque se chama um futuro incerto, e eu vou falar porque talvez eu escolha esta.

a) Bom, como eu falava hoje com o Felipe, tem aqui a questão financeira... que meu pai me ajudou a me sustentar aqui... eu tenho uma bolsa também mais essa bolsa não ajuda muito porque de vez em quando ela não vem... só Deus sabe quando ela vem, e a gente não sabe quando ela vem de novo, e aí fica super complicado porque a cada dia que passa o curso está me demandando mais gastos... gasto com livros, gasto com coisas que eu quero... e é que aí fica complicado, porque eu preciso de dinheiro. Tenho coisas da minha família também que de uma forma ou de outra para eles seria bom que eu me formasse logo... então... esse é o medo do futuro incerto... esse é o melhor nome para essa voz... medo do futuro incerto. Atrasar o curso implica também de uma certa forma uma perda de turma, ou seja, eu vou passar a ter colegas da outra turma com quem esses dias eu estava conversando com uma delas e eu me dei conta de que na realidade eu conheço alguns de vista mais eu não sou amiga dessas pessoas então eu penso assim...aí eu gosto de fazer trabalho com fulano, eu gosto de fazer trabalho com fulano, como é que eu vou fazer si eu estou com outra turma. E...essa questão do trabalho mesmo, tipo.....eu...si eu ficar aqui... de aqui a pouco eu posso sair e conseguir um trabalho e de repente...bom...me formar logo, começar a trabalhar logo e começar a eu me sustentar eeemm.. outra coisa também ...

b) Bom... aqui são as oportunidades. Nas oportunidades eu vejo assim.....vou me formar em seis anos, que é o que isso me possibilita? Eu viajaria a Rio de Janeiro... eu continuaria com a bolsa se a bolsa permite....eu ficaria seis meses lá fazendo pesquisa lá com as pessoas ou.... estudando numa universidade onde tem muita gente renomada no Brasil que é de lá assim, Luis Antonio e... enfim... eu ia estar num grupo de pesquisa onde eu ia a ser a única pessoa da psicologia... tar com gente da farmácia, da medicina, da publicidade, enfim, um grupo que trabalha com saúde pública, que é uma coisa que eu adoro. Tenho a impressão de que eu vou poder fazer mais estágios, mais estágios no sentido de aproveitar também melhor, não somente um número maior, tu sabe? ... mais pesquisas.... que isso é uma coisa que me assusta bastante, eu quero fazer mais pesquisas... tem coisas que eu estou começando... tem uma que eu estou começando agora assim e que é uma coisa que me está dando muita tristeza, que se eu vou fazer mais estágios, eu vou ter que quadrar nela, e eu não queria. Fazer mais disciplinas seria fazer um monte e já tem uma que eu não sei se eu vou poder fazer por

causa disso e além disso tou pensando bastante... e menos correrias, ou seja, essas coisas de... agora tu está entregando um trabalho atrasado... corre para lá, corre para cá, uma reunião... lá... tal hora... estou atrasada e não sei o que... e isso para mim, é uma coisa que me incomoda bastante....mais viagens porque como eu ia continuar com a bolsa, que a bolsa permite, eu ia poder fazer todas as viagens, porque como eu vou ter menos cadeiras e menos compromissos e ia conseguir negociar melhor com os estágios e com as próprias disciplinas e fazer todas as viagens que a, ... que a bolsa me exige... não necessariamente de mim mais aí então eu vou poder fazer isso que é uma coisa que eu gosto. Também ia aproveitar mais das disciplinas. E a minha vida... né? que lá pelas tantas, no meio de tanta coisa se perdeu assim... coisa de ficar com um fim de semana livre para ti...ou assistir novelas entende? Sabe?

J: É isso! ... são as oportunidades.

a) Mas esta questão financeira é muito complicada assim, mas mesmo assim....

[A coordenadora faz a proposta que as duas falem para Juliana]

b) Olha Juliana, pensa o seguinte, por mais que tenha toda essa questão financeira e tal, tu podes pensar tu também em conseguir um estágio remunerado a pesar de ele não ser na área que tu vai trabalhar, tudo bem, eu entendo isso, mas é a possibilidade de tu poder aproveitar mais, tu agora achas que tu vai... mas tu não vai, tu vai perder isso... as cadeiras de políticas públicas... tu não vai poder fazer direito não... entende?...nesse sentido. Outra coisa, o internado no Rio de Janeiro, tu podes ir por mais um tempo, tu pode ir para lá... e tal... mesmo que saia a greve, ainda assim tu vai poder ir para lá, porque como estava pensando antes tu só ia poder ir, se não sair essa greve, mas assim tu vai poder ir no outro semestre. E além disso, tenta te lembrar das viagens que tu já fez, das coisas boas que tu já fez, e pensar se tu não vai querer repetir isso.... Obvio que tu vai querer...então? Como é que tu não vai pensar nisso, e continuar insistindo em ficar do lado do medo... em vez de ficar no meu lado.. .do lado das oportunidades?

J: Sempre que eu olho nas oportunidades, elas me fazem pensar que sim, que vale muito a pena... porque eu vejo muitas coisas, sabe? Porque se eu seguir as oportunidades, eu vou ter mais tempo para dedicar para as coisas que realmente importam na vida além das disciplinas... Não que as disciplinas não importem, mas elas são o básico, e o básico todo mundo tem, e o básico não vai me fazer um diferencial, e não vai me deixar muito mais feliz como essas coisas que as oportunidades me oferecem. Só que ainda assim....

a) É....as oportunidades são muito bonitas, só que tu tem que pensar o seguinte, elas são bonitas mas...e aí? Depois tu terminas teu curso, resolve terminar teu curso em seis anos e aí? Tua mãe perde seu emprego....que é uma possibilidade que existe, que tu sabe que existe, não tem garantia. O que é que vai acontecer? Tu sabe que teu pai já perdeu um dos avanços que ele tinha com a mudança do governo... mudam os cargos, o cargo dele mudou, o salário dele inclusive. Ta certo que não é uma coisa exagerada mas é possível... e aí?...pensa nisso. Tu tem que ver toda essa questão antes, tem que ver também todo o que eles estão sentindo em relação a isso. E outra, tu sabe que por mais que o curso normalmente te faça tu te perder um pouco dos teus amigos, já pela questão de não ter mais aula juntos, tu vai continuar perdendo... tu vai perder muito mais... muito mais porque tu vai te distanciar deles um ano. Tu vai estar fazendo tipo outros estágios, tu vai estar em um estágio atrasado, o estágio escolar por exemplo e eles já vão estar no estágio de trabalho... e aí? Tu lembrou disso?

J: Pois é! Eu sei que tem tudo isso.... Aí que estão as duas, o medo do futuro incerto, e as oportunidades estão muito presentes para mim. Eu tenho medo dessas coisas que nem o medo apontou, né? Que não dependem deles, dependem de um terceiro que não é nem um chefe...

Participante 10 Marlene

Minha dúvida já foi resolvida, mas foi assim que aconteceu.

[Ela se senta numa cadeira.]

M: Eu faço engenharia mas não gosto muito disso então, que eu vou fazer... que eu posso fazer dentro das engenharias ficar nessa ou ficar pelas outra coisa não faz diferença... eu gosto de cálculos mas... matemática...professora não vai dar certo não... que é que eu vou fazer? Que eu vou fazer?... Não sei... não sei.

a) Ta! Mas eu não agüento mais! Eu não agüento mais... eu não tenho mais prazer em estudar, eu não vejo objetivo nisso, eu não consigo me ver trabalhando nisso. (Ela explica que essa(a) é a satisfação total e a outra (b) é a razão).

b) Mas é o trabalho do futuro, então tem que continuar nisso. Tenho facilidade a pesar de não estar satisfeita... já tou no meio do curso... tenho que continuar... como é que eu vou adiar tudo?

a) Mas eu sou jovem... eu posso mudar... melhor mudar agora que mudar aos quarenta ou cinqüenta anos. Eu não vou conseguir trabalhar desse jeito...

b) Agora não dá, agora o tempo já passou... então ta...vou pensar alguma coisa que me dê algum retorno financeiro mas que não me estresse tanto, e vou aproveitar isso que eu tenho facilidade que é a matemática.

M: Ta! ...satisfação total...eu não agüentava mais ai eu comecei a pensar que é que eu poderia fazer... eu ainda gostava assim um pouco das exatas daí eu comecei a dar aulas particulares, resolvi... então ta, eu vou fazer um curso que me deixe light, que não me preocupe assim... tranqüila... e vou fazer ciências contáveis, que tem exatas ainda e é um curso bom para trabalhar e tem garantida... Realização profissional eu não quero nem saber! Então ta, encerrei o processo e comecei..

Dados Coletados em 2005

Grupo 2

Participante 11 Martina

Aquecimento específico: Estou pensando em meu quarto. Da minha janela vejo meus vizinhos, outro prédio igual ao meu, a sala, pessoas conversando. Do lado oposto tenho uma penteadeira que não tem espelho. Eu estou na cama, é de noite.

M: (Solilóquio) Eu penso que os problemas meus são específicos, peculiares... mas sei que isso não é verdade... que isso é bobagem...ficar pensando nisso!

Di: Aqui tem dois argumentos?

Pe: Parece que há uma Martina que pensa que seus problemas são exclusivos e outra que não. Será que podemos colocar duas cadeiras?

M: Que há duas Martinas?

Di: Se tu achas que são duas Martinas sim, se tu não achas então não.

M: Eu concordo (ela se refere à hipótese de sua colega).

Di: Então podemos retirar um pouco a cama para entrar no âmbito interno.

M: (coloca duas cadeiras uma ao lado da outra bastante distantes) Pode ser esta a mulher que acha que seus problemas são exclusivos (a) e essa não (b).

a) Eu ultimamente penso que ninguém vive as mesmas coisas do mesmo jeito...jeitos diferentes de viver por isso que me preocupo para ocultar os problemas...no caso... de relacionamento...mas todo mundo tem...todo mundo

Pe: Parece que todo mundo reclamasse à Martina que acha que seus problemas são exclusivos.

b) (Ri) Quando eu penso em todo mundo eu conto com minhas amigas, e elas falam das mesmas coisas que eu...que eu penso também, que eu...

a) ...mas eu acho que não, eu acho que tem coisas que só eu penso e...não sei...às vezes a dúvida é se eu vou continuar o relacionamento ou não é, se é bom para mim ou não. Nesse caso há um relacionamento em andamento que eu não sei se eu quero continuar ou não, deixa meio questão de se ahm...sabe... enquanto qual é a posição dos homens agora na minha vida... e outras coisas que eu estou descobrindo na minha análise... rever a relação com meu pai e as relações familiares que é uma coisa exclusiva minha que eu vejo que, pelo menos por enquanto... não consigo compartilhar isso com ninguém. Gosto de falar isso com minhas amigas...

Pe: Não consigo compartilhar, mas gosto de falar sobre isso com minhas amigas, é contraditório?

a) (explica que não, não é uma voz diferente por isso continua na mesma cadeira) Não, ai que ta. Eu digo compartilhar a vivência. Elas não vivem o que eu vivo, eu não consigo compartilhar: “ah eu também vivi isso”! entende? Elas podem ouvir, entender se impressionar e tal...ou ter a mesma sacada...elas não tem a mesma visão que eu sobre as coisas, que eu acho isso bom na verdade, cada uma tem sua visão.

Di: Com respeito da decisão...tu tens algo a dizer a partir de este lugar?

a) Eu acho que estou contra porque justamente estou numa fase mais introspectiva... é que eu me enxergo... parece que eu só consigo me enxergar mais quando eu não estou me relacionando...que eu não sei se é verdade...mas eu me sinto assim na verdade...como se estar com alguém me fosse a privar de certas descobertas minhas...assim sabe?

Di: Tu aqui estás contra então? Tem algum aspecto de ti que esteja a favor, não necessariamente a partir deste lugar? Na outra cadeira por exemplo?

a): Tal vez tem um pouco de cada uma nas duas. Tem meu lado que acha que eu tenho problemas específicos meus que é também um pouco a favor. Mais contra do que a favor...Mas tem outro lado....(muda de cadeira)

b) que acha que os problemas são de todo mundo...esse lado seria mais a favor do que o outro. No aspecto social...esta é a visão de que as pessoas têm problemas e que os relacionamentos são todos iguais... então ao final, se são todos iguais porquê não?...mais um, eh?...né?... não iguais assim os teus aos das outras pessoas...sei lá...uma posição de quem está com alguém é diretamente favorável...isso aí...é um ponto a favor. Mais é contra também, no aspecto de que as minhas amigas também não estão com alguém...a maioria delas.

Pe: Há alguma divisão entorno ao eixo a favor o em contra para saber que tira para um lado e para o outro?

M: (de pé) A favor seria um crescimento pessoal de experiência de relacionamento...com todos os benefícios que um relacionamento tem. O contra seria continuar na mesma situação e o outro a introspecção.

Pe: Podemos explorar as duas para ver se são aspectos distintos ou não.

M: São as amigas e o crescimento pessoal que é bom para mim agora. E aqui aumentar um pouco a minha experiência com os homens.

Di: Tu reconheces nesses duas possibilidades dois aspectos de ti?

M: Tu quer dizer eu assim eu assá? Acho que tem...por exemplo meu lado mais assim..por exemplo meu lado mais esperançado (coloca mais uma cadeira. Se propõe uma troca de papéis com a participante que está de pé e uma ego auxiliar toma o papel de Mariana).

c) O meu lado a favor: Eu acho que eu devo continuar com esse relacionamento porque eu acho que tem que tentar ser congruente com as coisas... tem que cumprir as coisas. A gente não tem que esperar tanto...aceitar...acho que isso vai ser bom para ti...viver as coisas novas ...e vai esquecer...esquecer coisas que agora, às vezes tu não consegue...

d) eu acho que não tem que continuar esse relacionamento porque na verdade tu é nova ainda, tu tem muito tempo ainda para pensar sobre coisas que tu está num momento bom teu...para viver sozinha..sozinha...tem tuas amigas.. tu está com elas...

Esse (d) é o aspecto independente, autônomo, aquele (c) é o realista esperançoso.

Participante 12 Letícia

Aquecimento específico: Eu estou num bar, estou pensando se há alguém ou se vai chegar ainda. Pode estar lá, ele está falando e eu estou pensando se vou continuar ou não... Esses argumentos dele eu já conheço e eu estou pensando se eu quero um compromisso. Ai que está a dúvida...

L: Coloca uma cadeira de frente ao lugar onde está o namorado Aqui (a) a Letícia que quer continuar. Coloca outra cadeira de costas à outra cadeira que não olha para o lugar onde está o namorado (b) é a que não quer.

a) É justamente por isso que eu falei antes que nos somos muito parecidos. É difícil encontrar uma pessoa tão parecida assim contigo...tu diz e tu não precisa completar a frase porque o outro sabe o que tu está dizendo... tu sabe que as outras pessoas ficariam em dúvida mas aquela pessoa está entendendo...e se tu não diz essa pessoa também está entendendo... bah! isso é difícil de achar...é uma coisa boa...

b) não continuar...seria porque precisa tempo para um compromisso...mas quanto tempo?...não adianta continuar esperando... tu não sabe quanto tempo tu vai continuar esperando...se tu vai continuar esperando o resto da vida? Pode ser bom...mas ai tu vai deixar de fazer o que realmente tu quer... Às vezes tu pode achar que tem alguém parecido contigo, que realmente...mas eu acho que isso não necessariamente acontece...e isso pode ser até um tipo de razoamento que tem essa pessoa...pode ser fazer parte dessa característica da pessoa...e tal vez não seja bom...

a) eu não consigo pensar mais nada além do que eu falei antes

Di: Tu estás ainda convencida do que tu falaste antes aqui nesta cadeira?

a) Sim. É muito bom ser parecido com alguém pelo seguinte: tem muitas coisas que ninguém entende...atitudes muito pessoais...e o fato de eu me sentir bastante solta com uma pessoa...isso é bom... também isso de não querer um compromisso pode ser um aspecto do mesmo que eu gosto...de repente não é algo para deixar assim quieto é uma coisa para continuar trabalhando.

Visualização:

a) Eu me imagino que aqui eu sou mais baixinha do que eu sou, mais cheinha e bah! que estranho isto!! eu gosto de cerveja... mas ela (Letícia) não gosta de cerveja!

b) Aqui...? sou uma pessoa bem prática...assim bem independente e racional...o preto no branco e tudo claro assim...ee...não sei porque mas sou mais alta que ela (Letícia) e muito mais organizada...

Poderias dar um nome para cada uma?

L: Não...é mais uma imagem o que tenho...

Participante 13 Grace

Aquecimento específico: Eu estou em Gramado num lugar muito verde sentada pensando...

G: (solilóquio) uma dúvida assim...grande que eu tenho...com muitas possibilidades é em que área eu vou trabalhar porque tem muitas coisas que eu gosto em psicologia e...na verdade...eu estou com a expectativa de depois de eu contar com um estágio ter um pouco mais de clareza assim... porque ai eu vou experimentar mais eh...assim que eu já vi e me interessei é trabalhei com orientação profissional...já acompanhei um pouco as cadeiras e praticas no SOP...também poderia trabalhar na clínica...psicologia

educacional...hospitalar... (coloca quatro cadeiras)

a) A vantagem da orientação profissional lê que...ehm...primeiro que eu acho um trabalho super importante...uma escolha profissional que vai determinar muito o rumo que vai seguir na vida...só um momento de decisão assim...enquanto a isso a vantagem é que tu não lida... com sofrimento...acho que na psicologia se lida com um sofrimento muito grande assim, muito... com uma perda de um familiar...com uma dor muito forte sabe? e eu acho que trabalhando em orientação profissional...ehm...não entra tanto em contato com sofrimento assim...tem menos do trabalho com o sofrimento como pode aparecer na clínica...seria um trabalho mais light...(se senta em outra cadeira)

b) mas eu tenho medo de não poder aprofundar o trabalho de uma forma mais longa, de não poder aprofundar o trabalho...

Di: Existem aspectos teus que te levam a apoiar uma ou outra das alternativas?

G: Existem. Uma seria o desejo de encarar o sofrimento seria o enfrentamento...e a outra o bem-estar.

Di: As outras cadeiras são alternativas possibilidades externas ou também representam aspectos de ti? Poderíamos explorar isso?

G: Também tem ...

c) Aah...(suspiro)...a psicologia hospitalar...ehm...a vantagem e que tu está no meio...tu convive com profissionais...tu aprende muito....também com estagiários...tu vai estar ali no momento em que as pessoas vão precisar muito de ti...tu vai ser muito útil e...mmm...

G: Ali está a forte... porque ela tem uma estrutura forte para lidar com a morte o câncer.

d) Também a forte estaria na clínica mas seria diferente, eu vejo mais esse forte na hospitalar para agüentar o sofrimento.... o problema que estão te trazendo o outro da clínica seria mais saber manter uma postura ser uma pessoa confiável.

a) A partir do aspecto de enfrentamento eu escolheria qualquer possibilidade porque todas precisam...

b) A partir do bem-estar acho que tiraria a hospitalar.

c) aqui forte ...acho que todas

Di: Parece que enfrentamento e forte estivessem juntas...

G: Estão juntas...é que também é contraditório porque tu está enfrentando ou tu é forte e tu não tem bem-estar assim...tu tem que passar por isso...

Di: Tu dirias que essas três características (enfrentamento, forte, bem-estar)...são aspectos mais ou menos constantes... estamos tentando saber se existe, assim como existem discussões externas nas quais alguém afirma e outro nega, queremos saber se existe um debate interno entre aspectos das pessoas ou não.

G: Sempre tem o debate pelas características serem opostas assim..vou me...eu vou agüentar o sofrimento.... ou quero ficar no bem-estar, no tranqüilo.

Participante 14 Florência

Aquecimento específico: Estou na praia, em Punta, ali está a água, ali a areia...é o por do sol...a praia é mansa...eu estou sentada numa pedra...com uma blusa e abaixo biquíni rosa...a blusa é vermelha...oh..quê vergonha tão chamativa!...

F: (solilóquio) Minha dúvida é se eu vou trabalhar com crianças ou com adultos.

a) Eu penso trabalhar com crianças para fazer um trabalho de prevenção, trabalhar com o sofrimento na hora e com o desenvolvimento...e como eu gosto muito de crianças...ver sofrer e não fazer um trabalho seria muito preocupante...(coloca outra cadeira)

b) mas como eu gosto muito de criança seria muito ruim chegar uma

criança...um...psicótica ou esquizofrênica...uma criança com um problema sério...de repente eu não conseguir fazer o trabalho...melhorar...emm...seria bem frustrante assim... (coloca outra cadeira)

c) então tou pensando em trabalhar com adultos...ne?...que eu gosto... mais ai também eh...não sei..entrariam mais questões de dinheiro ai também eu acho....se eu trabalhar com consultório...com adultos....seria importante também fazer uma análise...trabalhando com pessoas no consultório ..acho que...na clínica, né? acho que....tem implicações...

Di: As três cadeiras são três alternativas?

F: Sim trabalhar com crianças, não trabalhar com crianças e trabalhar com adultos.

Di: O que te leva a te inclinar por uma ou outra das alternativas? Podes desenvolver mais os argumentos para apoiar cada uma das alternativas, tomando o lugar de cada cadeira. (Se propõe uma troca de papéis com a L.

a) Ah...eu acho que tu tens que trabalhar com crianças porque tu gosta muito delas e tens que conseguir ajudar elas de alguma forma...trabalhar para elas quando estão com algum sofrimento...com algum problema...acho que a frustração faz parte do trabalho...se não estiveram ali também vai ter...então não é contigo...tem várias formas de trabalhar...pode fazer coisas que elas gostam...grupoterapia.

F: O problema é bem o negocio da escolha mesmo, tem que largar alguma coisa para...eh...também está a possibilidade de trabalhar com crianças e adultos...

Di: Essa possibilidade não temos né?

F: Não temos... (coloca mais uma cadeira)

d) Para trabalhar com criança ela vai deixar de lado trabalhar com adultos...eh...de repente há a possibilidade de trabalhar com as duas formas assim...seria uma coisa que eu gostaria de aprofundar...mais parece...trabalhar com crianças e adultos que seria algo superficial.

b) Aqui estou pensando na clínica não que eu tenha certeza...

F: Se é assim, não está resolvido estão todas estas possibilidades.

Di. Tu achas que essas possibilidades representadas por essas quatro cadeiras, correspondem a aspectos diferentes de ti.

F: Acho que sim. Essa ai é o sofrimento, essa aqui é seriedade, aquela li acho que é superficialidade e essa aqui é completude

Participante 15 Laura

Aquecimento específico: É em Gramado, tem a grama bem bonita, tudo em volta, e em volta mais longe tem árvores mas para lá. Ai tem flores amarelas parecidas com margaritas. É de tarde às 4. Eu estou sentada na grama vestida com calça e uma camiseta...

L:(solilóquio) ...pois é!...hoje eu gosto...mais o menos eu já sei as coisas que eu gosto...mas que vou fazer depois que vou estar formada...mais o menos eu acho que já estou encaminhada...já achei o que mais eu gosto...só que eu tenho medos...não sei...do mercado. Se eu vou fazer um mestrado aqui...de repente ir a São Paulo...será que será interessante primeiro ter a prática...

Di: Vamos colocar uma cadeira para cada uma das alternativas.

a) aqui vou fazer neuropsicologia, uma especialização, continuaria estudando aqui no sul...na UFRGS... ou então...de repente iria a São Paulo...uma pasantia onde essa área é mais forte ou de repente Canadá...

Pe: Na área tu não tem dúvida. A duvida está no que fazer?

L: Sim, o então justamente em meus medos.

Pe: Colocamos uma cadeira para os medos?

b) Os medos um pouco são porque essa área não é muito forte aqui no sul ainda e o que me interessa que faz sentido nessa área é a parte de reabilitação cognitiva que não tem aqui mas que é muito legal e eu tenho medo de não ficar...acho que ela tem que ir buscar lá no Canadá.

Pe: Tu não tens medo disso de ir para o Canadá. Tu está falando do lugar do medo?

b) Se o medo não tem medo?

Pe: Se tem algum medo de ir para o Canadá?

b) Sim, também está a questão de não querer sair do país...de repente. Se ela está angustiada de repente o melhor é ir para São Paulo. Acho que é bom ir para São Paulo. Eu tenho uma tia que mora lá, aí seria um apoio...e tem profissionais competentes...não tem que estudar outro idioma e Canadá seja tal vez um passo muito grande.

c) Eu acho que seria bom ir para o Canadá porque lá vai encontrar serviços de ponta, conseguir vir para aça e ser uma profissional muito boa e... que mais?...sim, eu acho que vou ter uma grande carreira.

a) Acho que também é bom ficar...aqui tem pesquisa nessa área.

Di: Aqui tem varias cadeiras que são escolhas, e tem outra que é um aspecto teu que é o medo. Eu te pergunto se tu dirias que alguma das escolhas tem a ver com outros aspectos teus?

L: Sim.

Di: Poderias então assim como ela se chama medo, dar um nome para as outras?

L: A da Canadá é...deixa eu ver...é...vencer na vida...sabe?; a de São Paulo..acho que também... mas ali seria uma intenção mais forte... aqui é satisfação pessoal.

Pe: E aquela ali não tem nome?

L: É conforto.

Participante 16 Magdalena

Aquecimento específico: Caminhando pelo centro de Poá, é verão...faz calor...

M: (solilóquio) Para me formar faltam mais 5 anos mas posso me formar em mais...(coloca duas cadeiras frente a frente.) Essa para 6 anos (a) e esta outra para 5 anos (b) (vira a cadeira um pouco para um lado para não ficar as duas face a face).

b) Eu me formaria em cinco para começar a trabalhar, para começar a pensar em outras coisas mais principalmente para começar a trabalhar logo...sair de casa.

a) eu acho que eu me formaria em seis anos para estudar mais as coisa que eu gosto...eh...para ter mais tempo alem do estudo atividades extras... fazer coisas de lazer.

Di: São essas diferentes tendências em ti?

M: Sim, assim...

b) se eu me formar em cinco anos o trabalho vai proporcionar o que eu espero

a) se eu me formar em seis tenho mas o tempo de lazer...ir mais ao cinema...fazer mais relações com as coisas que eu vivo...com as coisas que eu estudo...em...estudar línguas...estudar filosofia. O curso passa muito rápido então em 6 anos poderia...

Di: São elas aspectos mais ou menos constantes em ti.

M: São. Ela (b) é mais organizada e ela (a) é mais relaxada. Mais não no sentido de suja, é mais no sentido de relaxed em inglês.

Grupo 3

Participante 17 Gabriel

G: Eu quero decidir se ir para minha cidade no fim de semana ou se ficar aqui

a) *Eu deveria ir para minha cidade porque lá eu teria mais possibilidades afetivas, mas gente que conheço, tem família, mais possibilidades de me relacionar com as pessoas e a minha casa lá é maior. Se eu for eu vou poder estudar lá com mais paz e minha casa lá é maior, é bem maior vou poder me relacionar com mais pessoas, tem mais conhecidos meus e...mmm...mm... isso...vou poder fazer tudo isso. Acho que lá é um lugar ideal*

Di: *Falando daqui surge algo diferente?*

G: *Sim, também teria argumentos bons para não ir*

b) *Olha eu acho que eu não iria porque é muito caro, a viagem é muito cara e eu vou acabar não podendo descansar porque o fim de semana o único momento para descansar eu vou ir lá, e vou ir visitando várias pessoas e ficando aqui eu vou poder descansar e vou estudar porque vou descansar sem culpa, lá eu vou ficar culpado se eu descansar porque lá eu tenho que estudar é eu acho que deveria ficar porque nesse caso eu vou, eu vou descansar e não vou ficar preocupado que eu tenho que visitar meus parentes e tem tudo o transtorno de ir e voltar.*

a) *Eu acho que tenho que ir para G... porque aqui os relacionamentos são muito poucos, a casa é muito limitada, o espaço físico e o espaço afetivo, lá é a oportunidade que se tem para abrir as opções, e a família também, e a família é uma relação que se tem que tem que ser reativada de vez em quando, além de estudar os fins de semana. Ir para G seria ir para descansar sem culpa.*

b) *Eu acho que não deveria ir porque ele, (assinala o espaço onde estava parado o Pr na frente entre as duas cadeiras), que sou eu, está comprometido esse ano com a faculdade e a faculdade exige que ele estude e deve ficar aqui até terminar as tarefas, ... tem uma equipe de pesquisa que ele está vinculado e não precisa descansar. Mesmo se quisesse descansar pode ficar aqui que vai ser mais efetivo porque não tem esse compromisso de viagem, não tem o tempo da viagem, não tem que gastar, pode ficar estudando, descansando sem culpa nenhuma porque estando lá invariavelmente vai ter que se comprometer com todo mundo e não poder estudar, ou seja, tem que ficar aqui para estudar e essa coisa do vínculo pode ser postergada para outro momento e ver a família.*

G: *(Vai para o lugar no meio e olha para os lados).*

Di: *Qual tem razão?*

G: *Ele (b) tem razão.*

Di: *Será porque foi a última em falar, se tu te sentas na outra cadeira (a) tu pensas em argumentos para refutar aquilo?*

G: *Não sei... (vai para a cadeira a)*

a) *Eu acho que não, eu acho que tem cinco anos de estudo e que nesses cinco anos de estudo essas coisas podem ser retomadas porque estudo não é sistemático, pode ser cumulativo o que tu não estudou hoje tu pode estudar amanhã, eu acho que é importante esse vínculo, essa construção do social e do afetivo pode contribuir de boa parte também para o estudo.*

Di: *Tu achas que tu tens razão?*

a) *Acho que sim.*

G: *Eu tenho agora um argumento contra. Vou para lá.*

b) *Olha eu acho que o Gabriel está comprometido com um estudo maior, ele quer estudar no exterior e se ele não se comprometer com um estudo mais sistemático assim, e deixar de lado o lado afetivo se preocupar mais com a questão do trabalho e dos resultados ele vai ficar gastando o tempo com bobagens.*

G: *E agora...?*

Di: *Tu achas que eles são aspectos teus?*

G: *Eu acho que esse (b) é o lado racional e esse (a) é o romântico. Mas... eu acho que ao final de contas ele também é romântico. A diferença é que esse aqui (b) acha que ao final do processo ele vai colher tudo e esse aqui (a) acha que não que os frutos estão pelos lugares que é tudo mais cíclico... Esse acha que o tempo é mais sistemático e que ao final das contas vai colher, esse outro acha que o tempo é mais... eh...cíclico assim não sei.*

Espelho:

G: *O Lucas (outro participante) poderia ser o (a) que podemos chamar de João e eu...acho...que a Sara (pesquisadora colaboradora) que tem cara de cientista poderia ser o lado racional (b).*

Di: *Poderias descrever como são cada um deles visualmente.*

G: *O João é uma pessoa visualmente insignificante acho que o tamanho dele é médio. Esse aqui (b) é mais alto, esse sim se ocupa do visual. O outro (a) não, ele pode estar com um visual horroroso e não se importar.*

(G se senta em cada cadeira para mostrar aos ego-auxiliares como pensa cada um dos lados)

a) *Eu sou uma pessoa que acha que é importante sim a questão da afetividade a questão do que é além do estudo, que é uma construção que tem muitas coisas envolvidas nisso...que a vida é muito mais de que simplesmente academia e o Gabriel também acredita que a família tem importância...sacraliza a família, sacraliza os rituais e a questão dos símbolos, o significado que as coisas tem e importante para mim e eu dificilmente abriria mão disso...*

b) *Eu acho que isso tudo é uma bobagem, eu estou dentro de um projeto maior que é meu estudo e eu acho que isso todo tem uma importância final que eu acho que abriria mão de tudo isso que esse outro falou em nome de essa causa final, essa busca por um super cargo, ou um super diploma...hiper-salário pra quem sabe depois buscar ...depois os rituais e símbolos e tudo mais e eu não abriria mão dessa causa maior em nome dos ícones e dos símbolos.*

G: *Agora eles falam entre eles... eu acho que sim... são só eles...não tem mais espaço na cabeça...eles falam juntos e muito rápido um e outro/ um e outro/ (faz movimentos de batimento de uma mão contra a outra rapidamente)...em pé inclusive.*

a) *(faz um movimento de cabeça para baixo)*

G: *(fala para os ego-auxiliares) Ele não tem vergonha, ele sabe o que vai falar, os dois sabem, ele precisa se mostrar durão mais ele é romântico.*

(Diálogo bem rápido entre os ego auxiliares nos papéis de a e b)

G: *Acho que ele (b) está vencendo a discussão e não é tão assim, vamos colocar um outro ego-auxiliar porque ao final ele (a) vai dar um jeito de comprar a passagem, esse é o argumento dele.*

(Continua o diálogo rápido entre os ego-auxiliares que defende argumentos contrários)

G: *Sim, é assim mesmo. São duas vozes distintas. Aquele ali (a) é o idealista e esse aqui (b) é realista e prático. Visualmente eu acho que esse (a) é um ridículo. Aquele (b) não aquele é uma pessoa que se for ridícula vai ser por pouco tempo assim.*

Participante 18 Lucas

L: *Eu pensei primeiro uma coisa e depois veio outra coisa a minha cabeça...*

L:(solilóquio) *Ta, a minha questão é a seguinte: gostar de alguém e fazer sexo com alguém para mim são coisas muito diferentes... só que eu tenho um lado romântico que diz que não que as coisas podem caminhar juntas e tenho um lado mais realista que me diz assim: não, eu nunca vou conseguir casar porque eu nunca vou conseguir estar com*

uma pessoa só...eh..eu ache que posso gostar sim de alguém...por um tempo e... mais mesmo assim...a questão sexual vai estar sempre presente. Mas meu outro lado....

Di: Vamos encenar isso.

G: Bom, a questão é essa: amor e sexo.

(Procura duas cadeiras para cada um que coloca frente a frente a do sexo (a) fica colocada de lado ao lugar na frente da sala onde L estava fazendo o solilóquio e a do amor (b) frente a cadeira (a) com uma leve inclinação para o lado da frente de onde falou L antes)

L: Esse (b) vai ser o Lucas que diz assim....não...esse é meu lado romântico vai disser...ehm...

b) Tal vez o fato de eu não acreditar nessas duas coisas caminhando juntas é uma proteção minha entende?... tipo...amor e sexo...gostar de alguém e ficar um tempo assim...família...esse é um ideal que não existe porque eu não tenho isso hoje...e por isso que eu não acredito, então se isso existe eu preciso ir atrás, entende? E aquele Lucas... que na verdade quer isso mais não sabe se é possível acreditar nisso...não sabe se isso é possível porque se isso não é possível melhor não sei...porque na verdade ele quer a família, quer tudo aí encaixadinho, bonitinho romântico sabe... Eu quero!

L: Eu gostaria que Martin (escolhido como ego-auxiliar) fosse o sexo.

a) Esse aspecto aqui (cadeira b) esse Lucas eu acho que não existe porque eu ...eu acho que isso não... que ele não existe... esse romantismo assim, eu acho que sexo é sexo e gostar de alguém é gostar de alguém. Tu pode gostar de alguém e estar envolvido emocionalmente com alguém e a questão sexual totalmente separado...sim...eu acredito... é que teria que existir alguém para justificar porquê eu acredito nisso é porque ele acredita naquilo. Porque eu tenho esses dois mais também tenho...eu tenho explicações para dizer porque que eu acredito nisso e entendeu?... porquê que ele acredita naquilo.

Di: Neste momento acho que tu não estás falando de esta cadeira. Tu saíste?

L: (retorna para o lugar central onde fez o solilóquio inicial de pé) E. Na verdade eu sou esse aqui...eu sou a mistura desses dois e sou quem entende porque ele acredita nisso e o outro no outro.

Di: Então são três os lugares?

L: Eu sou três na verdade porque o eu aqui sou o que entende porquê cada um pensa o que pensa. Entendeu?

Pe: Podemos ver um pouco mais desses dois?

b) Eu acredito que é possível... duas pessoas se gostarem, ficarem juntas e terem o desejo...serem cúmplices na vida romântica...na vida sexual, etc....eu acredito.

a) Eu não acredito porque eu acho que as coisas são separadas porque acho que sexo...a gente tem necessidade de...de... tem uma coisa de variedade...de coisas novas...de...até porque coisas novas despertam em...talvez...um ato selvagem no sexo que para mim é forte. E aquele lado romântico amortece essa selvageria do sexo e o lado mais animal do sexo desaparece...eh...desse lado...eu acho essa característica do sexo muito importante.

b) E esse aqui vai dizer assim: È possível gostar de alguém e não perder isso, esse dizer que para manter o romantismo...da ...mais agora eu vou ali.

Espelho:

L: Ai eu vou ser eu...vou ser eu ai. E eu vejo um lado enigmático sabe e Sara tem algo enigmático... e o Gabriel é um romântico. E Martín...ta eu quero que tu vá lá e Sara também, para ser o lado (a), esse lado é que defende que sexo e gostar de alguém são super separados. Eu gostaria que Sara estivesse parada e defendesse uma posição que diz que o sexo também tem um relacionamento, ele vai dizer que as coisas são

separadas porque não podem ir juntas e tu vai tentar contra-arrestar a posição de Martin e vai dizer que o sexo também tem uma coisa relacionar e o Martin vai ser o lado mais só carnal. E Sara o lado carnal mais sensível e aquele lá (b) puramente romântico ele pode dar argumentos para no futuro poder ter uma casa com cachorros, filhos...etc. ...eh...

b) Aqui eu sou aquele que perdeu a coisa de ir a festas que está mais voltado para a casa que consegue ficar nos fins de semana com a família, ir ao shopping. A mim agrada isso aqui, mais agora sentado aqui achei que não me agrada. Eu penso que esse lado aqui pode vencer se eu penso no futuro. Se esse lado (a) vencer, que vai ser desse aqui no futuro?

(os ego-auxiliares representam o diálogo e o Pr. observa e intervém dando indicações)

Pe: Tu não tens que nos dirigir, tu tens que escolher teu lugar. Qual é teu lugar?

L: Mais o problema é esse.

Pe: Ai que tá, ele pode ver os dois lados discutindo.

L: Sim, eu quero ver os dois lados discutindo.

(a discussão entre os ego-auxiliares continua)

L: Esse é meu argumento forte, o lado carnal sensível (se refere a um argumento dado por um dos ego-auxiliares no papel (a))

Comentários finais:

L: Quando eu penso com essa cabeça (a) eu vejo as coisas aqui... o argumento que a Sara expressou é um argumento forte para mim, a verdadeira relação de intimidade quando tem um relacionamento aberto é um argumento forte quando eu penso que a gente já viveu um relacionamento que foi legal. E ai eu, Lucas penso: será que eu não deixo aparecer esse lado para me defender porque eu acho que tal vez não vou viver de novo isso, a verdade é essa.

(continua o diálogo entre os ego-auxiliares)

L: Ahhh!!! Não, Não!!! Esse troço!! De aqui é possível, de ali não.

Participante 19 Martín

Aquecimento específico: Posso combinar com ele uma cena anterior? Eu sou eu, e o Lucas é minha mãe, ta? A gente está em casa e meu pai está viajando... de repente falta luz e vamos buscar os fósforos. (os dois participantes recorrem o espaço procurando alguma coisa).

Martín: Mãe pega a vela!... mas papá levou o isqueiro para a viagem e não tem isqueiro.

Mãe: E aqui no fogão? Não tem nenhum isqueiro?

Martín: Não, não tem isqueiro. Não tem isqueiro.

Martín: E eu penso... (solilóquio) eu tenho isqueiro mais eu não posso falar para ela. Eu poderia ascender a vela. E minha dúvida é se dizer que eu tenho isqueiro. E ela pergunta, não tem isqueiro? Ela não sabe. E a gente está no escuro e eu não posso dizer que eu tenho isqueiro senão ela vai saber que eu fumo. Na verdade eu não digo porque ela me perguntaria: porquê tem isqueiro Martin? Minha dúvida é: digo?

(coloca duas cadeiras face a face)

M: Eu acho que esse aqui (a) é Martin criança, que ainda faz coisas escondido e que tem medo de punição, que acha que não tem...responsabilidade... que não se acha capaz de assumir o que ele faz... ele não tem coragem...

a) Eu não tenho coragem de falar para meus pais que eu fumo...apesar deles fumarem os dois, eles nunca aprovariam que eu fumasse...e...e..não é só de meus pais que eu me escondo, também de minha namorada que também não deixa eu fumar porque eu fumo escondido e...mas...

M: Esse aqui (b) acha que:

b) Não!! Eu fumo!! Eu já tenho xx anos. Eu fumo e.... Meu!! eu escolhi fumar! E eu não devo nada para ninguém. Eu escolhi fumar e ninguém vai poder ficar me proibindo fumar. Muito menos meus pais que fumam!! Fumaram desde adolescentes. E minha namorada vai ficar me limitando, não é para que minha namorada me repreve, que diga que é que eu posso fazer...que eu abandone as coisas que eu gosto...

M: E esse Martin aqui, não sabe quê fazer se se esconde ou se fica revoltado....

a) Eu não quero causar desgosto a meus pais, não quero que fiquem tristes, eu sempre quis mostrar o melhor de mim. Eu não quero perder minha namorada por causa disso eu não quero sofrer...eu não quero que o cigarro me traga sofrimento. Eu gosto de fumar mas eu gosto de minha namorada. Quero ter as duas coisas, eu quero fumar e quero que minha mãe deixe eu fumar e minha namorada deixe eu fumar. E eu quero não me sentir culpado por fumar e não ter que lavar as mãos e os dentes a toda hora.

Pe: Mas tu está na escuridão; o dilema é tu poder fazer alguma coisas mas tu não fazes, é isso?

M: Eh! Esse (b) quer contar, ele contaria.

Pe: E tu ficar na escuridão é ruim?

b) É que não tem necessidade, si tem isqueiro. Eu quero contar, é ele que não quer, ele tem medo, ele acha que está fazendo tudo errado, mas na verdade não, ele fuma assim como uma compulsão, é assim, como seus pais... Ele tem que contar.

Di: Tu podes falar isso para Martin? (Martin escolhe um ego-auxiliar)

b) Tu adora fumar e tu fuma desde...sei lá...desde o colégio... e tu acha o máximo o prazer da nicotina de segurar um cigarro e depois a visão tem coisa melhor que segurar um cigarro, e então porque tu não abre o jogo e tu te expõe do jeito que tu é realmente para de querer ter essa máscara de bonzinho que não faz nada errado. Porque as pessoas não podem gostar de ti assim.

M: Sim, eh! Ele tem razão, toda a razão, mas o outro tem medo, ele não quer...

a) Eu acho que eles tem que me aceitar do jeito que eu sou, mas não me aceitam, se eu digo para minha namorada: “olha aqui, eu fumo e eu vou continuar fumando independente do que tu ta achando...ela não quer um namorado fumante. Não é que eu quero uma namorada que me aceite fumando ou não, e que ela é minha namorada e eu quero minha namorada. Ai que ta, eu me escondo e faço o bonzinho, “eu não fumo”....ai largo ela na casa e vou direto para casa a fumar no banheiro, sabe? escondido dela e de minha mãe, e fumo sempre, fumo todo o dia independente de quantas vezes eu prometo: “não! esta semana vou deixar de fumar”...prometo sabendo que eu não vou parar.

Espelho:

b) (Lucas como ego-auxiliar⁵⁸) eu acho que se eu vencer, que se este lado vencer eu tiro de mim Martin um monte de outras culpas entende? Sei lá, eu acho que essa questão num tempo ela...eu acho que esse padrão vai se estender para outros tipos de relação, para outras circunstâncias com outras pessoas. Entende? Esse padrão pode estar materializado na questão do cigarro, namorada, mãe e pai, mas é um valor que pode se estender para outro tipo de circunstância. Então no futuro eu posso enganar porque eu tenho medo de não ser aceito como eu sou então vou seguir enganando porque as pessoas sempre vão pensar em Martin que enganou um dia porque fumava e assim de aqui a dez anos.

⁵⁸ Em geral as falas dos ego-auxiliares não foram transcritas. Trata-se aqui de uma exceção que responde ao fato do ego-auxiliar ter introduzido uma modificação considerável no discurso do protagonista que foi aceita por ele como uma elaboração de seu próprio discurso nesse papel.

Pr: Como quebrar esse padrão?

b) (Inversão de papéis: Martin toma o papel de b e Lucas repete a pergunta) Assumindo perder a quem tu gosta.

Pr: Por achar que essa pessoa que eu gosto não gosta de mim sendo quem eu realmente sou que seria o Martin fumante e o Martin que tem medo, eu acho que não vou achar alguém que goste de mim...sei lá...e fumando e fazendo o que eu quero e que gosto...tenho medo, medo de perder a quem eu gosto e não conseguir mais ninguém... por isso a posição radical.

a) Acho que vale a pena se esconder porque tu consegue preservar a quem gosta de ti e tu consegue preservar a parte essa que continua fumando quando não está quem tu gosta e tu pode fazer o que tu quer a toda hora.

b) Eu acho que se eu me impor eu vou estar correndo o risco de perder essas pessoas e de dizer assim: “bem, gostem de mim como eu sou e aí eu estou sujeito a demorar a achar quem goste de mim...”

M: e sofrer!...

b) E sofrer por isso. Mas essa questão ainda mais do momento em que eu tenho um relacionamento muito mais aberto com alguém eu tenho que dar a liberdade para esse alguém e será que eu sou capaz de dar essa liberdade?

M: Não, não sou...

b) Acho que a questão é essa eu não posso ter liberdade porque eu não posso dar liberdade, porque eu não posso lidar com essa liberdade.

M: Bahhh! É isso, é egoísta, mas é uma coisa egoísta, eu quero...é um lado egoísta meu que quer fumar porque na verdade eu fumo e não importa... é insegurança

b) É verdade, eu quero liberdade mas ao mesmo tempo não consigo dar liberdade então eu acho que por eu não dar liberdade que eu sou tão...isso me faz sentir mal e querer transgredir, só que isso me causa muita angustia porque tou transgredindo...enganando e eu não consigo... Por isso para ter a liberdade, para poder assumir essa posição aqui eu vou ter que ser mais aberto.

Pe: Eu acho que essa é uma terceira cadeira.

Pe: Sim acho que esse é um Martin síntese dos dois: um lado romântico, um lado libertino mais maduro e tal vez mais realista e aqui está o conflito, aqui está a briga: eu acho que as pessoas tem que ser autênticas abertas, só que eu tenho medo enquanto esse aqui faz as coisas às escondidas.

M: E não tem outra são duas...até porquê se eu quiser realmente essa liberdade verdadeira eu vou ter que dar essa liberdade só que eu não quero dar essa liberdade então eu escondo a verdadeira, entende? eu tenho medo além de perder ela eu tenho medo de dar liberdade para ela...eu sei.... digo só um cigarro...

ANEXO C
Análise triádica dos discursos dos participantes

	Primeiridade (Qualidade) Uma ideia ou sonho sem nenhum particular isto ou aquilo. (CP 1.341) Matriz de identidade indiferenciada-Primeiro universo Papéis psicossomáticos	Secundidade. (Binaridade) Entre as formas que a binaridade assume estão as dúvidas que são forçadas sobre nossa mente. (CP 2.84) Brecha entre fantasia e realidade Papéis sociais		Terceiridade. (Mediação) Tendência geral, regra a ser realizada em eventos futuros. (CP 1.26) Segundo universo (como se) Papéis psicodramáticos
1	Hedonismo calmo. Cadência pausada da fala. Qualidade de descansar. Ritmo ágil, gestos faciais rápidos. Manter ritmo.	Vontade de parar e ter férias merecidas	Ter que manter o ritmo acordando cedo	Felipe folgado Felipe útil, preocupado
2	Hedonismo Festivo. Tom animado com sorrisos.	Vontade de ir à festa em Gramado o fim de semana	Não deveria ir é muito longe vou ter bebido	Catarina exposta Catarina preguiçosa
3	Autonomia. Mudanças de cadeira com ar decidido. Idéia de ter tempo para fazer coisas que gosto.	Vontade de trancar o curso, valorizo o que quero de mim	Dever de continuar, valorizo o que esperam de mim	Lilith Conforto e segurança
4	Liberdade. Tom de voz forte. Culpa. Tom fraco.	Vontade de viajar	O namorado vai ficar sozinho.	Desculpada Culpada
5	Sonho de uma identidade de psicólogo. Posição corporal solta. Movimentos leves Maturidade. Posições corporais firmes	Vontade de largar o trabalho e me dedicar ao curso.	Vontade de dar um suporte para a família	Desejo de seguir a profissão O maduro, responsável e considerado
6	Amadurecimento. Idéia de viajar e conhecer pessoas, expandir horizontes, conhecer mundos diferentes, lugares.	Vontade de trancar a faculdade	Vontade de continuar medo a me arrepender,	A livre A ligada às pessoas
7	Postura corporal erecta em relação ao futuro. Pernas estendidas, disponibilidade de tempo	Adiar a graduação e aprofundar o conhecimento	Vontade de deixar tempo para a família no futuro	O presente O futuro (a razão)
8	Variedade. Diversidade de experiências Muitas palavras uma trás outra Palavras estendidas nas vocáís, cadeira muito distante	Atrasar a faculdade para fazer diferentes estágios, clínico, de trabalho	Dever de pensar no mestrado	Planejamento e determinação Voz fraquinha

9	Relaxamento. Ilusão de vida folgada. Tom animado. Juvenil. Medo. Voz baixa, tom de voz adulto materno ou paterno.	Vontade de fazer estágio em Rio, pesquisa, conhecer pessoas renomeadas, aproveitar a vida	Não querer se expor a risco financeiro, pai desocupado, medo de perder amigos.	As oportunidades O medo do futuro incerto
10	Satisfação. Gestos soltos e leves. Prazer Realização. Hombros carregadas.	Vontade de mudar, ainda sou jovem, não agüento mais nesta carreira	Dever de continuar com o caminho escolhido, não há tempo para mudar.	Satisfação total Realização Profissional
11	Independência, Autonomia. Fala reflexive, gestos lentos. Esperanza Corpo mais solto.	Acredito que é bom para mim não continuar o relacionamento para viver a fase introspectiva	Acredito que é bom continuar com o relacionamento, não esperar tanto, aceitar.	Lado independente, autônomo Lado realista, esperançoso
12	Afinidade. Gosto por relação entre pessoas parecidas. Tom alegre e ágil. Praticidade. Movimentos pausados.	Continuar o relacionamento porque é difícil achar alguém tão parecido a ti	Não continuar porque não é bom,	Baixinha, cheinha, gosto de cerveja. Pessoa prática, alta, organizada, o preto no branco.
13	Tom lento, movimentos cuidados. associados ao enfrentamento. Rostro com sorriso, miradas cumprices com o público, bem-estar.	Vontade de trabalhar em psicologia hospitalar ou clínica	Vontade de fazer orientação profissional, um trabalho light, não lidar com sofrimento grande	O enfrentamento O bem-estar o tranqüilo
14	Ar reflexive, concentrado, sério. Ar de satisfação associado a completude.	Quero trabalhar com crianças em prevenção para estar ali quando o sofrimento começa o em psicoterapia grupal.	Não quero a preocupação de ver sofrer crianças. Posso trabalhar com adultos Posso trabalhar com adultos e crianças.	Completude Sofrimento Seriidade Superficialidade
15	Variedade. Múltiplas possibilidades.	Especialização em neuropsicologia, ir para São Paulo para uma passantia, ir para Canadá aprender tecnologia de ponta.	Medo de não ter trabalho, de deixar mina cidade, de aprender nova língua.	Vencer na vida e realização pessoal Conforto e medo
16	Vitalidade, cadência rítmica e andar decidido.	Vontade de me formar em seis, de ter tempo de lazer, de aprofundar, estudar línguas, filosofia.	Vontade de me formar em cinco anos, de trabalhar logo, de sair de casa.	Relaxada, não no sentido de suja senão de "relaxed" em inglês. Organizada.

17	Afeto, miradas aos olhos dos outros participantes. Fala amigável que faz contato. Razão, rosto vivaz e bem humorado.	Vontade de ir a X, tenho mais relacionamentos, paz. Eu sacralizo a família e os rituais.	Vontade de ficar para estudar sem culpa. Tenho um compromisso maior de virar um superprofissional.	<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="1139 190 1490 309">Romântico, idealista, visualmente insignificante. João, altura media</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1139 309 1490 376">Racional, prático, alto, causa final super-cargo</td> </tr> </table>	Romântico, idealista, visualmente insignificante. João, altura media	Racional, prático, alto, causa final super-cargo
Romântico, idealista, visualmente insignificante. João, altura media						
Racional, prático, alto, causa final super-cargo						
18	Romantismo, saídas rápidas da posição especial. Carnal, imgen de confortabilidade.	Quero ter uma família. Acredito em amor e sexo caminhando juntos. Pessoas podem ser cúmplices na vida sexual e afetiva	Isso não existe. Sexo e amor estão totalmente separados. Sexo tem selvageria que o romantismo apaga	<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="1139 577 1490 611">Romântico puro</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1139 611 1490 645">Carnal puro e carnal sensitivo</td> </tr> </table>	Romântico puro	Carnal puro e carnal sensitivo
Romântico puro						
Carnal puro e carnal sensitivo						
19	Liberdade, tom desafiante, cabeça alta. Corpo e movimentos constrangidos.	Eu fumo. Eu tenho 18 anos Meu!! Eu escolhi fumar, eu não devo nada para ninguém.	Eu não tenho coragem para dizer que eu fumo	<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="1139 784 1490 817">Fumador</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="1139 817 1490 851">Criança</td> </tr> </table>	Fumador	Criança
Fumador						
Criança						

ANEXO D

Identities particulares emergentes de papéis psicodramáticos complementários

Identities particulares emergentes de papéis associados a personagens de tipo idealistas	Identities particulares Papeis emergentes de papéis associados a personagens de tipo prático
Folgado, ético (relaxado até demais)	Útil, preocupado
Exposta	Preguiçosa
Lilith	Comodidade e Segurança
A desculpada	A culpada
Desejo de seguir a profissão	Maduro no sentido de responsável
A livre e positiva	A ligada às pessoas
O presente	O futuro
Planejamento e determinação	Voz fraquinha
Oportunidades	Medo do futuro incerto
Satisfação total	Realização profissional
Aspecto independente e autônomo	Aspecto realista esperançoso
Pessoa baixinha, cheinha, gosta cerveja	Pessoa prática, o preto no branco, alta e organizada
A forte, o enfrentamento	O bem-estar, o tranquilo
Completude	Sufrimento, seriedade, superficialidade
Vencer na vida e satisfação pessoal	Conforto
Relaxada no sentido de “relaxed”	Organizada
Romântico, idealista, visualmente insignificante, sacraliza família	Racional, prático, organizado, em busca de projeto final, super-cargo, hiper-salário
Romântico puro	Carnal puro e carnal sensitivo
Fumador	Criança